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Private Welfare in the Welfare State: Recent U.S. Patterns

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Loyola University of Chicago

This paper examines recent trends in American philanthropy and relates these to changes in the composition and size of both the private and public welfare sectors in the United States. The findings reveal that private welfare has been overwhelmed—but not replaced—by the growth in public welfare. Although private welfare maintains some of its traditional functions, it has become more closely linked to and in some cases dependent on public welfare. Consequently, there have been significant changes in the institutional character and organizational format and operations of private welfare. These transformations of the American welfare system are interpreted within the mass society perspective.

Private philanthropy in the United States has a long and celebrated history of fending off governmental intrusion far better than most European nations.[1] The reasons for this are complex, but the most important is the profound ambiguity and controversy surrounding public welfare.[2] Although extensive public welfare programs now exist, private philanthropy remains in place but in an unusual, hybrid system: public welfare increasingly dominates private philanthropy in expenditures, in organizational control, and in normative goals. Despite this general public dominance, private philanthropy still approximates some of its traditional goals of citizen involvement and program specialization.

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Four points are emphasized in this analysis. First, the expansion of public welfare not only eclipsed private philanthropy but also partially incorporated the private sector into the mandated public programs. Second, the "partnership" between public and private welfare contributed to shifting the concern of private welfare from need to that of quality of life. Third, the growth of public welfare and the internal dynamics of private welfare organizations have made private philanthropy more bureaucratic and professional in operation. Finally, the organizational format, presence of public funding, and pressures from the wider society have imposed universalistic standards on private philanthropy.

For those concerned about the traditional role of private philanthropy, these findings suggest that private welfare is assuming the same organizational form and objectives as public welfare. Thus, there is a danger that private philanthropy may no longer be recognized as different from public welfare. As a result, donors may no longer consider it to be innovative or view it as an instrument to benefit special groups. This could discourage giving to private philanthropy and move the United States toward the European pattern of almost complete reliance on public welfare. However, this argument is easily overstated. Our findings suggest a reduced role for genuinely private philanthropy independent of governmental or centralized control. However, a segment of private philanthropy still fulfills the traditional function Americans expect of it. As in so many studies of social change, the pattern is not one of complete replacement of one institution with another but rather of selective decline and modification of the former as the latter comes to dominate.

Funding Patterns in Welfare

The changing role of private philanthropy is reflected in overall welfare funding and expenditure patterns. There has been a dramatic increase in public expenditures for welfare purposes: the total expenditures in 1978 were almost one hundred times greater than in 1930 (table 1). Public spending has also grown considerably faster than the overall economy (col. 6), from 4.5 percent of the GNP in 1930 to about 19 percent currently. When economic growth and population increase are taken into account, a twelvefold increase in real dollar public welfare expenditures is revealed between 1930 and 1978. Only during World War II was there a decline in the relative growth of public welfare spending.

The greatest increase in public spending occurred after 1970 as federal expenditures grew rapidly. Programs which experienced the most

Table 1

WELFARE OUTLAYS—PRIVATE AND PUBLIC EXPENDITURES, 1930–1978

	TOTAL PRIVATE WELFARE EXPENDITURES				TOTAL PUBLIC WELFARE EXPENDITURES		
YEAR	$ Mill (1)	% GNP (2)	Per Capita GNP Adj (3)	Welfare* per Capita GNP Adj (4)	$ Mill (5)	% GNP (6)	Per Capita, GNP Adj ($) (7)
1930	1,474	1.6	54.65	6.19	4,085	4.5	151.43
1935	969	1.3	40.22	4.99	6,548	9.1	271.88
1940	1,212	1.2	46.56	5.76	8,795	8.8	337.88
1945	2,611	1.2	69.59	17.99	9,205	4.3	245.34
1950	4,429	1.6	80.49	12.46	23,508	8.2	427.39
1955	6,751	1.7	99.35	12.50	32,640	8.2	480.31
1960	9,996	2.0	120.48	13.31	52,293	10.4	630.30
1965	13,468	2.0	140.62	13.95	77,175	11.3	805.81
1970	18,052	1.8	146.61	16.64	145,893	14.9	1,184.88
1975†	(29,700)	(1.9)	(166.93)	(17.42)	(290,064)	(19.9)	(1,630.31)
1978†	(40,100)	(1.9)	(181.05)	(18.56)	(394,462)	(19.3)	(1,810.51)

NOTE.—In cols. 3, 4 and 7, the figures have been adjusted to 1978 constant dollars, using implicit GNP deflators.

SOURCES.—1930–70 figures are taken from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical History of the United States from Colonial Times to the Present* (New York: Basic Books, 1976), p. 359; 1975 and 1978 figures are from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1980* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980).

* Welfare and Other Services, excluding expenditures for religion, education, health and hospitals, civics, culture, etc.

† 1975 and 1978 figures are not directly comparable to previous figures.

rapid growth included public education (until 1971) and social insurance (fig. 1). Public aid and health expenditures accelerated after 1965 reflecting more liberal welfare policies, the War on Poverty, and the implementation of Medicare and Medicaid. Although gross public welfare expenditures leveled off after 1976, the data reflect consistent growth in public welfare spending between 1950 and the late 1970s, with the exception of veterans' programs.[3] Private expenditures for welfare also increased after 1950 and remained roughly equivalent to total state and local government welfare expenditures. Although private welfare accounts for a significant proportion of all welfare expenditures, its share has declined because of the rapid increase in federal expenditures.

There are significant differences in the kinds of services for which private and public welfare expenditures are used. Most private expenditures go to health; only a small proportion is allotted to "welfare."[4]

FIG. 1.—Welfare expenditures as % GNP by source of funds and type of expenditures, 1950–78. Sources: Alma W. McMillan and Ann Kallman Bixby, "Social Welfare Expenditures, Fiscal Year 1978," *Social Security Bulletin* 43 (May 1980): 3–18; Alfred M. Skolnik and Sophie R. Dales, "Social Welfare Expenditures, Fiscal Year 1976," *Social Security Bulletin* 40 (January 1977): 3–20.

and other services (fig 2). Furthermore, these latter types of expenditure declined slightly over time In sharp contrast, public expenditures go primarily to social insurance and public education (fig 1) By 1976 public expenditures accounted for more than 85 percent of expenditures on income maintenance, total education, and "welfare" and other services (fig 3) Public expenditures also constitute a small but growing proportion of higher education The public role in "welfare" services has increased dramatically since 1960, while its role in income maintenance declined overall

The declining public share in income maintenance since 1950 may surprise many observers who have noted the tremendous increase in public expenditures in such programs and the preference of private welfare organizations for providing services and benefits-in-kind rather than cash payments However, the trends reflect the fact that private income maintenance payments include private pensions and other insurance benefits, such as health, disability, and union unemployment Benefits from these private insurance programs have more than kept up with the growth in public income maintenance programs between 1950 and 1970 Overall, private welfare programs continued to grow after 1970 but not as fast as public programs

FIG 2 —Private welfare expenditures as % GNP, by type of expenditure, 1950–78 Sources same as fig 1

FIG. 3.—Public welfare expenditures as % total welfare expenditures, 1950–78. Sources same as fig. 1

Much of the growth in private welfare expenditures reflects the extension of work-related fringe benefits. Such programs contribute to the general welfare, and their growth is important, though not well understood. Philanthropy is not easily distinguished from fringe benefits, but the theoretical separation of the two is important. Fringe benefits generally result from employer-employee negotiations and provide a special form of wage compensation that is not taxable. The primary beneficiaries of these progams tend to be the better-organized, higher-income workers and their families. In contrast, philanthropic welfare efforts in principle are aimed at "needy"[5] populations who do not pay the full costs of services provided them, and neither the contributors nor managers are direct beneficiaries.[6]

While fringe benefits are important to the well-being of an individual, they are also important to the public and private welfare agencies providing such services. Service fees and philanthropic donations are two important sources of income for welfare agencies. Because of the peculiar nature of philanthropic donations and their traditional and

distinctive importance for private welfare agencies, it is useful to examine trends in American philanthropy before discussing the implications of trends in other funding sources for agency operations.

Trends in Philanthropic Spending

Information on philanthropic activities comes from such a variety of sources that a comprehensive perspective on private welfare and its relationships to public welfare is not easily obtained. There are primarily three types of data: (1) donor data consisting of estimates developed from Internal Revenue Service data,[7] (2) recipient data obtained from various surveys of nonprofit organizations,[8] and (3) a few special surveys of philanthropic organizations including data on both sources of income and allocation of expenditures.[9]

These data indicate that there has been some growth in philanthropic activities, but not nearly as much as in public welfare or as in total private welfare expenditures from all sources. About $10 billion were donated to nonprofit organizations in 1978, a tripling of per capita donations (adjusted for inflation) since 1930 (table 1). Recipient data show similar growth trends. However, secular trends may account for at least part of the observed growth: data from recipient organizations have become more complete in recent years, and the increase in personal income, extension of income tax obligations to lower-income groups, and corresponding increase in the use of itemized deductions have increased reported donations.[10] Nevertheless, it appears that private philanthropy has increased substantially during the past forty-five years.

For recent years, it is possible to adjust the data to indicate more clearly the growth (or decline) in the relative economic position of private philanthropy by use of special economic deflators. These adjustments are desirable because the cost indexes for the types of services provided by philanthropic organizations have increased faster than the overall inflation rate, especially for parochial schools, education, and health. Ralph Nelson computed special philanthropic deflators for the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs.[11] When these deflators are combined with measures of population change, the growth in private philanthropy is extremely modest between 1960 and 1972, from $51.53 per capita for current operations and construction in 1960, to a high of $59.10 in 1967, down to $57.06 in 1972 (in constant 1960 dollars), or an overall gain of less than 10 percent during the twelve-year period.[12]

Similar conclusions are reached when the growth in private philanthropy is compared with overall economic growth between 1930 and

1978. The philanthropic share of the economic product increased afte 1940 but has declined since the early 1960s. Its current share is onl slightly above that for 1930 (table 1).[13] For 1960–70, adjustments usin the special philanthropic deflators indicate a noticeable decline in bot philanthropic fund flows and economic product (see fig. 4).

The distribution of donors and allocations.—Historically, about hal of all philanthropic funds have gone to religious organizations (fig. 5). This share declined between 1955 and 1978 as support for parochia schools fell because of the declining birthrate, suburbanization of the white population, and increasing costs of lay teachers. The fastest growing philanthropic area has been civics and culture (to about 26 percent of recipient funds), followed by health and hospitals (to about 15 percent). These gains may reflect increases in personal income and the tendency of private donors, especially new donors, to invest in quality of life activities likely to be to their personal benefit. In con-

FIG. 4.—Philanthropic donations in constant (1960) philanthropic dollars as % GNP, by type of recipient organization, 1960–72. Sources: Ralph Nelson, "Private Giving in the American Economy, 1960–1972," in *Giving in America*, Vol. 1, pt. 1, *History, Trends and Current Magnitudes*, ed. Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Treasury, 1977), pp. 121, 123, 125, 132.

FIG. 5.—Philanthropic donations as % GNP by type of recipient organization 1930–79. Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical History of the United States from Colonial Times to the Present* (New York: Basic Books, 1976), and *Statistical Abstracts of the United States 1980* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980). Figures for period before 1970 are not directly comparable to figures after that date.

trast, strict "welfare" activities peaked at 25 percent of total recipient funds during World War II, primarily because of war-related relief efforts, but has remained at 10 percent since 1955. Some areas of donation which have grown or have at least been able to maintain themselves (civics and culture, health, "welfare," education) have also experienced significant government involvement during the same period. Consequently, government has not replaced private philanthropy in these areas but has overwhelmed it, and private philanthropy retains its relatively important place in the welfare state.

About 80 percent of all philanthropic funds currently come from individual "living donors,"[14] down slightly from 83 percent in 1950, but above the 1970 figure of 70 percent (fig. 6). How these funds are obtained from the living donors is unclear, whether from door-to-door or street-corner solicitation, United Way[15] or other federated fund-

FIG. 6.—Philanthropic donations as % GNP by type of donor 1929–79. Sources: same as fig. 5. Figures for period before 1970 are not directly comparable to figures after that date.

raising campaigns, mail solicitations, special benefit events, or direct spontaneous contributions. Considerable efforts are expended by each nonprofit organization to obtain its share of personal contributions, and fund raising has become an increasingly professional[16] and expensive part of philanthropic life.

Until recently, individual contributions to philanthropic organizations have grown more slowly than other types of donations, especially bequests and foundation support, which each accounted for about 8 percent of total donations in 1978. Support from foundations grew most between 1950 and 1970, a period when the number and assets of foundations increased sharply.[17] More important, individual donations have not kept up with capacity for donations: personal giving as a percent of personal income has been declining since 1960.[18]

One explanation for the lower level of donations made by individuals in recent years, despite higher personal incomes, is that there is

some timelag between an individual obtaining the higher income and developing a stable practice of a higher level of charitable donation. However, in the opinion of Morgan, Dye, and Hybels,[19] there are indications that the giving pattern may never fully catch up with the increase in income. Recent increases in the size of the standard tax deduction have reduced incentives for donations, as may the new tax laws which took effect in October of 1981. But the possibility for deducting charitable donations for those who do not itemize, also implemented in 1981, may partially offset these disincentives for donations. These observations gain significance when viewed in conjuction with the growth in public welfare and raise the issue of whether private philanthropic efforts have fallen off not simply because of reduced tax incentives but because public efforts simultaneously have become so large and visible that private welfare efforts appear less necessary. The response of philanthropic donors to cuts in public social programs and simultaneous changes in tax incentives for charitable donations may provide a test of this argument.[20]

The Context of Mass Society

The question of whether public welfare has grown so much that it is endangering the basis for private philanthropy is central to any assessment of the implications of the trends in private philanthropy. Cogent answers cannot be developed from an examination of trends in philanthropic donations alone. They must be placed in an organizational and macrosociological context. Like other modern societies, the United States has experienced a significant change in scale and complexity—from a loose collection of local communities to a highly integrated mass society. The concept of mass society, as used here, refers to a society where central belief systems and common associational forms are shared by large sections of the population and result in a sense of common identity and mutual responsibility.[21] Furthermore, the mass society is one in which the center, or the national elite, includes a relatively wide selection of the population, where the distance between the center and the periphery is diminished, and where there are close interactions between the center and the periphery.[22]

This transformation has been associated with increasing concerns with equality reflected in the extension of citizenship in all its forms, civil, political, and social. The drive toward broad citizenship rights is related to concerns with the values of fairness or fulfillment of obligations by central institutions vis-à-vis individual members of society. Correspondingly, attempts have been made to deal with social prob-

lems on a formalized and increasing scale. Government has initiated sponsored most of the efforts, using mixed bureaucratic and profe sional organizations

The integration of the mass society is reflected not only in the growt of government but also in the extent to which other institutions hav become dependent on and linked to each other and to governmen There are thus three components to these changes in the relationshi among welfare institutions (1) integration (expansion, centralizatior and coordination) of private welfare institutions, (2) integration (ex pansion, centralization, and coordination) of public welfare institu tions, and (3) linkages, more and stronger, between private and publi welfare institutions

Integration of Welfare Institutions

Before World War I, both private and public welfare institutions were generally small-scale, local undertakings with parochial concerns Often, private philanthropic organizations were seen as more important and desirable for dealing with social problems than were public welfare attempts The latter were more likely to be seen as an aid of last resort, to be used when other avenues had been exhausted [23]

A major development in the integration of private welfare came around the 1880s with the establishment of various charity organization societies (Buffalo, 1877) to coordinate the activities of charitable groups, prevent overlap of activities, and avoid inefficiency That tradition was continued by social service exchanges in most communities. In turn, social service exchanges evolved into welfare councils, often cooperating closely with the local United Way and increasingly focusing on general welfare planning The number of exchange-type agencies increased until the late 1930s and then began to decline as the nature of agency relationships changed [24] Beginning in the 1930s, professional social work became increasingly preoccupied with psychiatric treatment,[25] and private welfare agencies emphasized counseling rather than provision of basic needs Thus, duplication of services was less problematic, and the narrow functions of the exchange as it was originally designed was less central

It was partly for these reasons that welfare councils, emphasizing welfare planning, began to emerge as the social service exchanges saw their usefulness decline The development of specific mechanisms for coordinating welfare services in particular communities often focused on specific sectors of welfare, such as health or services to the aged.[26] Many of these attempts at coordination were initiated by welfare councils, and most were sponsored by federated fund-raising organizations

Others have been financed in part or completely by public funds. Welfare councils in particular have been successful in enlarging their scopes and promoting themselves as planning agencies for new and existing services. Although attempts at coordination have not been spectacularly successful,[27] they have been the subject of several studies on the importance of coordinating interdependent agencies.[28]

A second development took place with the establishment of Red Feather, Community Chest, or United Way fund-raising agencies (Denver, 1887; Cleveland, 1910). These were also umbrella organizations, but their functions were to coordinate fund-raising activities in a given community. Such organizations became numerous and important after World War I and subsequently have formed a national organization to set guidelines, train fund-raisers, and publish reports on contributions. The continued scarcity of funding for private welfare agencies makes these types of coordinating agencies increasingly important.

Also important has been the establishment of large private foundations around the turn of the century.[29] Foundations increasingly provide funding to special welfare projects and agencies not directly administered by them. Many provide funding to agencies and projects outside their own geographic areas, and some now use professional foundation managers to make funding decisions.[30] Often such decisions are made on the basis of formal evaluations of proposals competing for funding. The establishment of the Foundation Center and similar information clearinghouses testifies to the growing competition for foundation grants by nonprofit organizations and the need for foundations to coordinate their activities. Several congressional investigations have also encouraged foundations to streamline their operations in recent years.

These trends represent a movement on both the local and national levels toward the integration of private philanthropy. Similarly, a number of social service agencies have formed their own national organizations, such as the Family Service Association of America, to coordinate the activities of agencies, collect operating statistics, and in general provide various types of support. Also, an increasing number of charitable organizations themselves are national in scope, such as the Red Cross and the Salvation Army. Both the Community Chest movement and the increasing use of private national foundations solved certain problems for the private charity organizations, especially those of stability and security of funding.[31] Trend data described earlier suggest that such coordinating mechanisms have become particularly critical because of the relative decline in resources available to philanthropic organizations.

Integration of public welfare has also occurred. Around 1900 it was transformed from an organization of a local community-wide basis to a

more integrated and centralized system of welfare with responsibili for coordination and organization at the state level. Such coordinat began with the establishment of state boards to investigate the cor tions of almshouses beginning in the 1840s and 1850s and contin with the enactment of various state welfare programs. It was not ur the 1930s that the welfare system became integrated at the federal lev This is most evident in the provisions of the Social Security Act of 1' and especially in the structure of the social security system (OASDH which is a federal welfare program. Since then, the role of the feder government vis-à-vis state and local governments has been growir and in recent years several genuinely national public assistance schem have been seriously considered and partially implemented (Suppl mental Security Income).

Relationship between Public and Private Welfar

Until the 1960s there were only limited direct relationships betwee private and public welfare institutions. In fact, the rules and regula tions of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration specifically stat ed that federal emergency relief grants had to be administered by publi agencies. Although several states apparently had agreements with pri vate agencies to administer some public funds, this practice was dis couraged by the federal government after 1933.[32] Furthermore, private welfare agencies often were less than enthusiastic about the kind of assistance provided by public welfare agencies. In spite of such misgiv- ings, there have been well-established links between public and private welfare institutions for a considerable period of time. Accounts of wel- fare during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries reveal numer- ous links—especially among local, but also state, governmental units and certain private charitable organizations.[33] Usually such public- private links consisted of lump-sum grants from government to specific private charitable organizations in special circumstances[34] or relatively short-term contractual agreements between a private welfare organiza- tion and local government to provide special services at low cost to the public authorities.[35] Such contracts were most numerous in the area of institutional care.

The federal government supported private philanthropic institutions more than 150 years ago,[36] although reluctantly and for purposes linked to education or natural disasters. Except for brief periods during the Civil War and the two world wars, the federal government only recently established continuing financial relationships with private welfare organizations.

The introduction of social services in public assistance (1956, 1962), the War on Poverty (1965), and the 1973 Amendment to the Social Security Act (Title XX) transformed the relationship between private and public welfare. The two became directly linked when the social services to which public welfare recipients were entitled could be provided by private agencies. Under the Community Action Programs, as well as under Title XX, considerable direct government funding became available to private agencies to provide social services, community organization, and other benefits to people who were not recipients of welfare as well. Although similar links existed in the past, the relationship between public and private welfare developed in the last twenty-five years is far more extensive and permanent.

Unfortunately, there are very limited data to document the claim that private and public welfare have become more integrated over time. Clearly, legislative developments encouraged such a movement. Thus, a 1977 review of 182 federal income maintenance programs[37] indicates that about one-quarter of these programs have provisions for making grants to or purchasing services from private organizations (profit or nonprofit). If twenty-eight Internal Revenue Service exclusion-of-income programs are eliminated, these hybrid programs constitute about one-third of federal welfare programs—40 percent, if medical programs are excluded as well. This does not include all hybrid programs which are purely state and local in origin. An examination of such state-enacted programs (excluding state and local versions of federal programs) reveals that the twenty-five states with the largest welfare expenditures operated a total of 633 welfare programs in 1977.[38] Of these programs, about 20 percent had provisions for making grants to or purchasing services from private organizations. If tax relief programs are excluded, about 25 percent of state welfare programs were of a hybrid nature—a proportion increasing to 31 percent if medical programs are excluded, and to 35 percent if grants to higher educational institutions are excluded as well.

Many of the programs included in the above studies[39] are not welfare programs as usually defined. Concentrating only on health, education, and welfare, a survey by the United Way of Metropolitan Chicago[40] found that 53 percent of state, local, and federal programs in the Chicago area had provisions for purchasing services from or making grants (formula or special projects grants) to nonprofit or for-profit agencies. There are thus numerous welfare programs which have the legislative capacity to involve government transfer of funds to private organizations.

Evidence that public authorities do make use of such legislative provisions is also available. For the first six months of 1976, the cost of social services under Title XX, IV-B, and IV-A C of the Social Security Act amounted to about $1.1 billion, about 30 percent of which was used

for the purchase of services from private vendors.[11] This was substa-
tially more than the amount of services purchased from other pub-
service agencies (19 percent). There is considerable variation among t
states in the degree to which they purchase services from private ve-
dors, ranging from a high of 69 percent in New Hampshire to none
Iowa and North Carolina.

Purchase of services from private vendors is significantly related
the services provided. Day care is purchased predominantly from pr-
vate vendors (58–64 percent, depending on the type of day care pr-
vided), while 50 percent of recreational services, 42 percent of famil
planning services, 32 percent of placement services and residential ca
and treatment, and 27 percent of employment services are purchase
from private vendors.[12] In contrast only 11 percent of counseling and
percent of case management services are purchased from private ven-
dors nationwide.

While such statistics indicate the extent to which public welfar
institutions rely on private welfare agencies for performance of certai
legislative mandates, it does not necessarily follow that all privat
agencies have come to rely on government sources of income. It i
possible that some agencies have specialized in providing services fo
public agencies. Unfortunately, there have been few studies examining
the extent to which private welfare institutions receive public funding
and even fewer studies of the changes over time in public sources of
funding for particular types of agencies.

One of these studies involves a 1972 sample of privately controlled institutions.[13] The study found that 29 percent of all income came from government, and the percentage was even higher (34 percent) if religious institutions were excluded. Government sources are particularly important in health (43 percent of income), which is also the area in which government spends most of its funds (68 percent). Philanthropic giving is most important for education and "other" institutions (31–32 percent), while fees are particularly crucial to health (47 percent of income) and education (56 percent). One additional finding from this study was that large organizations or foundations in terms of assets are less dependent on contributions, gifts, dues, and assessments as sources of income.

More detailed studies of philanthropic agencies in four cities (Cleveland, Hartford, Atlanta, and Des Moines) are also available.[14] Although there are significant differences among the four cities, the findings support the conclusion that government is a major source of funding for many philanthropic agencies, especially those providing health and social services. There also appears to have been a movement away from private toward public support over a four-year period. A study of social service agencies in Chicago found that about 36 percent of the income of voluntary agencies came from government in 1975.[15] Ralph

M. Kramer[46] reports that 71 percent of surveyed agencies in 1961 had income from government sources, while the Family Service Association of America found that 72 percent of its 300 members received income from public sources in 1973. This amounted to about 23 percent of their total income—up from 14 percent in 1967.[47]

Legislative developments and the funding patterns of private welfare agencies thus suggest that an intensive and permanent relationship has developed between private and public welfare during the last twenty-five years. In some respects private and public welfare have become inseparable; one can view private welfare as an extension of public welfare, with many "voluntary" agencies becoming instruments for carrying out governmental mandates. This is particularly the case with the "quasi-non-governmental agencies,"[48] founded in response to particular legislative developments and relying very heavily, often exclusively, on government funding. Several other observers[49] have pointed to government dominance over significant portions of the private voluntary sector. Thus, there has been a reversal of the relationship between private and public welfare institutions during the last 100 years.[50] This shift in the relative importance of private and public welfare institutions is itself an indication of the movement of the United States toward an integrated and interdependent mass society.

More important, the existence of such an extensive interdependence of private and public welfare institutions, involving massive transfers of funds from the public to the private welfare sector, requires a reassessment of the trends in philanthropic funds discussed earlier. Not only has private philanthropy been overwhelmed by public welfare in terms of product, especially in the strictly defined welfare areas, but also some public expenditures exert control over private expenditures. Thus the unique contribution of private charitable undertakings in the United States is further reduced. This suggests that the United States may be moving closer to the Western European pattern of a declining or dependent private welfare sector.

Sources of Funding and Agency Operations

Public financing of private welfare and its associated effects on private welfare operations are not the only factors affecting the private sector. The review of donor data indicated other important sources of revenue for private welfare agencies, each likely to influence agency operations in particular ways. It is useful to examine each funding source and its likely impact on private welfare agencies separately.

Government funds constitute a large, growing, but inconstant source of income for private agencies. The availability and flexibility of such

funds seduce agencies into concentrating on services for which g ernment will pay or new experimental programs for which gove ment will provide a grant. This may result in the agency's subvert its own goals.[51] Use of such funds requires considerable grantmans by agency personnel as well as bureaucratic competency in fulfill government demands for accountability. Furthermore, there are st criteria as to which specific services are supportable by governme Because such criteria change rapidly, agencies may be left with p gram, personnel, and client commitments for which funding sudder disappears. The Commission on Private Philanthropy and Pub Needs raised this issue repeatedly.[52] It is an issue which is likely become prominent when currently proposed cuts in public social s vice programs are implemented.

Participation in federated fund-raising activities generally provide stable source of income for those agencies that manage to becor members. However, participation constrains agencies from changi organizational goals or engaging in services which might be regard as controversial by other participating agencies or the larger commun ty on which United Way depends for funds.[53] In many communities th United Way requires agencies to give up their own fund raising t avoid duplication of appeals, thereby making agencies even more d pendent on the United Way. Similarly, the United Way may encourag an agency to pursue government funding, perhaps reducing its auton omy further. The United Ways generally are bureaucratic and insis on various forms of accountability by member agencies. The predomi nance of businessmen on the boards of many United Ways[54] may explain the concern with efficiency, effectiveness, and managemen training evident in several United Ways recently. The difficulty o standardizing and measuring social service performances in order t assess efficiency and effectiveness has generated some conflict betweer the United Way of Greater Chicago and several of its member agencies.

Foundations provide a small but increasing proportion of the in come of philanthropic agencies, although the decline in the value o common stock since the mid-1970s has temporarily reduced foundatior funds. Foundations have highly varied programs and often strict prior ities or donor restrictions. The degree of formality, grantmanship, anc bureaucratic competence required in obtaining funds from foundation varies according to the size of the foundation and the professiona orientation of its managers. Foundations also desire accountability although generally they are flexible in defining "success."[55] Founda tion managers do, however, attempt to weed out those grant seeker who appear "inauthentic" in their dedication and or presentation o need for foundation support. Foundation managers are thus able t exert a fair amount of control over those seeking support.

Endowment funds are probably among the most desirable sources of income for a private welfare agency. However, endowments generally

provide only limited income and have been declining in recent years with the stock market values. When endowments are available they are a stable, reliable, unproblematic source of income if competent investment advice is available to the agency.

Corporate gifts are highly personal and for that reason also flexible and available on short notice. Although the total funds available are limited, their flexibility makes them important to many charitable institutions for emergencies or special opportunities. To the extent that federated fund-raising organizations have concentrated on working through corporations (as is the case in Chicago), individual agencies may not have equal access to corporate donations because these are usurped by federated fund-raising organizations for redistribution to their own member agencies.

Private philanthropic organizations also obtain funds from the sale of goods and products, such as baked goods, used clothing and furniture, or items manufactured by the blind in sheltered workshops. This is a time-honored method of raising money, but the organization needs to exercise caution to avoid becoming too oriented to making profit. Otherwise its tax-exempt status with the Internal Revenue Service may be endangered with serious consequences not only for soliciting individual donations but also for endorsements by various gatekeeping organizations.

User fees have become significant in recent years as a result of several trends. First, there have been pressures by various funding agencies, particularly United Ways and some foundations, to institute sliding fee scales to offset part of the cost of providing services. Second, most professional social workers seem to believe that services are most effective if the client makes some sacrifices to obtain them.[56] Third, around 1965 a shift in the class composition of the clients of private welfare agencies was recognized. Many agencies are now serving more middle-class clients who can afford to pay for services.[57] It is unclear whether the shift in the status of clients represents an unconscious attempt by professional social workers to increase their own status through that of their clients, a general professional bias in favor of more articulate and appreciative clients, or a changing role of private welfare agencies in an expanding welfare state. To the extent that private service agencies become dependent on user fees, agencies may come to promote their expensive services and induce clients to seek such services—whether needed or not. Agencies may also encourage clients to return for further services by providing expensive amenities. Like income from sales and products, reliance on fees blurs the line between profit and nonprofit operations and exposes agencies to conflict and competition. But fees are attractive because they provide stable income.

Finally, individual donations have long been an important source of income for private philanthropic organizations. Competition for such funds caused the development of federated fund-raising organizations,

and their continuing prominence emphasizes the significance of vo
tary donations. It also testifies to the difficulty and expense of solic
donations. Although individual donations have declined as a sour
funds for private philanthropic organizations, they provide age
with an important degree of flexibility because they are not link
particular programs or specific expense categories.

Summary and Conclusions

Each source of funding presents private welfare agencies with ad
tages and problems. These may be grouped into three categorie
pressure for bureaucratic and professional standards of compet
and efficiency, (2) effect of funding priorities set by donors or c
funding organizations on the type of agency services provided, an
requirements that agencies operate and provide services in an equi
manner, making such services available on an open basis to anyo
need of the particular service.

The increased use of bureaucratized funding sources (governm
federated fund-raising organizations, national foundations) ha
panded the potential amount of total funding available and offe
greater variety of funding opportunities. As a result, individual a
cies have become less dependent on direct voluntary contributions
can operate on a stable basis (with some important exceptions, as i
case of government grants). These new or expanded sources of fun
operate on a bureaucratic basis and require similar operational s
by agencies seeking their support. This insistence on standardiz
and accountability makes it possible for funding agencies to com
funding requests and assess performances. However, this is cost
private welfare agencies in terms of flexibility, time, and actual op
ing costs. Thus agencies have fewer resources to commit to their
particular tasks and goals. Individual donations generate similar
sures for accountability because independent organizations re
agency operations, and professional fund raisers emphasize the
sponsible" operations of agencies seeking individual donations.[58]

Regardless of the quality of services, a particular project or ag
must also provide a service defined as important and supportabl
funding agencies or donors in terms of their own priorities or g
This is when grantmanship is particularly important to the agen
knowing where the money is and how to put together a program
will meet the specific criteria or goals of a given funding source.
possible that agencies will adopt the goals of a funding organizati
their own to keep programs going and personnel employed.[59]

Welfare agencies may develop uniform and standardized activities if they increasingly compete with one another for the same funding sources. This will be most common for those areas of welfare with heavy government and foundation involvement and, thus, strict priorities. Private donations provide a contrast here because the appeal for such funds is general and does not involve a specific enforceable commitment to a particular program profile.

As a result of the increasing importance of formal funding sources, agencies have less control over how they execute programs and relate to clients. In recent years many philanthropic welfare organizations have had to conform to national goals and policies as formulated in government policies and guidelines on nondiscrimination or affirmative action. Similar policies have been adopted by most federated fund-raising organizations and national foundations. Agencies receiving funds from these sources can no longer restrict their services to members of one racial, ethnic, or religious group. This trend is an outgrowth of increasing national concern with the social rights of citizenship[60] and is reflected in a variety of civil rights legislation as well as in the expansion of public welfare itself.[61]

This issue has created problems for a number of private philanthropic organizations founded on the principle of religious or ethnic self-help. Supporters of such welfare agencies not only expected to receive aid if circumstances warranted it but also contributed time and money because the beneficiaries were of their "own kind." Both of these understandings generate considerable loyalty to agencies by their supporters.[62]

When such agencies are opened to new clientele groups, the loyalty of special supporters is endangered. For some agencies, the loss of such special support as a result of the application of universalistic principles may force an even greater shift toward formal funding agencies.[63] Such cases suggest that the shift toward greater reliance on formal funding agencies is not simply a reflection of the increasing availability of these sources of funding or a result of policy decisions by national foundations and government. It may also be a direct result of the drying up of direct voluntary contributions to individual philanthropies. That is, both pull and push factors may be responsible for the observed shift in funding patterns.

In sum, major transformations of the welfare system have occurred in recent years in the United States. The most prominent change involves the significant growth in public welfare and its increasing dominance over private welfare, with subsequent implications for the autonomy and operations of private welfare institutions. These and other modifications of welfare have resulted in more bureaucratic and professional forms of services than in the past. Such developments are a function of increasing pressures on agencies for accountability and

skilled self-presentation to compete for increasingly scarce fundin has also made it difficult for donors or grantors to make rational fu ing decisions, particularly in view of the difficulty of evaluating q itative services and agency operations. The transformation of the fare system is part of the movement toward a mass society wh recognizes various forms of citizenship rights. Although private w fare is still an important part of the American welfare system, this s toward the mass society has changed its role significantly in rec years.

Notes

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1. Italy may be an exception to this generalization, mainly because of the dominan of the Catholic church. Charles Richmond Henderson (*Modern Methods of Charity: A Account of the System of Relief, Public and Private, in the Principal Countries Havi Modern Methods* [New York: Macmillan Co., 1904]) provided an early description differences in welfare measures between the United States and major European countri Shepard B. Clough ("Philanthropy and the Welfare State in Europe," *Political Scien Quarterly* 75 [March 1960]: 87–93) argues that the pattern of welfare in Western Europe one in which private philanthropy has almost totally disappeared, owing in part to th absence of major tax incentives. See also Merle Curti, "American Philanthropy and th National Character," *American Quarterly* 10 (Winter 1958): 420–37; Peter Dobkin Hal "The Model of Boston Charity: A Theory of Charitable Benevolence and Class Develop ment," *Science and Society* 38 (Winter 1975): 464–77; Ben Whitaker, *The Philanthro poids: Foundations and Society—an Unsubsidized Anatomy of the Burden of Benevo lence* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1974).

2. See Kirsten A. Grønbjerg, David Street, and Gerald D. Suttles, *Poverty and Socia Change* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).

3. For a more detailed discussion of trends in public welfare expenditures betwee 1950 and 1978, see Kirsten A. Grønbjerg, "The Growth of Welfare: A Mass-Society Perspective" (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for the Study of Social Problems, New York, August 24–27, 1980).

4. The term "welfare" in double quotation marks is used here to mean assistance to the needy as distinct from broader social welfare efforts.

5. Whether the need is caused by ill health, low income, lack of skills, lack of culture, absence of recreational facilities, or lack of education and employment opportunities.

6. The distinction between philanthropy and fringe benefits is not clear cut. The latter may be negotiated by professional negotiators who do not share in the spoils, while decisions about what philanthropic programs should be developed often are in the direct career and job interests of those who make these "professional" decisions. Furthermore, those who contribute to philanthropic activities receive numerous substantial benefits from it, including tax deductions, prestige, and self-satisfaction, while the costs of fringe

benefits often are passed on to the consumer or taxpayer who does not benefit from the programs in any direct way.

7. Most of these data are based on individual and corporate tax returns and foundation reports. These documents provide information on the amount of money contributed by types of donors to nonprofit organizations. The data do not include information on the specific charitable purpose for which the money was donated or how it was actually spent and by whom. The quality of the donor data depends on the completeness and accuracy of tax returns. As far as individuals are concerned, the data only incorporate information from those filing a return with itemized deductions, although estimates may be made for those using the standard deduction. One other source of donor data is available, namely, two national surveys on philanthropic giving conducted by James N. Morgan, Richard F. Dye, and Judith H. Hybels ("Results from Two National Surveys of Philanthropic Activity," in *Giving in America*, Vol. 2, *Philanthropic Fields of Interest*, pt. 1, *Research Papers*, ed. Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs [Washington, D.C.: Department of the Treasury, 1977], pp. 157–325). These surveys examine why people give rather than which activities are supported.

8. The organizations may provide information on broad categories of income sources, e.g., assets, contributions, fees. However, most data consist of information about the amount of money received or spent by major types of philanthropic organizations, e.g., higher education, health, and hospitals. These data provide the only estimates of what purpose the money is used for, but the categorization of organizations is gross. The data are based on voluntary participation in surveys and are inaccurate and incomplete. The data quality problem is illustrated by a higher level of total donations than total funds received (cf. figs. 5 and 6). Whether the discrepancy is due to incomplete coverage of recipient organizations, overestimates of donations, unreported donations, or differences in accounting procedures is unknown. Additional estimates of recipient funds have also been made from analysis of IRS 990 forms submitted by foundations and other nonprofit organizations in accordance with U.S. tax laws concerning tax-exempt status. However, the information on the IRS 990 forms is very limited, and many agencies are late in filing the forms.

9. Such surveys are fragmented and incomplete and are not very useful in presenting an overall picture of private philanthropy. They do provide valuable insights for particular locations or special types of agencies.

10. On the other hand, Don F. Wortman ("New Government Initiatives—What Will They Mean?" talk at "FORUM 81," sponsored by the United Way of Metropolitan Chicago and the University of Chicago School of Social Service Administration, June 17, 1981) reports that increases in the size of the standard tax deduction since 1970 have reduced the number of families using itemized deductions from about 47 percent to 25 percent in 1979. Such a development may have reduced reported philanthropic donations in most recent years.

11. Ralph Nelson, "Private Giving in the American Economy, 1960–1972," in *Giving in America* (see n. 7), Vol. 1, pt. 1, *History, Trends and Current Magnitudes*, pp. 115–35. Most of the basic data used in this section of the paper were originally developed by Nelson and published in the U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical History of the United States from Colonial Times to the Present* (New York: Basic Books, 1976). I have, however, made additional computations of most of these data and take full responsibility for whatever errors may have been made in the process.

12. It is necessary to limit these data to recipient funds in order to use deflators specific to each sphere of philanthropic activity; see Nelson, "Private Giving," p. 122.

13. These trends are shown in more graphic form in figs. 5 (recipient data) and 6 (donor data). The two graphs present similar patterns in overall funds for the post-1940 period but differ sharply on trends in the 1930s. Given the poor quality of economic and organizational data during that period, it is unclear which of these early patterns is the more accurate.

14. The term "living donor" is used to distinguish between donations made by individuals in the course of their lifetimes and donations made in the form of bequests at the time of death. The distinction is primarily of interest in terms of tax reporting.

15. Current figures released by United Way of America indicate that its affiliates collect about 5 percent of all reported contributions in the United States.

16. The City University of New York now offers an M.A. degree in nonprofit fund raising, and there are a wide [illegible]

See also R. le Clerc Phillips, "Science of Money Raising: An American Profession," *Cornhill Magazine* 75 (August 1933): 177–87, who argues that money raising for charitable activities is a science and a profession peculiar to the United States.

17. Whitaker (see n. 1); Waldemar Nielsen, *The Big Foundations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).

18. Nielsen (see n. 17), p. 126.

19. Morgan et al. (see n. 7).

20. One estimate of the impact of these two developments on private philanthropy claims that nonprofit organizations stand to lose about $45 billion in lost government support and lower charitable donations in 1982. See *Chicago Tribune*, August 28, 1981.

21. Edward A. Shils, *Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975); T. H. Marshall, *Class, Citizenship and Social Development* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1964).

22. For a more detailed discussion of this concept, see Kirsten A. Grønbjerg, *Mass Society and the Extension of Welfare, 1960–1970* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 10–12, and Grønbjerg, "Growth of Welfare" (see n. 3 above).

23. Grønbjerg et al. (see n. 2); Eleanor L. Brilliant, "Private or Public: A Model of Ambiguities," *Social Service Review* 47 (September 1973): 384–96. See also Harold L. Wilensky and Charles N. Lebeaux, *Industrial Society and Social Welfare* (New York: Free Press, 1965), chap. 6, for a discussion of the early perception of a residual role for public welfare.

24. Eugene Litwak and Lydia F. Hylton, "Interorganizational Analysis: A Hypothesis on Co-ordinating Agencies," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 6 (March 1962): 397–420.

25. Dorothy Becker, "Exit Lady Bountiful: The Volunteer and the Professional Social Worker," *Social Service Review* 38 (March 1964): 57–72; Roy Lubove, *The Professional Altruist: The Emergence of Social Work as a Career, 1880–1930* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965).

26. Robert Morris, "Community Planning for the Aged," in *Selected Round Table Conference Papers 1963* (New York: American Public Welfare Association, 1964), pp. 98–103.

27. Graenum Berger, "From Traditional Self-Help to Increasing Dependence on Government Support," *Jewish Social Studies* 38 (Summer-Fall 1976): 225–46; Harold B. Chetkow, "Some Factors Influencing the Utilization of Priority Recommendations in Community Planning," *Social Service Review* 41 (September 1967): 271–82; Ray Johns, *The Cooperative Process among National Social Agencies* (New York: Association Press, 1946); Sol Levine and Lydia F. White, "Exchange as a Conceptual Framework for the Study of Interorganizational Relationships," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 5 (March 1961): 583–601.

28. Gordon Manser and Rosemary Higgins Cass, *Voluntarism at the Crossroads* (New York: Family Service Association of America, 1976); Merlin Taber, Frank Itzin, and William Turner, "A Comprehensive Analysis of Health and Welfare Services for Older People in One County" (Iowa City: State University of Iowa, 1963); James D. Thompson and William J. McEwen, "Organizational Goals and Environment and Goal-setting as an Interaction Process," *American Sociological Review* 23 (1958): 23–31; Stanley Wenocur, "A Political View of the United Way," *Social Work* 20 (May 1975): 223–29; John D. Aram and William E. Stratton, "The Development of Interagency Cooperation," *Social Service Review* 48 (September 1974): 412–21.

29. Barbara Howe, "The Emergence of the Philanthropic Foundations as an American Social Institution" (paper presented at the Seventy-third Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, September 1978).

30. Kenneth Larsen, "Foundation Managers, Candidates and Grantees: A Study of Classification and Control," *Urban Life and Culture* 3 (January 1975): 396–414.

31. It is possible that some agencies have more or less deliberately opted for security rather than growth and change in seeking such funding.

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The Discovery of Poverty in the United States (New York: New York University Press, 1956) and his *American Philanthropy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960); June Axinn and Herman Levin, *Social Welfare: A History of the American Response to Need* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1975); Allen F. Davis, *Spearheads of Reform: The Social Settlements and the Progressive Movement 1890–1914* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).

34. See Louise de Koven Bowen, *Growing Up with a City* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1926); Mrs. Lyman Baird, *The History of the Chicago Home for the Friendless from 1859–1909* (Chicago, 1909); James Brown, *The History of Public Assistance in Chicago 1833 to 1893* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941); Frank Denman Loomis, *The Chicago Community Trust: A History of Its Development 1915–1962* (Chicago: Chicago Community Trust, 1962); Harvey C. Carbaugh, ed., *Human Welfare Work in Chicago* (Chicago: A. C. McClough & Co., 1917).

35. Henderson (see n. 1).

36. Walter I. Trattner, "The Federal Government and Social Welfare in Early Nineteenth Century America," *Social Service Review* 50 (June 1976): 243–55.

37. William J. Lawrence and Stephen Leeds, *An Inventory of Federal Income Transfer Programs: Fiscal Year 1977* (White Plains, N.Y.: Institute for Socioeconomic Studies, 1978), hereafter cited as *Federal Programs*.

38. William J. Lawrence and Stephen Leeds, *An Inventory of State and Local Income Transfer Programs: Fiscal Year 1977* (White Plains, N.Y.: Institute for Socioeconomic Studies, 1980).

39. Ibid.; Lawrence and Leeds, *Federal Programs*.

40. United Way of Metropolitan Chicago, *Community Analysis Project: Governmental Financial Resources for Human Service Programs*, Report no. 2a, *Supplement to Services, Income and Expenditures* (Chicago: United Way of Metropolitan Chicago, 1978).

41. U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, *Social Services U.S.A.: Statistical Tables, Summaries and Analyses of Services under the Social Security Act, Title XX, IV-B, and IV-A/C, for the 50 States and the District of Columbia* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Human Development, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1978).

42. Ibid.

43. John Copeland, "Financial Data from Form 990 Returns for Exempt Charitable, Religious, and Educational Organizations, and Foundations," in *Giving in America* (see n. 7), vol. 4, pt. 2: *Research Papers*, pp. 143–58.

44. Institute for Social Research, "Private Philanthropy in Metropolitan Atlanta," in *Giving in America*, vol. 2, pt. 1: *Areas of Activity*, pp. 883–89; Human Services Design Laboratory, "A Philanthropic Profile of the Cleveland Metropolitan Area," in ibid., pp. 890–937; United Way of Greater Des Moines, "Philanthropic Profile of Metropolitan Des Moines," ibid., pp. 937–53; Community Council of the Capitol Region, "Philanthropy Profile of the Connecticut Capitol Region," ibid., pp. 953–63.

45. United Way of Metropolitan Chicago, *Community Analysis Project*, Report no. 2, *Chicago Services, Income and Expenditures* (Chicago: United Way of Metropolitan Chicago, 1975).

46. Kramer, "Voluntary Agencies and the Use of Public Funds: Some Policy Issues," *Social Service Review* 40 (March 1966): 15–26.

47. Robert M. Rice, "Impact of Government Contracts on Voluntary Social Agencies," *Social Casework* 56 (July 1975): 387–95, esp. 387.

48. Alan Pifer, *The Quasi Non-Governmental Organization* (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1967).

49. Rice; Kramer; Robert S. Magill, "Federalism, Grants-in-Aid, and Social Welfare Policy," *Social Casework* 57 (December 1976): 625–36; Gordon Manser, "Implications of Purchase of Services for Voluntary Agencies," *Social Casework* 53 (June 1972): 335–40, and "Further Thoughts on Purchase of Services," *Social Casework* 55 (July 1974): 421–27; Adam and Stratton (see n. 28); Bertram M. Beck, "The Voluntary Social Welfare Agency: A Reassessment," *Social Service Review* 44 (June 1970): 147–54, and *Governmental Contracts with Non-Profit Social Welfare Organizations: The Dilemma of Accountability in Modern Government* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971); Berger (see n. 27); Brilliant (see n. 23); William G. Hill, "Voluntary and Governmental Financial Transactions," *Social Casework* 52 (June 1971): 356–61; Manser and Cass (see n. 28);

Bruce L. R. Smith, "Accountability and Independence in the Contract State," in *The Dilemma of Accountability in Modern Government*, ed. Bruce R. Smith and D. C. Hague (London: Macmillan Co., 1971); Elizabeth Wickenden, "Purchase of Care and Services: Effect on Voluntary Agencies in the Health and Welfare Fields" (paper presented at the First Milwaukee Institute on a Social Welfare Issue of the Day 1970 [Milwaukee: Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin, 1972]); Robert Pruger and Leonard Miller, "Competition and the Public Social Services," *Public Welfare* 31 (Fall 1973): 16–25.

50. It is ironic, perhaps, that in the past it was not unusual to find public welfare institutions as recipients of private donations (see Brown [n. 34]). Today that pattern seems to be found primarily for public civic or cultural institutions, such as museums and universities.

51. Rice.

52. *Giving in America: Towards a Stronger Voluntary Sector* (Washington, D.C.: Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, 1977).

53. For examples, see Berger, Litwak and Hylton (see n. 24), Wenocur (see n. 28), and John R. Seeley, Buford H. Junker, R. Wallace Jones, Jr., N. C. Jenkins, and Haugh I. Miller, *Community Chest: A Case Study in Philanthropy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957).

54. Charles V. Willie, "Institutional Vitality and Institutional Alliances," *Sociology and Social Research* 54 (January 1970): 249–59; Charles V. Willie, Herbert Notkin, and Nicholas H. Rezak, "Trends in the Participation of Businessmen in Local Voluntary Affairs," *Sociology and Social Research* 48 (April 1964): 289–300. Eileen D. Ross ("Philanthropic Activity and the Business Career," *Social Forces* 32 [March 1954]: 274–80) has documented the significant career advantages to businessmen who are active in federated fund-raising campaigns.

55. Larsen (see n. 30).

56. See, e.g., David Macarov, *The Design of Social Welfare* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1978), pp. 137–38; J. Shireman, "Client and Worker Opinions about Fee-charging in a Child Welfare Agency," *Child Welfare* 44 (1975): 331–40.

57. Richard A. Cloward and Irwin Epstein, "Private Social Welfare's Disengagement from the Poor: The Case of Family Adjustment Agencies," in *Proceedings of the Annual Social Work Day Institute* (Buffalo: New York State University at Buffalo, School of Social Welfare, 1965).

58. See also Esther Stanton, *Clients Come Last: Volunteers and Welfare Organizations* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1970).

59. Rice (n. 47) raises this particular problem with regard to government grants and purchase of services. However, the general principle would seem to extend easily to national foundations and priority systems in federated fund-raising organizations. See also Joseph C. Lagey and Beverly Ayres, *Priority Determination Plans* (Vancouver: Community Chests and Councils of Vancouver, 1960) on the experience of federated fund-raising organizations and their success in implementing priority determination plans.

60. Marshall (see n. 21).

61. Grønbjerg, *Mass Society*.

62. See Berger (n. 27) for a history of Jewish organizations along these lines.

63. Arthur N. Long ("The Growth of a Bureaucracy," *Western Political Quarterly* 12 [December 1959]: 932–38) raises this issue with specific reference to federated fund-raising agencies and critizes them for soliciting money from people of various religious orientations but distributing it to only some religious agencies. Kramer (n. 46) makes the same point for agencies receiving government support. We noted earlier that changing donor tax incentives and increasing public welfare are also likely to have endangered voluntary contributions.

Wives, Husbands, and Social Change: The Role of Social Work

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The rising labor force participation rate of wives is often cited as an indication of social change. This article reviews social work's responses to wives and husbands attempting to adjust to this change. Generally, the needs of wives have been emphasized while those of husbands have been overlooked. Implications for social work responses in the 1980s are offered.

As the 1980s begin, considerable speculation exists about the further impact of social change on the family. Generally, the most dramatic indication of the effects of social change on the family has been the rising labor force participation rate of married women. This trend appears to be a direct challenge to traditional sex-role ideology that defines the work world as men's territory and the home as the domain of women. Hence, the 1980s could foster other developments in the evolution of American families. Will the work rate of wives continue to rise? Will the distribution of women among the various occupations change? Will the two-earner family become the dominant pattern?

While these questions appear to be of primary interest to family sociologists, demographers, and labor economists, they should also attract the attention of social workers. Embedded in these issues are key implications that touch on the changing nature of family life itself. Will

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wives encounter fewer difficulties in combining the family and work roles? Will child care and household responsibilities be shared equally between husbands and wives? As families attempt to cope with the dilemmas associated with social change of the 1980s, what is the role of social work in this period of transition? The trends of earlier years provide a basis for making informed predictions for the new decade

Evidence of Social Change

The post–World War II period saw a revitalization of traditional values that regarded working wives and day-care centers as leading to the disintegration of the family [1] Lundberg and Farnham capture the ethos of this time by associating work with the "masculinization of women" which posed "enormously dangerous consequences to the home."[2] Opinion polls revealed that the majority of respondents (both male and female) disapproved of a wife's working if jobs were limited and if her husband could support her [3]

Over time, however, attitudes toward the wife's role began changing A number of factors have been associated with this change During the late 1960s women delayed marriage and the birth of their first child, and had their last child at an earlier age More effective means of birth control and numerous technological advancements in the home provided greater freedom for some wives to pursue work opportunities outside the home Changing economic conditions required that some wives work in order for families to maintain a certain style of life. As more and more wives entered the labor force, this activity appeared less deviant. Finally, the political activities of women's groups led to greater recognition and acceptance of wives' rights to work outside the home [4]

While the opinion polls of the 1950s showed public disfavor toward working wives, the more recent polls reflect these changing attitudes A Gallup Poll found that, by 1969, only 40 percent of respondents disapproved of a married woman working if she had a husband capable of supporting her [5] Mason, Czajke, and Arber studied data from five sample surveys conducted between 1964 and 1974 [6] These researchers found that attitudes about family and work roles were becoming less traditional. Tsuchigane and Dodge note that attitudes toward working wives continued to change during the 1970s.[7]

These findings suggest that attitudes toward traditional sex-role norms are changing More people are expressing nontraditional beliefs that are less rigid and less confining. Such nontraditionalism provides many women with freedom to pursue a job or career while being a wife and or mother.

This trend is likely to continue in the 1980s. The factors associated with these attitudinal changes—demographic shifts, economic conditions, rising work rates for wives, technological advancements, and changing political and social climates—will not disappear in the new decade. Rather, their effects on the general population may be more widespread. It seems only reasonable to expect attitudinal changes in the area of sex-role beliefs to continue to parallel these demographic, economic, and social factors.

Changing social conditions and changing attitudes seem to converge in the redefining of wifehood in America. It is unlikely that the home will regain its former dominance in the lives of many women.

Social Change and Wives

The type of attachment wives have to labor force participation has also been changing over time. Working wives of the 1950s apparently coped with conflicts about working by defining their motivation to work in purely economic terms. The studies of Glenn, Hayghe, and Nolan and Tuttle support this observation by finding that money was most frequently mentioned by 1950s wives as the reason for their employment outside the home.[8]

As the number of wives in the labor force increases, it appears that more wives are recognizing the noneconomic rewards of their employment. Miyahira identifies another sign of social change to be less emphasis on the economic motive as the push for wives to work.[9] In comparing the attitudes of 1950s working wives with those of 1970s working wives, Iglehart found that the contemporary wives were more likely to say that they would continue to work even if they did not need the money.[10] These 1970s wives cited a sense of accomplishment, meaningful interaction with co-workers, and feelings of satisfaction as the primary reasons for working in the absence of economic need. Thus, the general public and working wives themselves appear to be accepting the work role as a legitimate extension of the wife's role.

Combining work and family roles can be stressful for wives. Norms governing success in each area are conflicting because success in the work role may imply failure in the family role. Full-time employment outside the home suggests that the wife has to somehow juggle her home and family responsibilities in order to minimize the potential interference of the job. Child-care arrangements, weekend housecleaning, and housework shortcuts provide some resolution to the numerous issues that surface when the wife is not a full-time homemaker.

Managing a job and a home requires a tremendous amount of time and energy. A wife often experiences conflict based on feelings of di-

vided loyalties. She may feel that work is taking her away from her children and causing tension in her marriage. If there is difficulty with the job itself, the stressful position of the working wife is further compounded.

For the 1980s, juggling home and work will continue to be an issue for working wives. More women will be attempting to do both. More supports, however, may be available to help wives with this home-job integration. Job sharing, flex-time, maternity leave, and on-site day care will be a much more dynamic part of the 1980s. In addition to the supports associated with the work world, social work will have some significant contributions to make.

Social Work and Wives

Helping professionals are becoming more and more sensitive to the needs of working wives and other women experiencing role transition. This sensitivity is mirrored in the reexamination of traditional intervention strategies and the assessment of their applicability to women. Several examples can be offered to support this observation.

The effectiveness of male therapists in working with women encountering role transition has been debated. Some argue that the male worker reinforces a woman's dependency on men, is less accepting of nontraditional choices, and unsympathetic.[11] While this debate may never be fully resolved, it at least points to the concern about what constitutes effective and appropriate intervention with nontraditional women.

Another example lies in the emergence of consciousness-raising (CR) groups as a means of working with women caught in the path of social change.[12] These groups have both a therapeutic base and a political base. On one hand, women can gain support from other women experiencing similar situations. People find out that they are not the only ones struggling with role conflict and role ambivalence. Through a type of collective experience, resolutions to issues may be facilitated. On the other hand, CR groups basically communicate to clients and the general public that there is nothing "wrong" with group members. The thoughts, feelings, and frustrations are considered to be normal for persons experiencing role shift and role transition. Consequently, the group members may be spared the stigma of a deviant label.

Klass and Redfern offer an example of the group work technique used with middle-aged housewives who want to return to jobs or school after a long absence.[13] These authors note that the prospect of

change is frequently exciting as well as frightening. They add, "at this point, the support and encouragement of other women in a similar situation can do much to make this potential change a positive experience."[14] Klass and Redfern developed a class to help housewives with self-exploration, resume preparation; job opportunity analyzing; and vocational, educational, and volunteer information sharing.

Group work techniques, especially those involving CR groups, appear to address the particular needs of women seeking nontraditional roles and making nontraditional decisions. This group experience may help women to mobilize their own resources in order to carry out the decisions they wish to make.

Social workers act as workshop leaders and training coordinators providing assertiveness training for women, hints on establishing networks among women, and help in forming female collectives or organizations. Workers have also been active in advocating for female clients who espouse nontraditional values.

Beckett suggests that working wives may need job counseling and assistance in locating jobs.[15] Social workers are learning that they can be resource people who refer women to a variety of services available in the community. Job information, day-care information, and various workshops may be available to working wives through a local social service agency.

Social work as a profession has been concerned about sexism among its members.[16] This concern reflects a sensitivity to the problems that might be encountered when a woman interacts with a sexist worker (male or female). Workers who hold traditional views may aggravate the frustration already felt by nontraditional wives. Women coping with the dual roles of wife and worker may be discouraged by social workers who feel that the home and family are suffering because of commitment to a full-time job. Social work's recognition of this problem reflects favorably on the profession's concern about the nontraditional woman.

In the 1980s social work's involvement in activity centered around the changing role of women will, no doubt, continue. Working wives are legitimate clients with legitimate needs, and more and more workers will be trained in helping these clients. Expansion of services and advocacy will take place, and innovative programs will continue to evolve as helping professionals strive to be even more responsive to this client group. Interventions of the 1970s will not be abandoned but will provide a concrete base for the modification and development of strategies for more effective work with nontraditional women. As the debate over the Equal Rights Amendment continues and as government-inspired affirmative-action programs continue, social work will be increasingly aware of its responsibility to the working wife and other nontraditional women.

Social Change and Husbands

Numerous studies have attempted to determine the effects of a wife's working on her husband and her marriage. Other studies have tried to determine how the husband's attitudes affect his wife's likelihood of being employed. Because wives are involved in a relational situation, this attention on the husband is appropriate. Nevill and Damico review marriage research that showed that "the personality and background of the husband, not the wife, were the important factors in the success of a marriage."[17] These researchers also offer data supporting their hypothesis that marriage is a stressful situation for women. These points emphasize the crucial role of the husband in the marriage and the potentially stressful nature of marriage.

Hedges and Barnett note that a strong correlation exists between husbands' attitudes and their wives' anticipation of employment. According to these researchers, "Wives whose husbands had strong objections were less likely to say they would work than were wives whose husbands had positive attitudes."[18] This finding suggests at least two implications for the 1980s: (1) As more wives enter the labor force, they do so because their husbands are becoming more approving of this activity, or (2) they do so despite the objections raised by their husbands.

The second implication points out the fact that a wife's working could be an added stress to the marital relationship. Indeed, Katelman and Barnett found that traditionally oriented wives were more likely to rate their marriages as happy than the less traditionally oriented wives who were more likely to rate their marriages as average or unhappy.[19]

Several studies have tried to explain the way in which a wife's working can pose a threat to the marriage. Orden and Bradburn note that, when a wife is working out of financial necessity, the husband may feel inadequate in his performance as provider for his wife and children.[20] These writers observe: "A man interprets his marriage role in terms of his ability to provide for the economic needs of his family. The fact that he cannot support his family without his wife's help is a threat to his perception of himself as a husband and father. He appears to be more sensitive to disagreements in his marriage."[21] Gould supports these observations by noting that many husbands may feel emasculated by their wife's working.[22] He suggests that the husband may express his anxiety by generating conflict with his wife in areas where there really is no conflict. Thus, attention is often not focused on the real problem.

These observations could help explain why husbands of working wives when compared with husbands of housewives are less content with marriage—a finding made by Burke and Weir.[23] These researchers interpreted their results to mean that husbands of working wives expe-

rience greater stress than do husbands of housewives, and that the husbands with employed wives seem to have more difficulty in adequately adjusting to this nontraditional way of life.

Because age, education, and ethnic background greatly affect the husband's coping skills, broad generalizations cannot be made to all husbands of working wives. The Orden and Bradburn study made a distinction between wives working out of necessity and wives working because of choice. While other distinctions may need to be made, the emphasis of the literature reviewed here seems to indicate that, for many husbands, a nontraditional family life can be stressful to the marriage and to the husbands themselves.

As the labor force participation rate of wives continues to rise, there is no indication that the situation of husbands will change drastically. Husbands have to respond to changes in their marriages brought on by their wives' employment. Husbands with wives working out of choice may make a better adjustment to changes because the choice may indicate that both spouses are committed to less traditional values. In addition, the choice may also mirror an absence of financial strain so that the husbands need not feel threatened by their wives' work activities.

For husbands who feel that their provider role is being challenged by their wives' jobs, the adjustment is often more stressful. As wives continue to enter the labor market in the 1980s, more couples may face marital discord. Eventually, many of these marital problems will contribute to the rising divorce rate. Numerous other couples will attempt to maintain their marriages. Throughout these efforts, many husbands will derive less satisfaction from their marriages. Obviously, social work has an important role to play in alleviating some of these stresses faced by husbands adjusting to their wives' employment.

Role Transition and Social Work: Implications for the 1980s

Unfortunately, social work has been concerned primarily with helping wives cope with the demands of home and job while the husbands of working women have been overlooked. In looking at the marital dyad as a system, the needs of husbands as well as the needs of wives should be addressed.

Several authors suggest that a more egalitarian family style with equal sharing of housework and child care may be of invaluable assistance to working wives.[24] Yet, the reactions and attitudes of husbands to this sharing is usually not addressed. Is it assumed that husbands will meekly comply with the requests of their wives to share these tasks?

Time-use studies reveal that equal sharing is not taking place. Employed women spend about eighteen hours a week on basic housework, while employed men spend about three to four hours.[25] In some cases, the husbands of employed wives may actually spend less time on housework chores than do the husbands of housewives. While the equal-sharing position may appear valid, it will not be realized unless efforts are directed toward its implementation.

The challenges of role shifts and transitions facing families are continuing. More and more women are deciding to enter the labor market or return to school. While the social supports available to the wife will reinforce the choices she makes, her husband is still struggling with the adjustments required of him. According to Halleck, the couple may be in for serious trouble when the husband attempts to live out a consciousness he is not psychologically prepared to accept.[26] Years of socialization and conditioning for the traditional husband-father roles simply cannot be erased at will. On an intellectual level, the husband may understand his wife's desire to expand her activities. He may even sympathize with her struggles to find a meaningful job or the right degree program. On an emotional level, however, the husband may be threatened by role shift because of the perceived challenge it poses to his position of dominance in the family. In order for the family to endure and survive this critical stage, more supports need to be available to the husband.

Marital counseling continues to be a valuable way of helping couples resolve the conflict in their marriages. An assertive wife will accomplish very little if her husband is wedded to traditional sex-role ideology. Scanzoni maintains that, as far as counseling is concerned, training the sexes on how to negotiate with each other is of paramount concern as people struggle with sex-role changes.[27] Emphasis on negotiating helps the couple to articulate their feelings and make compromises. This process does not see either partner at an advantage. Rather, each learns that power can be shared rather than possessed. The husband's position has as much significance as the wife's, and this is apparent as the bargaining process is learned.

Social workers must recognize that many husbands see themselves in a no-win situation. Egalitarian sex-role ideology appears to favor the wife because her subordinate, dependent position in the family is being elevated. Sherman, a male therapist, states, "I have the somewhat irrational, yet explicable, apprehension of loss that threatens to occur with role change."[28] He suggests that this feeling can be attributed to the treatment of sex-role change that views women as the have-nots who will gain at the expense of the haves, which are the men. Halleck maintains that the women's movement presents our society with something of a zero-sum game.[29] Power is seen as being in limited supply and, if one group wants more, it is obtained at the expense of another

group. No doubt numerous husbands conceptualize their position in this type of framework.

Helping professionals may be more attuned to the win side or the gains of role shifts rather than to the loss side. After all, the husband is freed from the tremendous strain of being the sole earner in the family. This burden becomes one that is shared when the wife enters the labor market. The husband also gains the opportunity to spend more time with the children if he takes on child-care responsibilities. He may also gain household chores, which means he has a more active role in maintaining his home. Scanzoni refers to this line of thinking as the self-interest approach.[30] This position holds that husbands themselves will be better off when roles move in an egalitarian direction.

Social workers must keep in mind that many of the male gains associated with role changes are linked to the duties and responsibilities traditionally reserved for women. Consequently, these tasks may be defined as low-status because they receive no societal recognition and no economic rewards. The wife, on the other hand, is being elevated to a higher status because monetary and social rights seem to belong to those who are economically productive.[31] An imbalance emerges when the gains of husbands are compared with the gains of wives. As the husband loses his role as the sole family provider, the replacement roles do not appear to offer status and significance comparable to his relinquished role. A greater sensitivity to this imbalance may be useful in aiding families experiencing role changes.

According to Halleck, family therapy "has made many of us committed to values of fairness, cooperation, mutuality, and harmony."[32] These values may lead social workers to take what Scanzoni refers to as a prosocial or altruistic stance.[33] This perspective holds that husbands should want to change their roles out of a sense of fairness and rightness. The wife who works outside the home or goes to school may not have the time or energy to assume total responsibility for the home and the children. It seems only reasonable to assume that her husband would want to assist her. Such assistance reduces role strain for the wife and supports the cooperative nature of marriage. A resistant, uncooperative husband challenges the therapist's values and, as a result, may not receive the validation and acceptance he needs.[34]

These value-related issues emerge as central to the social worker's intervention with families facing role changes. Berger says that the first task for therapists is to become clear about their own values and commitments.[35] Iglehart indicates that helping professionals tend to be nontraditional in their sex-role values and orientations.[36] Social workers must, therefore, be in touch with their own nontraditionalism so that they do not limit the alternatives they discuss with clients. The same is true for workers who maintain a more traditional view of sex-role behavior and norms.

In addition to value differences, there are other reasons that may lead the husband to feel alienated from the social worker. Rice asserts that the male spouse may feel as if he is entering marital therapy in a "one-down" position, not only is he likely to be "brought" rather than to have "sought" therapy, but the arena and (verbal) weapons are more comfortable for his partner.[37] The husband may see himself as an outsider or a bad guy, while he regards the therapist and his wife as conspiring against him. The worker therapist should be alert to the potential presence of these feelings on the part of the husband. This awareness will enable the therapist to guard against inadvertently reinforcing the husband's sense of alienation. Validation and acceptance should be just as available to the husband as they are to the wife.

Reactions of the husband to his wife's employment may be a contributing factor to the problems presented in therapy. These problems may appear to be only indirectly related to the employment issue. Shaevitz and Shaevitz identify several defensive reactions the husband may have.[38] The passive-resistant husband says he supports his wife's employment, but he expects that all her home and child-raising responsibilities will be the same. The guilt-inducing husband also appears to be supportive of his wife, while he asks how the children will be affected or whether his wife is unhappy with him. The verbal expressions often hide the threat and defensiveness felt by the husband. Workers must explore beneath the surface expressions for hidden meanings.

Marital counseling represents only one way social workers can help with role transition. Other strategies will also prove useful. Burke and Weir write that husbands may lack preparation for crossing traditional roles. They note: "We have not yet seen the emergence of therapists for the liberated man as counterpart to feminist therapists, nor have we seen groups evolving to support husbands of career wives with the same rapidity as groups for career wives themselves."[39] Although this observation speaks to dual-career families, it is still relevant for husbands of working wives in general. These husbands did not have much direct, concrete social work support in the 1970s. They had to cope and adjust on their own in what appeared to be isolation.

The group technique so effective with nontraditional women can be just as effective with traditionally oriented husbands trying to cope with the employment of their wives. Meeting and interacting with husbands in similar situations may facilitate the resolution of issues. Husbands will soon discover that they are not alone in their feelings of frustration. A skilled worker may help them to recognize, identify, and articulate concerns about their nontraditional family life. Husbands making a successful transition can serve as role models for others. Rather than reinforce traditional values, the group can reflect the positive side of role transition and change so that the fears and apprehen-

sions of husbands can be eased. Thus, the group could be a resource for men who desire to resolve the conflict between their traditional values and their nontraditional life with a wife who works.

A male therapist may be an effective role model for husbands struggling with role shifts. The therapist may share his experiences and personal adjustments in order to encourage the husband to freely verbalize his frustrations. The use of role modeling in this manner provides needed support to a husband who may otherwise feel alienated. The male therapist may be useful in both individual and marital counseling as a model for husbands.

Agencies can provide workshops, guest lectures, and numerous other supportive services to husbands crossing traditional lines. Such support may help husbands to know that others recognize their concerns as legitimate ones. Because change may not be easy for many husbands, social workers can provide assistance to make the transition as painless as possible.

In the 1970s, social work did not address the needs of men caught in the winds of social change. Women were the center of attention as they expanded the boundaries of their world. In the future, social work can make up for the oversight by providing needed services to husbands with nontraditional wives. By providing services to both husbands and wives, the marital system is further strengthened.

Notes

1. A detailed discussion of post-World War II social change can be found in William H. Chafe, *The American Woman: Her Changing Social, Economic, and Political Roles, 1920–1970* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972).

2. Ferdinand Lundberg and Marynia Farnham, *Modern Woman: The Lost Sex* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1947), p. 235.

3. A review of poll results is contained in Valerie Oppenheimer, *The Female Labor Force in the United States: Demographic and Economic Factors Governing Its Growth and Changing Composition* (Berkeley: University of California, 1970).

4. Many of these factors are covered by Chafe.

5. George H. Gallup, *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935–1971*, vols. 1–3 (New York: Random House, 1972).

6. Karen Mason, John Czajka, and Sara Arber, "Change in U.S. Women's Sex-Role Attitudes, 1964–1974," *American Sociological Review* 41 (August 1976): 573–96.

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Toynbee Hall and the American Settlement Movement

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Toynbee Hall and the American settlement houses had their origins in middle-class, largely college-educated men and women who were concerned with the conditions of the urban poor. They saw in the settlement house an opportunity to share their lives and culture with the poor and to allay the dangers of class struggle. Toynbee Hall, founded in 1885, served as a direct impetus to the pioneer settlement houses in the United States. Americans imitated its form and many of its practices, but the circumstances of American life led to significant changes on the English model. By 1900, the American movement dwarfed its British predecessors, and international leadership passed to American settlement-house officials.

Origins

In the century following the Napoleonic wars relations between Great Britain and the United States improved immensely. The Atlantic not only served as a highway for trade, travelers, and immigrants, but also as a bridge for ideas and institutions. Historians such as Frank Thistlethwaite, Richard Carwardine, Merle Curti, Howard Temperley, Henry Pelling, Clifton Yearley, and others have chronicled the interwoven

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Anglo-American strands that united British and American cousins in efforts for peace, antislavery, religions, women, trade unions, temperance, and socialist movements.[1] Most of these studies were confined to the antebellum period, although Richard H. Heindel and Bradford Perkins have dealt with the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They were less interested in the transfer of organizations and institutions than they were in commonly held ideas and the interplay of diplomatic, social, and philosophical positions.[2] To some extent the pre-Civil War issues were less important late in the century, and an indigenous leadership no longer needed transatlantic prompting or examples. In at least two areas, temperance and working-class radicalism, Britons and Americans had moved so far apart by the 1880s that they no longer found a common cause.

In one area, settlement houses, there was a direct institutional transfer from England to America. To use an image popular among nineteenth-century American historians, a "germ" was planted in the United States which flowered and proliferated. However, as comparative studies have shown, there are subtle forces that demand an adaption of a borrowed institution in order to meet the values and circumstances that prevail in different socioeconomic systems. To state that there are structural similarities between coal mining in Wales and in southern Illinois does not preclude wide variations among mining unions, political policies, and the relationship between miners and the larger community. In the case of an English import like the settlement house, the constants, a similar process of industrialization and urbanization, and the borrowing of institutions to meet the crises created by them are important. But the contrasts are just as revealing, perhaps more so, than the similarities which fostered American imitations of Toynbee Hall.

In Great Britain the expansion of industry and the unregulated growth of cities in the last half of the nineteenth century with their related problems of labor exploitation and ugly, festering slums created a crisis of conscience in the minds of university-educated middle-class Christians. They were deeply concerned with the harmful impact of the industrial revolution on the separation of social classes and on the artificiality of a culture based on the division of the worker from his final product. They felt that university graduates had a role to play in the elevation of the masses. As Christians, they reflected a "new consciousness of sin," which in Beatrice Webb's view was a "collective or class consciousness, a growing uneasiness, amounting to conviction, that the industrial organization, which yielded rent, interest and profits on a stupendous scale had failed to provide a decent living and tolerable conditions for a majority of the inhabitants of Great Britain."[3]

In England the need to establish contact with the poor and to allay class conflict led to the development of urban missions, Charity Orga-

nization societies, workingman's colleges, and university extension courses. But none of these involved a close, daily, and personal association with the poor. To meet this need a group of Oxford and Cambridge students influenced by Arnold Toynbee and under the direction of Canon Samuel Barnett, vicar of St. Jude's Church in London's borough of Whitechapel, favored the formation of a residence in the East End slums. "It is," Barnett declared, "distance that makes friendship between classes almost impossible, and, therefore, residence among the poor is suggested as a simple way in which Oxford men may serve their generation."[4] A university-based association was established, money was quickly raised, and on January 10, 1885, Toynbee Hall, the world's first settlement house, was opened.[5]

Many of the social forces which produced the settlement-house movement in Great Britain were also found in America. An English writer has commented: "Useful and necessary though the Settlement was in late nineteenth century England, both the need and the opportunities for Settlement and voluntary social work were incalculably greater in the New World where the traditional individualism was a serious obstacle to collective action for the remedy of social evils due to industrialisation, expansion and immigration on a scale hitherto unparalleled in the history of the world."[6] In America, as in Britain, the new religious currents which touched the college-educated upper middle class stressed activity and mission. The settlement house combined both; it was a social gospel at work.[7] Settlement work offered an outlet for idealism, an opportunity to do good works in a scientific way, and the possibility of allaying class conflict by working with and learning from the submerged masses—to create what Robert A. Woods called "an outpost for the discovery, by scientific method, of the next step towards social peace."[8]

Toynbee Hall offered a practical and concrete model for young Americans, and within a few years overseas visitors were sipping tea with the Barnetts. In 1885 William Jewett Tucker, then a professor at Andover Theological Seminary, sent Howard D. Bliss, one of his undergraduates, to take up residency at Toynbee Hall. In 1890 a second of Tucker's pupils, Robert A. Woods, was sent to England. After six months at Toynbee Hall, Woods returned to the United States, and in an article in the *Andover Review* and a series of lectures published under the title of *English Social Movements* he provided the first lengthy account by an American of the work of Toynbee Hall. The book had a profound influence on the early settlement movement. It was a textbook for settlement-house workers, and Woods became the leading American translator of the meaning of Toynbee Hall. Over the years, he continued to publish articles and books on Toynbee and other British settlements.[9]

All of the earliest American settlement houses were directly influenced by Toynbee Hall. Stanton Coit returned from residency at Toyn-

bee Hall and founded the Neighborhood Guild in 1887. The guild differed from Toynbee Hall; it owed more to Frederick Denison Maurice's workingmen's colleges. But after Coit left New York to live in London, the Neighborhood Guild became University Settlement in 1892. James B. Reynolds, appointed as its warden in 1894, had studied Toynbee Hall firsthand. The most famous American settlement house owed an immediate debt to Toynbee Hall. Jane Addams visited Toynbee Hall in 1887 as part of a European tour and returned again in 1888 and in 1889. Addams and her companion Ellen Gates Starr then founded Hull House, which Starr and Addams viewed as a "Toynbee Hall experiment." Addams was compared with Canon Barnett and in turn the Canon called Ms. Addams "the greatest man in America."[10] Hull House's first full-time resident, George B. Hooker, had lived at Toynbee Hall and Mansfield House.

Vida D. Scudder, a graduate of Smith College, spent several months in England and praised Toynbee Hall in her articles for the *Christian Union*. She proposed something like Toynbee Hall for women; they could live together, teach the poor skills and instill in them "the spiritual and hidden wealth of a sensitive nature attuned to beauty"; the residents would develop a "hearty, mutual comprehension and friendship between the classes" and help "avert our social dangers."[11] Scudder, with graduates of Wellesley, Vassar, Bryn Mawr, Radcliffe, and Smith Colleges, founded College Settlement in New York in 1889. Within a year young women from twelve eastern schools founded college settlements in Boston and Philadelphia.

Everett P. Wheeler, a New York civil service reformer, visited Toynbee Hall in the summer of 1889. Upon his return, he persuaded an Episcopal laymen's group to form East Side House in 1891. Maxwell House in Brooklyn, formed as an institutional church in 1889 and as a settlement house in 1896, was based on information gained by visits of several members of the Second Unitarian Church to Toynbee Hall. Northwestern University Settlement was founded in 1891 by Charles Zueblin, who had made an extensive visit to Toynbee Hall. In the same year, William Jewett Tucker and Robert A. Woods established Andover House in Boston. Woods became head resident because of his "knowledge of the organized activities of London settlements." Graham Taylor, while a clergyman in Hartford, Connecticut, had learned about Toynbee Hall, Hull House, and Andover House. On assuming a chair at Chicago Theological Seminary in 1894, he founded Chicago Commons. The Reverend George Hodges of Pittsburgh spent a summer studying English settlement houses and in 1893 opened Kingsley House in Pittsburgh.[12] The second generation of settlement houses were built on the experience and sometimes the personnel of the founding fathers. Quite rightly, Louise C. Wade concludes, "Toynbee Hall was the inspiration and model for most of the American settlement houses."[13]

The philosophy of Toynbee Hall was taken over wholesale by the early American settlements. Thus, the constitution of New York's University Settlement states that their aim was "to bring men and women of education in to closer relations with the laboring classes for their mutual benefit."[14] Certainly Barnett would have agreed with Jane Addams's three purposes of a settlement: to make society not merely politics, but democratic; to share the residents' higher culture with those who had little, and to lead men toward a higher Christian awareness. To Julia Lathrop, "Toynbee was the first so-called settlement, and the forces which initiated it show that union of Brotherly zeal for humanity and scientific ardor for truth which should characterize every settlement."[15] Graham Taylor of Chicago Commons also saw Toynbee Hall as the beginning of a larger social movement. "From Toynbee's day to this hour, the *raison d'être* of the social settlement movement, by which little groups of men and women have been impelled to leave the surroundings of the privileged classes and live among the unprivileged masses, has been the recognition of social democracy, not only as the worthiest ideal in society, but as the free-est self-development and highest self-expression of human personality."[16]

Toynbee Hall Influences

The physical and social surroundings of Toynbee Hall attempted to recreate the college atmosphere of Oxford and Cambridge. This aspect of Toynbee Hall was noted favorably by American visitors, and in the early United States settlements conscious efforts were made to provide residents quarters and a communal feeling familiar to the college-educated residents. As Jane Robbins remarked of her first year in a settlement house, "Upstairs in our rooms it seemed as if we were back in college again."[17]

The early American visitors to Toynbee Hall shared the Barnett's belief in elevating the masses by exposing them to the arts; in particular the young Americans hoped to duplicate the annual Toynbee Hall–sponsored Whitechapel Art Exhibit and, like Toynbee Hall, to house a permanent art collection.[18] Indeed, one of Hull House's first projects was the establishment of an art gallery. It was opened in 1891 by no less than Canon Barnett, who after the ceremony gave, as Henrietta Barnett cryptically remarked, "one of his suggestive, elusive, indefinite addresses so specially attractive to the American mind."[19] Robert A. Woods, out of the knowledge gained at Toynbee Hall, sponsored the first settlement house art exhibit held in Boston. Other settlements followed Hull House and South End House, and eventually American

settlements went beyond their English parent in providing art, music, and drama instruction. Like Toynbee Hall, the American settlements stressed the formation of clubs as the principal means of community organization. In England, with its long tradition of workingmen's clubs, it was easier initially to form clubs and recreational groups than it was in America. However, the American residents tapped the gregarious bent in the native American and the communal feelings of the immigrant. By the mid-1890s, English visitors were startled by the elaborate structure of the club life centering in the American settlement houses.

The American settlements quickly emulated the social surveys which they associated with Charles Booth and Toynbee Hall. The *Hull House Maps and Papers* was a conscious attempt to apply to Chicago what Booth had done for London.[20] Booth's study was also a model for *The City Wilderness* survey of Boston edited by Robert A. Woods of South End House. The famous Pittsburgh survey was largely the work of residents of Kingsley House, and it was based on knowledge of the work of Toynbee Hall. Other themes and practices of Toynbee Hall were taken up with enthusiasm by early United States settlement houses. The success of Toynbee Hall in establishing close relations with trade unions had a deep impact on Americans. It was the duty of the settlement, Jane Addams contended, to bring to the unions "something of the spirit which has lately characterized the unions in England."[21] As in Britain, unions used settlement houses to hold meetings and found in their residents allies willing to arbitrate in industrial disputes. Thus, the Toynbee Society of Philadelphia consisting of trade unionists, reformers, and settlement-house workers, investigated the working conditions of street railway men. In their report, they criticized the "intolerant" attitude of the employers and contrasted their intransigency with the acceptance of systems of conciliation and arbitration in England.[22]

The political successes of Toynbee Hall served as a stimulus to American settlement houses, although initially English residents were more successful in running for office than their American counterparts. The latter had to face the very real and entrenched machines of a Johnny Power in Chicago, Richard Crocker in New York, and John "Honey Fitz" Fitzgerald in Boston. As in London, American settlement workers sponsored "Independent" or "City" or "Progressive" tickets. By 1900, it was common to find American residents elected to boards of education, serving as secretaries of city and state commissions and as delegates to charter conventions. Following patterns set by Toynbee Hall, Americans worked for the establishment of public baths and parks, free libraries, model tenements, and improved sanitation in their neighborhoods.

Educational programs in the early American settlements were often copies of similar programs at Toynbee Hall. They consisted of a mixture of vocational and manual training, evening classes, special lecture series, adult education courses in the arts and social sciences, and university extension courses. Frank Parsons, a law professor at Harvard University, studied Toynbee Hall's Workingman's Institute and founded the Breadwinner's College at Civil Service House in Boston. And in most settlement houses there were variations on the famous Toynbee Hall "smokers."

American Contrasts

As observed above, there were direct and some indirect ties between Toynbee Hall and American settlements in the early years. Equally important are the differences which arose naturally enough between countries with varying political, social, and economic values and conditions. "So great are the divergencies in social and economic conditions in England and America," contended Florence Kelley, "that discussions of concrete evils and proposed remedies are not equally applicable in both countries."[23] The most obvious difference between the settlement movements in the two countries was the domination in Britain of male residents and of female residents in the United States. In America, according to Robert A. Woods, there was a feeling that male settlement-house residents were, somehow, "a group of exquisites."[24] There was never this sense in England, where a rigid separation of the sexes in schools, colleges, and clubs was considered natural and healthy. The American settlement movement owned its greatest stimulus to the new women's colleges established since the 1870s. Intelligent, liberal-minded, upper-middle-class girls found in the settlement movement a mission and a glorious sense of adventure.[25] J. Ramsay MacDonald called it the "revolt of the daughters." "It is," he argued, "the revolt against the conventional existence which despite common report, the majority of well-to-do American women have to live, and it is not, as is generally the case here [Great Britain], a fling, but the assumption of new and more worthy duties."[26] More common were mixed settlements, especially in the West where the tradition of coeducation had long been common. Even Hull House, which was founded by women, very early opened residency for men. After visiting mixed settlements in America, Henrietta Barnett remarked, "Candour compels me to state that with few exceptions in the settlements I visited, the grey mare was the better horse of the pair."[27] One of the practical

consequences of a women-dominated staff in America was the formation of kindergartens, child-welfare clinics, homemaking programs, handicrafts, play groups, and the involvement of workers in preschool education, juvenile courts, and child and labor legislation.

The financial character of Toynbee Hall and its American imitators showed some marked differences. Toynbee began with a large and imposing building, and as the years passed new buildings were added. There were no serious problems obtaining funds for these buildings nor for special projects. In part, this was due to Barnett's connections. He always conceived of Toynbee Hall in relatively modest terms—a place to use existing facilities rather than a place to expand new ones. The good Canon believed in the Empire, but not in empire building. American settlements, however, started humbly; often they were no more than a tenement, or a large home of faded gentility lost in a slum. Perhaps the mean beginnings encouraged American settlers to mount fund-raising drives and insistently tap funds from supporting associations and local philanthropists. By 1900 visiting Englishmen were surprised at the space and facilities available at American settlement houses. The earliest American residents paid their own way. But very quickly American settlement houses established a policy of stipends for residents, the use of outside volunteers, special fellowship residents, and a paid staff. The effect was to give an air of professionalism about American settlements which, fortunately or unfortunately, was not true of the Barnett era at Toynbee Hall. And unlike Toynbee, American settlements moved away from the narrow base of colleges as a source of residents.

The most startling differences in which the two settlement movements evolved concerned the ethnic and racial characteristics of their surroundings. Toynbee was originally in an English and Irish slum. However, by the 1890s Whitechapel became a center for Eastern European Jews. Barnett and his co-workers responded slowly to the Jewish immigration. One suspects this was due to a muted anti-semitism—almost a trumpet blast with Henrietta Barnett. A Jewish settlement house funded by the Rothschilds was opened a half-block from Toynbee Hall. Its first warden though, was Basil Henriques, an ex-resident of Toynbee Hall. The local Jews not only organized their own affairs but they had the bad taste to be law abiding. Older Toynbee residents must have missed the glorious days when Jack the Ripper prowled the streets immediately behind the settlement. By contrast, American settlements were founded in the context of the vast late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century immigration and were intended as assimilating agencies in a way hardly conceived of in Britain. A contemporary suggested that the "really distinctive necessity for the settlement house in America arises from immigration."[28] One only has to read the accounts of the founding persons of the settlement movements to catch that

sense of initial strangeness and then positive pleasure in the challenges of a multiethnic neighborhood. The immigrant experience shaped the work of the settlements as well as the concepts of American social work.[29] After inspecting American settlements, the Englishman Percy Alden concluded: "I lay great stress on the importance of the Settlement in creating the neighborhood spirit, becoming a nucleus around which men, women, and children of different nationalities may gather, and learn the meaning of citizenship. Out of the neighborhood feeling will grow the social consciousness, and slowly but surely the Settlement will become the voice through which the civic conscience makes itself heard."[30] American settlement houses also included black neighborhoods. In some instances, settlers favored separate black settlements, but in most they opened their doors on the basis of equality. To Percy Alden, the ethnic-racial atmosphere of an American slum was simply startling, and he clearly saw that the American racial and ethnic patterns had no exact counterpart in Britain. As for the Barnetts, whatever their sympathies toward individual American settlement workers, they could not overcome their antipathies toward black and immigrant clients of American settlement houses. Dame Barnett felt that "it is against the normal human nature (whatever a few angelic characters might believe) to feel on terms of absolute equality" with blacks. "In a population which largely consists of an admixture of many races," she stated, "there are in the United States of America a considerable number of abnormal children."[31]

The class basis and, more important, class attitudes of British and American societies affected the relationship between the settlement house and its clients and, perhaps, the effectiveness of its work. The Barnetts and the residents of Toynbee Hall were secure in their class position and in class terms consciously separated themselves from the East End Londoners. The aim of the settlement house was to reconcile classes not to eliminate class lines, and in that sense its intention was conservative. Canon Barnett stressed the upper-class qualities of "duty" and "service" toward the lower classes. As a leading authority on Barnett has contended, the canon "intended to *impose* Oxbridge culture and middle-class standards on his working-class neighbors," or at least on those elements of the deserving poor who were willing to accept and who were capable of absorbing the higher standards of Toynbee Hall residents.[32] There was seldom the belief, so common among American settlement workers, that the residents could gain knowledge from the poor and appreciate the rich working-class culture. As Emily K. Abel has rightly stated, there was an "absence in Barnett's writing of any awareness of human vitality or drama in working-class areas; he could describe East London as being uniformly dull and mean because he associated all signs of life with immorality."[33] If American settlement workers occasionally failed to grasp some of the

spirit and details of immigrant life, they at least indicated a desire to relate their work to the culture of their clients. Of course, as Thomas Lee Philpott's recent study clearly illustrates, middle-class American settlement workers approached slum dwellers with a host of middle-class prejudices and predilections.[34] But because the American class system was fluid, and because many American settlement workers came from families with a liberal and reformist tradition, they spoke less about "duty" and "service" and more about "opportunity" and "self-reliance." They viewed the poor not as a permanent underclass but as a group capable of improving their economic and social status. Furthermore, work with immigrants committed most settlement workers to some version of cultural pluralism, which in turn led to a stress on assimilating ethnic groups rather than reconciling social classes.

Toynbee Hall was an establishment organization from its inception. Its residents were drawn from a national elite which hardly existed in America. Barnett, for all his oddities, moved in circles which it took a Jane Addams years to develop. As an example, in a letter to his brother Barnett remarked that he had dined with the Bryces and, on the following day, "we dined with the Courtneys [.], Balfour, Morley, Asquith, the next Duke of Devonshire, and Hobhouse were there. It was very interesting."[35] Barnett could call upon the most stimulating as well as the most prestigious figures in British society to lead a debate or offer a lecture at the hall. It was said that there were more famous people seen in Whitechapel than in any borough in London. "We get too many lords," Barnett once jokingly complained. Toynbee Hall service was recognized as an entrée to a career, and ex-residents moved to positions of power in Britain and the Empire. This was an unimaginable notion in the American context. For example, four twentieth-century prime ministers have had close associations with Toynbee Hall, and one, Clement Attlee, was a long-time resident.[36] The American settlement houses had no such social and intellectual constituency until they created one. The social connections of Toynbee Hall meant that Barnett and his residents seldom had to struggle against an entrenched bureaucracy or oppose individuals in power who actively hated the settlement movement. The result was a faint air of diffidence and dilettanteism, quite unlike the professionalism found in American settlements.

Initially, the two settlement movements took different positions toward Charity Organization Societies (COS). Barnett had begun his welfare work in them and viewed Toynbee Hall as a cooperator in their work. However, as he moved from the individualistic stance of the COS to a more socialist-influenced collectivism, he gradually broke with them. In 1895 he made a scathing attack on the organization and thereafter took only a nominal interest in its affairs.[37] In America, the early settlement workers consciously differentiated between the charity vis-

itors of the COS and themselves. The depression which started in 1893 brought about a change in social-settlement thinking—men obviously needed food before they needed lectures on the Single Tax. In 1891 Julia Lathrop of Hull House led a discussion on settlement houses at the National Conference of Charities and Corrections, and two years later a panel of settlement workers explained their work at the National Conference. The settlement workers stressed the mutual concerns and the need for cooperation between themselves and the COS. By 1905 *Charities*, a COS publication, and *Commons*, a settlement-house magazine, merged as the official journal of both movements. In 1909 Jane Addams was elected chairman of the National Conference.[38]

Toynbee Hall came into existence simultaneously with the agitation for social and labor legislation of an advanced sort. To Barnett, legislation was more important than philanthropy, and he was among the earliest advocates of noncontributory state pensions. Toynbee residents supported legislation and helped to implement it in its local applications. Other Toynbee graduates drafted the great Liberal legislation of 1907, including the National Health Insurance Act. Barnett had a hand in the Education Act of 1902. In so doing, he cooperated with two Toynbee associates, Sir John Gorst, parliamentary secretary to the Board of Education, and Sir Robert Morant, who subsequently became permanent secretary to the board. Dr. Albert Mansbridge, the founder of the Workers' Education Association (WEA), had been a resident at Toynbee Hall, and the WEA grew out of his experiences there.[39] The effect of this body of legislation was to shift many of the voluntary functions of Toynbee Hall onto the shoulders of the state, thereby eliminating important aspects of settlement work. By contrast, in America, social and labor legislation hardly existed on a federal level, and in the states the pattern was erratic. American settlers were at the forefront of the demands for labor legislation, especially for women and children, and they were as much responsible for its passage as any group in the Progressive Period. But compared with several European countries, the state provided almost minimal welfare, and the settlement houses in America maintained their quasi-charitable features until the 1930s. Toynbee Hall lost its political impetus with the passage of liberal legislation, whereas American settlement-house workers were actively involved in local and national political movements for many years.

Toynbee Hall was closest to its American counterparts in the 1890s. The United States movement took off around the turn of the century, and by 1920 there were 110 settlements in the country. The American movement dwarfed the European one, and with the death of Canon Barnett in 1913 the leadership baton passed irrevocably to Jane Addams of Hull House. In fact, it had long before passed to Addams. In America, the golden age of settlement houses was the twenty years before the

Great War. More was written about them and they were more influential than in any other period. Unlike Britain, American universities adapted to the kinds of courses needed to provide intelligent settlers, so there was an easy transition from the amateurs of 1895 to the professional social workers of 1915. In England, the settlement movement was fading, or at least ossifying into institutional forms The old verve was gone, fewer graduates of Oxbridge were carried away by "settlement fever." The appeal to overseas missions and the civil service was greater than Barnett's call to an East End Macedonia The differences between the two movements is best expressed in a joint review written in 1914 by E. J. Urwick of Toynbee Hall and Robert A. Woods of South End House, Boston Urwick was pessimistic In Toynbee Hall, he saw a dead hand of tradition, and in general "the complete institutionalizing of settlements has been a real disaster " New legislation, the expansion of state and municipal services, and the rise of the trade unions had co-opted the territory of the settlement movement Gone were the days of the "young and enthusiastic" residents Woods, admittedly God's own optimist, simply cataloged American settlements' growth and successes.[40] Then, too, American city and national federations of settlements provided feedback and professional advice not found in the isolated settlements, what an ex-resident of Toynbee Hall called the "small enclosed fortress," of the British movement.[41]

In the years after World War I, the ties between Toynbee Hall and the American settlement movement were largely sentimental In 1920 Henrietta Barnett was appointed president of the United States Federation of University Settlements, which in that year met at the Roycroft Inn In this monument to Elbert Hubbard, Dame Barnett carried her message to the assembled social work Garcias. She spoke at length of the history of Toynbee Hall, "of the welfare of their parent," as she quaintly put it.[42] Two years later, the first International Conference of Settlements was held at Toynbee Hall and Dame Barnett was elected president. But this internationalizing of the settlement movement—there were 300 delegates from twenty-one countries at the 1922 conference—was largely the result of American initiative [43]

During the interwar years, Toynbee Hall became a backwater of the settlement movement The American movement too lost some of its spark and turned away from the Barnetts to other gods, first to Freud and then to Roosevelt The old generation was passing away. Symbolically, in 1934 one of Jane Addams's last public acts was to participate in a Christmas Eve transatlantic broadcast celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of Toynbee Hall [44]

In a broad sense, the relations between Toynbee Hall and the American settlement-house movement are a chapter in that curious turn-of-the-century world of Anglo-Saxonia. It was a world of easy interchange, of shared upper-middle-class values and prejudices; a world in

which Robert A. Woods could imagine himself a Londoner if he had not been called to a higher destiny in Boston. It was a world in which Britain's superior values and institutions, like the settlement house, provided models and guidelines for America.[45] Toynbee Hall pioneered a series of practical programs which the Americans imitated and then, because of different conditions, modified and evolved new approaches. Far more important, Toynbee Hall, particularly as it was personified by Canon Barnett and the traditions of Ruskin and Toynbee, provided a moral leadership and a prestige essential to the young men and women of the 1890s. The universals propogated by Barnett, namely, a community of men and women engaged in enhancing the lives of the deprived and creating a community of equals, were never questioned and remain the guidelines of the settlement movement today.

Notes

1. Frank Thistlethwaite, *The Anglo-American Connection in the Early Nineteenth Century* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1959); Richard Carwardine, *Transatlantic Revivalism: Popular Evangelicalism in Britain and America, 1790–1865* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978); Merle E. Curti, *The American Peace Crusade* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1929); Howard Temperley, "The British and American Abolitionists Compared," in *The Antislavery Vanguard: New Essays on the Abolitionists*, ed. Martin B. Duberman (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 343–61; Henry Pelling, *America and the British Left: From Bright to Bevan* (New York: New York University Press, 1957); Clifton K. Yearley, *Britons in American Labor: A History of the Influence of the United Kingdom Immigrants on American Labor, 1820–1914* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1957).

2. Richard H. Heindel, *The American Impact on Great Britain, 1898–1914: A Study of the United States in World History* (New York: Octagon Books, 1968); Bradford Perkins, *The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895–1914* (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1968).

3. Beatrice Webb, *My Apprenticeship* (London: Penguin Books, 1971), p. 193. See also the words used by William Beveridge in a letter to his mother justifying residence at Toynbee Hall: "Such places represent simply a protest against the *sin* of taking things for granted" (*Power and Influence* [London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1953], p. 21; my italics).

4. Henrietta Barnett, *Canon Barnett: His Life, Work and Friends*, 2 vols. (London: J. Murray, 1918), 1:307.

5. On the origins and foundation of Toynbee Hall, see ibid., 1:302–25; J. A. R. Pimlott, *Toynbee Hall: Fifty Years of Social Progress, 1884–1934* (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1935), pp. 21–43; Werner Picht, *Toynbee Hall and the English Settlement Movement*, rev. ed. (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1914), pp. 1–29; Emily K. Abel, "Canon Barnett and the First Thirty Years of Toynbee Hall" (Ph.D. diss., University of London, 1969), pp. 95–146; and "Toynbee Hall, 1884–1914," *Social Service Review* 53 (December 1979): 607–9.

6. Jane Addams, "*Toynbee Outlook* 1 (November 1935): 80.

7. Robert A. Woods and Albert J. Kennedy, *The Settlement Horizon: A National Estimate* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1922), p. 40; Robert H. Bremner, *From the Depths: The Discovery of Poverty in the United States* (New York: New York University Press, 1964), p. 61.

8. Robert A. Woods, "University Settlements: Their Point and Drift," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 14 (November 1899): 67-86, quote on 83.

9. Robert A. Woods, "University Settlements," *Andover Review* 17 (October 1892): 1-23, and *English Social Movements* (London: Swan, Sonnenchein, 1892). In addition to the above references to Woods, see also his "The University Settlement Idea," in *Philanthropy and Social Progress*, by Jane Addams et al. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1893), pp. 57-97, and "The Social Awakening in London," in *The Poor in Great Cities: Their Problems and What Is Being Done to Save Them*, by Woods et al. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1896), pp. 3-42; F. J. Urwick and Robert A. Woods, "The Settlement Movement in England and America," *Quarterly Review* 221 (July 1914): 216-32.

10. Barnett, 2:31. On the origins of University Settlement and Hull House, see Allen F. Davis, *Spearheads for Reform: The Social Settlement and the Progressive Movement 1890-1914* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 8-12; James B. Reynolds, "University Settlements," in *The Encyclopedia of Social Reform*, ed. W. D. P. Bliss (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1897), pp. 136-63; Jane Addams, *Twenty Years at Hull-House* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1911), chaps. 1-5; Allen F. Davis, *American Heroine: The Life and Legend of Jane Addams* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 49, 51, 57; Woods and Kennedy, pp. 11-17.

11. Quoted in John P. Rousmaniere, "Cultural Hybrid in the Slums: The College Woman and the Settlement House, 1889-1894," *American Quarterly* 22 (Spring, 1970): 45-66, quote on 58; see also, Peter J. Frederick, "Vida Dutton Scudder: The Professor as Activist," *New England Quarterly* 43 (September 1970): 407-33. Two of Scudder's closest associates, Jean Fine and Helen Rand, went to Great Britain to study settlement work.

12. Davis, *Spearheads*, pp. 13-14; Woods and Kennedy, pp. 47-51; Graham Taylor, *Chicago Commons through Forty Years* (Chicago: Chicago Commons Association, 1936), p. 5; Louise C. Wade, *Graham Taylor: Pioneer for Social Justice 1851-1838* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 79-81; Edward S. Shapiro, "Robert A. Woods and the Settlement House Impulse," *Social Service Review* 52 (June 1978): 215-26; Eleanor H. Woods, *Robert A. Woods: Champion of Democracy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1929), p. 45. The first critical study of Toynbee Hall, and by inference of its American imitators, was made by Professor Edward Cummings of Harvard University (who visited and lectured there in the winter of 1888-89) in his "University Settlements," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 6 (April 1892): pp. 257-79.

13. Wade, p. 80.

14. Robert A. Woods and Albert J. Kennedy, eds., *Handbook of Settlements* (New York: Arno Press, 1970), p. 228.

15. Julia Lathrop, "What the Settlement Work Stands For," in *Proceedings of the National Conference of Charities and Corrections 1896* (Boston: George H. Ellis, 1896), p. 107.

16. Graham Taylor, "The Social Settlement and the Labor Movement," in *Proceedings of the National Conference of Charities and Corrections, 1896*, p. 144.

17. Jane Robbins, "The First Year at the College Settlement," *Survey* 27 (February 24, 1912): 1801-3, quote on 1801; see also Rousmaniere, pp. 61, 64; and Davis, *Spearheads*, p. 31.

18. Woods and Kennedy, *Settlement Horizon*, p. 146.

19. Barnett, 2:30-31.

20. The warden of Mansfield House and ex-Toynbee Hall resident, Percy Alden, stated that the Hull House study "compares very favorably" with Booth ("The Social and College Settlements of America," *Outlook* 51 [June 22, 1895]: 1090-91).

21. Jane Addams, "The Settlement as a Factor in the Labor Movement," in *Readings in the Development of Settlement Work*, ed. Lorene M. Pacey (New York: Association Press, 1950), p. 31. See also Davis, *Spearheads*, chap. 6; Robert A. Woods, *The Neighborhood in Nation-Building: The Running Comment on Thirty Years at South End House* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1923), pp. 287-88.

22. *The Philadelphia Trolley Companies and Their Employees*, Pamphlet No. 1 (Philadelphia: Toynbee Society, 1895). Copy in the Library of the London School of Economics and Political Science.

23. Florence Kelley, "Towards Social Reform," *Survey* 23 (February 12, 1910): 712-14.

24. Woods and Kennedy, *Settlement Horizon*, p. 55; Woods, "University Settlements," p. 9. Between 1887 and 1896 nine women's settlements were opened in Great Britain, and by 1920 there were twenty-four women's or mixed settlement houses in London and the Provinces. In 1903 F. J. Urwick of Toynbee Hall noted the "arrogant self-confidence among the men" in the British settlement movement. He contended that the women's settlements were more like training schools than proper settlement houses. Certainly Canon Barnett discouraged women at Toynbee Hall, and in his frequent "pals parties" he positively excluded them (Ronald G. Walton, *Women in Social Work* [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975], pp. 52, 54).

25. Anne Firor Scott, "Jane Addams and the City," *Virginia Quarterly Review* 43 (Winter 1967): 53–62; Stephen Kalberg, "The Commitment to Career Reform: The Settlement Movement Leaders," *Social Service Review* 49 (December 1975): 608–28; Rousmaniere, p. 66.

26. J. Ramsay MacDonald, "American Social Settlements," *Commons* 2 (February 1898): 4–6.

27. Henrietta Barnett, *Matters That Matter* (London: J. Murray, 1930), p. 34.

28. Urwick and Woods, p. 226.

29. George Cary White, "Social Settlements and Immigrant Neighbors, 1886–1914," *Social Service Review* 33 (March 1959): 55–66; Daniel Levine, *Jane Addams and the Liberal Tradition* (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1971), chap. 11.

30. Alden, p. 1090.

31. Barnett, *Matters That Matter*, pp. 25–26, 68–71, 296.

32. Emily K. Abel, "Middle Class Culture for the Urban Poor: The Educational Thought of Samuel Barnett," *Social Service Review* 52 (December 1978): 599–600, 615; "Canon Barnett and the First Thirty Years of Toynbee Hall," pp. 80, 87 and "Toynbee Hall 1884–1914," pp. 611, 619, my italics.

33. Abel, "Middle Class Culture for the Urban Poor," p. 600.

34. Thomas Lee Philpott, *The Slum and the Ghetto: Neighborhood Deterioration and Middle-Class Reform, Chicago, 1880–1930* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), chap. 3. For interesting comments on the contrast between class-bound attitudes of British settlement workers and the greater personal involvement and equalitarianism of American settlement workers, see the contemporary British traveler, Alexander Francis, *Americans: An Impression* (London: Andrew Melrose, 1909), pp. 111–17.

35. Barnett, *Canon Barnett*, 1:390; see also Woods, *English Social Movements*, p. 94.

36. There were 188 residents from 1884 to 1911. In the latter year there were three ex-residents who were members of parliament, including Asquith who was parliamentary private secretary to the prime minister, one private secretary to the financial secretary of the treasury, one on the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and another on the Royal Commission on University Education in London; two served on the London Education Committee, one was principal of University College Reading, two were professors of political economy, a director of labour exchanges in the Board of Trade, a permanent secretary to the Board of Trade, the editor of the *Westminster Gazette*, the managing director and parliamentary correspondent of the *Daily News*, an assistant editor of the *Economist*, and an alderman on the London County Council (Picht [n. 5 above], p. 32; see also Harold Spender, *The Fire of Life: A Book of Memories* [London: Hodder & Staughton, 1927], pp. 98, 178; Abel, "Toynbee Hall 1884–1914," pp. 614–15, 624–25). The national political influence of settlement-house residents did not come to America until the 1930s. Harry Hopkins, Frances Perkins, Henry Morgantheau, Herbert Lehman, Adolph Berle, Gerard Swope, and Eleanor Roosevelt all had settlement house experiences (Davis, *Spearheads*, p. 244).

37. Abel, "Middle-Class Culture for the Urban Poor," pp. 613–14.

38. Davis, *Spearheads*, pp. 18–22.

39. Alan Harber, "Religious and Political Idealism in Adult Education with Special Reference to Toynbee Hall" (Dip. thesis, University of Nottingham, 1975), pp. 33–34. Sir John Gorst toured American settlements in 1894.

40. Urwick and Woods, pp. 216–32. Urwick's views are also expressed in Picht, pp. 132–34, and in M. D. Stocks, *Fifty Years in Every Street: The Story of the Manchester University Settlement* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1945), pp. 42–43. In 1913 the Toynbee Hall council reported: "Toynbee Hall is not flourishing at the present time. There is a

certain atmosphere of decay Toynbee Hall, in fact, seems to be living on the reputation which was built up during the early years of its existence" (quoted in Abel, "Toynbee Hall, 1884–1914," p 626) However, even in America a writer admitted in 1911 [illegible] settlement has become an established conservative influence in city life, no longer attractive as before to ardent youth with path-finding goals" ("The Settlement Movement A Quarter-Century Old," *Survey* 27 [December 16, 1911] 1352)

41 Picht, p 131

42 Barnett, *Matters That Matter*, pp 23–24

43 Ties between Toynbee Hall and the United States were encouraged by an annual American seminar, beginning in 1920, with United States welfare administrators, ministers, social workers, and students in attendance By 1935, over 1,000 individuals had participated in these seminars (Pimlott [n 5 above], p 255, J J Mallon, "Toynbee Hall Past and Present," in Pacey, ed [n 21 above], pp 261–71)

44 *Times* (London) (December 27, 1934)

45 Woods, *English Social Movements*, p 265

Balancing Required Resources and Neighborhood Opposition in Community-based Treatment Center Neighborhoods

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This paper analyzes the compatibility of two characteristics of neighborhoods containing community based treatment centers (CBTCs): the availability of resources that can be used in treatment and the likelihood of neighborhood opposition. Do CBTC neighborhoods having high levels of geographically based resources also have characteristics associated with low opposition to these centers? The findings suggest that among neighborhoods with centers serving adults, inner-city transitional neighborhoods where low opposition would be expected have significantly higher levels of treatment resources than do more affluent, suburban neighborhoods. The implications of these findings for selecting sites for community-based treatment centers are discussed.

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Geographically based treatment resources are public goods,[8] available to all neighborhood residents—both in and out of the center—simply by virtue of living in the neighborhood. Use of these resources is not, strictly speaking, controlled by an external agent. They are available to the center residents and staff for use in treatment as the center staff desires.[9] If, however, the neighborhood environment does not contain the geographically based resources that a center needs to facilitate reintegration of its residents into the community, the center staff does not have the option of using these potentially important treatment resources.

The kinds of geographically based resources required by community-based treatment centers depends on whether they serve adults or children.[10] The literature on CBTCs suggests that neighborhood environments for centers serving adults should provide residents with four different treatment resources: access to transportation, access to employment opportunities, access to recreational opportunities, and access to shopping facilities.[11] Each of these resources provides residents with some material benefit and with the chance to interact with noncenter residents who are going about their daily life-tasks. Perhaps the most important of these resources is access to transportation because it provides residents with the flexibility to seek the kinds of interactions they want and need to speed their eventual integration into society.

While transportation facilities can provide residents with access to more distant employment, recreational, and shopping opportunities, there are advantages to having these three kinds of resources located near the center. Residents who have been formerly institutionalized may lack the confidence to explore the community by public transportation. Having places in the neighborhood where they can work, play, and shop may increase the likelihood that they will actually use and benefit from these facilities. The security that residents may feel from shopping or going to work close to where they live can increase their confidence about interacting with strangers and expand the social networks in which they participate. Thus, while access to transportation is clearly an important resource in expanding the boundaries of the center resident's social world, it is not a substitute for the presence of employment, recreational, and shopping facilities in the immediate neighborhood environment.

Centers serving children require only two geographically based treatment resources from their neighborhood environments: proximity to schools serving the age groups represented in the center, and recreational opportunities for children.[12] With schools and recreational opportunities for center residents located nearby, the children's feelings of belonging in the neighborhood increase. In addition, by going

o school and playing in the same parks and recreation centers with the children who live in the surrounding neighborhood, center residents increase their opportunities for establishing friendships with neighborhood children and thereby becoming integrated into their social networks. Participation in these networks can in turn diminish the isolation that children experience in institutions and other closed facilities. While many centers could use their own resources to provide educational and recreational programs that serve some of the same needs as those provided by neighborhood-based resources, the opportunities for interaction that accompany using these resources would be seriously diminished.

The Data and Concepts

Defining the community-based treatment center.—Community-based treatment centers are differentiated from other kinds of treatment centers by the fact that they provide a therapeutic environment intermediate between independent living and institutional care. In this research, community-based treatment centers are operationally defined by the following five criteria:

1. The center provides twenty-four-hour residential care and is not simply a day treatment or activities center.
2. The center is not a total-care institution or a hospital. This focuses the research on residential environments that are intermediate between independent or family living and an institution.
3. The center is not primarily a medical or convalescent institution whose residents would probably be confined to the center facilities.
4. The center provides its clients with residence for longer than an emergency short-term stay but less than an indefinite, long-term stay. The lower limit ensures that residents of the center live there long enough to have at least the chance to establish social relationships in the neighborhood. The upper limit excludes total institutions.
5. The residents of the center are not so impaired either socially or physically that it would be difficult for them to use the resources available in the neighborhood environment.[13]

The identification of the CBTC population in New Castle County.—New Castle County is part of the Wilmington, Delaware–New Jersey–Maryland Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. The county provides a full complement of social and medical services and has a significant concentration of large manufacturing facilities. The county's population in 1970 was about 386,000 residents divided between the central

city of Wilmington of about 80,000 and an urban balance of abou 306,000.[14] New Castle County is thus both large and diverse enough t have a considerable number of community-based treatment centers ye is small enough so that data can conveniently be gathered on all of th community-based centers in the county. A preliminary list of CBTC was established by consulting the *Directory of Human Services fo Delaware* for 1978 and 1979.[15] Independent scrutiny of the directory b myself and an assistant generated a preliminary list of twenty-five centers meeting the five definitional criteria. A review of this list by six New Castle County practitioners active in the fields of child welfare, menta health, juvenile corrections, and criminal justice resulted in adding one new center, deleting three centers that had ceased to function, and providing information about the consolidation of two other centers. The final corrected list included a total of twenty-one community-based treatment centers. Table 1 presents the distribution of these centers by type of client, age of client, size of the center, and age of the center.

Table 1

Distribution of Community-based Treatment Centers by Selected Center Characteristics

Center Characteristics	Number of Centers	Percent of Total
Type of client served:		
Dependent and neglected children	7	33.3
Mentally ill	1	4.8
Substance abusers	5	23.8
Mentally retarded	2	9.5
Adjudicated delinquents	1	4.8
Physically handicapped	2	9.5
Homeless adults	3	14.3
Total	21	100.0
Age of clients served:		
Centers for children only*	7	33.3
Center for adults only	9	42.9
Centers for children and adults	5	23.8
Total	21	100.0
Size of center:		
0–10	3	14.3
11–20	8	38.1
21–30	5	23.8
31 +	5	23.8
Total	21	100.0
Decade of center origin:		
Before 1950	5	23.8
1950s	0	0.0
1960s	3	14.3
1970s	13	61.9
Total	21	100.0

* Centers serving clients under 18 years old.

Defining the CBTC neighborhood.—Ideally, the determination of neighborhood boundaries should take into account the needs and capacities of the residents housed in the center, the physical characteristics of the immediate environment, and the range of resources that are potentially useful in treatment. For example, a playground or community recreation center located one-quarter mile from the center might be part of the neighborhood environment of a center serving young adults or adolescents but beyond the neighborhood boundaries of centers serving very young children or the physically handicapped

While the determination of neighborhood boundaries for each center as stated above would be the most desirable procedure for research of this kind, it is impractical in terms of time and cost. For the purposes of this research a procedure to define the neighborhoods was adopted which is a compromise between two factors: constraints imposed by the ecological barriers in the immediate environment, and the need to insure that centers serving similar kinds of clients had neighborhoods of roughly the same size Initially, a circle with a radius of one-half mile was drawn around the site of each center Where the outer edge of the circle was close to a major ecological barrier, the boundary of the neighborhood environment was either expanded or contracted so that the major barrier became the boundary. Where discretionary choices as to the appropriate ecological barrier for the neighborhood boundary were required, the type of client served by the center guided the choices. It was presumed that centers serving adults might exploit a larger neighborhood than centers serving children. In this way, the shape of the neighborhood reflects the major physical features of the immediate area while preserving rough comparability among centers serving similar types of residents This procedure yields a first approximation of the boundaries of the twenty-one centers included in this analysis rather than a precise delineation of those boundaries.

Measurement of Neighborhood Resources

Access to public transportation —Public transportation is an important treatment resource because it enables center residents to move easily about the metropolitan area and to participate in employment, recreation, and other community activities thereby decreasing their social isolation. The index of access to public transportation used in this research is the number of full day bus routes passing through the neighborhood.

Employment opportunities.—Access to employment opportunities was measured by the presence of industries whose jobs potentially

would be available to center residents. Firms in three industrial categories—wholesale trade, retail trade, and various service industries—were selected as meeting this criterion. The total number of firms and their respective employee totals in such industries were calculated for each CBTC neighborhood from the 1979–80 edition of the *Directory of Commerce and Industry* published by the Delaware State Chamber of Commerce.[16] While all of these jobs clearly were not available to residents of the centers, this measure provides a useful approximation of the number of jobs in the neighborhood from which center residents might find employment.

Access to shopping opportunities.—In addition to providing center residents with some of the necessities of life, shopping opportunities in the neighborhood also provide them with places to interact with non-center residents. Indeed, because many centers provide their residents with most of the necessities of life, the social functions of shopping opportunities may be more important than the economic function. While many kinds of commercial facilities could serve as areas in which potentially therapeutic interactions might occur, the measure used here focuses on two types of retail shops: general merchandise stores and food stores. *The Directory of Commerce and Industry* served as the data source for shopping opportunities. The total number of firms in the two categories that were located in the neighborhood served as the measure of this resource.

Access to recreational activities.—The measure of neighborhood recreational activities available in the neighborhood counts only those recreational programs and facilities that are open to the public and that are applicable to the residents of the center. Three sources were used to obtain the total number of neighborhood recreational facilities: (1) lists of parks, recreation programs, and playgrounds from the county parks and recreation department and from similar departments in all municipalities in the county which had centers located within them; (2) a county map showing all parks in the county; and (3) the listings in the *Directory of Human Services for Delaware* under "recreation" and "community centers."

Proximity to schools.—A county map showing the location of all public schools, supplemented by the listing of schools in the local telephone directory was used to identify the location in the CBTC neighborhoods of public schools appropriate for children of the ages served by the center (see table 2).[17]

Neighborhood Characteristics

To determine the socioeconomic status (SES), racial composition, mobility characteristics, and renter-owner mix of neighborhoods used

Table 2

SUMMARY STATISTICS GEOGRAPHICALLY BASED TREATMENT RESOURCES

Resources	Mean	Standard Deviation	Range	Relevant Client Population
Bus routes	9	6 7	1–20	Adults
Jobs	2,268	2,222 9	45–5,512	Adults
Recreational facilities				
Children	4	3 1	0–10	Children
Adults	5	3 0	0–10	Adults
Shopping facilities	30	25 0	1–61	Adults
		Number of Centers	% of Total	
Proximity to schools				
No appropriate schools in neighborhood		4	33 3	Children
Some appropriate schools in neighborhood		3	25 0	Children
All appropriate schools in neighborhood		5	41 7	Children
Total		12	100 0	

in this research, one ideally prefers to use either the results of detailed neighborhood surveys or constructed indicators of the likely characteristics of the CBTC neighborhoods based on recently collected census tract data Since neither of these optimal sources of data was available for the neighborhoods of New Castle County, census tract data from the 1970 census were used to approximate the characteristics of the CBTC neighborhoods in 1979. These data provide the best available estimate of what the CBTC neighborhoods were like at the time of the analysis

The neighborhood characteristics used in the analysis, as discussed earlier, are those associated with the incidence of opposition to community-based treatment centers. income levels; educational attainment, the occupational status of the neighborhood residents measured by percentage in professional and managerial employment; the percentage of housing units in the neighborhood that are owner occupied; the percentage of the neighborhood population that is black, and, as a measure of residential stability, the percentage of the population over five years old living in the same house as in 1965. The location of the neighborhood in the metropolitan area—central city or suburbs—is also considered Table 3 presents the mean, standard deviation, and range on each of these neighborhood characteristics for the twenty-one CBTC neighborhoods.[18]

The Findings

Because centers serving adults and centers serving children require different constellations of geographically based treatment resources

Table 3

Summary Statistics: Neighborhood Characteristics

Neighborhood Characteristic	Mean	Standard Deviation	Range
Median income	$9,991	$3,751.67	$5,312–$18,668
Median years of school completed	11.7	1.3	9.4–11.2
% in professional and managerial occupations	26.6	13.3	7.7–55.2
% owner occupied	50.9	22.5	11.0–88.0
% black	19.3	23.0	0–73.5
% of population 5 and older living in the same house as in 1965	52.9	10.1	13.2–73.5

Note.—Percentage of neighborhoods located in central city = 57.1.

from their neighborhood environment, the relationships between the neighborhood's demographic and ecological characteristics and the availability of various resources are discussed separately for the two different kinds of centers. The five centers serving both adults and children and therefore requiring both constellations of resources are included in both of the analyses.

Centers serving adults.—Table 4 presents the zero-order correlation coefficients between the neighborhood characteristics associated with the degree of resistance to CBTCs and the four geographically based treatment resources desirable for the programs of the fourteen centers serving adults. The table also presents the coefficients between the

Table 4

Correlation Coefficients: Neighborhood Characteristics and the Presence of Geographically Based Treatment Resources for Adult Centers ($N = 14$)

Neighborhood Characteristics	Geographically Based Treatment Resources for Adult Centers: Access to Public Transportation	Access to Jobs	Access to Recreation	Access to Shopping Facilities	Summary Index*
Suburban city location	−.75	−.56	−.86	−.55	−.76
Median family income	−.80	−.75	−.80	−.75	−.86
Median years of school completed	−.80	−.53	−.65	−.41	−.67
% in professional and managerial occupation	−.76	−.54	−.73	−.45	−.69
% owner occupied	−.85	−.86	−.56	−.81	−.86
% black	.84	.80	.73	.82	.89
% of population 5 and older living in same house as in 1965	−.36	−.60	−.07	−.57	−.45

* Index calculated by adding standard scores for all four resources for each center.

neighborhood characteristics and a summary index combining all four resources

Although the sample size is necessarily small, the pattern and strength of these relationships is unmistakable. In the neighborhoods with centers serving adults, there are strong negative relationships for the three measures of neighborhood SES (income, education, and occupational status) and the percentage of housing that is owner-occupied with each of the four resources that are germane to adult centers. In addition, centers located in suburban areas have much lower levels of access to public transportation, jobs, recreational opportunities for adults, and shopping facilities than do centers located in the central city. Neighborhoods with higher proportions of black residents are also more likely to rank well on each of these four resources than are neighborhoods with fewer black residents.

The findings with respect to residential stability are more mixed: moderate negative relationships with access to transportation, to jobs, and to shopping opportunities and no relationship with recreational opportunities. However, they do suggest that neighborhoods with high residential stability are somewhat more likely to have lower levels of the four resources than are their more transient counterparts. The relationships between the neighborhood characteristics and the summary index of the adult-related resources further reinforce these findings.

The relationships in table 4 clearly show that in New Castle County neighborhoods with centers serving adults the characteristics associated with low resistance are compatible with the presence of the kinds of geographically based treatment resources these centers need. These findings suggest that low-SES, renter-dominated, racially mixed, central city neighborhoods which the literature suggests are unlikely to be able or willing to resist CBTCs,[19] are precisely the kinds of neighborhoods that contain the kinds of resources adult centers need to facilitate the work of reintegrating their residents into society.

Centers serving children.—Table 5 presents the correlation coefficients between the neighborhood characteristics and the measures of the geographically based resources required by centers serving children. The pattern of relationships in this table is much weaker than that found for the adult centers. The correlations of the neighborhood characteristics with proximity to appropriate public schools in most cases hover around zero. Those with access to recreational opportunities for children, although somewhat stronger, are generally lower than those observed for the adult centers. Only in the correlations between recreational opportunities, on the one hand, and suburban/city location (−.78) and educational attainment (−.61), on the other, do the relationships for the children's centers approach those found among the adult centers.

Table 5

Correlation Coefficients: Neighborhood Characteristics and the Presence of Geographically Based Treatment Resources for Children's Centers ($N = 12$)

Neighborhood Characteristics	Geographically Based Treatment Resources for Children's Centers: Proximity to Schools	Geographically Based Treatment Resources for Children's Centers: Access to Recreation
Suburban city location	−.08	−.78
Median family income	−.08	.49
Median years of school completed	−.10	−.64
% in professional and managerial occupations	−.02	−.58
% owner occupied	.20	−.18
% black	.32	.54
% of population 5 and over in same house as in 1965	.29	.29

These findings suggest that centers for children located in "transitional neighborhoods" have only a limited and mixed advantage over centers in more prosperous surroundings. While central-city, low-SES black neighborhoods are more likely to contain public recreational activities for center residents than are white, suburban, higher-SES areas, there is virtually no difference with respect to their proximity to public schools. This is not surprising given the dominance of the neighborhood school concept in decisions about the location of public schools. On the whole, the resources needed by centers for children are not more likely to be found in neighborhoods where resistance to CBTCs is likely to be low than in neighborhoods where such resistance might be expected to be more pronounced.

Discussion and Implications

This analysis has focused on the compatibility of two aspects of the neighborhood environments of community-based treatment centers: the presence of the geographically based treatment resources the centers need to facilitate the reintegration of their residents into society, and the likelihood that the residents of the neighborhood would oppose the existence of the center. The empirical results indicate that for the centers studied, these two requirements of the CBTC neighborhood are indeed consistently compatible for centers serving adults. Centers for adults that are located in neighborhoods whose demographic and ecological characteristics suggest they would be unlikely to mount opposition to the center are most likely to have high levels of the needed geographically based treatment resources. Access to public

transportation, jobs, shopping facilities, and recreational activities for adults tend to be concentrated in close proximity to low-income central-city neighborhoods that have large proportions of black residents and renters. Far from cutting themselves off from the resources they need to facilitate their work, centers for adults that are located in these low-resistance neighborhood environments are also located in environments that are rich in the geographically based treatment resources they require.

Centers for children in low-resistance neighborhoods are much less likely to find the necessary treatment resources located nearby. Appropriate public schools, the most necessary resource, are as likely to be in low-resistance neighborhoods as in neighborhoods whose demographic composition suggests more likely opposition to treatment centers. Public recreation programs for children, however, are somewhat more likely to be located in lower SES, black, inner-city areas. Given the options available for finding suitable recreational activities for children—ranging from school-related activities to informal play among neighbors—the increased availability of public recreational activities in low resistance neighborhoods gives centers in these neighborhoods only a small advantage over centers in more affluent areas. On the whole, if choosing an environment which contains the required geographically based resource were the only consideration in locating community-based treatment centers many different types of neighborhoods would be adequate locations for centers serving children. These results suggest that there is much less flexibility in choosing neighborhoods in which to locate centers for adults.

Of course, the presence of adequate amounts of geographically based resources is not the only criterion in decisions about location. The likelihood of neighborhood opposition also imposes major constraints on these decisions. Here too, however, there are differences between centers serving adults and centers serving children. The likelihood that neighborhood residents will oppose the establishment of a community-based treatment center in their neighborhood is at least in part a function of the fears that the center residents provoke.[20] While some types of children in community-based treatment centers are likely to arouse concern among neighborhood residents, most juvenile residents of such facilities probably are less likely to stimulate opposition based on fear than are adult residents. Released adult mental patients, adult drug users, retarded adults, homeless adults, and adults in work-release programs from correctional facilities all seem more likely to arouse the opposition of neighborhood residents than do dependent and neglected children in group homes. Thus, the capacity of the neighborhood to organize effective opposition to the center would seem to be a more crucial constraint in locating centers serving adults than in location centers serving children. While sponsors of centers for adults are more likely to be confined in their choice of neighborhood locations to

low-resistance neighborhoods, the sponsors of most children's centers probably have a wider range of possible locations from which to choose.

The greater flexibility in locating children's centers both with respect to obtaining the required resources and finding neighborhoods which are unlikely to oppose them does not mean that affluent "high-resistance" neighborhoods will *never accept centers for adults*. Neither should the findings presented here be interpreted as suggesting that the centers established in affluent areas necessarily will be ineffective in reintegrating their residents. However, given the growing climate of opposition to the establishment of community-based treatment centers, it seems likely that centers for adults in particular will increasingly be confined to neighborhoods in which residents lack the will or the capacity to oppose them. Perhaps the most important implication of this paper is that even if the sponsors of centers for adults find themselves with no option but to locate in such transitional neighborhoods, they can be reasonably confident that those neighborhoods will contain the geographically based treatment resources they need to do their work effectively.

While the combination of available geographically based treatment resources and low opposition in transitional neighborhoods seems sufficient to guarantee center effectiveness, a degree of caution must be exercised. Transitional neighborhoods may have other characteristics which seriously diminish the likelihood that residents of CBTCs can make effective use of the available resources. They are likely to experience high rates of crime, drug abuse, and other social problems that make the neighborhood too dangerous for some center residents to move about freely and easily. Similarly, center staff might regard the increased likelihood that center residents could be drawn into potentially damaging social networks as reasons to limit the access of residents to the geographically based resources in transitional neighborhoods. Mere availability of treatment resources in the neighborhood environment does not therefore ensure that they can or will be used in treatment.

Thus, a paradox emerges. While the findings of this paper suggest that transitional neighborhoods are likely to have both the high levels of resources and the low levels of opposition that make for desirable CBTC locations, other characterisitcs of transitional neighborhoods make it undesirable for staff to allow free use of the available resources thereby limiting the suitability of these neighborhoods as CBTC locations. Center sponsors and staff must decide whether the availability of geographically based resources and lack of opposition in these neighborhoods outweigh the potential harm that might come to CBTC residents in transitional neighborhoods.

Selecting a site in a suburban neighborhood with low rates of crime and dependency may be one way out of this problem. However, this is

not without its own drawbacks. The potential hazards to center residents stemming from the hostility and even violence by residents of neighborhoods like those examined in a recent report on suburban Detroit halfway houses cannot be easily dismissed.[21] When combined with the probable low levels of geographically based treatment resources found in these neighborhoods, their desirability as sites for adult CBTCs must be seriously questioned.

Thus, the problem of selecting optimal CBTC locations requires the execution of an intricate balancing act by center sponsors and staff. In many cases these sponsors and staff have few choices among center locations. However, when alternative sites are available, they must be evaluated with respect to the availability of geographically based treatment resources, the likelihood of neighborhood opposition, and the effect of negative community characteristics on center residents. The creativity of center sponsors and staff in maximizing the availability and use of geographically based resources, while minimizing both neighborhood opposition and the effect of negative neighborhood characteristics, are the crucial factors in the ability of CBTCs to achieve the goal of reintegration of center residents.

Notes

I wish to thank Kenneth Eckhardt, Robert Rothman, Deborah Freedman, Henry Meyer, Rosemary Sarri, and Ronald Freedman for their helpful suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper.

1. Oliver Keller, Jr. and Benedict S. Alper, *Halfway Houses: Community-centered Correction and Treatment* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath & Co., 1970); Timothy B. Baker, "Halfway Houses for Alcoholics: Shelters or Shackles?" *International Journal of Social Psychiatry* 18, no. 3 (1972): 201–11; James K. Whittaker, "The Changing Nature of Residential Child Care: An Ecological Perspective," *Social Service Review* 52, no. 1 (1978): 27–36, and *Caring for Troubled Children: Residential Treatment in Community Context* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1979); Martin Gula, "Group Homes: New and Differentiated Tools in Child Welfare, Delinquency and Mental Health," *Child Welfare* 43, no. 5 (1964): 393–97.

2. Harold L. Raush and Charlotte L. Raush, *The Halfway House Movement: A Search for Sanity* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968); Steven P. Segal and Uri Aviram, *The Mentally Ill in Community-based Sheltered Care* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978); John Goldmeier, Robert H. Sauer, and E. Virginia White, "A Halfway Home for Mentally Ill Offenders," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, vol. 134 (January 1977); Keller and Alper, p. 107.

3. Harold A. Berdiansky and Richard Parker, "Establishing a Group Home for the Adult Mentally Retarded in North Carolina," *Mental Retardation* 15, no. 4 (August 1977): 8–11; Diana Pearce and David Street, "Welfare in the Metropolitan Area," in *Handbook of Contemporary Urban Life*, David Street and Associates (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1978), pp. 319–51; Raush and Raush, p. 56.

4. Jeffrey L. Davidson, *Political Partnerships* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1979); Keller and Alper, p. 107.

5. Jeffrey L. Davidson, "Location of Community-based Treatment Centers," *Social Service Review* 55, no. 2 (1981): 221–41.

6. Geographically based resources are clearly not the only type of treatment resources that may be used by center staff to facilitate the reintegration of center residents. Two

other categories of resources—those controlled by the center itself and those controlled by other agencies—may also be identified. While the availability of the three types of treatment resources varies from center to center, only for geographically based treatment resources is access dependent on the location of the center. Resources controlled by the center can be used by center staff regardless of the location of the center itself. Those controlled by other agencies might be contingent on the center's bargaining power or the number and strength of competing users, but except in cases where the center is extremely isolated, access to these resources is relatively unaffected by the center's location (Howard E. Aldrich, *Organizations and Environments* [Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972]). While the mere availability of a particular type of treatment resource is no guarantee that the center staff will choose to use it in treatment, the flexibility center staff has in making decisions about the center's program is undoubtedly influenced by the mix of the three types of resources that is available (Craig A. McEwen, *Designing Correctional Organizations for Youth* [Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1978], pp. 19–53.)

7. McEwen, ibid., pp. 37–43.

8. Mancur Olson, Jr., *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965).

9. McEwen, pp. 37–43.

10. Wolf Wolfensberger, *The Principle of Normalization in Human Services* (Toronto: National Institute on Mental Retardation, 1972).

11. E. Blacker and D. Kantor, "Halfway Houses for Problem Drinkers," *Federal Probation* 24 (1960): 18–23; Norman Wechsler, "Transitional Residences for Former Mental Patients: A Survey of Halfway Houses and Related Rehabilitation Facilities," *Mental Hygiene* 45 (1961): 65–76; Keller and Alper, p. 107; Baker, pp. 201–11; Raush and Raush, p. 56; Goldmeier et al., pp. 45–59; Segal and Aviram, pp. 109–12.

12. Norman Herstein, "What Is a Group Home?" *Child Welfare* 43, no. 8 (1968): 443–44; Whittaker, "The Changing Nature of Residential Child Care," pp. 27–36.

13. This definitional criterion resulted in the exclusion of four centers for severely retarded children that were included in my earlier analysis of New Castle County's C.B.T.C.s (see Davidson, "Location of Community-based Treatment Centers").

14. U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1970, *Census of Population and Housing: Census Tracts*, PHC (1)-234 (1972).

15. State of Delaware Division of Health and Social Services and Division of State Service Centers, *Directory of Human Services for Delaware* (Wilmington: State of Delaware, 1978, 1979).

16. Delaware State Chamber of Commerce, *Directory of Commerce and Industry* (Wilmington: Delaware State Chamber of Commerce, 1979).

17. The degree to which proximity to public schools is an important geographically based resource for centers in New Castle County may be undergoing some change due to the existence of a court-mandated metropolitan school desegregation plan. The plan, which took effect in September 1978, creates a single country-wide school district. Students from the city of Wilmington are bused to suburban schools for nine of their twelve years in public school, while suburban students are bused to Wilmington for grades 4 through 6. The possible effects of this desegregation plan on the importance of locating future centers close to neighborhood schools cannot be determined at this time. Since all of the centers serving children in New Castle County were established before desegregation began, the effect on the location decisions for these centers is probably slight.

18. In addition to the data on neighborhood characteristics gathered from the census, each C.B.T.C. neighborhood was visited by myself or an assistant. We drew maps of the center's immediate surroundings to determine the degree to which the center was physically isolated from the surrounding housing. The presence of physical barriers between a center and the surrounding housing can indirectly affect the amount of neighborhood opposition to the center. Centers that are physically or visually separated from nearby housing are probably less likely to be included in nearby residents' cognitive maps of their neighborhood and are therefore less likely to attract attention and to generate opposition (see Gerald D. Suttles, *The Social Construction of Communities* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972]). In this research, systematic differences in the degree of isolation were found between centers in the city and those in suburban neighborhoods. Over 80 percent of the suburban centers were found to be isolated from surrounding

housing by fences, densely wooded areas, or major roads, while only about 15 percent of its centers were isolated (see Davidson, "Location of Community-based Treatment Centers.") These findings suggest that one of the mechanisms by which centers might mute he opposition in more affluent, suburban areas is to choose facilities that are relatively sy to ignore by virtue of their isolation.

19. Raush and Raush, p. 56; Goldmeier et al., pp. 15–19; Keller and Alper, p. 107.

20. Berdiansky and Parker, pp. 8–11; Keller and Alper, p. 107.

21. CBS News, "Not on My Street," *60 Minutes* (November 2, 1980).

Consumer Participation in Administrative Decision Making

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The term "consumer participation" in public agencies has come to occupy an important place in discussions of administrative theory and practice without any real consensus on how and with what consequences they participate. This article examines the development of this phenomenon in the field of housing. It examines the impact of tenant participation across 750 public housing projects. Data were derived from a survey of housing projects carried out by HUD in 1978. The findings appear to buttress the view that tenant organizations can be effective in increasing the level of resources and services made available to tenants. There is no evidence to support the perspective that consumer participation enhanced the administrative process.

Despite the widespread agreement that consumer or citizen participa tion in administrative decision making is desirable, the issue remain surrounded by controversy and confusion and thereby demands con ceptual clarification. It is clear that the term has come to occupy a central place in discussions of administrative and community theory without any real consensus on who the "citizens" are and how and with what consequences they participate.[1]

Several writers have attempted to capture the range and variety of meanings expressed by the term "citizen participation." The Cahn assert that the objectives of participation can be grouped into three broad categories:

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1. A source of knowledge for administrative agencies—a means of securing feedback from consumers on policy and programs and also as a source of new and innovative approaches to programming.
2. An end value. Participation is viewed as a means of building community and overcoming alienation, destructiveness, and hostility and a lack of faith in societal institutions.
3. A means of mobilizing untapped resources that lie latent in each community.[2]

Arnstein lists an additional category when she defines citizen participation to mean citizen power. She asserts: "It is the redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in the future. It is the strategy by which the have-nots join in determining how information is shared, goals and policies are set, tax resources are allocated, programs are operated and benefits. . . are parcelled out. In short, it is the means by which they can induce significant social reform which enables them to share in the benefits of the affluent society."[3]

Participation underwent another major transformation in the decade following Arnstein's assertion. In the 1970s, citizens were no longer the poor or their representatives but persons whose membership in a population served or affected by a program was deemed sufficient to give them a voice in operating or evaluating a program. The nature of this participation varied from agency to agency and was established by federal statute or by administrative regulation.[4] Citizen participation now had as its objective administrative reform to combat the problematic nature of overcentralized decision making.[5] Rather than being part of a social reform movement, the shift was in the direction of devolving power to specific groups of program beneficiaries, so that federal programs could be more responsive to consumer preferences.

If a major goal of citizen participation in the coming years is administrative reform rather than social change, as asserted by some, research is needed on the forms and characteristics of citizen participation that result in more effective service delivery. Does the devolution of control to program beneficiaries affect management performance and in what manner? Has the participation of clients in service systems resulted in increased benefits? Is it possible to link administrative outputs like effectiveness and service levels to various dimensions of participation?

This study focuses on consumer or tenant participation in public housing, an institution that today serves 3 million of the most deprived groups in society. The major emphasis of the tenant participation movement in public housing has been toward mandatory regulations that would give tenants the right to determine the nature and extent of their involvement in such areas as housing administration, budget allocations, maintenance, and tenant services. This emphasis on tenant participation, especially in its ultimate form of tenant management of

public housing, rests on the assumption that it will result in improved management performance and increased services to tenants. Tenant participation was perceived by housing experts and Congress as a means of reversing the tide of impotence and despair that threatens to overwhelm some housing projects.[6] Our focus was on resident involvement as a means of improving the quantity and quality of housing services to the residents of public housing.

Data

The data analyzed in this study came from a national survey of housing projects collected during the summer of 1978 by HUD's Division of Policy Studies. The information was derived from the second of a four-part questionnaire completed by staff in HUD area offices. It included factual data on each project as well as subjective ratings on specific items that were completed by personnel in the HUD area office that was most familiar with the project. Factual information was also derived from administrative by-product data. The data were used primarily to test our hypothesis that tenant participation would explain part of the variance in our dependent variables, the quantity and quality of housing services, and the effectiveness of management performance.

Participation

While, analytically, participation is many faceted and multidimensional, the focus of this study was on whether participation existed, its impact on decision making, and the degree of influence accompanying participation. Our indicator for participation was derived from responses of HUD area officials to a question relating to that concept. An ordinal scale was developed to denote degrees of influence.

Management Performance

Definitions of good management in public housing are not easy to obtain. Whether the phrase covers the productivity or the objectives of the program is not entirely clear. The outputs of public housing, espe-

cially in urban environments, have some intangible components that present severe measurement problems. The indicators we used are measures of whether the public housing program is meeting its minimal objectives of providing "decent affordable shelter" to its target population. We selected from our data the following indicators of management performance: vacancy rates, turnover rates, rent collection losses, strikes, delinquency and vandalism, and the projects overall condition.

Resources and Services

Our data provided us with significant measures of resources available to tenants of public housing. Our search of the literature indicated that many housing projects make facilities available to neighborhood social agencies to provide on-site services to residents. At the same time significant amounts of federal funding are available to private and public agencies as well as to the public housing authority itself to provide many types of needed services to tenants of public housing.

Some programs and services such as the Modernization Program and the Target Projects Program were special initiatives undertaken and underwritten by HUD to overcome the process of social and physical malaise that was affecting public housing.[7] The number of live-in personnel in the project was used as an indicator of the responsiveness of housing authorities to the needs of their tenants and of the quality of services provided. Protective services were developed by some housing authorities in response to the high crime rates affecting urban projects and the inability or unwillingness of the local police to provide protection for public housing tenants. The resource variables used in our analysis are amounts of modernization funds approved, amounts of modernization funds expended, number of tenant services personnel in project, number of protective service personnel in project, and number of live-in personnel in project.

Control Variables

Our search of the literature suggests that certain neighborhood and project variables could critically affect our outcome variables. The character of a neighborhood may influence the viability and stability of a project in a number of ways. Unless extraordinary measures are taken to isolate neighborhood influences, the combination of adverse physical and social conditions such as high crime rates and neighborhood

deterioration can well result in vacancies, high rates of mobility, and hence revenue losses. A blighted environment, which includes such factors as abandoned housing, high crime rates, and minimal or inferior public services, can severely limit opportunities and the quality of life and repel all but those who have no choice but to dwell in such surroundings. Our sample provided us with a number of measures of neighborhood quality. We adopted the following six measures to represent this characteristic: level of police protection, number and quality of neighborhood parks and recreational areas, nature and quality of social services, percentage of subsidized housing, neighborhood crime, and proportion of units abandoned. The housing literature suggests that the character of a project is intimately bound up by the social environment produced by its occupants.[8] Personal values, life-cycle stage, and whether the projects are occupied by families with children or by the elderly (couples and singles) determine not just the atmosphere of the project but also the necessary costs and the character of the housing services to be provided. Family occupation usually entails a high density of children. The indicator we selected to represent project characteristics was whether the project primarily served the elderly (couples and singles) or families with young children.

Data Analysis

The goal of the analysis was to explain the variance in the outcome variables in the housing survey data in terms of differences in participation. This was accomplished through cross-tabulations linking two or more variables to distinguish their individual impacts on each other.

The variables utilized in this research were nominal, ordinal, and interval, the independent variable measuring participation belonging to the second category. It was decided in the early phase of the analysis to focus on contingency (cross-tabulation) analysis, although the research design would appear to demand the use of multivariate techniques. A major factor in our decision was that the statistical assumptions of multiple regression require that the dependent variable be explained and be measured at least on an interval or ratio scale. Our data obviously did not meet this test. Although techniques such as discriminant analysis, probit, and conditional logit can convert ordinal data for use in multivariate analysis, they present severe problems in dealing with missing data. As is usual where large data sets are involved, there were some gaps in our data.

In keeping with our decision to utilize cross-tabulations, we used the χ^2 statistic to determine if the relationship was significant or not. The

measure-of-association gamma was used in conjunction with χ^2 to indicate the strength of the association between the variables measured.

The analysis was addressed to several basic questions relating to participation that were posed at the commencement of the research. Was tenant participation an effective technique for improving the housing environment and the conditions of life for tenants? A positive answer to this question would constitute evidence that participation had attained one of its basic objectives.

The next question was aimed at determining whether any of the key associations that had been identified were spurious. Did any significant differences exist between different projects with and without tenant organizations on certain neighborhood variables? Another question focused on whether these projects and neighborhood variables were related to our outcome measures and if they modified our initial findings and in what manner. The last question defined the characteristics of housing projects to which it would be useful to generalize the study results.

Research Hypotheses

Our research centered on the following hypotheses.

1. Projects with tenant participation differ significantly from projects without such participation on key indicators of outcome.
2. Projects with tenant participation do not differ significantly on the indicators for the control variables from projects without tenant participation.
3. There is no relationship between the indicators of the dependent variables and selected neighborhood and project factors.
4. When intervening variables are controlled, the outcome scores for projects with tenant participation are significantly different from the scores of those without participation.

For most of the analysis, only a subset of the data consisting of 750 cases was utilized. The cases consisted of the original stratified random sample drawn by HUD from its entire inventory. The rest of the cases were added subsequently for informational reasons.

The Predictions Examined

The first phase of our analysis produced some mixed findings. Our service and resource indicators were all consistently significant and

strongly related to the independent variable The associations were a in the predicted direction Our indicators of management performanc yielded mixed results Three indicators—length of strikes, vacanc rates, and collection losses—showed associations, but these were in th opposite direction from that predicted by our model. One indicato perhaps the most important, relating to management performance- the project rating—showed no relationship to our independent vari ble Two indicators of performance—turnover rates and perceptions c delinquency and vandalism—showed moderate associations but we in the direction predicted by our model The findings demonstrate that management performance was a complex phenomenon that ca not be captured by simple bivariate relationships and calls for a som what more complex level of analysis than is possible with simple cros tabulations Our findings are summarized in table 1.

A major determinant of housing adequacy is the neighborhood er vironment We attempted to determine if neighborhood factors mod fied our initial findings regarding management outcome and in wh manner Our study compared projects with tenant organizations wi those without to determine if they differed significantly from each oth on this crucial dimension Our findings are summarized in table 2

Our analysis suggests that projects with tenant organizations are lo cated in neighborhoods that score significantly lower on certain criter than are projects that are not similarly organized Some of the indica tors of a troubled community, such as lack of police protection, hig crime rates, abandoned buildings, and a very high proportion of sub sidized housing, signified that these projects have to contend with som rather adverse neighborhood features

The only positive neighborhood indicator we could identify wa better quality social services. Projects with tenant organizations wer

Table 1

Relationship of Outcome Measures to Tenant Participation

Participation	Significance	Gamma	*N*
Services and resources			
Tenant services	001	4307	681
Protective services	001	1537	681
Live-in employees	01	4860	683
Expenditure of Mod funds	001	384	635
Approval of Mod funds	001	2898	635
Allocation of TPP funds	001	5112	635
Management performance			
Rating of project condition	N S	0655	643
Collection losses	01	2053	683
Vacancy rates	01	1945	621
Turnover rates	01	− 2408	621
Length of strikes	001	6439	681
Delinquency and vandalism	001	− 1062	418

Note —Mod = Modernization program, TPP = Target Projects Program

able 2

Relationship of Tenant Participation to Neighborhood Variables*

Neighborhood Variable	Significance	Gamma	*N*
Public services			
Social services	07	1636	603
Parks and playgrounds	07	0556	602
Police protection	02	− 2684	601
Overall service quality	N S	− 0125	602
Characteristics			
Subsidized housing (%)	0001	3639	604
Neighborhood crime rate	0001	− 201	601
Abandoned buildings (%)	001	− 2532	590

* Ratings by HUD area officials

not significantly different from others in terms of the overall quality of community services. Our analysis was able to establish that a connection existed between projects that had tenant organizations and certain adverse neighborhood factors The nature of this relationship remains to be spelled out

We attempted to determine if neighborhood and project characteristics were themselves related to our management performance indicators If it were shown that such a relationship did exist, it could be that the seemingly negative relationship between tenant participation and several management performances was in fact spurious. One could suppose that a causal link existed between neighborhood and project conditions Our findings summarized in table 3 suggest that the seem-

Table 3

Relationship of Management Performance Variables to Neighborhood Variables

Neighborhood Variables	Significance	Gamma	*N*
Rating of crime			
Vacancy rates	0001	− 4232	666
Project rating	001	4520	560
Collection losses	01	− 2833	598
Delinquency and vandalism	001	− 1156	353
Abandoned buildings			
Vacancy rates	0001	− 3565	628
Project ratings	001	3510	525
Collection losses	001	− 2548	326
Delinquency and vandalism	001	− 1536	326
Police protection			
Vacancy rates	0001	− 3132	696
Project rating	001	3941	581
Collection losses	0001	3282	622
Overall quality of neighborhood services			
Project ratings	0001	4708	585
Vacancy rates	0001	− 3636	686
Collection losses	0001	− 2279	620

Note —Data on collection losses derived from Housing Authority's quarterly reports to HUD on Form 52295 Other data derived from HUD questionnaire to area office personnel

ing negative association between tenant participation and the critical management-performance indicators could have been spurious. Some of the relationships had been in the opposite direction to that postulated by our model.

In our examination of project variables which could affect our outcome measures or shed further light on the relationships between the variables in our conceptual model, one emerged as important. This was whether the project was occupied primarily by families with children or by the elderly, singles or couples.

Our findings show that there were clear differences between these two types of projects. While in a few instances there are relationships between tenant participation and the resources and services provided to elderly tenants, the relationships are not significant (i.e., tenant services and Target Projects Program funding). In the case of families there is a strong relationship between participation and the resource and service variables. The findings are summarized in table 4.

In regard to management performance and tenant participation there appears to be either no relationship or weak relationships between participation and outcome in regard to projects for the elderly. The relationships between most indicators of tenant participation and outcome in family projects are in the opposite direction to that predicted by our model. Tenant participation had a depressant effect on turnover rates and delinquency rates; this was congruent with our model. Table 5 summarizes these findings.

Table 4

RELATIONSHIP OF OUTCOME MEASURES TO TENANT PARTICIPATION CONTROLLING FOR TYPE OF OCCUPATION

Services and Resources	Significance	*Gamma*	*N*
Tenant services			
Elderly	N.S.	0769	189
Family	01	354	192
Protective services			
Elderly	N.S.	0882	189
Family	0001	4594	192
Live-in employees			
Elderly	0001	1177	192
Family	005	3881	500
Allocation of Mod funds			
Elderly	N.S.	− 10914	175
Family	0001	4772	146
Expenditure of Mod funds			
Elderly	N.S.	1205	175
Family	001	5560	446
Allocation of TPP			
Elderly	N.S.	4587	175
Family	05	4699	146

NOTE.—Data on live-in employees derived from quarterly reports by housing authorities to HUD on Form 51235, other data derived from HUD questionnaire to area office personnel. Mod = Modernization program, TPP = Target Projects Programs.

Table 5

RELATIONSHIP OF OUTCOME MEASURES TO TENANT PARTICIPATION CONTROLLING FOR TYPE OF OCCUPATION

Performance Measures	Significance	Gamma	N
Project rating			
Elderly	N S	− 135	186
Family	0001	2185**	567
Vacancy rates			
Elderly	N S	0643	178
Family	0005	2466	451
Turnover rates			
Elderly	N S	− 1100	178
Family	0001	− 1472	451
Tenant strikes			
Elderly	N S	− 858	192
Family	005	6588	500
Delinquency and vandalism			
Elderly	N S	− 34	104
Family	0001	1618	289
Collection losses			
Elderly	01	0627*	189
Family	001	3714	498

NOTE —Data on collection losses derived from quarterly reports to HUD by housing authorities on Form 52295 Other data derived from HUD questionnaire to area office personnel

* Adverse project conditions were associated with tenant participation

Conclusions

What impact does consumer participation have on the organization and the organizational participants? We tested a cherished belief of modern administrative and community organization practice with the conviction that the empirical facts would validate that belief. While our findings demonstrate support for some of the assumptions regarding participation, they also suggest that it is no panacea for the many ills that beset urban public housing.

Much of the theoretical literature tends to treat "participation" as an end in itself, an equally valuable experience for the participating groups and for the community at large However, the research on the participation of the poor in the 1960s shows that participation can lead to quite variable results [9] It has been suggested that rather than being regarded as an end value, participation should be treated as a means that ought to be employed selectively and only when certain conditions prevail [10]

Our study attempted to determine the impact that the participation of the poor had within a specific administrative context. The objective of participation in public housing was both administrative reform and the improvement of conditions of life for the tenants. Richardson states that there are two major arguments for tenant participation which rest

on conflicting assumptions about the interests of tenants and management and conflicting interpretations of the nature of participation.[11] The first argument assumes that tenants and managers share identical aims concerning housing management. Participation through the exchange of information furthers these mutual goals. The second assumes that tenants and management have conflicting objectives, and participation is a means whereby the one furthers its objectives at the expense of the other through the use of power. Richardson's view is that both perspectives reflect only a partial and therefore incorrect understanding of tenant management interests. The views of tenants and management are neither fully congruent nor completely opposed but are a combination of the two. She points out that an essential characteristic of all participation schemes is the inclusion of mechanisms for institutionalizing interaction between tenants and management—a forum for bargaining which also attempts to exchange information and exercise power. Bargaining in this context becomes a process that facilitates the accomodation of seemingly incompatible interests.

Our findings show that tenant participation as a mechanism for bargaining to improve the services available to the poor can have some success. For persons living under conditions of extreme poverty, participation can be rewarding only if there is a perception that direct benefits are to be gained by such participation. Our findings suggest that such participation is most likely to occur in family projects rather than in projects for the elderly.

Our perception of participation as a means of increasing the services available to the poor appears to hold in other areas besides housing. Participation of the poor in decision making was a device intended by the Office of Economic Opportunity to redistribute funds flowing through local agencies. According to some analysts, a major result of the Great Society programs was to create a demand for a variety of local services on the part of the urban poor.[12] Haveman argues that, by granting the poor increased participation in the decisions of agencies that allocate goods and services, their access to such services increased and enabled them to alter the composition of services available.[13] Assessing both the direct and the indirect impacts of the participation of the poor, he points out the enormous growth in income-conditioned health, housing services, and income-conditioned programs. These unplanned and unexpected developments would, according to him, indicate a more favorable assessment of the participation of the poor than would be implied by cost-benefit appraisals of specific programs. Haveman's analysis is consistent with our data.

Our findings relating to management performance should come as no surprise to those familiar with public housing, especially in its urban manifestations. Our analysis suggests that persons living under conditions that pose hazards to personal safety and well-being can be

impelled to ward off the blighting influences of their environment by organizing. We had hypothesized that the occupants of public housing, by organizing, could alter their environment through their involvement in management processes. However it may well be that the direction of causality is the reverse. Outside activists and organizations may also concentrate their efforts on projects and neighborhoods where conditions are more desperate.

It is by no means evident from our data that tenant organizations' power or influence extended to those areas where they might reasonably be expected to alter the effectiveness of management. Perhaps the early expectations of legislators and housing experts regarding the impact of tenants on these areas was unrealistic. It is also quite possible that the seeming negative relationship between participation and some management variables may in fact be spurious. Time-series data are needed to verify this.

Nevertheless, it is quite clear from our data that there is no evidence to support the *notion that management performance is improved* materially by tenant participation. Administrative theorists have argued that "a bureaucracy whose very structure requires rationalization runs contrary to the requirements of participation, which, insofar as it broadens influence over policy formation and involves the amateur's enthusiasm, inevitably leads to confusion, delay, inefficiency and perhaps even downright corruption."[14] Rationalization through precise, routine, standard operating procedures is thought to be a necessary condition for organizational survival.[15] That administrative rationality and consumer participation cannot be maximized simultaneously places an important constraint on the one or the other.[16] We have found nothing in our data that would refute this view. At the same time our findings suggest that projects that maximize tenant participation also operate in neighborhoods with conditions so severely adverse that any possibility of success is foreclosed.

Notes

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4. Community Services Administration, *Citizen Participation* (San Jose, Calif.: Rapido Press, 1977).

5. Robert K. Yin et al., *Citizen Organizations: Increasing Client Control over Services* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corp., 1973).

6. 42 U.S.C. #1437 d(c) (1) (c) 1968, also Conference Report to accompany S. 2864.

7. U.S.C. #1701-1. The Modernization Program instituted in 1968 was influenced by the spirit of the War on Poverty. Congress was to allocate the funds to upgrade the physical environment of public housing, but tenants were to have a voice in determining how the funds were to be allocated. Secondary goals were to aid tenants in obtaining needed social services and employment opportunities. The Target Projects Program was initiated by HUD in 1974. Its major emphasis was on the nonphysical needs of public housing. Its main objectives centered around the provision of social and community services, the improvement of management operations and assistance to tenants to move out of poverty.

8. Roger Starr, "Which of the Poor Shall Live in Public Housing," *Public Interest* 23 (Spring 1971): 116–21; Frank de Leeuw, *Operating Costs in Public Housing: A Financial Crisis* (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 1970), p. 112; Michael Teitz and Richard Dodson, *Financial Failure in Multi-Family Housing Projects: Final Report: Conclusions and Recommendations* (Berkeley, Calif.: Berkeley Planning Associates, March 1975), pp. 7–8.

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12. Robert Haveman, ed., *A Decade of Federal Anti-Poverty Programs* (New York: Institute for Research on Poverty: Academic Press, 1978).

13. Ibid.

14. David Greenstone, "Race and Authority in Urban Politics," in *Community Participation and the War on Poverty*, ed. David Greenstone (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 220.

15. Max Weber, "Bureaucracy," in *Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. H. Garth and C. W. Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 51–60.

16. Greenstone, p. 225.

Social Class and Public Policy for the Elderly

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This article hypothesizes that public policy targets benefits to three classes of elderly (*a*) the poor or marginal elderly, (*b*) the middle- and lower-middle-class downwardly mobile elderly, and (*c*) the middle- and upper middle-class high-income elderly. It is suggested that public policy for the elderly serves as an intervening variable or mechanism which helps to ensure status maintenance in old age. It is argued, in conclusion, that public policy for the elderly must be redirected to emphasize a redistribution of benefits from an elite of high-income elderly to the poor and near-poor elderly.

The modernization and industrialization of society has resulted in a rapidly aging society. The growth of the elderly segment of society has produced demands for extensive social welfare measures to protect the well-being of the elderly. The government has increasingly assumed the role of protecting people against many of the risks incurred with old age. Correspondingly, government expenditures for the elderly have resulted in a "graying of the budget."[1] The mounting costs of programs for the elderly are beginning to draw attention, in part a reflection of a mounting resistance to social welfare expenditures in general. As expenditures to the elderly are the major component of overall social welfare expenditures,[2] this resistance reflects a growing criticism of funds directed to the elderly.

These developments raise important questions. Two such questions are as follows: (*a*) Who among the elderly receive the benefits of government intervention? (*b*) Are these benefits based on need? This article

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hypothesizes that public policy targets benefits to three classes of elderly.[3] These beneficiary classes include: *(a)* the poor or marginal elderly, *(b)* the middle- and lower-middle-class downwardly mobile elderly, and *(c)* the middle- and upper-middle-class high-income integrated elderly. It it theorized here that public policy for the elderly operates to maintain in old age status and social class differences experienced prior to old age. It is suggested that public policy for the elderly serves as an intervening variable or mechanism which helps to ensure status maintenance in old age. The conclusion of this article argues that public policy for the elderly must be redirected to emphasize a redistribution of benefits from an elite of high-income elderly to the poor and near poor elderly.

Social Class and Public Policy for the Elderly

There is a pervasive feeling on the part of both the public and many planners and policy analysts in gerontology that the hardships associated with old age fall evenly on the elderly. There is a sense that old age is the great leveler of social class and status distinctions. Correspondingly, much of the work done on status attainment ignores that segment of the life cycle that extends beyond sixty-five years of age. The status-attainment literature focuses on explaining the impact of family origin and education on occupational attainment and income position in the years immediately following schooling.[4] It is assumed that an individual's maximum socioeconomic position is achieved prior to leaving the labor force. Subsequently, little attention is paid to social status and stratification issues for individuals over sixty-five years of age, despite the fact that life expectancy at age sixty-five is fourteen years for men and eighteen years for women.[5] The elderly in effect are treated as a social class, issues of social and economic inequality are obscured. Yet, considerable income variation does continue into old age. In 1977, 21 percent of the elderly couples in this country had incomes of $15,000 or greater, whereas 27 percent had incomes of less than $6,000.[6] A segment of the elderly population, primarily high income elderly, also possesses significant asset holdings.[7] Henretta and Campbell examined income variations among the elderly on the basis of status attainment prior to retirement. Their findings held that the factors which determine income differences prior to retirement are the same ones that determine income in retirement.[8] "While everyone may 'take a cut in pay,' old age does not reduce the effect of attainment variables on income."[9]

Prior to retirement, earnings constitute about 87 percent of the aggregate money income for the entire population.[10] Income studies for

individuals and families over the age of sixty-five in contrast identify earnings as constituting 23 percent of aggregate money income. Another 39 percent is derived from social security, 7 percent from private pensions, 6 percent from government employee pensions, and 18 percent from assets.[11] Given the persistence of social class differences into old age,[12] that persistence must be in part induced through the operation of such intervening variables as the accumulation of assets over a lifetime, tax policy toward the elderly, health insurance measures, pension policy, and other government measures.

Given the existence of socioeconomic differences prior to old age, why might we presume that they would persist in old age with the active assistance of public policy measures? In analyzing the differences in the quality of life circumstances among individuals and classes of individuals, David Gil identifies three universal processes or societal mechanisms which shape those circumstances. Those interrelated processes include resource development, division of labor and task for status allocation, and rights of distribution.[13] Individuals and classes of individuals either have or do not have the right to certain resources and benefits based on their status. It is argued here that the public assumption of risks for the elderly is based in large part on status patterns established prior to old age, and that the rights to publicly supported benefits in old age stem from one's preretirement status. The erroneous view that the elderly constitute a universal social class identifies the "status" of old age as being the determining characteristic which entitles the elderly to publicly supported benefits. While there is an element of truth in this notion, it obscures the impact of primary socioeconomic status characteristics on entitlements in old age.

How might the interplay between socioeconomic status and public policy benefits for the elderly be conceptualized? The work of Richard Titmuss illustrates the connection.[14] In public welfare measures for the elderly, as in nonelderly welfare measures, there are different classes of "approved" and "disapproved" public dependency. Accordingly, those elderly who receive approved public dependency measures do so on the basis of possessing certain status, achievement, and need characteristics. These elderly expect and receive their entitlements as a matter of right. They receive what Titmuss calls occupational and fiscal welfare.[15] Occupational welfare benefits result from one's occupational status, that is, health insurance, contributory social security, and private pension benefits. Fiscal welfare measures are primarily tax-based income transfers facilitated by such things as double income tax exemptions for the elderly, property tax relief, and tax-protected retirement savings plans. Disapproved social welfare measures are based strictly on the criteria of need. Benefits for the poor elderly are given as a measure of paternalism and not as a matter of right.[16] Means-tested benefits such as Supplemental Security Income for the elderly are de-

signed to provide a minimal level of care and sustenance. The pul assumption of risks to the elderly is based on the distributive princi of equity. Accordingly, those who possess certain valued status char teristics are seen as having earned and deserved greater benefits

Classes of Elderly Entitlement

In social policy for the elderly there is a tendency to label the elderly a problem group. Efforts to discriminate need within the elderly pop lation are limited, and yet the needs of the various segments of t population are quite different and access to resources to meet the needs is very disparate. As a means of categorizing both need and eld ly public policy measures, three classes of elderly beneficiaries can identified: (*a*) the marginal elderly, (*b*) the downwardly mobile elder and (*c*) the integrated elderly. The nature of social provisions, in-ki versus cash, and the level of benefits for each class of elderly individu are determined by the elderly individual's socioeconomic status. Co sequently, each class of elderly is entitled to different governme sanctioned and defined levels of support—levels of support which ser to sustain in retirement those socioeconomic inequalities experienc prior to retirement

Marginal Elderly

The marginal elderly are those individuals who are characterized absolute need and poverty. The official federal government pove statistics in 1978 identified 14 percent, or 3.3 million, elderly persons poor.[17] These are individuals who remain poor despite the receipt public income transfers. For many of these individuals poverty in o age is simply a continuation of a life of poverty. The marginal elder as indicated by data on elderly Supplemental Security Income rec ients, are more likely to be individuals living alone, female, minori and of advanced years.[18] They are individuals who worked as unskill or semiskilled laborers, domestic workers, or worked in jobs not co ered until recently by Social Security. Their needs in old age are cle cut and absolute.

Downwardly Mobile Elderly

The downwardly mobile elderly, on the other hand, are assumed closely correspond to individuals who were previously middle or low middle class prior to old age. With the onset of old age, they fi themselves threatened with poverty or near poverty. The downward mobile elderly experience need on the basis of a sense of relative dep

ition They attempt to maintain a life-style based largely on their past periences. They seek to accomplish this with limited success through e marshaling of public sources of support. Their own private resources are limited.

Integrated Elderly

The integrated elderly are assumed to be previously middle- and upper-middle-class individuals. They represent a class of individuals who in old age are able to hold onto some of the key determinants of status maintenance, such as property ownership, essential knowledge and skills, and positions of community influence. Due to their higher economic status prior to old age, they are able to marshal both the private and public resources necessary for the maintenance of their socioeconomic position. It is hypothesized that due to their maintenance of socioeconomic status, this class of individuals is more likely to maintain those social values, roles, and group memberships, both formal and informal, which constitute the ties necessary for social integration.

Three-Tiered System of Benefits to the Elderly

Since earnings from work constitute the primary source of income for most individuals, the cessation of these earnings upon retirement imposes an economic hardship for most elderly which society has sought to ameliorate through a variety of public and private programs. This network of programs is comprised primarily of income-maintenance measures supplemented by health insurance and social service programs. This network is comprised of three tiers, or levels, of support. The first tier consists of means-tested welfare programs such as Supplemental Security Income, Medicaid, and Title XX services for the marginal elderly. The second tier involves the compulsory, earnings-related Social Security program; the Medicare health insurance program for Social Security recipients, and the universal Older Americans Act social service programs for the largest group of elderly, the downwardly mobile. The third tier involves publicly supported benefits for the integrated elderly. The benefits for this group come in the form of both straight public transfers, publicly supported and regulated "private" provisions to the elderly such as private pension plans, and various tax exclusions and benefits which serve to supplement and fill the gaps left by Social Security and Medicare. By combining publicly supported "private" benefit schemes with Social Security and Medicare, the integrated elderly are able to resolve most, if not all, the economic hardships associated with old age.

Each tier reflects a separate set of policy objectives, which are in tu reflective of different policy constituencies or classes of elderly benef ciaries. Each tier, through the use of public policy as an intervenin variable, seeks to maintain a certain level or "minimum" of govern ment support consonant with the elderly individual's prior socioeco nomic status. The policy objective for the marginal elderly is to ensur subsistence. The policy objective for the downwardly mobile elderly to provide a cushion of benefits to prevent a slide into poverty and t maintain some comparability between pre- and postretirement lif styles and socioeconomic status. Such policies seek to ensure a measu of social adequacy in benefit levels. The policy objective sought for th integrated elderly is the maintenance of preretirement life-styles an socioeconomic position. It should be understood that most of thes policies cut across at least one or all classes of elderly. The point o suggesting three distinct classes of beneficiaries is to identify th "primary" target population for each policy measure.

Income-Transfer Programs

In further developing this notion of elderly policy measures and corre sponding classes of elderly beneficiaries, the three major areas of gov ernment support for the elderly which are examined include the fol lowing: (*a*) income-transfer programs, (*b*) health care, and (*c*) persona social services. The concept of three tiers of government interventio and of classes of elderly beneficiaries is applied to each policy area Accordingly, income-transfer programs to the elderly are seen as bein composed of three tiers of support: (*a*) means-tested programs for th marginal elderly, (*b*) compulsory earnings-related Social Security fo the largest segment of the elderly population, the downwardly mobil elderly; and (*c*) public and private pensions, savings plans, and ta benefits for the integrated or high-income elderly.

The central income-transfer measure for the marginal elderly i Supplemental Security Income (SSI). SSI is a means-tested measur and as such, beneficiaries must meet certain income and asset stan dards. The enactment of the SSI program in 1972 replaced a previousl state-directed public assistance income-transfer program with a singl federally financed and operated one administered by the Social Securi Administration. The SSI established a common minimum incom benefit for the marginal or poor elderly. As of July 1981, the guarantee monthly income was $265 for an individual and $397 for a coupl States have the option of supplementing the federal benefit and mus do so where recipients would receive less under SSI than the previou federal, state, and local system. While establishing a minimum floor o benefits for the poor elderly, the "welfare" of the SSI recipients in th states is still highly uneven. For example, after the implementation o the SSI program in 1974, 7.8 percent and 36.3 percent, respectively, o

the SSI adult assistance population remained in poverty in California and New York. This compared to an 85.5 percent and 87.5 percent poverty rate for the SSI adult assistance population living, respectively, in Mississippi and Texas.[20] The majority of the elderly public assistance population remains in poverty despite the implementation of the SSI program "... aged persons living in nuclear families with income at or above the poverty line increased only from 30 percent in 1973 to 34 percent in 1974."[21] The marginal elderly are guaranteed the most meager subsistence under the SSI welfare income-transfer program.

The second tier of income support for the elderly is Social Security. Presently 90 percent of the work force is covered by old age, survivors, and disability insurance, or what is known as Social Security. In 1981, the Social Security program collected contributions from 100 million workers and their employers and paid approximately $120 billion in benefits to 36 million people, the majority of whom were elderly. The average monthly Social Security benefit amounts for an individual and couple in July 1981 were $374 and $640, respectively.[22] The term "downwardly mobile elderly" includes the majority of Social Security recipients who earn the average wage. This group relies on the Social Security check and whatever private savings they have accumulated for their economic support in old age. For the downwardly mobile elderly Social Security is a guarantee against falling into absolute poverty in old age. Robert Ball, former Social Security Commissioner, estimates that without Social Security some 60 percent of the elderly would fall into poverty.[23]

The third tier of income-transfer programs for the elderly involves the integrated elderly. They are elderly individuals who receive a combination of governmentally supported public and/or private pensions in addition to their Social Security check. They also receive cash benefits from government-supported private savings plans and favorable tax policies. Coverage of private retirement plans doubled between 1950 and 1974 from 22 percent to 44 percent of the private labor force.[24] By 1974, of 19.7 million old age and survivor recipients, 6.4 million were receiving benefits from private pension plans. Private pension plans tend to go to average and above-average wage earners.[25] One of the obvious results of private pensions is that they serve to supplement the Social Security benefits of middle- and high-income workers. Munnell notes that "a man retiring in June 1976 who had earned in all years the maximum earnings taxable for Social Security received a Social Security benefit equivalent to 31 percent of preretirement (1975) earnings. According to a study by the Bankers Trust Company, a male worker received an additional 37 percent of previous earnings in private pension plans."[26] In 1976 the estimated income of dual pensions was $10,050, compared to $6,400 for elderly families with only Social Security.[27] The high-income worker with Social Security, a private pension

plan, and asset income from a lifetime of investment was protected against a serious loss of income in old age. Robert Ball estimates that in 1978 approved private pension plans were subsidized by about $10 billion a year.[28] This figure is for the amount of taxes that would have been paid if the tax exemptions had not been provided. In contrast, the federal share of the expenditures for all elderly on SSI amounted to approximately 2.5 billion in 1979.[29]

This third tier of income support for the integrated or high-income elderly also involves the supplementing of Social Security benefits with *other public pension benefits.* It is estimated that 40 percent of all civil service pensioners receive cash benefits from Social Security.[30] In 1976 some 60 percent of state and local retirement system beneficiaries were also covered by Social Security.[31] Skolnick estimated that 40 percent of all railroad retirement beneficiaries were receiving Social Security. The high incidence of multiple public pension benefits also applies to many federal government employees and veterans. Public employee, railroad, and military pensions accounted for an estimated $34 billion in federal expenditures in 1978.[33]

Another form of income transfer that applies primarily to the integrated elderly are the voluntary savings and insurance plans authorized by the 1974 pension legislation. The Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and Keogh plans are subsidized by the government through foregone taxes, adding about 20–30 percent of the value of the individual contributions.[34] Tax policy benefits the high-income elderly in other ways also. The elderly, while they share the tax advantages of the general population, have special tax preferences. Tax advantages, such as the nontaxation of Social Security benefits, double income tax exemptions for individuals sixty-five and over, property tax reductions, and preferential treatment on the sale of a home ($100,000 tax free) yield economic benefits that go primarily to high-income elderly.[35] Tax preferences amount to subsidies to an affected group, in this case to the high-income elderly. In 1974 the three major tax preferences for the elderly, the additional exemption, the retirement income credit, and the exclusion of Social Security from taxable income, amounted to an excess of $4 billion in revenues foregone to the federal government. These tax preferences, in conjunction with private and public pension supplements to Social Security, serve to ensure the economic position of the higher-income elderly, or what are referred to here as the integrated elderly.

Health Care Programs

Health care programs for the elderly are also comprised of three tiers of support. On the bottom tier we have the welfare Medicaid program, in the middle the Medicare program, and on the top tier a combination of Medicare and private health insurance measures designed to provide

omprehensive coverage. Each tier of benefits corresponds to the three classes of elderly beneficiaries—the marginal, downwardly mobile, and integrated elderly.

The Medicaid program is a means-tested program. Eligibility is linked to public assistance and shares the shortcomings and complexities of that system. Currently an estimated 30 percent of Medicaid expenditures are directed to the marginal elderly primarily in the form of institutional care, both nursing homes and hospitals. Medicaid paid for 39 percent of nursing-home costs for persons sixty-five and over in 1978. Some 13.1 percent of the total personal health care expenditures financed by public programs for individuals sixty-five and over comes from Medicaid.[37] The central issues pertaining to Medicaid coverage for the marginal or poor elderly are issues of eligibility for Medicaid coverage and type and availability of various types of health care provisions.

The problems associated with eligibility for Medicaid coverage are multiple. First of all, while states cover all Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), not all SSI recipients are eligible. Some fifteen states opted to use the more restrictive state Medicaid eligibility requirements of 1972.[38] This provision was allowed to offset the anticipated influx of the SSI recipients resulting from the passage of the SSI program in 1974. Second, it must be remembered that not all elderly who are eligible for SSI, and thus for Medicaid, participate in the SSI program. The participation rate of elderly eligibles in the SSI program is believed to be approximately 55 percent.[39] In addition to public assistance recipients, states may extend coverage to the medically needy—individuals whose incomes after medical expenses are less than 133 1/3 percent of the AFDC eligibility level. Only twenty-eight states provide coverage to the medically needy.[40] Davidson and Marmor found that in a majority of the states claiming to serve the medically needy, the income test was as severe or more severe than the SSI income test for the poor elderly.[41]

What is the outcome of this maze of Medicaid eligibility guidelines? First, Medicaid does provide substantial and important assistance to the marginal elderly. However, the provision of this assistance is highly incomplete and uneven. Medicaid expenditures are concentrated in the wealthier states. In 1973, New York, Michigan, California, Illinois, and Pennsylvania accounted for 50 percent of all Medicaid expenditures in the country.[42] The unevenness is further depicted in an examination of Medicaid participation rates among the poor. Using a ratio based on Medicaid recipients to the aged poor, one found in 1971 that the ratio varies from .21 in West Virginia to 2.82 in California.[43] Finally, despite Medicaid, the elderly poor still spend more out-of-pocket than do the nonpoor elderly. Feder and Holahan note that ". . . families with incomes above 'near poverty' ($2,600 for an individual in

1970) spent 5.9 percent of their incomes on medical care and insurance families with lower incomes averaged 12.3 percent."[44]

A second major shortcoming of Medicaid is its preoccupation with funding institutional care. The result is poor care and high costs. It has been estimated that between 10 and 25 percent of the institutionalized elderly population could live in the community if appropriate services were available.[45] In 1969, 13 percent of the nursing home residents used Medicaid funds as their primary source of payment. By 1977 this had increased to 48 percent. These costs consume 41 percent of every Medicaid dollar and 71 percent of the elderly Medicaid dollar.[46] Medicare by comparison accounted for only 2 percent of the residents in nursing homes. In contrast to the focus on institutional care, only 1 percent of Medicaid expenditures went to home health services in 1978, and 80 percent of these expenditures went to the state of New York.[47] This bias toward institutional care is in part also reflected in the finding by Davis and Schoen that "aged Medicaid recipients averaged 4.6 visits in ambulatory settings, considerably less than the 5.8 average of the entire elderly population."[48] The result of Medicaid's stance toward the health care needs of the marginal elderly is both inadequate coverage of necessary health care expenditures and an unwarranted bias toward the provision of institutional as opposed to home-based care.

The Medicare program is directed primarily to the nonpoor elderly. Within that group the largest class of beneficiaries consists of the downwardly mobile elderly—the middle and lower middle class. Medicare constitutes a second tier of support in policies addressing health care needs of the elderly.

Medicare eligibility is nearly universal. Individuals are eligible to receive benefits if they are sixty-five or over and receiving or entitled to receive Social Security or railroad retirement benefits. In order to receive Part A benefits, the elderly must pay $160 deductible for the first sixty days of hospital care and $40 per day for the sixty-first through the ninetieth day in the hospital. Under Part B, Supplemental Medical Insurance (SMI), enrollees pay a monthly premium which was $8.70 as of July 1979.[49] The SMI portion covers physician services, and all SMI services are subject to an annual deductible and co-insurance.

The distribution of Medicare benefits demonstrates persistent variation based on income. The distribution closely reflects the class patterns of elderly beneficiaries suggested in this article. The National Opinion Research Center's 1970 survey of the distribution of Medicare expenditures reported data in three broad classes of elderly recipients. The survey suggested that per capita Medicare expenditures are about 70 percent higher for elderly with family incomes above $11,000 than for the elderly with incomes below $6,000. Per capita hospital expenditures are twice as high for the highest income class as for the lowest

income class.[50] This distribution of benefits is the inverse of what would be expected based on the probable incidence of need for health care resources. Medical survey data from 1968 found that Medicare SMI reimbursements for families with incomes above $15,000 were $160 per person compared to $79 per person for families with incomes below $5,000.[51] In addition, physician visits have been found to increase uniformly with income. Davis and Schoen note that "among the elderly with an average number of days of disability, the lowest users of physicians' services were those with incomes below $5,000, who averaged 6.6 visits annually; the highest were people with incomes above $15,000, who visited physicians 9.5 times a year, or 44 percent more frequently."[52]

There are a number of factors that no doubt help account for this development in the distribution of Medicare benefits. The greatest single one is the reliance on a uniform cost-sharing provision, co-insurance and deductibles, irrespective of ability to pay. This serves to curtail the participation rates of those who lack either the private resources or private insurance plans to pick up the costs not covered. A recent estimate of Medicare coverage of health-related costs to the elderly reveals that it covers only 30 percent of such costs.[53] This is down from an estimate of 38 percent in 1977.[54] Congress enacted Medicare to reduce the financial burden of medical care to the elderly. It was not intended to cover all health care costs but rather to relieve the elderly of a significant portion of their health care costs associated with hospitalization, surgery, and recovery. The difference was to be made up by private funds, a situation which prohibits many poor and near poor from full participation in the program. Increasingly, however, only those elderly individuals with private insurance policies can meet the gaps incurred by Medicare. Therefore, this is the only group which can assure itself of comprehensive health care coverage in old age.

The integrated or high-income elderly are able to ensure complete, comprehensive health care coverage through a combination of Medicare, private health insurance, and private financial resources. This combination of policy measures constitutes a third tier in health-coverage policies for the elderly. In many situations individuals purchase private insurance to pay some or all of the Medicare deductibles and co-insurance. In other situations unions and management may continue individual or group coverage into retirement. A conservative estimate identifies 37 percent of the personal health care costs for the elderly as coming from the private sector through a combination of private insurance and individual private outlays.[55] Private health insurance and private financial resources are essential to ensure comprehensive health coverage in old age. The integrated or high-income elderly are the only class of elderly that can "afford" comprehensive health care through combining private resources with the public Medi-

care program. The proportion of the elderly in 1974 whose bills were paid by private insurance, along with payments by the individual, increases with income—10 percent with incomes below $2,000, 34–36 percent with incomes from $4,000 to $14,999, and 39 percent with incomes above $15,000 were served by private insurance.[56] Those with the most comprehensive private insurance in old age are more likely to be white, better educated, and unionized.

What kind of private health insurance coverage do the elderly have? In 1977 an estimated 9 million, or 38.2 percent, of the elderly had no private hospital insurance. Some 13 million, or 52.9 percent, had no private surgical insurance. Additionally, only 25.3 percent of the elderly had private health insurance for office and home visits, 19.2 percent for prescribed out-of-hospital drugs, 16.9 percent for private-duty nursing, 19.9 percent for visiting nurse services, 20.1 percent for nursing home care, and only 5 percent for dental care.[57] Increasingly, private insurance group coverage is being extended into retirement, with premiums often being picked up by the employer.[58] Only a minority of the elderly, although a significant one, had sufficient private health insurance to complement their medicare coverage.

In the discussion of the Medicare program, it was reported that benefits and utilization increased with income. In the discussion of the role of private insurance, the possession of comprehensive private health insurance has been seen as essential to guarantee comprehensive health coverage. A related finding to the above points concerns the general issue of access to health care coverage. For the poor or marginal elderly receiving Medicaid, access to health care providers is a central problem. Access for what we have termed the downwardly mobile elderly Medicare recipients, while less of a problem, is still a concern. It has been found that when Medicaid and Medicare fee levels are lower than those of private insurers, doctors limit the number of Medicaid patients and Medicare assignments and see private insurance patients instead.[59] Not only do private health insurance patients have easier access to health care, thereby affecting who receives care generally, they also have considerable influence on the cost of care. Greenspan and Vogel argue that the private health care insurance sector, partially as a function of the tax subsidies given to it, serves to raise prices in the medical sector, thereby constraining the Medicare and Medicaid programs' abilities to provide access to care for their beneficiaries.[60] In turn, the discrepancy between private-sector costs of health care and government reimbursement levels creates a demand for private health insurance on the part of those elderly who need it to fill the Medicare coverage gaps and who can afford to purchase it. The decline in the coverage of health care costs by Medicare has been accompanied by a growing number of complementary contracts.[61] The argument is that private insurance policies serve to increase overall health care costs, diminish the coverage of

Medicare and Medicaid, and, as a partial result, create a demand for private insurance policies to cover the subsequent gaps.

Social Services

The elderly experience a range of needs for personal social services, needs which are met either by the elderly individual, family, friends, or services from the public sector. Again it is argued that personal social services to the elderly are grouped into three tiers. On the bottom tier means-tested social services are provided to the poor or marginal elderly. Such services to the elderly are provided primarily through Title XX of the Social Security Act. The middle tier of service provision for the elderly is marked by the services provided under the universal entitlement Older Americans Act program. While the poor are a priority service population under the Older Americans Act, the primary beneficiaries of the program are nonpoor, middle- and lower-middle-class elderly.[62] The third tier of service provision, which is directed at the higher-income integrated elderly, is comprised primarily of privately secured services. It is argued that the publicly supported income transfers of social security, public pensions, publicly supported private pensions, and tax-exclusion benefits provide the integrated or high-income elderly with sufficient income to purchase a majority of their personal social services in the private market.

Public in-kind social services to the elderly are comprised primarily of those services developed under the Older Americans Act and Title XX of the Social Security Act. These programs differ from each other on three dimensions: (*a*) elderly service constituency, (*b*) means of entitlement, and (*c*) nature of the social service provision.

Title XX is a program providing social services to all age groups. A priority service constituency is the poor elderly. Entitlements to services are means tested. The vast majority of Title XX services to the elderly go to the elderly receiving SSI.[63] Title XX services provided to the marginal elderly have been called basic life-sustaining services. Gil argues that, based on status attributes, social policies involve the individual's right of access to an array of life-sustaining and enhancing resources generated by society.[64] In analyzing the Title XX service provisions to the SSI elderly, I found that 86 percent of those services could be grouped into what I call life-sustaining, self-care services.[65] Self-care services seek to compensate for losses in health and the capacity for complete self-maintenance. They include services such as homemaker and chore services, home management, home-delivered meals, and adult protective services. They also include out-of-home services such as adult day care, foster care, health-related services, and institutional or residential care services. Together these services are directed at assuring a basic minimum of support for the marginal elderly but do not

concern themselves with improving their overall quality of life or social integration

In contrast to Title XX service for the marginal elderly, Older Americans Act programs serve a largely nonpoor constituency, the downwardly mobile elderly. Entitlements to services are universal, and the only criterion necessary to prove eligibility is that one be elderly. The Older Americans Act identifies a priority for serving the poor and minorities but sees its larger mission as serving all elderly who might request its services. Until recently, service provisions for the downwardly mobile elderly have focused on life-enhancing services.[66] The assumption of the program is that middle- and lower-middle-class elderly have most of their basic needs taken care of and often are seeking services to improve or maintain their past quality of life. Integrative services seek to compensate for loss of roles and positions of influence and involvement in the community. The losses might include the loss of a job, spouse, income, or community ties and roles which serve to integrate the person and give him or her a sense of belonging. Service interventions which seek to reintegrate the individual include employment and education services and new institutional outlets for socialization, such as senior centers and organizations. Access services seek to compensate for losses in ties and linkages to community institutions and resources. Service interventions include transportation, information and referral, and legal services. An analysis of the service patterns of 139 Older Americans Act Area Agencies on Aging identified the primary service provisions of agencies without Title XX resources as falling into the category of what we have called life-enhancement, integrative, and access services. For those area agencies which had obtained Title XX resources for the elderly, there was a significant shift toward the provision of basic life-maintenance services.[67] Older Americans Act services have sought to provide some measure of quality of life and not mere subsistence for the downwardly mobile elderly.

The third tier of personal social services is marked by a situation where the integrated, high-income elderly secure personal social services with their own financial resources. These resources in turn are obtained through a combination of private investment and publicly backed private and public retirement income and tax-benefit programs. Having sufficient income, the integrated elderly are able to secure a majority of needed services in the private market and need not resort to publicly provided in-kind services such as those provided under Title XX or the Older Americans Act. Private health insurance policies also assure access to many health-related services for high-income elderly such as private duty nursing and visiting nurse services. This class of elderly is also more likely to be situated in an intact family system which has access itself to a broader array of financial and social resources.[68]

Social Policy and Social Integration of the Elderly

As the term "integrated elderly" implies, the high-income elderly are more likely to be socially integrated than other classes of elderly. The combination of public policy benefits and private resources for the high-income elderly helps to assure the maintenance of their prior socioeconomic status in retirement. Socioeconomic status, as Cutler has noted, is one of the most consistent correlates of social participation.[69] The research of Rose, Tissue, and Hyman and Wright links socioeconomic status with frequency of participation in formal organizations.[70] Lower-class individuals are more often outside the reach of formal social networks. Liang notes that since socioeconomic status is also correlated with health status and satisfaction with financial standing, "it could be assumed those individuals with lower incomes would have less access to activities which require money and transportation and, obviously, those individuals who believe they are too sick to participate in activities will not likely be active."[71] Rose, in examining class differences among the elderly, found that in relation to the lower class, the middle class is "a) less likely to have a problem of interpersonal relationships, and less likely to have relationships disrupted by old age. b) more likely to have a subjective sense that old age has not brought them ill health or unhappiness, and c) less likely to have problems, of course, connected with adequate income."[72] The Rose sample of middle-class elderly included individuals who identified themselves as upper middle class and above. As such, they correspond with what we have termed the high-income or integrated elderly. The integrated elderly assisted by public policy interventions and private resources are likely to experience the least disruption in their transition into old age.

Social Class and Social Need among the Elderly

The development of this three-tier benefit approach to the elderly is in part a function of how need is defined. How one defines entitlements to meet those needs is, in turn, related to political considerations. Townsend identifies perceptions of need based on: (*a*) objective deprivation, (*b*) subjective or relative deprivation, and (*c*) conventionally acknowledged deprivation.[73] To this list a fourth view of deprivation or need can be added: universal deprivation.

Objective Deprivation

Objective deprivation is based on actual objective losses and absolute

need. The most obvious measure of objective need is income, that is, sufficient income to raise oneself above poverty and assure a basic standard of well-being. Another measure is access to comprehensive health care and social services. The poor or marginal elderly have the greatest absolute need for income, health care, and social services. However, they lack, as a class, the status, political resources, and organizational capacity necessary to obtain adequate benefits.

Subjective-Relative Deprivation

Subjective deprivation is the counterpart of the concept of relative deprivation. The term "relative deprivation" was used by Stouffer and his associates and elaborated on by Merton to denote "feelings" of deprivation relative to others and not "conditions" of deprivation relative to others.[74] It is argued that the downwardly mobile elderly experience the greatest sense of relative deprivation. This sense of deprivation leads to political ferment, which demands public welfare measures to maintain some continuity between pre- and postretirement life-styles.

The concept of relative deprivation is central to understanding the development of present-day policy measures for the elderly. It is argued that the primary target population of public policy measures for the elderly is the downwardly mobile middle- and lower-middle-class elderly. Prior to the development of the modern "welfare state," public and private measures for the elderly were directed largely to the poor. When the middle- and lower-middle-class older worker was detached from the work force by the depression and the continuing advance of industrialization,[75] social welfare measures focused on this extensive class of displaced elderly. A secondary and indirect beneficiary of the new policy measures for the middle-class elderly are the high-income elderly, who now reap the public benefits initially targeted to the middle- and lower-middle-class elderly, as well as other increasingly substantial tax-exclusion and income-transfer benefits.

Conventionally Acknowledged Deprivation

How does the concept of conventionally acknowledged deprivation fit into this analysis? Conventionally acknowledged deprivation results from a merging of individuals and societal perceptions of deprivation. Both perceptions are influenced by the status attributes of the client population. Status locates a person in the social structure and denotes "a collection of rights and duties."[76] Gil goes more directly to the point by saying that the effect of status is the development of an institutionalized inequality of rewards for classes of individuals with different statuses.[77] The criteria underlying the distribution of benefits to the elderly are multiple. As mentioned earlier in this article, those criteria include status, achievement, and "need."[78] Government entitlements to the elderly are distributed primarily on the basis of achievement and

itus and only secondarily on a criterion of objective need. Middle-
iss individuals who experience a sense of relative deprivation in old
are more likely to have their claims for assistance approved because
their status characteristics. The downwardly mobile elderly are seen
having earned their benefits, in contrast to those individuals who
ve always been poor

niversal Deprivation

fourth perception of need envisions the elderly as a class of individu-
s who are universally deprived Here the elderly are seen as constitut-
g a separate social class based on age Consequently, elderly individ-
ls who feel deprived are inclined to fight any attempt to distinguish
grees of deprivation within the class, that is, priorities for minorities
d poor elderly This notion of universal deprivation additionally
ves to produce other effects (*a*) it obscures the real objective differ-
ces in need among the elderly, (*b*) it obscures the persistent effects of
ial class on rights and entitlements to public resources in old age,
d (*c*) it uniformly labels the elderly as a problem population and as a
parate entitlement class based on age alone

he Need to Redistribute Public Benefits the Elderly

rrently there is growing concern among policy analysts and politi-
ns about the "graying" of the federal budget In fiscal year 1981
re than $150 billion in direct cash and in-kind benefits was provided
the elderly by the federal government Tens of billions in tax exclu-
ns will, in addition, be paid out to the elderly [79] In 1980 an estimated
percent of the federal budget went to the elderly, and based on
nographic trends and current benefit structures, this is expected to
ch 40 percent early in the next century[80] and 63 percent by the year
25 [81] These figures and much of the discussion about the graying of
federal budget would have us believe that the elderly as a class are
nefiting equally from these measures, and that, in fact, poverty in old
has disappeared [82] For example, a caption to a recent article in
rbes Magazine reads as follows "The myth is that they're sunk in
verty The reality is that they're living well The trouble is there are
many of them—God Bless 'em "[83]

agan Administration Initiatives

e Reagan Administration argues that government assistance to peo-
must be reserved for those who are truly needy. However, using this

article's conceptualization of old-age policy. Reagan Administration initiatives would seem to most severely affect the poor aged while benefiting the high-income elderly. While this analysis is tentative and cursory at this early stage of the Reagan Administration, the policy initiatives on both the budget and tax side of his overall economic plan point in that direction.

Social welfare measures to the marginal aged are being drastically cut.[84] An expenditure cap has been placed on Medicaid. The cap calls for a 3 percent cut in expenditures for fiscal year 1982, 4 percent for 1983, and 4.5 percent for 1984. Title XX service expenditures have been cut from $2.99 billion in fiscal year 1981 to $2.4 billion in 1982. Title XX expenditures will gradually grow to $2.7 billion in fiscal year 1986. The federal matching requirement for Title XX services is being eliminated along with the specific requirements of services for welfare recipients. Enrollment for the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program is expected to increase with the possible elimination of the Social Security minimum payment. Thousands of elderly individuals will fall between the cracks and receive coverage from neither program. Other programs benefiting the poor elderly, such as legal services, housing and food stamps, have also been drastically cut.

The effects of Reagan Administration policy initiatives for the middle and lower-middle-income elderly are less certain. Two characteristics of the administration's policy toward this group of elderly which do stand out are: (*a*) the weakening of policy elements which target benefits to the poor elderly, and (*b*) evidence of a certain "political respect" for the potential clout of the middle-income elderly. The weakening of policy elements which target benefits to the poor elderly can be seen in the possible elimination of the minimum Social Security benefit, the increase in co-insurance and deductible payments associated with Medicare, and the dropping of the Older Americans Act service provision calling for the targeting of services to elderly individuals with incomes of less than 125 percent of the poverty level.[85] Each measure may be seen as an attempt to eliminate the "welfare aspect" of programs which serve primarily lower-middle and middle-income individuals. The administration is very cautious about cutting benefits to the middle-income elderly. David Winston, writing for the Heritage Foundation in the book *Mandate for Leadership*, regards the elderly as a conservative constituency.[86] Winston in all likelihood is not referring to the poor elderly, who seldom vote in large numbers. Reagan Administration trial balloons concerning cuts in Medicare, Social Security, and the Older Americans Act which would most affect middle-income elderly have met with a great deal of resistance and have to date been largely unsuccessful. Budget cuts have been made which affect the group least able to resist them politically—the poor elderly.

What about policy measures for the high-income elderly? As policy nefits to the high-income elderly come most often in the form of cash insfers or fiscal welfare, as opposed to in-kind benefits, one needs to ok to the Reagan Administration tax legislation for its implications the high-income elderly. As the overall administration tax bill re-lted in a transfer of wealth to high-income individuals, it also results tax expenditures for future high-income elderly individuals. The mary vehicle for this tax subsidy to the wealthy elderly comes in the rm of the expanded-use Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and rement subsidies for the self-employed. The legislation liberalizes class of individuals and the amount of income these individuals can t aside free from taxation for future retirement benefits.[87] Designed a savings incentive, the tax transfer amounts to an increased subsidy the wealthy elderly. James Schulz reported on 1976 data which owed that "the only income group that has a high IRA utilization te is the one for people with incomes over $50,000. Less than one rcent of the eligible wage earners with incomes under $15,000 took vantage of the IRA opportunity in 1976."[88] Under the Reagan Ad-ministration, tax legislation—increased tax expenditures for the IRAs er the period 1982–86 will amount to $8.3 billion, with another $770 illion for self-employed plans. Another area of support for the high-come elderly comes with the increased tax expenditures on the elder-person's sale of his or her residence. The amount to be excluded for pital gains taxes has been increased under the Reagan Administra-on tax legislation to $125,000. Tax expenditures here amount to an imated $301 million for fiscal years 1982–86. When these three tax asures are combined for fiscal years 1982–86, we have an estimated reased tax expenditure which benefits primarily the wealthy elderly some $9.395 billion.[89]

ed to Redirect Benefits

hat we have in public policy measures for the elderly, then, is a ee-tiered benefit structure which employs highly political and sub-tive standards of entitlement: (*a*) a standard for the poor, (*b*) a stan-rd for the middle- and lower-middle-class elderly, and (*c*) a standard the high-income integrated elderly. The standard for the marginal lerly, based on maintaining a subsistence level of support, sentences eral million individuals to destitution for the rest of their lives. The st majority of public benefits are expended for the lower-middle and ddle-class downwardly mobile elderly. The standard here is directed achieving a basic level of "adequacy" and decency in old age. Public penditures for the high-income integrated elderly are significant and owing. The standard for the high-income elderly is based on the goal maintaining continuity between pre- and postretirement life-styles.

Such a standard for the high-income elderly raises the issue of whether or not it is in the public's interest to use billions of tax dollars to bolster high-income life-styles of an elite of American elderly when millions of others have incomes which are inadequate to the task of meeting the most basic of needs such as food, shelter, and health care.

In an effort to ensure a basic standard of adequacy for all elderly, policymakers need to critically examine the impacts of public programs for the elderly and judge the desirability of their distribution.[90] We need to ask who should benefit and who is actually benefiting from the vast array of programs for the elderly. To do this, we must collect information on income and asset distribution. Policymakers must examine Medicaid and Medicare programs for barriers to comprehensive health coverage for the poor and middle-class elderly. Co-insurance and deductibles, for example, could be made sensitive to the elderly individual's ability to pay. Ways of making social service programs more efficient in targeting to the poor and near-poor elderly under Title XX and the Older Americans Act must be developed. The situation must be changed where multiple pensions and tax-free pension benefits go to an elite of high-income elderly, and tax policy as it benefits the high-income elderly must be revised. These benefits should be redistributed to the poor and near-poor elderly. A guaranteed annual income for the elderly should be developed to assure that all elderly have an adequate standard of living. Poverty and other associated socioeconomic inequalities will continue to persist in old age until we commit ourselves to redistribute policy benefits to those who are truly in need.

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Whatever Happened to 43 Elizabeth I, c.2?

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Court decisions in the area of welfare law have influenced both the development and implementation of the social welfare system, particularly income maintenance. Many of the court rulings dealing with income maintenance have dealt directly with welfare principles derived from the English poor laws. This article reviews the evolution of the poor laws and delineates their underlying principles. Court cases related to the poor laws are then examined and the current status of the poor laws is assessed.

Introduction

Social work's attention to legal matters is frequently limited to child welfare provisions dealing with abuse, adoption, and delinquency. However, social work should be concerned as well with welfare law and the implications of judicial decisions in this area. The courts have had significant impact upon the social welfare system, and its development and implementation.[1] Provisions for income maintenance in particular have been influenced by court rulings, many of which have directly dealt with welfare principles derived from the English poor laws. To provide a context for some of the court's impact upon the welfare system in this country, it is useful to review again the evolution of the poor laws, to delineate their underlying principles, to identify their influence on the American system of social welfare, and, now almost 400 years after their initiation, to assess once again their influence on the current welfare system.

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The Poor Laws

The history of the English poor laws has been richly presented in a number of works such as those by Sir George Nicholls, the Webbs, Karl de Schweinitz, and Helen Clarke.[2] A brief review is presented here to highlight their development.

There seems to be a consensus that a statute enacted under Richard II in 1388 *to regulate the movement of laborers and thus prevent vagabondage* marks the beginning of the poor laws.[3] This statute distinguished between the impotent and the able-bodied poor and introduced into legislation the concept of settlement, meaning legal residence, as a condition for assistance. In the 1530s, two significant statutes were enacted under Henry VIII. The first[4] continued to distinguish between the impotent poor and the able-bodied poor and within that framework set up a system for licensing beggars. This statute is recognized as government's initial assumption of responsibility for the care of the poor. The second statute[5] established the first comprehensive system of *relief under government* sponsorship thereby incorporating into legislation the principle of public responsibility for the poor. Recognizing that a person may be able to work but unable to obtain it, the statute also contained specific provisions for setting the unemployed to work.

The act most commonly identified as the foundation of the poor laws was adopted in 1601.[6] Building on previous statutes which established local responsibility, local taxation, the position of an overseer of the poor, and the responsibility of family members, this act consolidated the various principles and provisions of the poor laws into one unified statute. It also extended the concept of mutual liability for support of parents and children *to grandparents* and contained a "rate-in-aid" clause which allowed a parish to receive funds from the hundred or the county if the parish could not levy sufficient monies for relief.

The concept of settlement, first introduced in 1388, was most clearly developed in the Settlement Act of 1662. The act gave powers to the parish overseers to return any newcomers likely to become public charges to their parish of legal settlement. This act thus established the system of "warning out," but, as the Webbs point out, the concept of settlement itself was not new. The system in which a person legally belonged to a parish had existed in England "from time immemorial."[7] Specific *provisions for the removal of the poor who did not* belong to a parish extend as far back as 1547. According to Rose, the provisions of the Settlement Act were never rigidly enforced, but they did strengthen the local and parochial basis of the poor laws.[8] In a positive sense, the concept of settlement was based on the idea that individuals belonged to a particular locality that was obliged to support them in time of need.

As identified by the Pumphreys, the fundamental assumptions underlying poor law legislation were the individual's responsibility to provide for himself and his family, including near relatives; the government's responsibility to relieve want and suffering and to insure the maintenance of life by supplementing insufficient individual efforts and the government's adaptation of its activities to the persons in need.[9] Given the long history of the settlement concept, it may also be included as a fundamental assumption. The administrative features of the poor laws included local government responsibility, financing through taxation, the classification of those in need, and provision for the kinds of relief needed by each category.[10] In summary, the main principles of the poor laws were local responsibility, family responsibility, and legal settlement.[11]

With the Act of 1601 providing the foundation, these principles and assumptions, if not the actual statutes, provided the framework for the development of a welfare system in this country. For example, in 1849 when Minnesota became a territory, a statute was enacted for the relief of the poor which included the above delineated principles. Section 1 of the act states "that the Board of County Commissioners of the several counties of this Territory, shall be and they are hereby vested with the entire and exclusive superintendence of the poor, in their respective counties." The provisions for family responsibility are covered in Section 2: "Every poor person, who shall be unable to earn a livelihood . . . shall be supported by the father, grand-father, mother, grand-mother, children, grand-children, brothers or sisters of such poor person, if they or either of them, be of sufficient ability."

The statute goes on to define the consequences of not fulfilling obligations to relatives and the order in which relatives are liable. Residency, or settlement, is dealt with several times within the statute and the requirements for residency are delineated in Section 7: "When application is made, by any pauper, to the Board of Commissioners of any county in this Territory, for relief, it shall be necessary for said Commissioners to require of said pauper satisfactory evidence that he has been a resident of said county, for twelve months immediately preceding the day upon which such application is made." Provisions for the removal of "paupers" are also included.[12]

As late as 1934, Abbott identified thirteen states using the term "pauper" in the legal title of the statutes providing for public aid.[13] In that same year, fourteen states were identified by Heisterman and Keener as depriving the pauper of his right to vote or to hold office.[14] In 1938, Abbott also reported that two-thirds of the states required relatives to provide support for poor persons.[15]

In Minnesota, the intent, and indeed the wording, of these statutes changed very little until the 1970s when they were repealed. For example, the provisions for family responsibility, not repealed until 1973

cad as follows "Every poor person who for any reason is unable to ...rn a livelihood shall be supported by his children, parents, brothers, and sisters, grandchildren or grandparents; and relatives having sufficient ability shall be called on for such support in order above named."[16] The principles and the concepts of the poor laws have been firmly ingrained in the American system of welfare, and it has not been until recent court decisions that their role has been legally challenged and undermined

Judicial Decisions Related to Poor Law Concepts

Court cases relating to poor law concepts can be categorized on the basis of those concepts (i e , family responsibility, settlement or residency and local responsibility) This will not be a discussion of all the court cases pertinent to poor law concepts, but rather a presentation of a few significant, illustrative cases. Preference has been given to those cases ruled upon by the highest court

Settlement

The most clear-cut of the three areas is that of settlement A significant early decision in 1837 which upheld the poor law principle of settlement was *City of New York v Miln* [17] At that time, the state of New York had a statute which required the master of any ship to report to the mayor the origins of its passengers. The mayor could require the master to guarantee assumption of expenses should any of his passengers become public charges within two years. The city brought action against a master because he failed to report 100 passengers who arrived in New York in 1829 It was maintained by the defendant that the New York statute was unconstitutional because it regulated interstate commerce, a function specifically delegated to the Congress The U S Supreme Court sustained the statute and found that it was an exercise of police power within the state's right. In the opinion delivered by Justice Barbour, the Court said "The act immediately before us . . . is obviously passed with a view to prevent her citizens from being oppressed by the support of multitudes of poor persons, who come from foreign countries without possessing the means of supporting themselves . . . New York . . . is . . . exposed to the evil of thousands of foreign emigrants arriving there, and the consequent danger of her citizens being subjected to a heavy charge in the maintenance of those who are poor. It is the duty of the state to protect its citizens from this evil."[18]

The Court further stated: "We think it as competent and as necessary for a state to provide precautionary measures against the moral pesti-

lence of paupers, vagabonds, and possibly convicts, as it is to guard against the physical pestilence, which may arise from unsound and infectious articles imported from a ship."[19] This case is illustrative of the Court's thinking until the 1920s and 1930s when it had to address the constitutionality of the Maternity and Infancy Act of 1921 and the issue of limitations on local legislation in *Edwards v. The People of California*.[20] In the *Edwards* case, the plaintiff challenged a California statute making it a misdemeanor to bring or assist in bringing a nonresident, indigent person, knowing him to be indigent, into the state.

Citing *Miln*, California argued that the statute was constitutional and further attempted to justify its statute on the tradition of the English poor laws. However, the Court held that the state could not restrict the transportation of indigent persons across its boundaries because it interfered with interstate commerce. In the opinion delivered by Justice Byrnes, the Court finally ceased to equate poverty with immorality: "We do not think that it would now be seriously contended that because a person is without employment and without funds he constitutes a 'moral pestilence.' Poverty and immorality are not synonymous."[21] As so aptly stated by Bendich, "It had taken more than one hundred years for poverty stricken persons to progress, in the eyes of the law, from the dignity of treatment accorded to contaminated commodities to that of uncontaminated ones. Yet the decision marked a watershed in the development of our intellectual and legal attitudes toward poverty."[22] In the *Edwards* decision, the Court also found it necessary to address the English poor laws: "We do, however, suggest that the theory of the Elizabethan Poor Laws no longer fits the facts. Recent years, and particularly the past decade, have been marked by a growing recognition that in an industrial society the task of providing assistance to the needy has ceased to be local in character. The duty to share the burden, if not wholly to assume it, has been recognized not only by the state governments, but by the federal government as well. . . . In not inconsiderable measure the relief of the needy has become the common responsibility and concern of the whole nation."

Clearly then this decision had significant implications for viewing welfare as a local responsibility. Its more direct impact upon welfare policy, however, was in terms of settlement which pervaded the poor laws. It threw into question the constitutionality of the state durational residence requirements. That question was not settled until the 1969 decision of *Shapiro v. Thompson* which held that, indeed, the state durational residency requirements denied equal protection of the law under the constitution by restricting the right to interstate travel.[23]

Current status.—Since the *Shapiro* decision, the concept of settlement has greatly decreased in importance. However, in the area of income transfer, there are still a number of programs in which residency itself (as opposed to durational residency) is an issue. In the

Medicaid provisions, the states are merely restricted from imposing residency requirements which would exclude any resident of the state. They are not prohibited, however, from establishing a requirement of U.S. citizenship as a condition of eligibility. For general assistance programs which are administered and/or funded by state and local governments, eleven states had durational residence requirements within the state, within the local jurisdiction, or both in 1977. Twenty-nine states required that the applicant be a state or local resident at the time of application.[25] Residency requirements may also be involved in in-kind services such as nursing home care. The relatively new federal program of Supplemental Security Income raises some interesting questions with its provision for the termination of benefits if a recipient is outside the United States for a month, and the recipients are treated as being outside the country until they have been in the country for thirty consecutive days.

Family **Responsibility**

The second poor law concept to be considered is family responsibility. In this area, much litigation has occurred around the interpretation of parent to include stepfather or an adult male assuming the role of spouse. In 1970, a California law which provided that the income of a nonadoptive stepfather or of an adult male assuming the role of spouse should be considered in the computation of Aid to Families of Dependent Children (AFDC) grants was reviewed by the Court in *Lewis v. Martin*.[26] The California law assumed that this income was actually available to the children, but the Court held that in the absence of proof of actual contributions, these resources could not be so considered. Drawing on an earlier decision in *King v. Smith*,[27] the Court restated that "parent" refers only to those with a legal duty of support.

More typical are the cases that deal with the relatives' obligation to provide support. In *Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner*,[28] the Department of Mental Hygiene in California attempted to recover from the defendant's estate the costs of care given to the defendant's mother who had been committed to a state institution for the mentally ill. Although the mother's commitment to the institution followed a civil rather than a criminal proceeding, the California Supreme Court held that "the purposes of confinement and treatment or care in either case encompass the protection of society from the confined person, and his own protection and possible reclamation as a productive member of the body politic. Hence the cost of maintaining the state institution, including provision of adequate care for its inmates, cannot be arbitrarily charged to one class in society; such assessment violates the equal protection clause."[29]

Although this would appear to be a very broad decision by the Supreme Court of California, in fact, lower courts in California as well as

in other states have continued to impose the concept of family responsibility. In later clarification, the California Court indicated that the *Kirchner* ruling was intended to apply to only a narrow group of situations. The more usual outcome of cases dealing with family responsibility is illustrated by the decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois in *Department of Mental Health v. Coty*.[30] The father of a mentally retarded child in a state institution challenged an Illinois statute holding parents liable for the care given to their children. In part, it was claimed that the statute was unconstitutional because it directed "only one small segment of a class [the parents of a mentally retarded child confined in a hospital] . . . to pay monthly charges." The Court, however, found the reimbursement provisions to be proper and held the father liable for the support of his son.

Current status.—Years ago, Edith Abbott recognized that family relationships and moral obligations for helping members of one's family could not be maintained or strengthened by statutes delineating those responsibilities and prescribing litigation. She specifically pleaded for the repeal of legal provisions for the prosecution of relatives in all social welfare statutes dealing with public assistance.[32] In assessing the current status of relative responsibility, it appears that some progress has been made. The federal Supplemental Security Income program greatly limited relative responsibility for the aged, blind, and disabled. In general, relative responsibility is now fairly well limited to spouses and to the parent of a child eligible for benefits. The latter still results in extensive investigation and expensive litigation for the AFDC program. To receive federal funds for an AFDC program, each state is required to have a mechanism for establishing the paternity of children born out of wedlock and for securing financial support for them as well as for children who have been deserted by their parents. For general assistance, however, in 1974, eleven states considered adult children responsible for their parents and four states extended responsibility to siblings and/or grandparents and grandchildren. Two states restricted general assistance to those persons with no relatives able to provide support.[33]

Local Responsibility

The final concept to be dealt with, local responsibility, is perhaps the most complex of the three areas. It is here that questions about moral behavior and personal freedom are raised. But first, the transition from welfare viewed as a local concern to welfare as a national one needs to be addressed. As previously mentioned, the *Miln* ruling reflected the Court's thinking in this area until the 1920s. Its thinking was a reflection of the prevailing philosophy toward welfare. It was not until the passage of the Social Security Act of 1935 and the subsequent court decisons upholding its constitutionality that a role for the federal gov

ernment in social welfare emerged. Part of the groundwork for this turn of events was the U.S. Supreme Court's decison in *Massachusetts v. Mellon* in 1923.[34] In this case the constitutionality of the Maternity and Infancy Act was challenged. This act, aimed at reducing maternal and infant mortality and at protecting maternal and infant health, was one of the first attempts at federal and state cooperation in social welfare. Because the states were given the option of participating in the program, the Court held that the states' powers were not in question and implied that, indeed, the alleviation of poverty was a permissible national objective.[35] This decision opened the door for further federal government activity in the area of social welfare.

Building on the cooperative system established in the Maternity and Infancy Act, the Social Security Act of 1935 broadened the scope and the funding of programs for these cooperative ventures. The taxing mechanisms of the various programs were challenged as unconstitutional on the grounds that they interfered with the taxing powers of the states. In *Steward Machine Company v. Davis*,[36] the Court held that the tax imposed on employers (for which they were given credit if contributions were made to a state unemployment compensation fund) was not in violation of the constitution. A companion case, *Helvering v. Davis*,[37] challenged the provision for retirement benefits through taxation of employers and employees. The Court held that this provision did not violate the constitution and in the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Cardozo, the Court stated: "Nor is our concept of the general welfare static. Needs that were narrow or parochial a century ago may be interwoven in our day with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the times. . . . The purge of nationwide calamity that began in 1929 has taught us many lessons. Not the least is the solidarity of interests that may once have seemed divided."[38]

Clearly then, social welfare has come to be perceived as an area of appropriate concern for the federal government and not solely that of the local community. In one sense, this may be interpreted as removing the English poor law concept of local responsibility. In another sense, however, it is a logical extension of the poor law administrative feature of rate-in-aid which allowed the local parish to receive funds from outside sources if the parish could not levy sufficient funds for relief.

On the other hand, as recently as 1974, in *Lindsay v. Wyman*,[39] the New York Supreme Court held that welfare could be treated as a matter of local concern by the state. The mayor of New York had challenged a state plan which would distribute the costs of welfare among the localities in proportion to the number of recipients in each locality. The mayor argued that this was an unfair burden to the city of New York because it had a disproportionate share of the poor population. The Court's opinion is extremely interesting in light of the earlier opinons delivered in the *Edwards* and *Helvering* cases. In part, the opinion stated:

> The choice of the City, a functioning governmental unit, as a Single Social Service district . . . is a logical unit which, historically, had an obligation to provide welfare as part of its municipal services . . . The history of social welfare makes it quite clear that assistance to the needy has been the primary responsibility of the immediate locality . . . The fact that poverty is a national problem does not mean that it is not a local one, as well. Under the statutes attacked, the major fiscal burden is borne by the national government . . . so that the participation of the locality is unreasonable only if it is unreasonable for the people of the State to perceive the problem of poverty as 25% a local problem.[10]

On the basis of the *Lindsay* decision, does the question become to what proportion, degree, or percentage is social welfare a local responsibility or when does the rate-in-aid concept apply?

The U.S. Supreme Court has played a significant role in placing some limits on the amount of discretion retained by the local and or state governments. Specifically, the Court has clarified the essentially financial criteria for the determination of eligibility for federally funded programs. *King v. Smith*[11] is the leading decision here. The question in this case was the "substitute father" regulation in Alabama which denied AFDC payments to children of mothers who "cohabit with a man, either inside or outside the home. By this type of regulation, Alabama along with many other states, was attempting to regulate the personal behavior and morality of public assistance recipients. The Court held that while Alabama was free to deal with the concerns of immoral behavior and illegitimacy by a variety of methods included in the Social Security Act, the termination of benefits was not one of those methods and was in conflict with the Act's provisions concerning eligibility. This decision made it clear that states could not impose eligibility requirements which were contrary to those established by Congress in the Social Security Act.

States do, however, retain wide discretion in determining the level of financial benefits and the method of computation. In *Jefferson v. Hackney*,[12] The Texas system for computing financial need was challenged. At that time, Texas used a percentage reduction on the level of need before outside income was deducted and the percentage reduction varied for each public assistance category. Both of these practices were challenged, the former on the basis of obscuring actual need; the latter on the basis of discrimination because a higher percentage of need was paid to the adult programs than to the program for dependent children. The Court rejected both of these challenges, holding that the Texas method did not obscure actual need nor did the pattern of discrimination violate federal laws.

Current status.—States and or local governments continue to have wide discretion in the areas of financial benefit level, Medicaid, and the provision of personal social services offered under Title XX of the Social Security Act which was passed by Congress in 1974. The federal

vernment has no jurisdiction over general assistance. Title XX, ich separated the personal social services from other components of Social Security Act, delineates the goals to which social services ist be directed. Within those boundaries, however, states retain broad cretion in determining the types of services to be provided as well as system of organization and delivery. Further, those eligible for vices need not be restricted to recipients of public assistance. On the hand, Title XX may be viewed as a return to viewing the locality the state), as having the responsibility as well as the authority for nning and providing a whole range of social services, including als on wheels, day care, chore services, and homemaker services. me of these personal social services are actually in-kind provision d as such, represent the transfer of income. On the other hand, Title X may be viewed as an additional experiment within the framework federal-state cooperation begun in the welfare field under the Matern y and Infancy Act of 1921.

onclusion

can be seen by this review of court decisions, the English poor laws ich initially played a fundamental role in this country's social wele system and which persisted well into the twentieth century have en undetermined on a piecemeal basis. Over the last fifty years, court cisions have played a key role in restricting the influence of the poor w concepts on social welfare legislation. And yet, remnants of the or law concepts are still contained in some of our welfare provisions, rticularly in general assistance and in Medicaid. Whether the relativenew Title XX of the Social Security Act represents a reemergence of concept of local responsibility in new form or an extension of leral-state cooperation remains to be seen. Although the principle of leral participation in social welfare has been established, the extent which the localities are responsible for the funding of social welfare asures remains in question. In addition, the application of residency quirements to aliens and to migrants will continue to be challenged. That these poor law concepts continue to endure as legislation and issues in social welfare policy is indicative of the central importance ren, as least ideologically, to the family unit and to "taking care of e's own," be they family or community members. The American mocratic tradition continues to reinforce ideals of self-reliance and gged individualism. The emphasis on local responsibility is reflecf of the traditional fear in this country of a powerful central govnment and of the enduring belief that each community knows best

how to handle its own problems Given the size and diversity of this country, this emphasis on local determination appears reasonable, but it raises questions of equality and equity, both strong values in American society Settlement concepts, be they belonging to a parish, residence with intent to remain, or citizenship in a country, continue to reflect fears of those who may be somehow different in color, life-style, or values. As this country continues to struggle with the concerns of welfare state, these issues will continue to arise

Notes

1 For an analysis which concludes that the role of the courts is limited to the interpretation and application of social welfare legislation, see Philip B Kurland, "The Judicial Road to Social Welfare," *Social Service Review* 48 (December 1974) 481-9...

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27 392 U S 309 (1968)

28 60 Cal 2d 716 (1964)

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30 38 Ill 2d 602 (1967)

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35 Arthur B LaFrance *Welfare Law Structures and Entitlement* (St Paul West ...ublishing Co , 1979), p 9

36 301 U S 548 (1937)

37 301 U S 619 (1937)

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Theoretical Orientation and Clinical Practice: Uniformity versus Eclecticism?

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It is widely believed that congruence between one's theoretical framework and on interventive strategies enhances the effectiveness of social work practice, thoug little evidence is available to demonstrate the degree to which this linkage betwe belief and action systems is achieved in practice. In an effort to explore this questio the present study sampled almost 700 practitioner educators to determine the deg of "fit" between their theoretical orientations and their choices of interventive st tegy. The study's findings indicate that this fit is a very weak one which ra questions as to the professional education process that future social work practitio ers experience as well as the effectiveness of interventions in social work prac which may lack theoretical grounding.

Introduction

Social work's status as a profession has been both questioned an defended over the years. As early as 1915, Flexner denied social wo

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rofessional status, claiming that "the coordination function between eople and institutions, as well as the organization of resources and ervices, would never qualify as a profession."[1] In 1957, Carr-Saunders sted social work among the semi-professions; Greenwood, however, rgued that social work was indeed a full profession.[2] In 1975, Gartner ontrasted the "professions" of medicine, law, education, and social ork on several dimensions, tending to "team" social work and educa-ion at a lower end of the hierarchy of professions compared with edicine and law.[3]

One dimension on which Gartner compared these four professions as the degree to which each possessed a common knowledge base. ndeed, it might be argued that this dimension lies at the very center of ocial work's questionable status as a profession. Arkava, for example, rgued that the lack of a clear definition of social work has been a ontributing factor: "It is precisely because such a definition is lacking at the field of social work does not appear to be able to draw upon a recise or even somewhat general body of knowledge that may serve as guide for practice."[4] The status of social work as a profession not-ithstanding, the validation of such a base of knowledge which pur-osely directs social work intervention is, in fact, a necessary precondi-on for effective practice.

Perhaps the most significant indication of social work's lack of a ommon knowledge base might be observed in the profusion and diver-ty of theoretical orientations within the profession. Marx suggested at a diversity of theoretical orientations, often contradictory and at mes even competitive, may be a reaction to an awareness that the esent knowledge base is inadequate for understanding and acting fectively in various client-worker situations.[5]

This diversity of theoretical orientations within the social work pro-ssion is clearly reflected in the social work literature. Briar and iller, for example, discussed six orientations: psychoanalytic, Rank-n, ego psychology, social science, existential, and behavioral.[6] oberts and Nee included seven orientations: psycho-social, func-onal, problem-solving, behavior modification, family therapy, crisis tervention, and social systems.[7] Marx, on the other hand, categorized ght theoretical orientations: Freudian, neo-Freudian analytic, neo-eudian ego psychological, Sullivanian, Rogerian, existential, milieu, d social psychiatric.[8] Finally, Jayaratne included nine theoretical ientations: psychoanalytic, reality therapy, humanistic, neo-Freud-n, behavioral theory, gestalt, Rogerian, transactional analysis, and ional emotive.[9]

he various orientations listed above overlap and are duplicative in ny instances. While there is considerable variability in the degree to ich each orientation is utilized by professional social workers, most ese orientations have, in fact, been borrowed from other fields,

such as psychology and psychiatry. This borrowing phenomenon, turn, further highlights the profession's lack of its own common know edge base.[10] Futhermore, novel attempts to redefine the framework social work practice toward a common base in terms of a general sy tems theory or an interactional/transactional perspective simply add in our view, yet another theoretical orientation in need of systema conceptualization and validation.

In viewing the variety of theoretical orientations listed above, pe haps the four that the social work profession has invested the great energies in refining, applying to social work practice, and emphasizin in its educational processes are psycho-social, behavioral, proble solving, and functional. These four theoretical orientations have hi torical precedent and grounding. They also have been utilized by soci workers and have been tailored to respond to a wide range of proble situations, client populations, and interventive realities within t social work practice arena.[12]

Yet, a basic paradox emerges. At the same time that it might argued that this diversification in theoretical orientations is a natu product of a profession's attempts to expand and refine its knowled base(s), it might also be argued that this diversity of theoretical orien tions creates conflicts for the practitioner at the decisive moment having to select a strategy of intervention. The assumption that o adopts a particular theory and consistently translates it into pract may, indeed, be more fiction than fact. Lazarus, for example, points o that "complete unity between a systematic theory of personality and effective method of treatment derived there-from remains a cherish ideal."[13]

What emerges, therefore, is a dual perspective for viewing the the retical orientations of professional social workers. On the one har there is the theory or "belief system" that a professional social work embraces. Marx has described this as "an ideological commitment one of the diverse analytic models or theoretical systems . . . that d with the nature of personality, behavior, and psychopathology."[14] Se ond, there is the social worker's actual practice approach or "acti system." These are the interventive decisions actually employed in t helping process.

From a more important point of view, the practitioner's belief syste and action system may not necessarily be identical or matched in given case situation. Jayaratne, Lazarus, and Pinkus, for example have pointed out that there may be incongruence between belief syst and action system.[15] The purpose of the present study, therefore, is explore the diversity of theoretical orientations of professional soc work practitioners, with particular attention to the degree to whi social workers' choices of intervention (action system) are congru with the theoretical frameworks (belief system) they espouse.

Iethodology

istrumentation

s noted in the preceding section, theoretical orientations can be ewed from the dual perspectives of one's belief system and one's tion system, as well as from the additional perspective of the degree consistency between these two systems In the present study, the spondents' belief system was operationalized by two scales. The first ale entailed the respondents' rankings of the key concepts or princiles inherent in each of the four major theoretical orientations within e social work profession noted earlier These rankings were made ong the following five dimensions: the role of the social worker in the elping process, the social worker's priorities in beginning the helping lationship, the thrust or focus of the social worker's assessment process the theory about human behavior that underlies this assessment, d the goals of treatment The second scale required the respondents rate eight books articles as to the degree to which each contributed the development of their own theoretical base. For the concepts ale each respondent received a composite ranking score from five to enty, five dimensions, one to four ranking on each, for each of the ur theoretical orientations—with lower rankings scores assigned gher significance On the books/authors scale, the scores for each ientation ranged from zero to ten, with higher scores assigned higher gnificance

The respondents' action systems were operationalized by their reonses to ten case situations or vignettes, where the four choices of tervention for each vignette represented one of the four theoretical ientations For purposes of analysis, a percentage score for each of e four theoretical orientations was constructed for each respondent, ed upon the proportion of the respondent's responses to all ten gnettes which were assigned to each of the four theoretical orientations

Finally, each questionnaire included a brief section on background a, focusing in particular on the respondents' prior social work education and experience in teaching, supervising, and direct practice. It was icipated that this data would help to further clarify the nature of the ariate relationships between the belief and action systems of the pondents

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urposive sampling plan was implemented for this study. Ten grade schools of social work were targeted for inclusion due to their gnition in the social work education community for representing of the four theoretical orientations. While variability in the theo-

retical orientations of the respondents within any of the ten particip ing schools of social work was anticipated, it was believed that suc purposive sampling plan was the best procedure for maximizing t likelihood of obtaining an adequate representation of respondents f each of the four theoretical orientations being studied.

Upon selection of the ten schools of social work, anonymous que tionnaires were distributed to all faculty and field instructors w either taught and or supervised in the "clinical track" of these pr grams While we recognized the potential bias inherent in using edu tors of social work practice to look at the practice arena, it was belie that this sampling plan would identify respondents who were in t best position to be familiar with both the theoretical and the practi arenas, as well as those who were significant agents in the preparati of future professional social work practitioners Familiarity with bo the theory and the practice of social work was critical if the degree agreement between belief and action systems was to be validly inve gated in the present study

Results/Discussion

Sample Description

Faculty from ten graduate schools of social work, totaling 670 respon ing clinical educators, participated in this study This represente return rate of 55.7 percent from the original population of 1,203 M of the respondents (89 0 percent) were field instructors, with 2.3 perc classroom instructors and the remaining (8 7 percent) assigned resp sibilities in both areas The respondents were primarily female (6 percent), almost entirely M S W 's (90 6 percent), and relatively you (59 0 percent under the age 42, averaging 40 2 years of age)

The respondents also were a relatively experienced group, with ov one-half having had at least ten years of direct practice experie (mean equaling 11.3 years) In addition, those respondents with cla room teaching responsibilities averaged 5 3 years of prior teaching perience, while those with field instruction responsibilities averag 5 8 years of field instruction experience

Theoretical Orientations

As noted previously, the action systems of the respondents were op tionalized through responses to ten case situations or vignettes For entire sample, the proportion of behavioral responses to the ten gnettes averaged less than one in ten (8 7 percent), while the propor of problem-solving, functional and psycho-social responses were

proximately three in ten vignettes for each (31.53 percent, 26.84 percent and 32 93 percent, respectively)

Table 1 portrays the Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients when looking at the relationship and therefore consistency between the respondents' action systems, based on vignettes, and their belief system, based on concepts.

It can be seen from table 1 that a consistent pattern emerges wherein the correlations between *similar action and belief systems all are statistically significant* and in the anticipated negative direction It should be remembered that the ranking of concepts resulted in a lower score equaling greater significance assigned to that particular concept Similarly, all of the correlation coefficients between different action and belief systems were also as expected, either nonsignificant or significantly correlated in a positive direction

Table 2 displays the correlation coefficients for the respondents' action systems, based on case vignettes, and belief systems, based on books authors It is apparent that the pattern noted in table 1 weakens considerably Only problem-solving and psycho-social display some degree of consistency between belief and action systems It should be remembered that a positive correlation was anticipated here, as a higher score equaled greater contribution/significance assigned to that particular book author

Overall, one striking pattern of the findings was that, despite the fact that the correlation coefficients generally were in the anticipated direction and statistically significant, the relationships were relatively weak ones throughout In an attempt to elaborate on these bivariate relationships, therefore, the background data collected on the respondents were utilized in a multivariate analysis plan, utilizing partial correlations More specifically, neither the respondents' ages, their years of direct practice experience, nor their years of field instruction experience influenced or affected the original bivariate relationships. That is, the degree of consistency between each of the four belief and action systems was neither strengthened nor weakened for respondents who were

Table 1

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACTION SYSTEM (Vignettes) AND BELIEF SYSTEM (Concepts)

	VIGNETTES			
CONCEPTS	Behavioral	Problem-Solving	Functional	Psycho-Social
Behavioral	− 189**	N S	+ 094**	N S
Problem solving	+ 125**	− 113**	N S	N S
Functional	+ 079	+ 118**	− 217**	N S
Psycho social	N S	N S	+ 109**	− 078*

* p < 05
** p < 01

Table 2

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACTION SYSTEM (Vignettes) AND BELIEF SYSTEM (Books/Authors)

	VIGNETTES			
BOOKS	Behavioral	Problem-Solving	Functional	Psycho-Social
Behavioral	N.S.	N.S.	N.S.	N.S.
Problem solving	−.103**	+.072**	N.S.	N.S.
Functional	−.073*	N.S.	N.S.	N.S.
Psycho-social	−.082*	N.S.	−.072*	+.152

* $P < .05$
** $P < .01$

older, or who had a greater number of years of practice or field instruction experience. Similarly, the consistency between the respondents' belief and action systems was not influenced by their sex.

On the other hand, the respondents' teaching experience, current responsibilities, and their professional discipline did affect the original findings. Respondents who had had prior teaching experience displayed significantly greater consistency between each of the four belief and action systems than those without prior teaching experience. In addition, respondents whose present responsibility included both field and classroom instruction displayed significantly greater consistency between all four belief and action systems when compared with those whose responsibilities included only field or classroom instruction. Finally, respondents with professional degrees in social work displayed significantly greater consistency when compared with respondents with degrees in other professional disciplines.

Implications

The present study represents a renewed effort to measure the theoretical orientations of clinical social work practitioners and educators. If the social work profession is to achieve clarity regarding the parameters of its knowledge, value, and skill bases, closer attention must be directed to measuring and profiling the divergent belief and action systems which constitute the profession. The authors believe that the approach to measurement utilized in the present study, particularly the use of case vignettes and the ranking of key concepts or principles, represents a vital strategy worthy of expansion and validation. Expansion of this strategy might occur by increasing the number of concepts used to operationalize belief systems and similarly by expanding the number of vignettes used to operationalize action systems, while validation might be pursued through the difficult but necessary process of observing how

linicians actually perform in practice and comparing these findings to heir self-reported responses to case situations or vignettes. On the other hand, though precedent for using books/authors to operationalize theoretical orientations is available in the clinical psychology literature,[16] the lack of statistically significant relationships in the present study's findings raises skepticism about the merit of this approach.

The study's findings consistently indicate that the matches between the respondents' belief and action systems were in the anticipated direction, but that these relationships were very weak. In most instances, less than 2.0 percent of the variance in the respondents' intervention strategies were predicted by knowing their theoretical orientation. Futhermore, it was surprising to note that consistency between belief and action systems was not enhanced by years of direct practice or field instruction experience. This raises anew questions regarding the degree to which practitioners read the current literature and guide their practice by it.[17] Such inattentiveness to evolving bodies of knowledge in turn leaves the practice of social work in the unenviable position of becoming largely unresponsive to new and more effective models of assessment and intervention. On the other hand, greater consistency between belief and action systems was obtained by respondents who had had prior teaching experience, as well as by those currently involved in both classroom instruction of practice and field supervision. While the generalizability of the present study's findings would have been enhanced by sampling practitioners as well, these findings do lend support for the study's sampling plan of involving educators of social work practice, not solely practitioners. Furthermore, they offer incentives for instructional models in the teaching of practice which seek to join or integrate classroom and field instruction teaching-learning activities.

Compositely, the present study's findings raise significant questions as to the "grounding" of professional social work practitioners and educators. The diversification in the social work profession's theory and practice base(s) poses the dilemma that the practioner's efforts to broaden exposures in response to this diversification may also serve to inhibit or dilute efforts to pursue more in-depth or specialized competencies in a particular knowledge base. Lacking the guiding frame of reference provided by such an in-depth knowledge base, the practitioner's choices of belief and/or action orientations may in turn become more idiosyncratic, random, and unpredictable. When confronted with such choices between breadth and depth of exposure, for example, we concur with Hall, who argues that the more appropriate emphasis should be to first learn one theoretical orientation or belief system completely, "without reservation."[18]

This dilemma of keeping abreast of the expanding and diversifying knowledge, value, and skill bases of the profession, while at the same

time maintaining one's "grounding" in a particular theoretical orien-tation, strikes directly at the heart of concerns regarding the effective-ness of social work practice. If the educator and/or supervisor of pro-fessional social workers presents unclear or inconsistent messages to his trainees, then it might be anticipated that the trainees will lack clarity in identifying and defining the principles which in turn serve to guide their own practice.

When viewed through another lens, Haley notes that theories about human systems tend to naturally grow in complexity as they attempt to incorporate new knowledge and/or confounding evidence. This pro-cess, he argues, inevitably leads to an abandonment of these existing theories as they become unmanageable, with the introduction of overly simplistic principles in their place and with the cycle repeating itself over and over.[19] It is the authors' contention that a "generalist" model of social work theory and practice represents one such example of simplification, but, as such, it may divert the profession from the more critical task of defining and evaluating the knowledge and skill bases required for effective practice.

From yet another perspective, it has been argued that an eclectic ap-proach in which one borrows from and acts upon a range of empirical-ly validated belief and action systems is preferable to an approach based on a singular orientation. As Fischer argues, the direction for social work practice must be toward an eclecticism of knowledge and skills that is purposefully guided by empirical assessment.[20] Yet attaining such a goal may represent the very zenith of professional competence. Such a goal may be achieved only after the diversity of specialized knowledge and practice bases within the profession are acknowledged, explicated, and evaluated. This would first require the theoretical grounding in a particular, specialized orientation before new and in-deed contradictory evidence can be integrated by the practitioner.

Ultimately, the solution to this dilemma rests with a multistage strat-egy of knowlege building within the social work profession. Such strategy supports and encourages efforts to define and specify the spe-cialized knowledge base(s) of the profession and encourages efforts to measure both the knowledge and the skill bases possessed by profes-sional social workers. And finally, such a multistage strategy would seek to assess the degree to which pairings between particular knowl-edge and skill bases promote the changes in client functioning upon which the effectiveness of social work practice ultimately rests.

Notes

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Professionalization, Bureaucratization, and Unionization in Social Work

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This study examines the perception within social work of incompatibility betwee professional status (implying a service norm) and unionization (reflecting sel interest). Attitudinal data were collected through personal structured interviews wit 121 randomly chosen professional social workers in Toronto. The vast majority saw no incompatibility; indeed, many felt unionization may facilitate service goals, offset ting workplace bureaucracy. Respondents also saw virtually no overlap between are of greatest effectiveness for a union and professional association. Respondents' ow priorities were highly congruent with an association's strengths. They believed a conventional trade union could best meet the priorities of "most social workers.

Among the most troubling of the commonly held concerns abou unionization for many social workers is that of compatibility wit one's stance as a professional. Although professional social wo unions have been in existence for many years in different forms, as la as 1978 Schulman labeled this dilemma "Issue Number One."[1] Th essential problem is that, while professionalism as a concept conve clear priority to the needs of those being served, the union is seen largely serving the self-interest of its members. Particularly for tho concerned with the movement from "semiprofession" to full profe sion for social work, the union is often seen as a retrograde step, imp ing both the development of professional status and the exercise

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professional practice. This perceived incompatibility between professionalism and unionization was described by Alexander in 1980 as a commonly held though untested assertion."[2] Much of the literature in the area deals with ideal types and theoretical discussions, with the focus largely on professionalism. The empirical evidence on compatibility is both limited and exploratory.

This paper presents the results of structured personal interviews conducted with a random sample of 121 members of the Ontario Association of Professional Social Workers in metropolitan Toronto. Respondents were asked to give their general perceptions of the compatibility of unionization and professionalization and to identify the areas of greatest competence and effectiveness for both a union and a professional association. The general finding was that the majority of respondents perceived no incongruity and were able to clearly delineate the preferred areas of functional responsibility for each approach.

The Basic Dilemma: Union as Bureaucracy

For some time it has been recognized that professionalism and bureaucracy are alternative and potentially conflicting responses to the complex specialization of modern society. Unions, according to this perceived dominant view, are merely another component of bureaucracy.

Over twenty years ago, Greenwood cited five elements of an "ideal type profession," including among them a code of ethics which specified that a professional must be prepared "to render his service upon request even at the sacrifice of his personal convenience."[3] In 1958 Wilensky and Lebeaux also discussed a service code of the professional which "requires him to give foremost attention to the needs of the client";[4] they posed a "norm of altruistic service" as essential to the professional. "Keep personal and commercial interests subordinate to the client's needs."[5] The same point was made by Goode in discussing the theoretical limits of professionalization: one of the two core traits in this concept was the service ideal, requiring that solutions "should be based on the client's needs, not necessarily the best material interests or needs of the professional himself."[6]

The bureaucratic work setting is seen as interfering with this clear set of priorities by introducing rules, regulations, and structural rigidities; by superimposing the authority of office over the authority of expertise;[7] by substituting lay for professional judgment of work and thereby restricting autonomous practice,[8] or by limiting the exercise of professional discretion.[9] Freidson states: "By virtually all writers, expertise and profession are equated with a flexible, creative and equalitarian

way of organizing work, while bureaucracy is associated with rigidity and with mechanical and authoritarian ways."[10]

Though this literature rarely makes reference to the concept of unionization, it appears that, in all of these dimensions, the union would be seen as exercising the same constraints on professional priorities as would emerge from the more general notion of bureaucratization. This dilemma may even be compounded if the union is seen, not merely as part of some prior existing bureaucracy, but as a new and exogenous bureaucratic mechanism introduced into the workplace to further reduce professional discretion.

The power-based language and processes of the union are alien to the experience of most social workers, whether management or line, and its different goals and priorities can be expected to result in yet another bureaucratic layer. The norm of altruistic service is challenged not only by the general bureaucratic context but also by the overt goals of personal gain and the language of confrontation which are assumed to characterize the union.[11]

The goals of bureaucracy are multiple, but the aims of a union are seen to be more narrowly self-interested. Thus, while the general bureaucratic-professional dilemma operates in a variety of dimensions, the union-professional conflict highlights one essential question: whose interest is being served? Is it that of the client, as reflected through the exercise of professional judgment and the service norm, or is it that of the practitioner, as manifested through membership in a union?[12]

Some Responses: Union versus Bureaucracy

Although this general perception of incompatibility between unionization and professionalism may possibly represent the dominant view within social work, it is not the only approach. Other commentators, in fact, have suggested just the opposite—that the union may actually enhance attainment of service ideals, or, more restrictively, the union as a body would be considered organizationally neutral with respect to this goal.

In the first view, the union is seen as a liberating force for professional social workers. Through it they can be freed from the unacceptable constraints of bureaucratization, enabling them to meet their service goals more effectively. Just as Blau maintained that a professional orientation "neutralizes feelings of dependency . . . ,"[13] so too can unionization have this effect. Collective bargaining in the United States and Canada is fundamentally premised on an adversarial relationship

assumption that there are essential differences of interest between ployer and employee The union may be seen as a means through ich professional—or any other—interests of the employees can be set opposition to the bureaucratic processes and norms associated with employer Lambor, for example, cited one study which found that ial workers "can only be effective advocates of clients if they are capa- of advocating for themselves as workers."[14]

A similar view, though set within a broader political framework, was t forward by Galper, who views professionalization in class terms, iding social workers from other segments of the labor force; the ial worker is thereby aligned with the state itself, "which then be- nes simultaneously both the social worker's oppressor and protec- "[15] It appears that, in Galper's view, it is professionalism which resents another component of bureaucratization, and "unionism refore serves as a counter-ideology to professionalism." [16] Larson, ose view corresponds to that of Galper, noted that professions stress ndividual differentiation," while with unions "roles and strategy fo- exclusively on collective benefits." These latter benefits, in her view, uld be determined on the basis of social workers' broad interest as rkers built upon "alliances with other workers or with clients"[17]

A second basic response to the dilemma of incompatibility treats the ion as an ideal type which may be compared with "ideal" profes- nal characteristics A recent article by Alexander attempted "to ex- mine unions and professions theoretically, as ideal types."[18] Though concept of professionalization was handled well in this article, atment of unionization was less persuasive While Alexander chose discuss particular types of unions as they tend to function in prac- , in fact, as an ideal type, the union is nothing more and nothing s than the embodiment of the collective will of its members. It is ictually neutral toward the attainment of the service ideal and any er goals, and it has no independent corporate existence, outcomes, orities, or processes As a democratic entity, the conceptual union l pursue professional goals and service ideals if this is the wish of membership, it will assume a bureaucratic antiprofessional stance his is desired In this view, the basic question is not whether unioni- ion is compatible with professionalism but rather whether the ues and priorities of individual social workers (as aggregated) are npatible with the service norm. The level of analysis moves from the ganizational or structural to the individual.[19]

What may be described as a neutral stance toward unionization has o been taken by the National Association of Social Workers in its *de of Ethics*[20] By explicitly stating that "the social worker's primary ponsibility is to clients," the association has indicated that the ser- e norm must take precedence over any bureaucratic goals or pro- ses Thus, whether unionization would reinforce or contradict these

bureaucratic norms is not directly addressed and, indeed, not particularly relevant

A variant of this latter view would suggest something akin to a division of responsibility between the union and professional stance. The union has its areas of expertise and strength, presumably dealing with its traditional concerns, such as wages and job security; and the professional association for its part also has its own fields of competence, focusing on ethical norms and the like. Each body recognizes its own strengths and limitations as well as those of the other, and there is no necessary overlap or conflict between the two approaches.

Unionization and Professionalism: From Ideal Type to Data

The status of being a professional is a quality that inheres within the individual, membership in a trade union is a characteristic associated with a particular work setting On this level, there can be no necessary theoretical incompatibility between a personal quality and a job related property The relevant question is not whether the concepts are incongruent in the abstract, but, rather, whether they will come into conflict on an operational level. Pure professional practice has long been constrained by its exercise within bureaucratic work settings, and the concern is that unionization may impose further and potentially unacceptable restriction "The more professionals become like other workers the more they will organize like others," according to Oppenheimer[21] In his view, the danger of unionization is that pursuit of professional concerns may become secondary. Thus, the relevant empirical issue is whether the organizational structure and priorities of trade union are such as to interfere significantly in practice with the exercise of a professional service orientation

As was indicated above, the perceived incompatibility between the concepts of unionization and professionalism has been essentially untested on an empirical level. In fact, there appear to be only two studies containing any data at all. In the first of these Shaffer reported on his "exploratory" research using two child welfare agencies, one in Pennsylvania and the other in Illinois: "Workers did not find unionism incompatible with their educational or professional goals."[22] No further information was given about sample or methodology. Shaffer then went on to examine eight collective bargaining agreements covering social workers in four states, and he found that none of the contracts "explicitly dealt with issues of . . . ethical practice and quality service to clients."[23] Shaffer's view apparently was that social workers

should attempt to cover these areas in union contracts in the future, for he cited with approval the nursing and medical professions, whose members "have been effective in incorporating such provisions into their contracts in order to improve service to the clients."[24]

While Shaffer suggested that unionization could, in principle, enhance the attainment of service ideals, an alternate interpretation would consider these omissions to be deliberate. Union bargaining committees may have believed that these are not areas which are amenable to resolution in a collective agreement and that limited union strength could best be directed toward more conventional and readily attainable goals, such as wages. Professional concerns could then be dealt with on an extracontractual basis, either bilaterally with one's employer or through a professional association. This latter interpretation would imply acceptance of the divided responsibility model suggested above.

The other previous study, also labeled "exploratory," involved a "self-selected and non-random" sample of eighty-four M.S.W. social work union members in a large metropolitan area. A conflict was perceived between unionism and professionalism by 38.3 percent.[25] The authors concluded: "[The view] that simultaneous membership in a union and a professional association is troublesome and incompatible is not supported within this study group."[26] A perception of conflict by nearly 40 percent of the respondents may, of course, also be interpreted as very troublesome indeed. However, even aside from the obvious and recognized limitations in a small and nonrandom sample, there is a possible additional bias in this study resulting from the choice of union members as respondents. This bias would likely impart a pro-union orientation toward the responses and a possible underestimate of the perceived incompatibility on the part of a broader sample of social workers. Thus, on the basis of the reported findings, one might well infer that somewhat in excess of 38 percent of professional social workers in the United States might in fact perceive conflict between unionization and professionalism. Whether this overall higher figure would represent a fundamental incompatibility remains unanswered in the absence of further data.

In contrast to the previous work, the present study chose to draw its sample from the professional association of social workers in Toronto, Ontario.[27] Names were drawn at random from the current membership list of the organization, and a letter of introduction was sent on University of Toronto letterhead informing potential respondents of the purposes of this study and requesting their participation. About a week later, one of thirteen previously trained interviewers attempted to make contact to arrange a convenient time for a personal interview. If contact could not be made or if the respondent declined to participate, another name was drawn at random from the membership list. This process

continued until a target sample of approximately 125 respondents was attained.[28]

The questionnaire was precoded to ensure reliability with thirteen different interviewers. Respondents were asked a series of structured questions concerning their attitudes toward unionization in general and its perceived incompatibility with professionalism in particular. They were also asked to delineate their preferred areas of expertise for a union and a professional association.

Though no data are available on the extent of unionization of social workers in either the United States or Canada, more liberal laws concerning public sector bargaining in the latter country would imply higher overall union membership.[29] For 12.5 percent of the respondents in the present study, all the social workers in their work settings were in unions, while for a further 24 percent some of the social workers were organized. For over half the respondents (51 percent), the social workers were not unionized, and the remaining 12.5 percent indicated that the question was not applicable (private practice, not currently employed, etc.). Of forty-four respondents for whom the question was relevant, twenty belonged to a union and twenty-four did not. Of thirty-nine responses, 62 percent described their attitudes "towards unions in general as a result of your experience with the union in your work setting" as favorable or very favorable; 26 percent were neutral, and 12 percent held attitudes described as unfavorable or very unfavorable.

The dominant work setting for the respondents appeared to be bureaucratic; nearly half (49 percent) were employed in large organizations with more than 100 employees, although for 37 percent of the sample there were fewer than ten social workers. Nearly 30 percent of those replying were considered to be direct employees of some level of government, while just under two-thirds worked for organizations "primarily funded from government."

The Compatibility of Unionization and Professionalism

Table 1 presents the responses to a series of Likert-type statements exploring the perceived incompatibility between unionization and professionalism. Information was originally collected on a five-point scale which has been collapsed for present purposes to a tricohotomy.

The first two statements in the table directly probed the essential question, and it is clear that, for the vast majority of the respondents, there was no conceptual problem. Three-quarters of the sample did not feel that membership in a union was unprofessional for social workers

able 1

he Perceived Compatibility between Unionization and Professionalism (N = 120)

	Disagree	Uncertain	Agree
It is unprofessional for social workers to belong to unions	75.2	11.6	13.3
Membership in a union is compatible with professional values of social work	20.7	10.7	68.6
Unions are not receptive to the professional needs of social workers	38.8	33.1	28.1
Professional social workers have a special and direct obligation to their clients which unions do not understand	55.0	16.7	28.3
Unions improve working conditions for social workers at the expense of clients	65.0	25.8	9.2
One can expect to see staff-client relationships deteriorate if an organization unionizes	69.0	21.1	10.1
The quality of service to clients is likely to improve if social workers are unionized	16.6	33.3	20.0

nd two-thirds saw compatibility with professional social work values; nly 13 percent and 21 percent of the respondents felt the contrary.

The next four items on the table highlighted the issue of self-interest s contrasted to the service norm. Only one in four respondents (28 ercent) felt that unions were not receptive to or did not understand the rofessional obligation to clients; in fact, less than one in ten (9 percent) felt that the self-interest of social workers was enhanced by unions at the expense of clients."

The final item on the table tested the counterview in which unionization and the service norm are seen as complementary rather than competitive. While nearly half the sample (47 percent) could not accept this osition, one in five respondents felt that unionization would be an gent of positive change for the clients.

Overall, the results of table 1 lend little support to the widespread iew that unionization and professionalism are antithetical approaches. Only a small minority, between 13 and 21 percent of the espondents, basically saw the two approaches as incompatible. In fact, oughly the same proportion—20 percent of the sample—viewed the wo concepts as potentially complementary and mutually reinforcing. At the same time, for all questions but the first two, there was a high ndecided rate among the respondents, ranging from one in six to over ne-third of the sample. These figures may have reflected a general lack f familiarity and experience with unions on the part of most social orkers, or, alternatively, a recognition that there are different types of nions and that generalizations are inappropriate.

Nevertheless, the respondents did indicate that, limited information otwithstanding, the recurring issue of incompatibility had little emrical basis. The debate is one that has been conducted in the literature rgely on a theoretical level, and in practical application the issue did

not appear to be important for the large majority of respondents in this study.

Spheres of Influence

Respondents were given a list of ten "factors which may influence your ability to do your job." They were asked to choose up to two items from this list according to the criteria specified for each of the vertical columns in table 2. The total responses for each column are presented as percent distributions, although in many cases it is the ordinal rankings which are of primary interest.

The general findings of the table supported the notion of clearly divided zones of responsibility—certain areas where the union was perceived to be more effective and other issues in which a professional association was felt to have the greater competence. In addition, there were still other areas in which neither was held to be as effective as individual bilateral negotiations between the individual and his or her supervisor.

An unanticipated finding produced in table 2 showed that, although respondents held that organizational input and the improvement of professional standards were the most important areas to themselves (evoking 17 percent of all replies in col. 1), "most social workers" were felt to be primarily concerned with wages and job security (45 percent of all replies in col. 2). In addition, the ability to engage in social advocacy and in-service training and education were also identified as most important to far more respondents, while "others" were felt to deem case load a more vital interest.

Interpretation of these fundamentally different priorities for the respondents themselves and for "most social workers" turns on a methodological issue, the statistical problem of validity. Whether respondents were transferring their own views onto unidentified "others," as is often suggested in textbook discussions of indirect projection—or whether respondents truly saw themselves as different from and more service-oriented, that is, more professional than their colleagues—is a fascinating question. Unfortunately, it is also a question which cannot be answered in the absence of additional exogenous information. Indeed, even to explore further the ramifications for practice of this dissonance is beyond the scope of the present study.

The remaining information in table 2 lends itself to straightforward interpretation. As is expected, unions were seen as being more effective in dealing with wages, job security, resolution of grievances, and fringe benefits, all traditional areas of union strength. Professional associa-

Table 2

AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR A UNION AND PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION (PA) (% Distribution of Responses)

	Most Important to You as a Social Worker (1)	Most Important to the Majority of Social Workers (2)	Could Best Be Improved by a Union (3)	Could Best Be Improved by a PA (4)	Could Best Be Improved by Direct Negotiations (You and Your Superior) (5)	Where a Union Would Be Least Effective (6)	Where a PA Would Be Least Effective (7)	Where Direct Negotiations Would Be Least Effective (8)	Where Your Opinion Least Considered in Decision Making in Your Organization (9)
Wages	6.7	22.6	34.1	2.2	2.8	9	19.9	22.4	26.5
Job security	2.9	22.6	26.1	9	9	1.4	26.4	16.3	14.3
Level of case load	7.1	18.1	3.1	3.5	14.2	5.1	6.0	5.6	5.8
Employee-management relations	6.3	5.0	5.8	4.1	22.5	7.5	6.9	2.6	1.8
Fringe benefits	8	4	11.5		2.8	9	15.7	18.4	15.9
Input in organizational decision making	23.8	13.6	5.8	5.3	20.6	11.2	12.5	7.1	13.8
Resolution of grievances	8		12.4	3.1	16.5	5	7.4	5.6	5.3
Ability to engage in social advocacy	14.2	3.2	4	11.6	3.2	15.4	4.2	12.8	8.5
Improvement of professional standards	23.4	10.0		46.0	4.6	36.4	5	8.2	3.7
In-service training and education	13.8	4.5	9	19.9	11.9	20.6	5	1.0	1.6
Totals (%)	99.8	100.0	100.1	99.9	100.0	99.9	100.0	99.9	100.2
No responses	239	221	226	226	218	214	216	196	189

tions, on the other hand, were viewed as having greater impact in improving professional standards, along with in-service education and training and increasing the ability to engage in social advocacy. Those areas in which each of the two approaches was held to be less effective were precisely those in which the other was felt to have the greater competence. The division of responsibility between a union and a professional association as reported in this study was virtually complete, with essentially no overlap between the approaches.

There were also two items—the general employee-management relations and organizational input—for which the respondents felt neither a union nor a professional association would be particularly effective. *These two areas were seen as most amenable to improvement through direct negotiations between the individual and the supervisor.* In addition, although grievance resolution was placed within the union's "zone of responsibility," as compared with a professional association, it evoked an even greater percentage of replies as being most effectively dealt with on an individual basis.

The areas where direct negotiations were felt to be least effective and where the respondent's opinion would be least considered were generally those within the union's sphere of influence, such as wages, fringe benefits, and job security. *One item, the ability to engage in social advocacy,* had previously been placed within the domain of the professional association.[30]

Conclusions

This study began by considering the relevance of the concepts of professionalization, bureaucratization, and unionization to social work practice. Virtually all the literature has dealt with theoretical limits and ideal types, largely focusing on the first two concepts, with the treatment accorded unionism rather more cursory. The empirical research on the problem is essentially limited to two studies, both of which were exploratory and hence methodologically restricted.

This study has presented what may be the first empirical data reporting on the extent of compatibility between unionization and professionalism as actually perceived by a random sample of professional social workers. For somewhere between two-thirds and three-quarters of the respondents, there was no conceptual incompatibility between the approaches. In fact, as many as or possibly more of the respondents held that membership in a union would facilitate the attainment of service goals as held the position that the two approaches were contradictory. Only 9 percent of the sample believed that unions work for social workers' own self-interest at the expense of clients.

Respondents were also asked to identify areas of greatest effectiveness for unions and professional associations, and there was essentially no overlap reported. Unions were seen to be most capable of attaining their traditional goals—wages, fringe benefits, job security—areas in which the respondents felt their own leverage as individuals was likely to be minimal within the workplace. Professional associations were held to be most effective in dealing with professional standards, in-service training, and similar "professional" concerns. The respondents generally saw their own priorities as well as the areas in which they could individually be most effective as being highly congruent with the professional association approach. The priorities attributed to most social workers, however, could be most effectively attained through the conventional union model.

Although the indirect projective technique limits the ability to definitively ascertain the priorities of the respondents themselves, it is clear that the sample reflects an unambiguous division of fields of competence between the union and the professional association. The compatibility between the approaches which was reported in table 1 was reinforced by the detailed zones of responsibility yielded in table 2.

The overall conclusion of this study is that the literature and popular perceptions that unionization and professionalization are incompatible are not supported by empirical evidence. On the basis of the perceptions of the respondents, it appears that not only did most social workers see no incongruity between the two approaches but in fact also felt that the spheres of influence were clearly delineated and that the compatibility between a professional association and a union was virtually complete.[31] It appears that another "common belief" within social work must be provisionally relegated to the category of myth.

Notes

The cooperation of the Ontario Association of Professional Social Workers, Metropolitan Toronto Branch, is acknowledged. I am grateful for the valuable comments offered by Elspeth Latimer and John Coates.

1. Lawrence Schulman, "Unionization and the Professional Employee," in *Social Administration*, ed. Simon Slavin (New York: Haworth Press, 1978), p. 161.

2. Leslie B. Alexander, "Professionalization and Unionization: Compatible after All?" *Social Work* 25 (1980): 476–82, esp. 476.

3. Ernest Greenwood, "Attributes of a Profession," *Social Work* 2 (1957): 44–55.

4. Harold Wilensky and Charles Lebeaux, *Industrial Society and Social Welfare* (New York: Sage Books 1958), p. 246.

5. Ibid., p. 301.

6. William Goode, "The Theoretical Limits of Professionalization," in *The Semi-Professions and Their Organizations*, ed. Amitai Etzioni (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 278.

7. Talcott Parsons, cited in Eliot Freidson, "Dominant Professions, Bureaucracy and Client Services," in *Human Service Organizations*, ed. Yeheskel Hasenfeld and Richard

English (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1974). See also Peter Blau and Richard Scott, *Formal Organizations: A Comparative Approach* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963).

8. Goode.

9. George Thomason, "The Organization of Professional Work in the Social Services," in Foundations of Social Administration, ed. Helmuth Heisler (London: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1977).

10. Freidson (see n. 7), p. 129. For a further discussion of the potential conflict between profession and bureaucracy, see William Anderson, "Conflict and Congruity between Bureaucracy and Professionalism: Alienation Outcomes among Social Service Workers" (Ph.D. diss., Florida State University, 1977); Robert Weinbach, "Accountability Crises: Consequences of Professionalization," *Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare* 4 (1977): 1011–24.

11. One of the few explicit references to unions within this literature is found in Goode, who described "labor unions or the medieval guilds" as characterized by "cohesion with self-seeking" (p. 292).

12. Among the many bureaucratic goals may be the enhancement of the material interests of the professionals, potentially at least at the expense of clients. In the union, however, the pursuit of material gain is felt to be blatant, essentially unqualified by the *presence of competing goals*.

13. Peter Blau, *Dynamics of Bureaucracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 188.

14. Milton Tambor, "The Social Worker as Worker: A Union Perspective," *Administration in Social Work* 3 (1979): 289–300, esp. 292. See also John Coates, "The Role of Unionization in the Development of a Profession: The Case of Social Work" (University of Toronto, Faculty of Social Work, 1981).

15. Jeffry Galper, *Social Work Practice: A Radical Perspective* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1980), p. 165.

16. Ibid., p. 165.

17. Magali Larson, *The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 157–236.

18. Alexander (see n. 2).

19. This analysis assumes that individual preferences can be aggregated. See Kenneth Arrow, *Social Choice and Individual Values* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1951).

20. NASW, *Code of Ethics* (Washington, D.C.: NASW, 1979).

21. Martin Oppenheimer, "The Unionization of the Professional," *Social Policy* 5 (1975): 34–40.

22. Gary Shaffer, "Labor Relations and the Unionization of Professional Social Workers: A Neglected Area in Social Work Education," *Journal of Education for Social Work* 15 (1979): 80–86, esp. 82.

23. Ibid., p. 83.

24. Ibid., p. 83. There are numerous studies of unionization within other human service organizations. See, e.g., Ronald Corwin, *Militant Professionalism: A Study of Organizational Conflict in High Schools* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970); Sally Holloway, "Health Professionals and Collective Action," *Employee Relations Law Journal* 1 (1976): 410–17. Also see the references cited in Leslie Alexander, Philip Lichtenberg, and Dennis Brunn, "Social Workers in Unions: A Survey," *Social Work* 25 (1980): 216–23, esp. 223.

25. The authors drew their sample from three different unions and observed that, in one of these, less than 30 percent of the respondents held simultaneous memberships in NASW or the state society of clinical social workers. They then suggested the two concepts "may be perceived as competitive in this union" (Alexander et al., p. 222).

26. Ibid., p. 221.

27. Membership in the professional association is voluntary; as a result, the findings cannot be directly generalized to the population of all social workers. However, it is generally believed that the more conservative portion of the social work profession is disproportionately represented within the ranks of the association, so the results reported here may well understate the positive attitudes toward unions that would be found within the entire profession. The actual compatibility between professionalism and unionization would thus likely be greater for all social workers than is reported in the text.

28 Since the probable response rate was not known, it was decided to specify the target sample in terms of a number of successfully completed interviews rather than the more usual approach. However, this did not affect the randomness of the sample or impart any bias since the reasons for nonparticipation in the study—too busy, out of town, etc.—were not felt to be associated with any particular view toward unions or professionalism.

29 This greater familiarity with unionization among social workers in Canada may limit the immediate transferability of the findings. At the same time, however, it has recently been suggested that the current Canadian situation may reflect possible future trends in the United States, as the latter country experiences ever increasing unionization of professionals in general (and presumably social workers in particular) especially within the public sector. See "Symposium: Public Sector Labor Relations: A Canadian—U.S. Comparison," *Industrial Relations* 19 (1979): 239–324.

30 The fact that unions are seen as being so incapable or unwilling to promote social advocacy goals will undoubtedly be discouraging to both unionists and social workers who have an affinity with the traditional reform roots of both the labor movement and the social work profession.

31 It should be recalled that the reported data are attitudinal, with no necessary implications for behavioral outcomes. Also, no comment is made on the actual strength of a union or professional association in the areas indicated; ability to achieve any goals in this context, whether through a union or through an association, is largely a function of power. The focus of this study is on compatibility as perceived by respondents.

Debate with Authors

The Obsolete Scientific Imperative in Social Work Research

John R. Schuerman
University of Chicago

Martha Brunswick Heineman's article on the bases of social work research (*Social Service Review* 55, no. 3 [September 1981]: 371–97) is a fascinating and challenging piece. The point of view she presents is not new but has rarely been presented in such a scholarly way within social work. I want to discuss two aspects of the article, its rhetoric and its substance.

With regard to the rhetoric, Heineman begins with quotations from a number of social work researchers. She then recites several principles of "logical empiricism," a set of methodological prescriptions based on but less rigid than classical logical positivism. She proceeds to attack these principles using, for the most part, well-known arguments of "post-logical positivist" philosophers. Having presumably demolished certain elements of logical empiricism, she assumes that she has also discredited the views of the quoted social work researchers, views she believes are derived from logical empiricism.

While it may be good rhetoric, Heineman has committed the classic logical error of affirming the consequent. The argument might be schematized as follows: Logical empiricism implies that social work researchers are correct; logical empiricism is wrong; therefore, social work researchers are wrong. At least from a logical standpoint, Heineman has proved nothing about the views of social work researchers in going after the theories of logical empiricists. (If L implies R then not-R implies not-L, and showing that not-L is true says nothing about the truth of not-R.)

Perhaps more serious is the assumption that the views of social work researchers are derived from logical empiricism. Social work research uses a wide variety of methodologies with varying intellectual roots. It is a gross oversimplification to assert that the principles used by social work researchers are derived from logical empiricism, although they may be consistent in some respects. Most of these principles have roots that far predate the Vienna circle

Social Service Review (December 1981)

The principle of parsimony in conceptualization and theorizing was explicated by Ockham in the fourteenth century. The idea of experimentation, that is, manipulating things to see what will happen, is at least as old as mankind. The use of experimentation to establish general laws was advocated by Francis Bacon in the sixteenth century. The use of contrast groups to deal with variability of subjects' responses to experimental conditions was anticipated by Boylston in the investigation of smallpox vaccine in the early eighteenth century and was given a statistical underpinning in the late nineteenth century.

Furthermore, it is interesting that Heineman herself observed that the philosophy of science has little impact on the way science is conducted. I agree with that observation; it is certainly true of social work researchers. Philosophers of science have long set down various methodological canons only to have them ignored or violated by practicing scientists. Sometimes the violations are accompanied by guilt. At other times, quite competent scientists are blithely unaware of current philosophical positions, with no perceptible negative effects on their contributions. Apparently this is true in all disciplines.

So much for rhetoric. I turn now to substance. Much of the substance of Heineman's arguments could be disputed. However, I want to focus on what I consider the most troubling parts of her argument. These have to do with the relationship between theory and observation, with operationalism, the nature of data, and the role of replication.

It should be observed at the outset that Heineman describes a form of operationalism that is extreme, has never been followed by actual researchers, is easily disputed, and was abandoned early on by philosophers. Heineman is correct in pointing out that it is not possible for us to achieve measurements that are fully atheoretical. All observation is biased. To begin with, observation is biased because it is selective; not all sensory experiences can be recorded.

But as Heineman also clearly demonstrates, science is very much a social enterprise. We need to communicate our observations and our theories, and we need to have our observations and our theories criticized by others. Such communication requires conventions. At the very least it requires the conventions of language. Communication requires that we be clear about the meanings of important terms. We cannot share fully any experience with another individual, and we cannot fully make known to another person the contents of our minds. Thus we must define the meanings of words in terms of the thing we come closest to having in common, sensory experiences, realizing that our communication will be limited by the fact that one person's sensory experience will not be exactly that of another.

Beyond such social and linguistic considerations, there are, of course, other reasons for clearly specifying at least some of our concepts in terms of observables. One is the desirability of consensual validation and replication, both of which Heineman derides as old-fashioned ideas. There are many examples of scientific "findings" that turned out to be flukes or hoaxes when replication was attempted. Besides that, scientists have long accepted the inevitability of error in observation. Heineman herself points out the common occurrence of error arising out of experimenter expectations and other biases. Given the inevitability of error, we are left with the necessity of evaluating its extent in any given research and its impact on the conclusions that can be drawn. Ordinarily, the assessment of the extent of error requires repetition of measurement, which in turn requires definitions of concepts in terms of observables.

I do not mean by "replication" the repetition of observation under exactly the same conditions. That is impossible in the social sciences and probably impossible in the physical sciences. That fact is not a limitation but an advan-

tage; in fact, it is desirable that a replication be a repetition with a difference. In that way, successful replications contribute not only to increased confidence in the findings but also to making the findings more general. Unlike strict operationalists, we do not want our conclusions to be specific to particular measurement procedures or to other specifics of the study.

After all of Heineman's dissection of the errors of researchers, one must ask what she would suggest as an alternative view of social work research and what criteria she would propose for evaluating research. The conclusion to her paper is notably lacking in such suggestions. I take it that the response would be to refuse to answer that question directly on the grounds that it is inappropriate to prescribe research methods, beyond insisting that *the procedures should be open. We should judge each piece of research on its own terms and within its own context.*

I would be quite happy if philosophers of science would get out of the business of prescribing scientists' behavior and criticizing their methods. I think it is fine if they want to get back to pure descriptions of science. However that will not do for members of the research profession. We have the responsibility to evaluate and criticize our colleagues' work, as do social work practitioners. Surely we cannot take the position that anything goes. To judge research solely *in its own context* would result in hopeless relativism. Furthermore, it seems to me that if Heineman were to make judgments of research studies, she would not be able to hold for long to a purely relativistic stance. After all, no observation is purely atheoretical. Eventually, at least some criteria would be evident in her judgments.

Author's Reply

Martha Brunswick Heineman
Chicago, Illinois

John Schuerman's negative remarks about "The Obsolete Scientific Imperative in Social Work Research" (*Social Service Review* 55 [September 1981]: 371–97) are groundless in that he neither accurately represents the content of the article nor addresses the issues raised.

In taking issue with the assertion that the current regulative principles of social work research derive in important ways from logical empiricism, Schuerman misreads the article. It states only that the prevalent principles of social work research derive most directly from logical empiricism, and it certainly neither says nor implies that the logical empiricists invented the principle of parsimony, the idea of experimentation, or the use of contrast groups. Furthermore, the article emphasizes that, taken on a constitutive rather than a regulative level, the value of empiricism or experimentation is not in question. Rather, the problem is that, just as the logical empiricists do, social work researchers apply certain principles so restrictively that important questions, methods, and data are excluded from scientific activity, even though the principles being used restrictively are themselves too problematic to be infallible or exclusive roads to truth.

Social Service Review (March 1982)

Schuerman's exegesis on the logical error of affirming the consequent should have been obviated by an alert reading of the article, which clearly demonstrates that both the prescriptive tone and also many of the specific criteria for acceptable research advanced by social work researchers are identical with the prescriptive tone and criteria advanced by the logical empiricists. Thus the logic of the argument is actually in the paradigmatic form A equals B, not A, then not B (where A represents the major tenets of logical empiricism and B represents major tenets of contemporary social work research).

Schuerman's statement that I describe an extreme form of operationalism is puzzling in that my note 60 clearly states that, although operationalism is often applied less restrictively than it was originally, this more relaxed use of operationalism (which permits different operations to measure the same concept) merely reintroduces the theoretical judgments operationalism was supposed to eliminate, such as which operations measure the same concept. Schuerman never responds to the assertion that there are fatal defects inherent in the concept of operationalism.

The remainder of Schuerman's objections either continue to avoid the issues raised in the article or hit hard at straw men. For example, he reads the article to say that I am against clarity of meaning, definitions based on sensory experience, *consensual validation, and replication. These sentiments are expressed* nowhere, and, in fact, I am all for these scientific shibboleths as ideals or Platonic forms. However, as the article says, in the real world these research ideals are problematic in that there is no possibility of an unambiguous, unchanging definition of, say, an observable or a sensory experience and thus no possibility that following Schuerman's particular definition of observable or his criteria for adequate replication will guarantee anything except probable agreement with those researchers who happen to see the world and define things the way he does. The question that arises is, Why should Schuerman's particular definitions or criteria control what other social work researchers can do? This is the main issue raised by the paper—namely, why the social work profession allows certain researchers to use discredited scientific criteria to proscribe or restrict research questions, data, or methods which other social work researchers believe will significantly enhance the knowledge base and clinical tools of social work. Unfortunately, Schuerman never addresses this central issue or even acknowledges that it was raised.

Schuerman's final objections are, first, that the position that there are no scientific definitions or procedures that can guarantee bias-free results is untenable because it leads to "hopeless relativism" and, second, that I suggest no alternatives to the current program of social work research. Again, he seems not to have read the article carefully, because the last section and conclusion of the article are devoted to the discussion of alternatives, that is, ways in which inevitable bias can be reduced without excluding complexities or important problems. It seems to me that a "hopeful relativism" such as I am espousing is superior to the unquestioning adherence to a discredited set of principles that proscribe much potentially fruitful research on the promise of a certainty they cannot deliver. In conclusion, I would like to quote briefly from an applicable passage in the article: "Because of its failure to promise bias-free results, this alternative to the logical empiricist view may make some researchers uncomfortable. In the face of the findings of the last two decades of the philosophy of science, however, the desire to cling to logical empiricist theories and methodology can be understood psychologically as the wish for a certain, knowable world but should not be mistaken for proof that such a world exists" (p. 391).

When I wrote "The Obsolete Scientific Imperative in Social Work Research," I hoped that it would stimulate a much-needed dialogue about the current

regulative principles of social work research. Unfortunately, Schuerman, instead of contributing to such a dialogue, both misreads the article and merely reiterates the prevalent view of social work research without either addressing or acknowledging the criticisms of that view advanced in the article.

Book Reviews

A City and Its Universities: Public Policy in Chicago, 1892–1919 By Steven J Diner Chapel Hill University of North Carolina Press, 1980 Pp 263 $18 00

The optimistic perception that social reform emerged out of the selfless dedication of reformers, professionals, and philanthropists suffers another insult as historian Steven Diner scrutinizes the processes through which Chicago academics, businessmen, and politicians joined hands during the Progressive period to initiate far-reaching reforms designed to improve the lot of urban dwellers By assessing the relationships of professors at the new University of Chicago and their political and business supporters during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Diner illuminates the process through which academic social scientists came to influence and then to dominate social reform in Chicago Diner's perceptive and richly detailed case studies of the liaisons between academics and other reformers in the fields of education, social welfare, health, criminal justice, and public administration provide manifold evidence for his thesis that the contours of reform were largely shaped by the university's quest for relevance and social support

In the period following the Civil War, American universities transformed themselves from purveyors of classical culture and tradition into centers of scientific and technological training dedicated to engaging contemporary problems with the new tools that universities had at their disposal Diner shows how the University of Chicago, representative of many institutions undergoing such transformation, sought and gained crucial public support by demonstrating that the knowledge of universities and their faculties could be brought to bear on contemporary problems of social as well as commercial import Education was thus touted, and accepted, as the key to social control and civic improvement University faculties were encouraged to explore real-world problems and to initiate practical activities that would foster community betterment while incidentally demonstrating the superiority of scientific methods Each social reform—in social welfare, health, urban management, juvenile justice, and public education—cemented the relationship between the academy and social policy by increasing the demand for professional training which could only be accomplished at a university level Drawing from the experiences of such turn-of-the-century academics as sociologists Charles Henderson and Albion Small, jurist and legal scholar Paul Freund, educational philosopher John Dewey, and social workers Sophonisba Breckenridge and Edith Abbott of the Chicago School of Civics and Philanthropy, Diner carefully develops his thesis that despite the apparent good will and concern of social scientists and their professional school counterparts, they inevitably ad-

vocated reforms that increased demand for university-trained scholars and functionaries.

Diner takes pains to avoid suggesting that this was a pernicious practice. Rather, he suggests that, given the explosion of knowledge, it was probably inevitable. He does conclude, perhaps arguably, that the poor tended to lose social power as professionals increased their own. Moreover, the university's need to retain the good-will as well as the cash contributions of local elites often determined the focus of social research. Business interests were rarely offended by the activities of university reformers—not because of their nascent altruism but rather because academics systematically avoided investigations that might alienate their sponsors. As a result, while academics felt free to attack municipal corruption, advocate for better public management, or examine the ineffective operations of the juvenile justice system, they were somewhat less intellectually aggressive when undertaking research about the salaries and conditions of working people in factories owned by university patrons.

By documenting the role that university faculties and administration played while seeking support for the academy through relevant social involvement, Diner adds to our understanding of the opportunities as well as the limits of professionally directed social reform. First of all, academics succeeded in forming coalitions with social workers, businessmen, lawyers, and other professionals and became a major component of the reform community in Chicago in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. And despite constraints imposed upon them by the need for financial support, they addressed many controversial issues, such as urban corruption, public educational reform, and social welfare, squarely placing these problems within the political arena. At a time when there was hunger for information but few vehicles for providing it, the empiricism of these social scientists succeeded in providing a useful and comprehensive method for increasing public appreciation of the situation of the urban poor. Diner's view of the role university professionals play thus differs from that of Burton Bledstein, for example, who notes that the role of academics was to "segregate and contain" controversial ideas within the academy, rather than to politicize them. Nevertheless, despite the fact that academically sponsored reforms sprang from an ethic that celebrated progress, scientific investigation, and bureaucratic and political accountability, university social scientists failed to provide a substantive basis for social policies which attacked the root causes of many social problems. An assault on low wages, industrial health, or income insecurity would clearly have offended the mercantile sponsors universities required if they were to prosper.

This thoughtful study adds much depth to our understanding of the development of social policy. Offering a complementary and often controversial alternative to the work of scholars like Roy Lubove, Robert Wiebe, and Bledstein, Diner's book is a valuable addition to the literature. Social workers and others who wish to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the history and politics of reform and social policy will find this an essential work.

Steve Antler
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Housing Vouchers for the Poor: Lessons from a National Experiment. Edited by Raymond J. Struyk and Marc Bendick, Jr. Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 1981. Pp. xxii+424. $25.00.

Out of the euphoria of the Kennedy years emerged a variety of extensions of the "affirmative state" that had originated in the New Deal. New federal agencies

were created, such as the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). New institutions were created, such as the Urban Institute, charged with being the nation's think tank for urban policy research. And, for a brief period of time, there was a willingness to contemplate broad social experiments—tests to determine the effects of alternative social programs and whether or not they could achieve prescribed social goals. The notion of goal-oriented research was reinforced by the successes of the space program, in which a mission-oriented organization had used systems analysis to engineer "a man on the moon by the end of the decade." Indeed, HUD's policy research activities were structured by transferees from NASA and there was the same attachment to systems analysis and mission orientation. The notion of goals-achievement strategies was so strong that the NASA fallout even penetrated the early Nixon White House in the form of the National Goals Research Staff.

One of the national experiments that was conducted by the Urban Institute for HUD was the Experimental Housing Allowance Program (EHAP), undertaken over an eleven-year period from 1970 to 1981. This program tested the feasibility of providing cash subsidies to low-income households to help them obtain adequate housing. In *Housing Vouchers for the Poor*, eight Institute researchers report on the experiment and also probe the larger question of just what governmental strategies seem most effective in aiding the poor. The book focuses on three field operations within EHAP (the Demand Experiment, the Supply Experiment, and the Administrative Agency Experiment), and addresses in particular the interest of policymakers in the effects of housing allowances on the suppliers of housing, on housing price inflation, on participation in the program, and on participants' responses to different payment formulae, varying levels of benefits, and minimum housing consumption requirements. The general conclusion is that direct cash transfers to low-income households are more beneficial and effective than housing allowances loaded with government restrictions and that allowances provide services equivalent to other housing programs but at lower cost. But, set within broader goals (to simultaneously improve the situation of individual households, develop communities, and enhance the vitality of the housing sector), the conclusion is more equivocal, and what the authors appear to prefer is the tailoring of a set of well-coordinated strategies to the requirements of individual situations.

The book is a rich mixture of program and experimental history, experimental design, and substantive assessment. As such, it will be of interest to those with substantive interests in housing as well as those with methodological interests in social experimentation. Both social scientists and social policymakers will find it to be a rich source of ideas and examples, as well as a source of inspiration. What the book ultimately reveals is that if individuals are given the opportunity and resources to make choices, then individual and collective selections are superior to any that are prescribed for them.

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Poverty and Inequality in Common Market Countries. Edited by Vic George and Roger Lawson. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980. Pp. xii+253. $27.50 (cloth), $15.00 (paper).

This volume continues and extends the long and unparalleled tradition of productive poverty research emanating from Great Britain, in this case on a comparative basis with several other Western European countries. The editors,

Vic George and Roger Lawson of the University of Kent and the University of Southampton, contribute several of the chapters. The nations covered are Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, West Germany, and the United Kingdom itself. It is regrettable for the American reader that the United States was not included for similar separate analysis, but there are many references to this country throughout the book so that the significant contrasts and similarities are brought out quite adequately as well as provocatively.

Comparative research of this type is characteristically plagued by limitations of data, and this publication is no exception. However, the various authors have obviously scoured the available materials to date and are fully cognizant of the conceptual and factual pitfalls. Indeed, the omission of other Common Market countries—Denmark, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg—is due to the lack of usable information. As a result, the present work provides as much as is known in the public domain about relative poverty and inequality in the countries profiled.

Despite the unavoidable shortcomings, a convergence of findings from various sources reinforces the interpretation that France and Italy (and the United States) are the most unequal of the countries studied in both after-tax income and wealth distribution. Great Britain and West Germany are the least unequal—though not by an overwhelming margin to be sure.

Materials on poverty are even harder to come by, owing to the greater variability in national definitions and data sources. Wide impressionistic ranges in estimates are as good as the authors can do. The best available comparative yardstick points to national standings in extent of poverty which generally correspond to the above rankings on inequality of distribution, with Ireland noted as a special case of widespread want.

Particularly striking to the reader on this side of the Atlantic are the differences in frame of reference and value premises in European poverty research, as reflected in these writings. The authors by and large see poverty as related to maldistribution of national resources, rather than as a discrete problem of "target efficiency" or "income gap", as a structural rather than a functional or individual issue, as a political power conflict rather than a technical question per se, as a relative rather than an absolute concept, as more than income deficiency, encompassing several dimensions of resource control, access, and opportunity, and—not unexpectedly—as a universal claim of the poor and not so poor on the broader society rather than as a residual, supplementary means-tested need.

Intriguingly, some of the salient features of poverty research in the United States are largely bypassed in European priorities. For example, the key American political and research issues of work incentives and work requirements seem to be too passé to preoccupy overseas scholars. The dominance of American poverty research by economists and economic concepts is counterbalanced by social policy and social administration research leadership in the Common Market countries. And the current national obsession with the presumed trade-off between economic incentives and efficiency on the one hand, and social equity and service standards on the other, seems less of a stumbling block in most of West Europe, owing to the lack of supporting evidence and value assumptions in their context.

It is stimulating to observe the ongoing high standard of theoretical and empirical work in this historic area of humanitarian concern in Great Britain now being extended to neighboring democracies. Despite their substantial advances in this vital field of social policy, they are by no means content to stand still while we or others catch up. On the contrary, they are continually prodding their colleagues and governments to press ahead, even while regretfully

recognizing that, in the prevailing political and economic climate of the world the prospects of this happening in the immediate future . . . appear negligible (p 242) Hopefully this pessimism will be overcome promptly after "the immediate future" in this country as well as in Western Europe It is gratifying to commend this nontechnical, broadening perspective on the state of comparative research on poverty and inequality to interested readers

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Research Techniques for Clinical Social Workers By Tony Tripodi and Irwin Epstein New York Columbia University Press, 1980 Pp viii+225 $15 00

Social work practice is undergoing a remarkable transformation It began slowly in the mid-sixties, gradually gained momentum in the seventies, and has vigorously surged forward in recent years The transformation is focused on the relationship between practice and research The earlier dichotomous view of these as two distinct and relatively unrelated areas of professional activity is giving way to more integrated perspectives It is not uncommon to find reference to the "scientific practitioner,"[1] "clinical scientist,"[2] "clinician-researcher,"[3] or "empirical practice "[4] If this transformation continues to unfold, the practitioner of the eighties will indeed be a new breed of social worker

This transformation has undoubtedly been stimulated by developments in the social work literature Unsettling reports of evaluation studies,[5] admonitions for accountability,[6] and disenchantment with the division of labor within the profession separating researcher from practitioner have led many to conclude that "enough is enough "[7] While the transformation has been stimulated by such irritants, more recently it has been facilitated by creative contributions to the practice literature These contributions make it possible to teach and learn scientific practice The work of Bloom, Thomas, Briar, Reid, Fischer, Jayaratne and Levy, and Grinnell[8] are illustrative of such contributions Joining these contributions is the work of Tripodi and Epstein

Tripodi and Epstein's perspective illustrates the key assumptions in this new view Its pragmatic thrust places value on practice that is effective, efficient, and accountable A rational, problem-solving process is proposed as the means to these pragmatic objectives Intervention is to be based on knowledge obtained and tested through research methods To the extent possible, this knowledge base is to be empirically grounded, objective, eclectic, and open to critical discussion And, knowledge-based practice is seen as driven by skepticism as well as by the ongoing search for new and better methods From such a perspective research and practice are seen as not only compatible but fundamentally related

Tripodi and Epstein have sought to link research concepts and techniques with the essentials of clinical practice Research procedures are presented as practice tools relevant for obtaining information regarding diagnostic assessment, treatment implementation, and evaluation These three phases of the problem-solving process are seen as reflecting critical areas of decision making in clinical practice, and the various research techniques presented are viewed as useful means for informing those decisions The authors do not attempt an exhaustive presentation of research methods, but focus on those they consider easily learned and readily applied The discussion includes a consideration of the use of research interviewing, questionnaires, available instruments, systematic observation, content analysis, client self-monitoring forms, rating scales,

surveys and time-series designs. Basic techniques of data analysis are considered. Principles for review of the research literature are discussed, especially from the perspective of facilitating selection of treatment techniques. The book is organized into three parts corresponding to each of the three phases of the problem-solving process. The chapters in each part present various research techniques considered most useful for informing the decisions to be made at that stage. Each chapter provides principles for implementing the research techniques under discussion, practice examples, a research exercise, and a brief bibliography.

This book complements Epstein and Tripodi's earlier volume, *Research Techniques for Program Planning, Monitoring, and Evaluation*. That work presents research techniques useful for administrative practice. The recent volume does the same for clinical practice. It is intended as an introductory research text for graduate level clinical students and as a supplementary text for practice courses.

This work is an important contribution. Tripodi and Epstein clearly illustrate how clinical practitioners can use research concepts and techniques to strengthen their work with individual clients. Through their discussion of techniques and use of examples they demonstrate how knowledge gained through work with one client can be used to support subsequent intervention with additional clients. The social worker's role as researcher is presented as facilitating the worker's role as practitioner. This is a refreshing perspective.

The style of presentation makes this book suitable for the inexperienced. It makes no assumptions regarding previous practice or research knowledge. The clinical intervention process is presented in its most general and unembellished form. Research concepts and techniques are discussed plainly and simply. The reader is not presented with controversial perspectives (although the knowledgeable reader will frequently encounter explanations, definitions, and perspectives about which alternative views readily come to mind). The examples provided are unsophisticated and the suggested exercises appear to be manageable for beginners. The text is generally unencumbered by references to the results of previous clinical research or to methodological contributions of social work's clinical researchers.

Tripodi and Epstein do not present a conventional research methods text. This is not a book written for those interested in preparing for scientific research in the usual sense. Research concepts and techniques are discussed as tools for enriching the information base of individual practitioners in their work with specific clients. How these concepts and techniques can be used to further the development and revision of theory or empirical laws is not addressed. Neither the research process nor the function of that process in scientific inquiry are directly considered.

The authors anticipate the most serious criticism that could be leveled against this book. To the knowledgeable researcher or practitioner the presentation may appear simplistic, and consequently, misleading, especially for the novice. Tripodi and Epstein argue that oversimplification has not been the intent but rather that the book has been written for research consumers without extensive research training. Their objective has been to link some basic research concepts and techniques with some of the fundamentals of clinical practice. This volume is a valuable addition to the literature supporting the teaching and learning of scientific practice. However, as a book linking research and practice it should not be expected that it can stand alone as either a research methods or practice text.

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Jotes

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2 Scott Briar, "Clinical Scientists in Social Work Where Are They?" (paper presented the University of Chicago School of Social Service Administration Alumni Conference Chicago, May 1974)
3 Srinika Jayaratne and Rona L. Levy, *Empirical Clinical Practice* (New York olumbia University Press, 1979)
4 Ibid
5 Joel Fischer, *The Effectiveness of Social Casework* (Springfield, Ill Charles C. homas, 1976)
6 Scott Briar, "Effective Social Work Intervention in Direct Practice Implications Education," in *Facing the Challenge*, ed Scott Briar et al (New York CSWE, 1973)
7 William J Reid, "Needed A New Science for Clinical Social Work," in Fischer, *he Effectiveness of Social Casework*, p 265
8 Martin Bloom, *The Paradox of Helping Introduction to the Philosophy of Scientif- Practice* (New York John Wiley & Sons, 1975), Edwin J Thomas, "The BESDA Model Effective Practice," *Social Work Research and Abstracts* 13 (Summer 1977) 12–16 ott Briar, "Incorporating Research into Education for Clinical Practice in Social ork Toward a Clinical Science in Social Work," in *Sourcebook on Research Utiliza- on* ed A Rubin and A Rosenblatt (New York Council on Social Work Education, 79) William J Reid, *The Task-centered System* (New York Columbia University ess 1978), Joel Fischer, *Effective Casework Practice An Eclectic Approach* (New York cGraw Hill Book Co , 1978), Jayaratne and Levy, and Richard M Grinnell Jr *Social ork Research and Evaluation* (Itasca, Ill F E Peacock Publishers, 1981)

iscovery and Development in Social Work Education Proceedings of the IXth International Congress of Schools of Social Work, Jerusalem, Israel ienna International Association of Schools of Social Work, 1981 Pp 171

ith the passing of three years since the 19th International Congress of Schools Social Work, held in Jerusalem, Israel, in August 1978, this lucid, well-ganized report will serve as a useful reminder for those who attended and as a source document for those who did not This was the Fiftieth Anniversary of e International Association of Schools of Social Work (IASSW), founded in 28 when there were 111 schools of social work in the world. Now there are arly 500 schools in seventy countries This biennial congress affords partici-ants an unusual opportunity to scrutinize the major issues and significant anges in social work education as seen from international perspectives hese were addressed by the major speakers in challenging and realistic terms he editor, Katherine A. Kendall, acknowledges the omission of twenty com-entaries and contributed papers from different regions used in the small scussion groups Moreover, there is no reference to the excellent one-day search seminar preceding the congress which was concluded with an inspi-g and provocative address by Eileen Blackey on the occasion of the twentieth niversary of the founding of the Paul Baerwald School of Social Work, ebrew University, one of the sites of the congress Fortunately, the report does clude a concise and informative history of the IASSW, noting the valuable ntributions by leaders such as Dr Rene Sand, Dr Alice Salomon, Dr Jan Jongh, Dame Eileen Younghusband and others Thus, in one short mono-aph there will be found a compendium of information and professional apers that still have import for today's world

Readers should begin this book with Ruby B. Pernell's "Reflections on the Congress" (pp. 146–51). Her summaries of the major papers and the content of the small group discussions display an unusual capacity to synthesize and highlight central issues. Her broad international perspective enables her to identify and explicate the unique differences in views of social welfare around the world. The persistent theme is the clear, distinctive interpretation of the meanings of social welfare and social development. The African, Asian, and Latin American representatives eschewed Western definitions of social work and social welfare in favor of strong sentiments for social action and social change, defined by them as social development. Though the various approaches to social work education outlined so comprehensively by Loewenberg and Lowy have universal implications, they were viewed with reserve by educators concerned with priorities related to the development of life-sustaining resources and movement from primitive agriculture and industry to better means of production, communication, and distribution of wealth to assure survival. While poverty and social pathology do exist in all nations, the organizational structure and political environment required to enable a society to meet social, educational, and health needs even at a minimum level exist in few nations in the world today. The underdeveloped nations tend to reject the models for education and service delivery that are current in the more affluent nations.

Dr. David V. Donnison, speaking from the vantage point of educator and social administrator in England, elaborated on the issue of lack of good interaction among practice, education, and social research. He was abrasive in his criticism of the conservatism evidenced in the academic, bureaucratic, and professional communities concerned with social welfare practice and education for social service. It was his strong feeling that the situation would not change until more educators became directly involved in practice and find ways for themselves and their students to take part in effective social action. He concludes: "Give more attention to economics and politics, rather less to psychology; look to the community before focussing on individuals; do not simply help people cope with the world, help them change it; do not dwell on people's weaknesses, build instead on their strengths" (p. 23). Following this lead, Henry S. Maas cites Richard M. Titmuss, who in his seminal 1961 address to this congress exhorted social work educators to "explore topics which will have meanings in societies preoccupied at one end of the spectrum of wealth and poverty, with how to make self-consciousness bearable in human relations, and at the other end, with how to alleviate mass disease and famine" (p. 29). The papers by F. Maxine Ankrah (Africa), Rose P. Resnick (Latin America), Yung-Chin (David) Chin (Korea), and a UN Team Report (Pacific-Asian region) all echo a central theme—the great need to adapt or initiate modes for social development that will address themselves to serious deficiencies in economic, health, and education resources. Suman N. Dubey, in examining the contribution of research to macrolevel practice, provides an interesting table displaying the "groupings of societies by their economic and political system and the stage of development" (pp. 79–80). The availability of a human services or health system may be curtailed by the political intervention which determines the amount of freedom there is to make use of such services. Martin Herbert (United Kingdom), Frank M. Loewenberg (Israel), and Louis Lowy (United States) provide discerning overviews of the desiderata for social work curricula at all levels, with emphasis on generic objectives, while providing opportunities and useful guidelines for flexibility to include specialized content adapted to special needs within the region or subregional entity.

At three different points in this volume, there is reference to the possibilities for prevention in social work, social welfare, and social development. Maas (p.

), Herbert (p 65), and Pernell (p. 152) raise the issue as part of their presenta-
ons Maas suggests the need to preserve family life for children by reducing
e need for adoption or placement, Herbert is similarly concerned with chil-
en at risk, emphasizing early intervention, Pernell reports on the small
oup discussions in the Latin American group which recommended early
nphasis on social policy and social action It was further suggested that "
ofessional education should cover remedial and preventive approaches as
ell as the social action and political knowledge base" (p 152) Ensuing dis-
ssion dealt with the dilemma of the student oriented to social reform who
en moves into a state-dominated system that resists change It is a problem
lt in all nations status quo or social change? How are these defined in terms
at permit survival of social work ideals and goals?
For American social workers, there is the need to be fully aware of the
stinction in the minds of overseas social workers between the Western con-
ption of social work/welfare and, more recently, human services and the
ıderdeveloped nations' view of social development as the more ideal concep-
al formulation needed for their purposes The African, Asian/Pacific, and
atin American communities see much greater need for the restructuring of
cial and economic systems to provide in a better way for the whole popula-
n, regardless of class or status Social development means bringing the bene-
s of science and civilization to people who have lacked these for generations,
d, in some respects being not far removed, if at all, from slave or serf status
ome Western nations seem more related to concerns about interpersonal be-
ıvior and means for extending clinical services, aiming more at psychopa-
ology than sociopathology Both macro- and microsystems of service are so
dly needed in all nations that it seems sad indeed that one priority appears to
ke precedence over the other Dame Eileen Younghusband is cited by Robin
uws Jones in his well-stated foreword

> Will social work tear itself apart in ideological conflict? Will it be more active alike
> social research and social reform than we, to our shame, have been?
> Will it keep alive the spirit of zest and adventure? Or will social work education
> come a preparation for a career with good promotion prospects in ever larger bureauc-
> ies or for lucrative private practice? Will some basic sanity and integrity keep it
> oving forward in spite of all the odds, progressing because it continues to believe that
> essential purpose is concerned with better human relations, and with fostering social
> llbeing in a world rent by man's inhumanity to man? [P 8]

year from now, in 1982, the congress will be meeting again in Brighton,
ngland, this time in closer integration with the International Conference of
cial Work, a move long overdue. With England reeling from urban violence
t this writing) that clearly reflects so well the economic and racial unrest of
e times, it will be interesting to consider the themes from 1978 that will still
with us in 1982 Inequality, economic disequilibrium, social action, and
izen involvement all persist in strident notes resounding in the themes of the
oceedings All will demand attention from the academic, bureaucratic, and
ofessional communities so lucidly identified by Donnison as key to the emer-
nce of human services systems that are viable and effective in the new world
conservatism and economic retrenchment

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Teaching Social Work Research: Alternative Programs and Strategies. Edited by Robert W. Weinback and Allen Rubin. New York: Council on Social Work Education, 1980. Pp. vi+86. $6.00.

Identifying, Measuring, and Teaching Helping Skills. By Lawrence Shulman. New York: Council on Social Work Education, 1981. Pp. x+116. $6.00.

Research training in social work education has produced a large number of practitioners who do not conduct, read, or use research. Students often view research courses as the least helpful in the curriculum. Meanwhile, over the past several years, the number of research requirements in graduate social work programs has dropped. Lately, however, attention to the need for research in social work practice has been growing. Many practitioners, as well as funding sources, seek empirical evidence of need for service and of intervention effectiveness. Social work educators have begun to search for curriculum designs which integrate the teaching of social work practice and research. Numerous recent publications on the integration of research and practice are evidence of the concern. Among these are two monographs, *Teaching Social Work Research: Alternative Programs and Strategies*, edited by Robert Weinback and Allen Rubin, and *Identifying, Measuring, and Teaching Helping Skills*, by Lawrence Shulman.

Weaving research and practice together in social work education is difficult for many reasons. In addition to the traditionally divergent concerns and subsequent tension between the researcher and practitioner, few social work educators or field instructors have been sufficiently skilled in both areas to be able to define clearly what the integration of research and practice is, much less operationalize such integration and teach it. In order to address these issues, the Council on Social Work Education conducted a project on research utilization which has spawned *Teaching Social Work Research: Alternative Programs and Strategies*, a source book presenting various approaches to social work research education. Part 1 describes four different approaches for combining research and practice teaching. These "integrative" approaches, as they are called, are rather ingenious outlines of ways in which social work practice and research production and consumption can be taught in one instructional unit. The authors of the first four chapters show a realistic awareness of the obstacles to effecting the practitioner-researcher model, yet also suggest points of view and curriculum strategies for approaching the goal of training students to think empirically, systematically, and critically about social work practice.

For example, Naomi Gottlieb and Cheryl Richey describe the University of Washington's methods for teaching single subject design and evaluation in concert with treatment issues such as specification of goals and interventions. The evaluation and intervention content are integrated in several different ways: "through team teaching, where both instructors are actually present and active in all class sessions," by "parallel teaching," in which two instructors teach separate courses but know what the students are learning in the other course and thus try to integrate the material within each class session, and by "the use of one instructor who can teach both the research and practice components" (p. 5). In order to address the gap between classroom and practicum experiences, field instructors are involved in students' learning in several ways. The methods and research faculty meet with the field instructors to explain how research and practice are integrated conceptually and in the curriculum and how clinical evaluation strategies can be employed in the agencies. Field

istructors are also included in classroom sessions, while faculty occasionally tend agency staff meetings or serve as case consultants

In her description of various approaches she has used to teach research and actice, Katherine Wood succinctly presents the reasons for working to hieve integration Wood states that in addition to increasing accountability, ie practitioner-researcher model shows "promise of turning out practitioners ith the requisite skills to analyze critically the differences among practice isdom, doctrine and cultism, and practice theory, and the skills to enable iem to take responsibility for development and empirical validation of the iowledge base for their own social work practice" (p 14) Wood aptly articu-ies a creative view of integration which goes beyond merely applying single ibject design From her perspective, practice and research are similar activi-s, 'the stages the practitioner uses in conceptualizing a case are identical ith the conceptual stages of the research process" (p 17)—moving from prob-m definition to problem analysis (diagnosis), selection of a dependent vari-ile (desired outcome), definition of an independent variable (intervention), iplication of the independent variable, collection and analysis of informa-in, and evaluation of outcome Wood's goal is to teach students to think "like searchers, while acting like compassionate helpers" (p 18)

The articles in part 2 do not address methods of combining research and actice instruction In contrast to the preceding chapters, the curricula in part are innovative primarily in that they maintain a relatively high number of search requirements, hence they are less interesting They are included, in the litors' words, " to stimulate thinking about a few of the many possible ays to strengthen education in social work research" (p vi) One might object the editors' summary statement that "the descriptions suggest that there is o one best way to attain research curriculum objectives, rather, there are many ry *good* ways that can be tried " (p vi) To conclude that all of the oproaches are good is premature, their merit remains to be judged within the intext of explicit definitions of desired curriculum outcomes and empirical vestigations

Lawrence Shulman's book, *Identifying, Measuring, and Teaching Helping ills* addresses "the need in social work education to identify the skills re-iired for effective practice, to develop instruments to measure these skills, and design an approach to teach them effectively" (p v) Although Shulman has ot framed his discussion in terms of how to integrate research and practice e book addresses that issue directly Using William Schwartz's mediating odel of social work practice, Shulman identifies twenty-seven worker helping ills—such as "clarifying purpose," "reaching inside of silences," "dealing ith the authority theme," and "asking for a review of the learning"—which believes are applicable across different methods and models of social work actice He then develops ways to measure the performance of these skills in der to give students and workers an accurate assessment of their helping tivities The book describes a questionnaire developed during a four-year udy which used client feedback to obtain data on how often workers used the ills Also described is a second instrument for measuring worker skill in ing a category observation system of taped interviews in order to observe stematically interactions between workers and clients Shulman cautions e reader that the questionnaire and observation system are in an embryonic ige of development and that the findings must be viewed as suggestive rather an conclusive But in discussing the reliability and validity testing of both struments Shulman illustrates the richness of efforts to use research as a tool r teaching practice skills and evaluating client satisfaction The book ends

with an illustration of how a social work instructor modeled practice skills when conducting a class.

Shulman's book addresses the social work student's, educator's, practitioner's, and researcher's concerns. It exemplifies an approach for doing research on practice in order to increase worker self-awareness and skill, refine practice theory, and examine client satisfaction. In short, Shulman has integrated research and practice; his study epitomizes many of the ideas presented in *Teaching Social Work Research: Alternative Programs and Strategies.*

Unfortunately, the twenty-seven worker skills provide a theme which only loosely connects the various chapters. The theoretical underpinnings of the study are presented a bit too tersely to provide a compelling rationale for the worker skills examined in the study. But the book remains a valuable contribution to the literature on how to integrate research and practice.

As always, unresolved issues remain. Research and evaluation techniques applicable in practice are still embryonic, unequal to the task of defining and measuring complex social interventions. To some extent research and practice are fundamentally different activities, and forces within agencies mitigate the likelihood of integration. In the era of Reaganomics any social program which costs money is suspect, regardless of clear empirical verification of need or of cost effectiveness. Nonetheless, social work research has an important role to play in the development of the profession, for research can enrich the helping process and can provide the information needed to advance the political and economic battle to obtain funds for unmet human needs. The movement in some social work curricula away from research is a disservice to students and clients. The two books reviewed here can help social work educators and practitioners understand the potential of research and practice integration.

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Damaged Parents: An Anatomy of Child Neglect. By Norman A. Polansky, Mary Ann Chalmers, Elizabeth Buttenwieser, and David P. Williams. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981. Pp. 271. $15.00.

Norman Polansky and his colleagues have produced a truly remarkable book. In fewer than 300 pages we can read what he aptly describes as "the distillation of fifteen years of the study of child neglect" (p. ix). Both the findings and the wisdom gleaned from these years are conveyed in this well-organized, clearly written, and thoughtfully documented treatment of a social problem that is widely misunderstood and often overlooked.

Professor Polansky begins the book by noting that our collective ignorance of child neglect is rooted in the nature of the problem. The neglect of children by their parents is "a matter of things undone, of inaction compounded by indifference" (p. 1). It occurs, for the most part, in the privacy of family homes and its effects do not have the shock value or attention-getting power of child abuse. So neglected children and their parents, as compared with abused children and their parents, are less visible to all of us even though their numbers in the population at large are probably twice as great.

One of the consequences of this relative invisibility of child neglect is that we also know less about it. But this book will help to correct that for it contains reports of findings from two systematic efforts to define, measure, classify, and understand child neglect: the first with a sample of low-income, white families

rom Appalachia, the second, a replication of the first, with a sample of families from Philadelphia.

Polansky, working with an earlier group of colleagues, had developed a Childhood Level of Living Scale to discriminate among low-income households on the dimension of quality of child care. It was administered with considerable success to a sample of households from Appalachia. A separate Maternal Characteristics Scale was developed and administered to the sample as well. Its purpose was to measure characteristics of mothers' personalities believed to be related to the level or quality of care they provided their children. A complete account of the development, administration, and findings from the use of both scales with the Appalachian sample was reported in the book *Roots of Futility* (Jossey-Bass) authored by Polansky with Robert Borgman and Christine DeSaix in 1972.

Since then, many who had been following Polansky's work in this area wondered whether the scales would succeed as well with an urban sample. This was a question of more than academic interest. Polansky and his co-workers had begun to report preliminary findings that ran contrary to prevailing opinions and had substantial implications for social policy. First among them was that child neglect was not caused by income poverty, although the two often were associated with one another. Second was that in most instances child caring classified as neglectful was both pervasive and enduring. It was evident in both the physical and psychological components of parenting that neglect involved all the children in the family and had persisted since their births. Quality of parenting appeared to be related to the whole caliber of functioning of the parental personalities studied. Third, child neglect did not appear to be due to any lack of knowledge as to what constituted adequate or even good child care. Neglecting mothers knew what was expected and socially acceptable when it came to child care. Fourth, maternal character was emerging as the key to understanding the quality of child care and ultimately that end of the continuum of child caring that legislation defines and courts adjudge as neglectful.

In the present work, Polansky describes the Philadelphia study and its findings in detail. By way of introducing it, chapter 3 provides an excellent summary of other research on the topic and includes an enlightened discussion of prevailing theories of the causes of child neglect.

Chapter 4 recounts the main clinical finding from the Appalachian study that child neglect was more often than not the result of a pathological condition of the mother's personality—a condition that Polansky designates as infantilism. His choice of the word "infantilism" is considered and deliberate (p. 3). It means a massive or pervasive fixation of the adult personality at a childlike level of functioning that undermines the ability of a mother to care for her children. This is an unpopular view of the problem these days, even among those with some working experience in child protective services. But Polansky does not back off in the face of what his data have revealed. Instead he has designed this book as he did the replication study in Philadelphia to question the validity of this formulation. This approach draws the reader into the book in a most engaging manner.

Chapters 5 and 6 describe the design of the Philadelphia study and the modification and administration of the Childhood Level of Living Scale. Polansky's skill at explaining how technical matters can serve the substantive interests of the inquiry is unsurpassed. The chapter on the Childhood Level of Living Scale (CLL) explains how the scale was administered and scored, addresses questions regarding its content and construct validity, and disposes of the modern-day notion that child neglect is the result of imposing middle-class values on the lives of poor people.

probably no better description of how to help parents reported or referred for child neglect anywhere else in the literature, with the exception of the *Bowen Center Project for Abused and Neglected Children* (M Sullivan, M Spasser and G. I. Penner [Washington, D.C. Public Services Administration, Office of Human Development, 1977], a report Polansky cites and refers to repeatedly)

Chapter 13 explicates the significance of character to the task of understanding what is wrong in cases of child neglect. Polansky debunks the popular myth that "most instances of child neglect represent situations with readily definable causation, usually in the family's environment, and which can quickly be set to rights" (p. 181). He chides the policies and practices of public protective service agencies in many states predicated upon that myth. He then describes how to establish and maintain treatment leverage with hard to reach clients, select a treatment method, and understand those clients' responses to offers of help that appear resistive. This chapter has much to offer even the professionally educated social worker. Polansky's approach to these topics enables the reader to see how the more general principles of social work practice have to be extended for use with this client group. The generous use of case illustrations renders the chapter most suitable for teaching methods of direct practice as well.

In chapter 14 he takes up the central task of those who want to help these families: filling in and making up for the loneliness and emotional emptiness that prevents these parents from being able to accomplish either good things for themselves or to care for their children even as they themselves would like. With consummate skill Polansky describes and illustrates how both the casework relationship and the concrete services provided through it are the vehicles that carry the necessary help to the clients. It is here that he draws most heavily from the Bowen Center Project, a program established in Chicago to demonstrate how the range of services needed for many of these families could be organized and provided in an integrated fashion. Effective help requires a social caseworker trained to recognize the significance of character and capable of responding to clients' loneliness, emptiness, apathy, and impulsivity in their various manifestations.

For practitioners and policymakers alike, Polansky's penultimate chapter, entitled "Parental Prostheses," is the icing on the cake. In it he discusses each of several specific services—homemakers, day care, volunteers, emergency services, institutional placement, and foster care—from two points of view: what the worker must do to connect clients to the services and what policymakers and administrators must do to render these kinds of services relevant and helpful to these clients given their known patterns of intraurban transience and nonparticipation in formally organized processes or events. It is clear that Polansky knows that most children from such families are not removed from the care of their parents even when brought to the attention of courts. This creates a demand for services that can be administered to the parents and their children as they are, that is, living together. It also creates a demand for workers, judges, and administrators who are disposed to do so. But it is also clear that he knows placement "works out best when it is done with the agreement of the natural parent or parents" (p. 235) despite those aspects of the process that lead many to view it only as adversarial in nature. Effective treatment and permanent plans for children in placement often depend on the cooperation and/or collaboration of the parents. Polansky's discussion of institutional placement and foster care frames the choice of these actions in proper perspective and includes useful instruction on how to use them when they become necessary.

In the final chapter, entitled "Where Do We Go from Here," Polansky continues to interweave issues for research with those for practice. For example, he notes the frequency of reported "burn-out" among protective service workers Then he suggests that systematic inquiry on the topic might be facilitated if burn-out were recast, conceptually, as an end result of the emotional drain inherent in working with people suffering from extreme loneliness and emotional emptiness He describes six steps workers and agencies can take to protect themselves from the emotionally assaultive aspects of protective service work Thus, even in the final paragraphs of the book the research is shaped by and placed in the service of practice Indeed, the entire book is a striking illustration of how productive the relationship between research and practice can be when it is formed properly

Polanksy and his colleagues have given us two major, well-crafted studies of child neglect and this superb book reporting their findings and conclusions Beyond that, they have lifted the veils of ignorance and misunderstanding surrounding child neglect and replaced them with at least the following five major guideposts for understanding and dealing with this phenomenon First, the quality of child care can be assessed and measured on a continuum Second, approaching the problem of child neglect in this manner is more fruitful than the dichotomous manner in current use. It makes possible an informed approach to the hazards attending false positives at the reporting/intake stage, and it calls attention to the variation in quality of child care and prognoses for improvement within the neglect end of that continuum Third, their work relieves the field from further preoccupation with emotional neglect as a basis for intervention separate from physical neglect Since the two are so highly correlated with each other, intake decisions could be made on the basis of quality of physical care alone This might allow agencies to reserve their resources for treatment of both the emotional causes and consequences of neglect that are more critical in the long run Fourth, the significance of character and an understanding of "the degree to which neglect rests in parental character pathology" (p 158) must guide child protective practice, program administration, and policy formation Otherwise, services and the people who need them do not connect Finally, we are all indebted to Polansky for reminding us in unforgettable terms that neglecting parents "did not mean to be this way" (p 158) and for showing how an ounce of empathy for their plight as fellow human beings is worth a pound of self-righteous indignation if we honestly intend to solve this social problem

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Brief Notices

Females in Prison in Michigan, 1968–1978: A Study of Commitment Patterns. Josefina Figueira-McDonough, Alfreda Iglehart, Rosemary Sarri, and Terry Williams. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan School of Social Work, 1981. Pp. viii+154. Single copies available at no cost.

During the 1970s many states experienced a rapid increase in the female population of their prisons. This report is a study of the critical factors associated with this phenomenon in the state of Michigan. It focuses on the operation of the criminal justice system as a crucial element in explaining gender differences in incarceration rates.

Treating Families in the Home: An Alternative to Placement. Edited by Marvin Bryce and June C. Lloyd. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1981. Pp. xiv+338. $21.75.

Assessment, treatment, and education in the home with the family as the focus of service are stressed by the authors of this text. It addresses specific program innovations and service strategies, provides examples of placement prevention programs, and includes information related to deinstitutionalization and permanency planning.

Social Welfare and the Failure of the State: Centralised Social Services and Participatory Alternatives. By Roger Hadley and Stephen Hatch. Winchester, Mass.: Allen & Unwin, 1981. Pp. 186. $22.50 (cloth), $9.95 (paper).

The role of the state in social welfare has been increasingly debated in Great Britain in the 1980s. The authors of this book present the issues in a new light and argue that the traditional pyramidal bureaucracy believed necessary for the delivery of services by the state alienates those it intends to benefit. They call for alternative forms of collective action and a new kind of relationship between the state and the people.

Young, Pregnant and Alone: An Audio-Visual Program in Clinical Child Welfare. Chicago: Jewish Children's Bureau of Chicago, 1981. Pp. x+74.

A two-part audiovisual program designed to be used by those who work with young girls who plan to have their babies.

Consultation and Education in Mental Health: Problems and Prospects. By Richard Ketterer. Sage Studies in Community Health, vol. 3. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, Inc., 1981. Pp. 245. $20.00 (cloth), $9.95 (paper).

Consultation and education as an alternative form of mental health service delivery has received renewed attention as public interest in prevention and health promotion has increased. The author anticipates that the result of this renewed interest will be the further growth and development of consultation and education services. The book is divided into four sections: background, field research, state of the art, and meeting the challenge of the 1980s.

Innovation in Health Policy and Service Delivery: A Cross-National Perspective. Edited by Christa Altenstetter. Research on Service Delivery, vol. 3. Publication of the Science Center Berlin, vol. 34. Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, Publishers, 1981. Pp. vii+304. $27.50.

This book examines both cross-national and single-country studies of innovations in public or private health organizations, service delivery, and health policies. Its focus is on political, sociological, economic, and historical factors that affect innovation rather than on economic cost.

Social Development in Times of Economic Uncertainty: Proceedings of the XXth International Conference on Social Welfare, Hong Kong, July 18–22, 1980. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981. Pp. xix+202. $25.00.

Economic uncertainty demands the redefinition and refinement of social welfare policy, service delivery, and the role of community and participation. This work presents the discussions focused on this theme at the XXth International Conference on Social Welfare.

Work Sharing: Issues, Policy Options and Prospects. By Fred Best. Kalamazoo, Mich.: W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1981. Pp. xv+204. $8.00 (cloth), $5.00 (paper).

The author reviews the history and current relevance of work sharing and assesses the issues, policy options, job creation potential, and the social and economic implications of the concept.

The Mary Lawrence Child Welfare Lectures: Working with Children by Gisela Konopka and Words Are Not Enough by Florence Lieberman. Edited by Judith Schild. Chicago: Jewish Children's Bureau of Chicago, 1981. Pp. xii+12.

The two lectures in this publication in honor of Mary Lawrence, an influential, former staff member of the Jewish Children's Bureau of Chicago, stress clinical social work with children and adolescents.

Social Work Practice with the Mentally Retarded. By Martha Ufford Dickerson. Fields of Practice Series. Edited by Francis J. Turner and Herbert S. Strean. New York: Free Press, 1981. Pp. xv+224. $14.95.

Self-knowledge is the primary focus of the author's approach to social work practice with the mentally retarded. She maintains that clients must understand the implications of their disabilities and must learn to experience themselves as more like other members of society than as different.

Social Work Papers of the School of Social Work, University of Southern California: Volume XVI, Spring 1981. Edited by Elizabeth McBroom. Los Angeles: School of Social Work, University of Southern California. Pp. iv+89. $1.75.

This centennial edition is devoted to family treatment in social work. The contributors are alumni of the School of Social Work, University of Southern California.

The English Prologue. Edited by Russell E. Smith and Alan D. Wade. School of Social Work Series, Documents and Readings in American Social Policy, vol. 1. *Sacramento:* California State University. Pp. xvi+122.

A collection of documents that will assist graduate and undergraduate social work students in understanding social welfare history. Each document is preceded by an ample explanatory preface. Future volumes will concern corrections, child welfare, mental health, income maintenance, and health.

Public Documents

Reaching Troubled Youth: Runaways and Community Mental Health. Edited by James S. Gordon and Margaret Beyer. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Rockville, Md.: National Institute of Mental Health, 1981. Pp. vi+204.

A collection of essays by runaway center workers and administrators describing their work with youth and their families. The book is organized to provide readers with an overview of runaways and runaway centers and to introduce them to specific short- and long-term services provided.

Contributors

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Federal Welfare for Revolutionary War Veterans

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The 1818 Revolutionary War Pension Act combined features of a pension plan and poor law provisions to reward and assist impoverished Continental army veterans. The act included a means test which was administered with the aid of a national poverty line. Approximately 20,000 veterans applied for benefits. Their claims produced a national survey of poverty conditions experienced by a large number of elderly men and their households. This article examines the pension act and offers the first systematic study of the claimants and their households who sought relief under the act.

Introduction

In 1818 both houses of Congress passed, by overwhelming majorities, the Revolutionary War Pension Act. The bill provided $96 a year for privates and $240 annually for officers who served at least nine months in a Continental line and who swore that they were "in reduced circumstances" and "in need of assistance from [their] country for support."[1] Congressional pension advocates were responding to a public outpouring of sentimentality toward Revolution veterans which was an integral part of a growing national spirit in the aftermath of the War of 1812. By embracing a common patriotism founded upon the legacy of the Revolution, Congress rejected the traditional argument

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that republican principles were incompatible with the creation of a military pension establishment or with federal charity to a "rank of society."[2] The new attitude stressed that the Republic's heritage would be dishonored and its principles tarnished unless the nation aided its "heroes of the Revolution"[3] who were suffering in poverty. Furthermore, some congressmen believed that the country owed a debt to these soldiers who were scantily rewarded for risking their lives and property to secure liberty. Finally, a large surplus in federal revenues, combined with assurances that the pension program would be brief and inexpensive, contributed to the bill's popularity. Fewer than 2,000 veterans were believed to be eligible for the program at a cost of $115,000 for the first year.[4]

Historians have correctly identified this act as a milestone. It shattered nearly forty years of resistance against awarding lifetime pensions for completing military service. It created the first military pension plan, and it set a precedent for later veterans' programs.[5] However, scholars have overlooked the act as the first federal effort to aid some of the nation's poor. the 1818 pension act combined features of a pension plan and poor-law provisions to reward and assist impoverished Continental army veterans.[6]

The charitable intent of the 1818 act was explicit. Pensions were awarded to veterans "in reduced circumstances" who swore that "they were in need of assistance from their country." In 1820, because of a flood of applicants, Congress tightened the poor-law provisions of the act by adding a means test. Veterans wishing to continue on the pension rolls as well as new applicants had to report their residence, occupation, health, income, debts, and an inventory of real and personal property to the War Department. Also, they were to provide the age, gender, physical condition, and relationship of all others in their household and any sources of aid rendered the applicant. Furthermore, the War Department required a codicil containing a court's assessment of the value of the veteran's property. Finally, the War Department established an unofficial poverty line to help separate deserving from undeserving applicants. The attorney general ruled that only applicants "in the lowest grade of poverty" deserved the benefit.[7] Over 18,000 of the 20,000 applicants passed the means test. One result was the first federal program of direct assistance to some of the nation's poor. A second result was the largest federal relief effort until the twentieth century. Recipients and an estimated 60,000 members of their households received aid for an average of nine years at a total cost of $22,000,000.[8]

The amended pension act implemented a social policy resembling recent proposals for a guaranteed annual income for persons below a national poverty line. The act established that economic need was to be measured by wealth, that is, income plus assets, it affirmed that eligible persons had a vested right to benefits, and the War Department in-

cluded a national poverty line as part of its means test.[9] Finally, the $96 annual payment provided enough aid to allow an individual a "comfortable and frugal" existence.[10]

This article seeks to develop historical perspectives on early federal poverty policy by answering three questions: Who were the poor veterans? What was the nature of their poverty? How were they affected by federal aid? These questions will be addressed first through statistical analyses of the applicants, noting their wealth and conditions of poverty, the compositions of their households, and the differences between applicants above and below the federal poverty line. Second, statistical data will be combined with case studies, relying on testimonies in the applications, to further understand the conditions of poverty and to see how claimants viewed the aid. Finally, a single applicant's "life course" will be studied to illustrate in detail some causes of impoverishment and results of extended aid.

Statistical Analysis

The statistical data come from the 20,000 pension applications filed under the act as amended in 1820. A structured random sample of the claims produced a representative group of 877 applicants. All personal, household, and information about assets found in their claims were recorded on a standard form for each case and then codified for analysis, using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). In addition, about a third of the sampled claims included testimony, usually by the veteran, which was recorded on the standard forms.[11]

Statistical analysis revealed the general characteristics of the claimants. Most of them had joined the Continental army by 1778 while in their teens or early twenties and had served one to three years as privates. At the time of their application, 81 percent of the veterans lived either in New England or in the middle states. Despite this concentration, the applicants were highly mobile geographically. A third of the total no longer lived in the regions where their units originated, and another 20 percent appeared to have moved to a different state within the same region. This last figure, however, has to be taken cautiously because units routinely recruited men from nearby states. Half of the applicants were sixty-five years old or older, but only a small portion, about 3 percent, were in their eighties or nineties. About a third used a mark to sign their form and slightly more let a scribe affix their names to the claims. The use of a mark or proxy is sometimes interpreted as a measure of illiteracy. However, it may also have resulted from the effect of age or ill health, the latter being reported by eight out of ten appli-

cants. Eighty percent of the applicants had wives who were on the average eight years younger than themselves. But, in most cases, they were reported to be suffering from infirmities. Over two-thirds of the veterans reported that they had no occupation, worked as laborers, or were tenant farmers. The remainder were almost equally divided among tradesmen, yeomen, and business proprietors. Nearly 25 percent of all applicants swore that they had once received, were receiving, or would soon be forced to seek charity from their family, friends, or town.

A series of tables gives a more precise picture of the veterans' wealth and poverty. Table 1 provides the distribution of wealth for all claimants, using the official court figures as well as those assessed by the applicant. The latter were derived by subtracting all reported debts not deducted by the courts from the official estate value. Courts determined the official figures by adding the values of the personal and real property cited on the applicant's estate inventory and subtracting the amount owed on a first mortgage. The War Department's regulation allowing the deduction of first mortgages was probably intended to reward frugal veterans, to protect investors, to deter fraudulent claims of debt, and to ease the court's work. Only 3 percent of the applicants benefited from this regulation. Most inventoried estates consisted of household goods, a few farm implements, a couple of animals, some tools, and an occasional decorative piece. Real property was reported in one case out of five, and only one veteran in twenty-five claimed income. Applicants averaged $129 in court-assessed wealth, but half had less than $37 in property. And, as table 1 shows, nearly 14 percent had nothing more than their clothing and bedding, items not counted in assessing wealth.

Official figures, however, do not fully portray the degree of economic jeopardy which threatened many veterans with dependency and which

Table 1

Wealth Distribution of All Applicants in the Sample

	Court-Assessed Wealth		Applicant-Assessed Wealth		
Value ($)	Cases (N_1)	%	Cases (N_2)	%	Difference $(N_1 - N_2)/N_1$ (%)
201 and less			15	1.7	
−101 to −200			20	2.3	
−51 to −100			22	2.5	
−1 to −50			60	6.8	
Zero	118	13.4	115	13.1	−2.6
1–50	406	46.3	362	41.3	−10.9
51–100	138	15.7	118	13.5	−14.5
101–200	99	11.3	84	9.6	−15.2
201–500	62	7.1	44	5.0	−29.1
501 and more	54	6.2	37	4.2	−31.5
Total	877	100	877	100	

probably led them to see themselves as in need of assistance. Table 1 shows that when applicant-assessed wealth, assets less all debts, is compared with court-assessed wealth, veterans in all wealth categories are further reduced, especially those reporting more than $200 in property. The effect of indebtedness can be seen in other ways. For example, had every claim of debt been deducted from the court-reported assets, average wealth for all applicants would have been cut nearly in half, from $129 to $70. Even this figure is probably high, because the War Department regulation restricting deductions to first mortgages likely discouraged many applicants from reporting debts. Among the 31 percent who ignored regulations by declaring debts of all kinds, average wealth dropped from $253 in court-assessed assets to $61 in self-assessed wealth. As some of their testimonies confirm, these veterans probably saw the pension as the means to prevent economic collapse, household dissolution, and dependency.

Whether by court measures or self-assessments, applicants fell far below contemporary standards of wealth. In 1819, for example, each New York State resident had an average of $205 in real and personal property compared with $30 per capita reported by New York State pension applicants.[12] Table 2 shows that, while per capita wealth was lowest for claimants in the west and highest in New England, the differences were minimal. Regardless of the region, these veterans shared a meager portion of the nation's wealth.

Table 3 provides data on household composition and table 4 shows a connection between household type and economic status. Table 3 indicates that few veterans lived alone and that their household compositions varied greatly, averaging between three and four people. A large number, 25 percent, had five or more members. Only 15 percent of the claimants lived in households classified as solitary. These veterans were widowers, separated from their families, or had never married. Most of these men lived by themselves and only rarely were found in an almshouse. Conjugal households, those composed of only a husband and wife, were reported in more than a quarter of the applications.

Table 2

Average per Household and per Capita Wealth for Each Region

	Court-Assessed Wealth		Applicant-Assessed Wealth	
Region	Average per Applicant Household ($)	Average per Capita	Average per Applicant Household ($)	Average per Capita
New England	160	47	81	23
Middle Atlantic	95	30	47	15
South	112	35	110	34
West	102	27	53	14

Table 3

ANALYSIS OF HOUSEHOLDS

A. N PEOPLE IN APPLICANT'S HOUSEHOLD (Counting the Applicant)

People	N Households	% Households
1	139*	15.8%
2	250	28.5
3	142	16.2
4	123	14.0
5	102	11.6
6	54	6.2
7	26	3.0
8	21	2.4
9	13	1.5
10+	7	.7
Total	877	99.9

Mean = 3.35 Mode = 2.85

B. DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD TYPES (All Applicants)

Type of Household	Total N	%
Solitary	132	15.1
Conjugal	233	26.5
Nuclear	400	45.6
Extended		
Applicant living with kin	21	2.4
Kin living with applicant	78	8.9
Nonrelatives living with applicant	13	1.5
Total	877	100

* Of the 139, 132 were later classified as solitary households and seven were part of extended households.

while nuclear households containing husband, wife, and children were found in nearly half of the claims. Less than 12 percent of the veterans lived in extended households, a figure which falls within the range expected for most Western societies.[13]

Extended households are usually divided into three categories: (*a*) "extended up," meaning an older relative was present, (*b*) "extended down," which indicated the presence of a younger relative other than offspring, and (*c*) "multiple up and down," which refers to two conjugal or nuclear units bonded into one household. However, because these categories are based solely on composition, they mask distinctive functions performed by the households and important differences among them.

On the one hand, twenty-one applicants, 2.4 percent, reported that they were taken in by kin. These extended households functioned essentially as asylums for the veteran and, in a few instances, included wife and children. On the other hand, 9 percent of the claimants ex-

tended their households by creating a refuge for kin such as grandchildren, married children and their spouses, and mothers, while thirteen veterans, 1.5 percent, reported nonrelatives living with them. These three types of extended households were very different. Veterans who took in kin were generally younger than claimants in other kinds of extended households. Table 4 shows that veterans who made their households into refuges for kin had over four times more in court-assessed wealth than veterans who had moved in with kin. For households with nonrelatives the multiplier increases to eight.

Table 4 also illustrates a hierarchy of wealth among all types of households. Solitary veterans were at the lowest level with an average of $20 in court-assessed wealth, followed by $64 for applicants living with kin. Conjugal households had an average of $141 in assets, while those at the highest levels were the extended households which functioned as refuges for the veteran's kin or housed nonrelatives. Confirming this pattern, the proportion of veterans reporting any real or personal property increased from 53 percent among solitaries to 76 percent for veterans living with kin, while conjugal, nuclear, and other extended households all surpassed 90 percent.

Important distinctions emerged between nuclear households reporting debts and those that did not. Debtor households were, on the whole, wealthier than nondebtor households. The data show that retention of children was more likely among those households whose little wealth was threatened by debt. As table 5 illustrates, debtor households contained more males and females fifteen years old and older than nondebtor households. The higher retention of older children suggests that even a small amount of property could have a substantial effect on family composition. Sons and daughters may have remained to preserve their stake in their father's estate, or filial support of parents may have been more readily given when there was danger of slipping into pauperism rather than after such a state had been reached.

In nearly one case in five, applicants claimed dependency. Table 6 gives the proportion of applicants who claimed to have received charity

Table 4

WEALTH DISTRIBUTION BY TYPE OF HOUSEHOLD (Average Wealth)

Type of Household	Court-Assessed Wealth ($)	N
Solitary	20.00	132
Conjugal	105.00	233
Nuclear	141.00	400
Extended		
Applicant living with kin	64.00	21
Kin living with applicant	279.00	78
Nonrelatives living with applicant	500.00	13

Table 5

IMPACT OF DEBT ON HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION OF NUCLEAR HOUSEHOLDS

	MEAN HOUSEHOLD		% HOUSEHOLDS WITH MALES 15 AND OVER	% HOUSEHOLDS WITH FEMALES 15 AND OVER
	N	Size		
Debtors	154	4.8	17.4	60.4
Nondebtors	246	4.4	36.0	44.7

from their family, friends, or town prior to the pension. The table shows a scaling of need among household types which nearly corresponds to the pattern of wealth in table 4. The percentage claiming aid was highest for solitaries and applicants living with kin. It was lowest for the nuclear households and households where kin were living with the applicant.

Table 7 examines the sources of assistance utilized by households which claimed aid. Sources of aid differed substantially among solitary, conjugal, nuclear, and extended households. Thirteen percent of the aid claimed by solitaries came from their families as compared with 24 to 64 percent for conjugal and nuclear households, respectively. As might be expected, extended households provided high levels of family aid. Town support went mainly to the solitary veterans and impoverished couples.

The overall picture of the applicants drawn from the statistical features underscores their diverse origins and conditions. These claimants were not from a single impoverished class; they came from various levels of social structure. The picture shows a mixture of laborers, farm owners, and businessmen, the geographically mobile and immobile, the literate and illiterate, the very old and middle-aged, debtors and nondebtors, the destitute and those on their way to destitution. No one

Table 6

DISTRIBUTION OF AID RECEIVED BY HOUSEHOLDS PRIOR TO PENSION

TYPE OF HOUSEHOLD	AID CLAIMED *N*	AID CLAIMED %	NO AID CLAIMED *N*	NO AID CLAIMED %	TOTAL *N*
Solitary	28	28.8	94	71.2	132
Conjugal	36	15.5	197	84.5	233
Nuclear	52	13.0	348	87.0	400
Extended					
Applicant with kin	19	90.5	2	9.5	21
Kin with applicant	5	6.4	73	93.6	78
Nonrelatives with applicant	2	15.3	11	84.7	13
Total	152	17.3	725	82.7	877 (100.0)

NOTE.—Contingency coefficient = .34.

Table 7

SOURCES OF ASSISTANCE RECEIVED BY HOUSEHOLDS

	Sources						
	Family		Friends		Town		Total
Type of Household	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
Solitary	6	12 5	15	31 2	27	56 3	48
Conjugal	11	23 9	17	37 0	18	39 1	46
Nuclear	39	60 9	11	17 2	14	21 9	64
Extended							
Applicant with kin	19	90 5	1	4 8	1	4 8	21
Kin with applicant	5	100 0	0	0	0	0	5
Nonrelatives with applicant	1	50 0	0	0	1	50 0	2
Total	82	43 9	44	23 5	61	32 6	187 (100 0)

NOTE — The 152 cases reported 187 sources of assistance because a few applicants had received or were receiving help from two or more sources

household type characterized these poor Most households seemed to be in a process of decomposition, yet in a number of instances household recomposition had occurred, as evidenced among claimants living with kin and veterans taking in kin and nonrelatives In a number of cases, assistance from kin and friends bolstered a weakened household economy For others, especially the solitaries, who were also the poorest and oldest group of claimants, town relief had become their main support Ironically, the poor-law features of the pension act can be credited for categorizing these veterans as an impoverished class

The War Department made the final determination of the veterans' claims The only official guideline was to accept applicants in the "lowest grade of poverty" To implement this guideline, the department used several criteria. It sorted claimants according to the court-assessed value of their property and the possession of real property It attempted to determine the veteran's health, ability to work, amount of aid received, the number of people in his family, and the cost of living in his region In borderline cases, the length of the veteran's service could determine eligibility.[14]

An analysis of accepted and rejected claimants revealed that, while no absolute poverty line emerged, the department awarded pensions in most cases in which the applicant had less than $100 in personal and real property This line remained fairly constant throughout the program Nevertheless, discretionary judgments were made when other criteria were weighed Generally, applicants with $100 or less in court-assessed property who received some charity, lived as solitaries, in conjugal households, or with kin, served for the entire length of the war, lived in the South, and were over seventy years old, were most likely to get the pension. Veterans with over $100 in assessed wealth, including

real property, who were still supporting children, had served nine months and who lived in New England, were least likely to get the benefit. Table 8 summarizes these generalizations.

Case Studies

Much more can be learned about these applicants through case studies which amplify the quantitative data with testimonies found in the pension files.[15] Nearly one-third of the veterans volunteered comments about their circumstances. These usually consisted of only a phrase or a few sentences. Occasionally applications were accompanied by affidavits describing unusual conditions facing the veteran. In a few instances, the pension file contained correspondence supporting the applicant's claim. Despite the pleading tone of the testimonies, they add insights

Table 8

Wealth, Property, and Region Categories of Accepted and Rejected Applicants

A. Court-Assessed Wealth—Categories

Applicants	Zero		$1–$50		$51–$100		$101 and More		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Accepted	117	15.6	399	51.1	132	18.0	102	12.2	750	86.6
Rejected	1	.9	1	.9	3	1.7	111	96.5	116	13.4

B. Land Ownership

Applicants	Owned Land		Didn't Own Land	
	N	%	N	%
Accepted	75	10.0	675	90.0
Rejected	90	77.6	26	22.4

C. Region

Region	Accepted		Rejected	
	N	%	N	%
Northeast	358	82.9	74	17.1
Middle Atlantic	245	90.4	26	9.6
South	67	94.4	4	5.6
West	80	87.0	12	13.0

Note.—Eleven cases out of the sample 877 were dropped from the analysis of the War Department's poverty line because they failed to satisfy the military service requirement. Two of the rejected cases with less than $100 in assets had apparently filed incorrect claims. Contingency coefficients: A = .63, B = .51, C = .12.

into the causes of impoverishment and help explain the claimants' perceptions of the physical and psychological effects of poverty and of the potential impact of the pension on their lives. The following case studies are arranged by household type—solitary, conjugal, nuclear, extended—and include rejected and accepted applicants. Unless otherwise indicated, these veterans received pensions.

Solitary veterans, who by all measures of the data were deeply impoverished, unsurprisingly portrayed themselves as losing the struggle to sustain an existence. The data in table 9 reveal that most of them were penniless. Tables 6 and 7 show that many grubbed out a living only with the help from their community and friends, rather than from family.

For veterans like Asher Russell and John Ward, beset with infirmity and total destitution, their only choice was to become a pensioner or a town pauper. Until Russell, age sixty-six, received his pension in 1818, he had been supported by the town of Wethersfield, Connecticut, for ten years. He claimed that he would have to return to town rolls if his pension were not continued. Similarly, John Ward, a seventy-two-year-old infirm laborer, told the War Department that he was penniless and unable to work, and that without the pension "the town would be obliged to support me."[16]

In the cases of Icabod Beckwith and James Graton, town overseers of the poor applied for the pension on their behalf. In 1820, the overseers in Ludlow, Massachusetts, told the War Department that the sixty-nine-year-old Beckwith had no wife, no family, and no property. He was described as "a pauper disabled in body and mind" with no means of support other than from the town and from friends. The overseers of Hartford, New York, described Graton as a seventy-three-year-old in-

Table 9

WEALTH CATEGORIES FOR EACH TYPE OF HOUSEHOLD

	Court-Assessed Wealth							
	Zero		$1–$50		$51–$100		$101 +	
Type of Household	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%
Solitary	68	51.5	51	38.6	6	4.5	7	5.3
Conjugal	23	9.9	121	51.9	40	17.2	49	21.0
Nuclear	17	4.4	195	48.7	69	17.2	119	29.7
Extended								
Applicant living with kin	5	23.8	12	57.1	3	14.3	1	4.8
Kin living with applicant	4	5.1	22	28.2	19	24.4	33	42.3
Nonrelatives living with applicant	1	7.7	5	38.5	1	7.7	6	46.1
Total	118	13.5	406	46.3	138	15.7	215	24.5

NOTE.—Contingency coefficient = .49.

sane pauper with four dollars in goods to his name. At the time of the claim, he was living apart from his wife who was also supported by the town.[17]

In Abraham Taylor's case, the fall into extreme poverty had dissolved his family. In 1820 Taylor was living in Montgomery County, New York, sometimes sharing quarters with his brother. His wife and son, age sixteen, were living in Vermont. Taylor told the court that in 1816 his family broke up because he could no longer support them. His wife and son had moved to Vermont to live with friends, and since that time his circumstances had further diminished because he could no longer work because of rheumatism. He reported only a few things in his pension application which totaled $17 in value.[18]

For Henry Buzzell, age sixty-five and living alone, poverty was imminent because of infirmity and the unexpected loss of kin assistance. In 1825 Buzzell, appearing before court in Strafford County, New Hampshire, claimed to be a penniless and disabled farmer who was no longer able to support himself. Buzzell told the court that he had once owned a farm that supported his family, but in 1812 he began getting "feeble." At that time he deeded the farm to his son, Jacob, in return for an agreement that Jacob would maintain his father for life. The son had lived up to his obligation until recently when, Buzzell swore, "Jacob has become poor and wholly unable to support me or contribute to my relief and I am now entirely left destitute." Buzzell claimed to have no other family to turn to and consequently was wholly "dependent on charity." Without the pension, Buzzell would have become a town-supported pauper.[19]

To summarize, the solitary veterans were for the most part at the end of their ability to be self-supporting. For a few, such as Henry Buzzell, impoverishment may have occurred despite careful planning for continued support in retirement or in case of illness. For others, like Abraham Taylor and James Graton, households had been whittled away by poverty and infirmity. For some, poverty in old age was a continuation of the hard times of their youth compounded by the anguish of seeing their children eke out meager existences. Despite various paths to poverty, nearly all, as shown in tables 4, 6, and 7 and as illustrated in Icabod Beckwith's case, claimed that their assets were gone, their health was failing, and that they were without family resources and even family ties. The normal life of independence and kinship was near an end and life as a public ward had either begun or was imminent.

The applications coming from veterans who lived in conjugal households also contained stories of bankruptcy, fractured families, destitution, dependency, and pauperism. Like many of the solitary veterans, a few couples reported being aided by the town (see tables 6 and 7) before obtaining pensions or being on the verge of becoming town wards if they did not receive pensions. Other veterans told the War Department

that support from children was insufficient, uncertain, or impossible because the children were either poor or far removed. Couples held, on an average, five times more in assets than solitary veterans, but 60 percent of them had already slipped under the $50 mark in court-assessed property. (See table 9.) In addition, 20 percent of the couples held debts as compared with 10 percent of the solitary veterans. The debt figure suggests that a large number of couples were vulnerable to bankruptcy. Many couples appeared close to the condition reported by solitary veterans—loss of assets, broken households, and dependency on friends and the town—which, for a few, could mean spending the remainder of their lives in an almshouse.

The testimonies of Henry Hallowell and Michael Waggoner reflected the fears of other couples who were better off. They saw themselves losing self-sufficiency and dreaded pauperism. When Hallowell, who was refused a pension, appeared before the court in Lynn, Massachusetts, in 1820, he was sixty-five years old, living with his wife (age not given), and had an estate valued at $418.50. His property consisted of three-quarters of an acre of land, "part of a dwelling house . . . consisting of two back chambers," an "old shop," an "old barn, part of a cellar," and "one-half pew in a Methodist Meeting House." Hallowell had acquired this property in a previous marriage. He acquired additional property through remarriage. His current wife's part interest in a dwelling house, four-fifths of an acre of land, a wood lot, and a salt marsh brought $28 a year in income. In addition, he and his wife received $12 a year by renting rooms in their house and part of the cellar. Hallowell claimed that he still needed to work as a fisherman to support himself and his wife and to aid his two married sons, who were both "very poor and destitute." He noted that one of the sons was receiving help from the town. This precarious network of kin help, supplemented by town aid and income from rent and real property, was near collapse because, in Hallowell's words, he was "weak in body and unable to do much work" and because his wife's health was also poor. Michael Waggoner, who received the benefit, was sixty-six and lived with his wife, fifty-five, on a small farm in Pennsylvania. In 1820 Waggoner told the court that he was "infirm" and in debt, and that his wife was in "bad health." His total estate was valued at nearly $400, about the same as Hallowell's, but Waggoner also reported owing $300 on a first mortgage on his farm. He claimed that the pension was needed to pay off the mortgage; without the benefit he would lose the farm and his means of making a livelihood. War Department regulations allowed the deduction of first mortgages, leaving, in Waggoner's case, $65 in assets, well below the department's unofficial poverty line.[20]

Most couples who included testimony, like Hallowell and Waggoner, portrayed themselves as once self-sufficient tenant farmers, laborers, tradesmen, and landowners who, through failing health, rising debts,

old age, and a declining ability to work were on the edge of losing their meager assets. They wanted the pension to retain their status as well as to prevent their being ground down by disability and poverty. Federal policy, however, was intended mainly to aid destitute veterans—as the rejection of Hallowell's claim illustrated. Only if the veteran held a first mortgage, like Waggoner, did federal guidelines favor aid to prevent loss of home and position in the community.

Testimonies from veterans heading nuclear households resembled those provided by couples. These too were poor, indebted, aged, and infirm men who scratched out a living in a desperate effort to sustain their households. While they generally succeeded without aid from kin, friends, or town (see tables 6 and 7), the struggle for self-sufficiency was difficult. The cases of Joel Atherton, a rejected claimant, and Joseph Craven, who was awarded the pension, illustrate the precariousness of nuclear households containing young and disabled children as well as the War Department's discretionary power to award or withhold assistance.

In 1820, Atherton, age fifty-six, was living on his farm in Portland, Maine, but could do little work because of "rheumatism." His household consisted of his wife, age fifty-four, who was reported to be in "comfortable health and able to do part of the housework," and eight daughters. His two oldest daughters, ages twenty-two and twenty-four, lived at home and were "very feeble." His six other daughters, ages eight to twenty, also lived with him, and all but the youngest were "able in part to support themselves." His property, valued at $210, consisted of forty acres of farm land, a barn and attached half-house, a cow, a yearling, five sheep, farm tools, and household goods. He claimed no income and no collectible money and noted debts amounting to $275. In essence, Atherton told the court that if he did not get the pension he would have to dispose "of all the little property I possess" in order to pay debts. His application was denied.[21]

In the case of Joseph Craven, a sixty-one-year-old baker living in Elizabethtown, New Jersey, the federal poverty line was bent because family tragedy compounded his declining health, deepened his impoverishment, and threatened to dissolve his household. Prior to his court testimony, Craven's son had suddenly gone blind. The boy was sent to a hospital in New York but discharged after a few months because his condition was considered incurable. According to the affidavit received by the court, "The father is now required to take him away, take care of him, that he may no longer be a burden on that institution." The effect produced "very great despondency" in Craven which "rendered him incapable of that exertion, which contributed somewhat to keep him above absolute poverty." Without the pension, Craven faced the likelihood of losing his property ($205) to creditors

and his son to the overseers, and possibly finding himself and his wife on the auction block for outdoor relief.[22]

The testimonies from nuclear households leave a general impression of veterans either barely able to keep afloat or else being dragged down by the afflictions of their young. In a few instances, the ability and desire to have and raise children had exceeded the family's capability to maintain them. While healthy girls and boys could and probably did contribute to the household's support by working or helping with chores, as in Joel Atherton's case, they often compounded the veteran's poverty. In these cases, the impact of poverty was not only broader because it included children but also more threatening because the household stood on the verge of ruin and dismemberment should it fail to sustain itself. Nevertheless, the survival of these households revealed the tough, resilient strands connecting family members.

Veterans' testimonies suggest that household ties, once broken, were irreparable. The ex-soldiers realized that they faced not only economic dependency but also changes in family relations. Feeble or handicapped children might be placed out or put into an almshouse. Young men would leave in order to escape the pull of their parents' poverty. Families might end up being supported by the town and thus losing control over their own lives. The veterans were clinging to their property and their family ties for some comfort, security, and status.

Testimonies from veterans who were taken in by kin revealed the character of reformulated family ties. As table 1 shows, in nearly all of these cases the veterans were completely destitute. In a few instances, their pension helped to keep the household going. The pension forged a link with kin which, if broken, threatened to cast off the applicant to live in circumstances such as those described for the bleakest solitary veterans and couples. The following cases illustrate the variety of circumstances existing among veterans living in reconstituted households.

William Worster was completely dependent upon the kin with whom he lived. In 1820 he told a court in York, Maine, that he was a seventy-five-year-old blacksmith with $20 in property and was suffering from old age, "descreptitude and poverty." He said that he was no longer able to work to support his wife, age seventy-seven, who was still in "tolerable shape." Worster reported that he and his wife were "wholly dependent on the charity and benevolence of my son, Samuel Worster with whom I live."[23]

The Mann and Davis families reestablished ties which made them interdependent and which were mutually beneficial. Nathan Mann, age fifty-eight, his wife, sixty-four, and an unmarried son (no age given) had moved to the farm of another, married son. Mann told the court that he still had to support his own family as well as provide aid to his "feeble" daughter-in-law and her infirm child. He was, however,

less able to help with the farm because of rheumatism. Also, he had burdened the household with $119 in debts against $30 in assets. Daniel Davis was a sixty-eight-year-old penniless laborer who could not work because of rheumatism. Davis, his forty-seven-year-old wife, and their three sons, ages seven, eight, and ten—one of whom was an "idiot"—had been taken in by his daughter from an earlier marriage and his son-in-law and received additional help from the daughter's brothers and sisters who lived nearby. While one can only guess at what members of these families thought of each other, it is reasonable to suspect that an ethic of filial and parental duty to help kin in need, and a household economy capable of supporting more members, led to the effort to establish new bonds.[24]

Worster, Mann, and Davis worried that their children would no longer be able to support them or that they would become unbearable burdens and be forced to leave. Similarly, James Worren feared that while his sons, ages twenty-four and twenty-eight, could support themselves, they could not maintain Worren himself, fifty-nine, and his wife, sixty, without the pension. The situation was particularly tenuous because Worren could do little to help the household because of an asthmatic condition.[25]

Bartholomew Stevens of Summerset County, Maine, had experienced what Worren feared. He had been forced out of his son's household and had become a town ward. Stevens and his wife, both age seventy-two, were paupers who had lived off the town until he received the pension under the 1818 act. When they got the pension, Stevens and his wife moved in with their son whom they claimed to be "a man with small property" unable on his own to support his parents. Stevens stated that without the pension he and his wife would be forced to leave their son's home and return to being supported by the town.[26] Despite their precarious position, veterans like Worster, Mann, Davis, Worren, and Stevens could count themselves among the lucky few who were able to find refuge among kin.

Claimants who took in kin were the wealthiest group of veterans (see tables 1 and 9), but they reported a variety of circumstances which taxed their resources, threatened their self-sufficiency, and justified, in their minds, the supplemental support promised by the pension. Veterans heading these households reported burdensome responsibilities such as caring for aged mothers, infirm children and in-laws, grandchildren, daughters deserted by their husbands, widowed daughters and their children, daughters whose husbands were off trying to establish their own homesteads, and young married daughters and sons who could not make a start on their own. But, as the case of Phineas Hamblett demonstrates, federal officials were not inclined to award pensions to these households.

Hamblett was the main link in the chain of his family's support. In 1820 Hamblett was living on his farm in Cheshire County, New Hampshire. His estate was assessed at $777, but he also claimed debts totaling $253. Hamblett's household was a refuge for disabled and aged kin. His wife, sixty-two, was deaf and blind. His daughter, thirty-nine, lived at home because she was too infirm to support herself. In addition, Hamblett's mother-in-law, age ninety-two, lived with them and was totally dependent upon him for support. Hamblett stated that although he was fairly well off and still in good health at age sixty-five, he was no longer able to work much.[27] Hamblett's concern must have been shared by others. What would happen to him and to his property should he cease to be able to keep up his farm and stave off the creditors? Hamblett probably knew of collapsed households such as those of Henry Buzzell and Joseph Craven. The prospects of a similar disaster probably led to his self-assessed claim of indigency. However, his claim was denied.

A "Life-Course" History

A more complete portrait of the veterans, their poverty, and the impact of federal aid requires a life-course study linking application data with public records and local histories.[28] Rufus Burnham was randomly picked for such a study from a list of pensioners in Essex County, Massachusetts. Through study of Burnham's life course, greater insight may be gained into the accuracy of the application data, the causes and conditions of poverty, and the effects of the pension. In Burnham's case these factors were well documented. In 1820 Burnham's claim to continue on the pension rolls was rejected because of excessive wealth.[29] Three years later the pension was restored. Burnham was accepted under a new law which made veterans rejected under the 1820 act eligible for the benefit if they had subsequently become impoverished. Claimants were required to document changes in wealth or other circumstances which had reduced them to "the lowest grade of poverty."[30]

Burnham was born in 1748 in Boxford, Massachusetts, the first of three brothers and sisters, all of whom survived to adulthood.[31] In 1763 Burnham's father was declared insane, and his estate of nearly £300 was put into trust by the court to be used to support the Burnham family. Rufus Burnham was placed under a court-appointed guardianship. By 1775, the Burnham estate was nearly gone. By 1777, it had been completely used to pay for support of other family members. Rufus Burn-

ham, once the son of a yeoman farmer with good economic prospects, *now faced a bleak future as a landless farm laborer.* When the war broke out, Burnham joined the militia, fought at Bunker Hill, and was discharged at the end of 1775. He continued to serve short terms in the militia until June 1778, when he enlisted for nine months in a Massachusetts unit of the Continental line. After this duty, Burnham saw no *more war except as a host for a Hessian prisoner and his family.*

In November 1777, Burnham married and within five years had three children, Sarah, Seth, and Hannah. Between 1784 and 1785 Burnham bought forty-three acres of land with a house and barn for £210. He also sold most of that land during these same years for a slight gain, which leads one to believe that he either was speculating or had accrued some debts which had to be paid. For five years Burnham and his family lived on their fourteen-acre farm. In 1790 Burnham sold his property and moved to rented quarters, where he remained until 1822. The reasons for the sale can only be surmised. Boxford's population dropped by 8 *percent* between 1790 and 1800, possibly indicating an economic constriction that adversely affected the Burnhams. In 1818, when Burnham applied for the pension, his household consisted of his wife and his children, Seth and Sarah. Hannah, his third child, had married in 1801 and was no longer in the community. Burnham received a pension.

The pension made a significant impact on the Burnham household. Within a few months of his father's receipt of the pension Seth, age thirty-six, bought a farm two miles down the road from his father and married Caroline Herrick, age twenty-two, the daughter of a well-to-do neighbor. Most likely, Seth had remained in his father's household to assist his parents while saving money to buy property. The pension released Seth from the need to contribute to his parents' support and enabled him to establish his own household. Within two years of the marriage, Seth and Caroline had their only child, Charlotte. A year later Seth was elected a selectman for Boxford, serving for one year. By 1855, the year he left Boxford, Seth had acquired a taxable estate valued at $2,100.

In 1820 Rufus Burnham reapplied for the pension as required by law. His claim showed that while Seth had moved out, his daughter Hannah had returned home in a sickly condition. Burnham reported that he was seventy-two, infirm, suffering from a hernia, and nearly blind in his right eye. His wife, age seventy-one, was also in poor health. Only their daughter Sarah, age forty, who cared for her parents and presumably for Hannah, was healthy. Burnham had three acres in marshland worth $25, livestock valued at $147, and goods totaling $106. Like many of the veterans cited earlier in the discussion of wealth, Burnham claimed debts—in his case $150. He was dropped from the rolls because "his property amounted to more than any other person whose name

has been continued on the list and who served so short a time."[32] For two years Burnham appealed the decision.

Following this loss of support, Burnham and his wife were aided by friends, Sarah, and probably Seth. Sometime between 1820 and 1822, neighbors lent Burnham money to build a house next to his rented quarters. The loan was probably made with the expectation that Burnham would be restored to the rolls and use the pension to repay neighbors. As his neighbors' help demonstrated, Burnham "was much esteemed" by the community and considered "an honest, upright and industrious citizen" deserving assistance. In 1822, Burnham, now a widower and blind, moved to this new house with his two daughters.

The discontinuation of the pension, however, put the Burnham household in severe jeopardy. By 1823, when he reapplied for the pension, Burnham claimed to be penniless and was officially reported as such. In 1821 his real property, three acres of marshland, was conveyed to Sarah to pay off a $50 debt, possibly accrued for his care. His livestock had been either consumed or "sold for expenses of family." For example, he sold six cows and a heifer for $105 to pay rent and taxes. Accompanying testimony from townsmen confirmed Burnham's claim that without the pension he could not support himself "except by public or private charity." Furthermore, impoverishment and infirmity had transformed Burnham's household status. In 1820 he was the head of the household, but in 1823 he was nearly subordinate to his daughters, or as Burnham put it, "two daughters live with me, or rather I live with them." According to Burnham, Sarah and Hannah were too "infirm" and "indigent" to continue to support him.[33] No references were made to Seth's ability to aid his father and sisters.

Restoration of the pension in 1823, which included back payments to 1820, sustained the household and even allowed the Burnhams to build a modest estate. It also meant that the town would not expect Seth to support his father and possibly his sisters. Burnham's household remained intact until 1834, when Hannah died. Two years later, at age eighty-seven, Rufus died. Sarah inherited the house and the remainder of her father's estate, which had increased in value to over $500. In 1842, Sarah, now aged sixty-two, announced her intention to marry a resident of Middleton, Massachusetts. The marriage never occurred. In 1844 she married a neighbor and widower, Joseph Tyler, who then moved to her house. He apparently had little wealth. When she died in 1858, her estate was put in trust for her husband's support, with her brother Seth and his heirs as remaindermen. When Tyler died in 1864, the estate was liquidated by Seth, with the small balance going to Tyler's creditors.

The reconstruction of the Burnham family history provides insight into the variety of conditions which ultimately led 20,000 veterans to

declare poverty and into the impact of the pension upon their lives. Burnham was neither the product of a cycle of poverty nor part of a floating class of paupers. He began his life as the son of a yeoman farmer who had a "substantial" estate. When his father became *non compos mentis*, the town stepped in to place the children under guardianships. In 1768 the father and youngest son were placed with others to live. It is not clear whether the remainder of the family stayed on the farm until it was liquidated for debts in July 1777. Nevertheless, by 1777 Rufus had to start from scratch and seemed to be fairly successful until 1790 when he lost most of his estate. Despite his decline, Burnham appeared to have a solid place in the community. His son married well, acquired wealth, and had a high standing in Boxford. The pension appeared to be instrumental in sustaining his strong family ties, in part because it benefited all of the members of the households. Seth was able to go ahead with his plans to establish his own household. Rufus Burnham's household was maintained without charity and became a refuge for the infirm Hannah. And finally, Sarah eventually acquired an estate that made an attractive dowry and helped to sustain her widowed husband.

Conclusion

As Gerald Grob reminds us, welfare policies seldom are the products of a single motive and a single goal, and they often do not turn out as planned.[51] The 1818 pension act reflected a mixture of motives and conflicting purposes. It appealed to benevolent and patriotic feelings, assuaged guilt for earlier injustices dealt Continental soldiers, and served the nationalistic policies favored by the Monroe administration. The pension act created the largest federal program of direct relief until the New Deal. Ironically, it also produced the first federally defined class of poor by placing thousands of veterans below a national poverty line.

Despite poor-law features, the pension act was not a conventional poor law like that which might be applied to impoverished veterans by their towns. Town aid was reserved for persons who were judged both morally worthy and economically needy. The rate of support varied to meet the need for subsistence, and assets could be encumbered or liquidated by the town to help support the pauper. That need was constantly reviewed by the local overseers and adjusted accordingly. Although most town poor received outdoor relief, that is, supplemental aid while living in their own homes, overseers could also disperse the poor among other families by placing them out or on occasion auctioning them off to the lowest bidder through public auctions.

In contrast to these local practices, the federal poor law assumed, prima facie, that every Continental soldier was worthy of aid, so the only question to be answered was whether he needed it. Once judged in need of aid, the claimant was not granted relief rated to his need but rather awarded a lifetime pension at a rate higher for officers than for ordinary soldiers. By passing the War Department's means test, the veteran was transformed from an alms seeker into an honored pensioner with a guaranteed annual income for life. There was no evidence in federal policy that poverty was perceived as a social problem, or that the poor were feared and needed to be controlled.[35]

The pension act reveals that American social welfare is based not only on Elizabethan poor-law traditions but also on new practices which combine features of a pension plan and poor-law provisions. The distinction is significant because it illuminates the complexity of American social welfare. On the one hand, traditional practices create a net to catch worthy and deserving individuals who are unable to support themselves. While not automatically entitled to aid, they nevertheless have the right to appeal for assistance. On the other hand, as this study illustrates, American welfare includes practices which, in effect, invite individuals to apply for assistance from the nation in recognition of their membership in a group identified with particular cultural ideals. The recognition of cultural value and impoverishment afforded to Revolutionary War veterans led to the first federal policy to provide relief to such a group through a pension.

The 20,000 claims made under the pension act are a rich source of demographic and wealth information which had never been systematically studied. They amount to a national survey of poverty among a large number of elderly poor and their households in the early Republic. The data, case studies, and Burnham's life course show that the poor who applied for the pension represented various sections of society and occupied different economic strata. Poverty, acting somewhat like a press, compacted the strata and forced a number of individuals to lower positions. Poverty not only meant relative economic deprivation but also consisted of a number of interrelated factors such as old age, declining health, reduced self-sufficiency, and household decomposition. According to the veterans, illness, the death of a spouse, departure of children, the burden of handicapped or dependent children, mental anguish, impoverishment of children, and indebtedness accentuated the slide toward poverty and dependency. Sometimes a network of kin and friends formed to halt the slide. Poverty was best combated in households where there were healthy children. They contributed to household support, attracted help from kin, or relieved pressure on the household by leaving. Older veterans who were penniless had to resort to direct support from friends and the town. Conjugal households

remained open for the aid of kin but could deteriorate rapidly without support.[36]

Despite the variety in causes and conditions of poverty, the veterans shared common goals—the retention or restoration of self-sufficiency. They wanted to protect meager assets, avoid further losses, and defend their positions as heads of households. They sought to halt the grinding effects of poverty and to prevent household decomposition and a decline in status. The pension helped them meet their goals by enabling them to return to relative independence, by helping to reestablish or sustain households, by contributing to the formulation of networks of kin and friends' support, and by cutting town costs for relief. There were also psychological and social benefits. The lifetime income ended the dread of pauperism and ensured recipients an honored place in their communities as pensioned heroes of the Revolution.

Notes

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1. *Annals of Congress*, 15th Cong., 1st sess., 1817–18, pp. 2518–19. The House passed the bill "without division," while the Senate voted twenty-three to eight in favor of the bill (ibid., p. 512; *Journal of the Senate*, 15th Cong., 1st sess., 1817–18, p. 200). Amendments, particularly over the exclusion of state militias, created some sectional and partisan divisions.

2. For the debate on the bill in the House and Senate, see ibid., pp. 140-59, 191–200, 197–99, 505–6, 510–12. For expressions of public sympathy toward the veterans, see *Niles Weekly Register*, November 23, 1816, February 8, 1817, and March 1, 1817. For recent discussions on revolutionary values, see Alfred H. Kelly and Richard D. Miles, "Maintenance of Revolutionary Values," *Annals* 126 (July 1976): 25–52; Jack Greene, "Values and Society in Revolutionary America," ibid., pp. 53–69. For a detailed and thoughtful treatment of how the revolutionary generation perceived the Continental army within the emerging political culture, see Charles W. Royster, *A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and American Character, 1775–1783* (Durham: University of North Carolina Press, 1980).

3. *Annals of Congress*, 15th Cong., 1st sess., 1817–18, p. 1698.

4. Ibid., pp. 191–97.

5. William Glasson, *Federal and Military Pensions in the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1918), pp. 1–3, 20–53; Robert G. Bodenger, "Soldiers' Bonuses: A History of Veterans' Benefits in the United States, 1776–1967" (Ph.D. diss., Pennsylvania State University, 1971), pp. 27–28. For general discussions of the pension and half-pay controversy, see Royster, pp. 3[illegible]–51, 373–78; Richard Kohn, *Eagle and Sword* (New York: Free Press, 1975), pp. 1–53, 277–303. See also John Shy, "American Society and Its War for Independence"; Don Higginbotham, "The American Militia"; and Richard Kohn, "American Generals of the Revolution," all in *Reconsiderations of the Revolutionary War*, ed. Don Higginbotham (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), pp. 72-123.

6 Walter I. Trattner has recently observed that the federal government has been little studied in the antebellum period for its social welfare practices because it is generally believed that, except for emergency relief, some land grants, and the Dorothea Dix bill, the national government was not involved in social welfare. Walter I. Trattner, "The Federal Government and Social Welfare in Early Nineteenth-Century America," *Social Service Review* 50 (June 1976): 243–55. The Dix bill, passed by Congress in 1854, provided 12,225,000 acres of public land to support institutions for the insane and deaf. President Pierce vetoed it. See Robert H. Bremner, ed., *Children and Youth in America*, 3 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), 1:789–91.

7. *Annals of Congress*, 16th Cong., 1st sess., 1819–20, pp. 2611–15. For comments on the attorney general's opinion that the benefit was intended only for veterans in the "lowest grade of poverty," see W. Edwin Hemphill, ed., *The Papers of John C. Calhoun*, 11 vols. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1977), 5:265. In 1823, a second amendment was passed to overrule the attorney general's opinion that, because of the silence of the law, the secretary of war was not empowered to grant pensions to claimants who were rejected under the 1820 amended law but who had subsequently become destitute. The 1823 amendment allowed rejected claimants to reapply with a new schedule of property plus a full explanation of why their property had been sold. See *Annals of Congress*, 17th Cong., 2d sess., 1822–23, pp. 1409–10.

8. Glasson, pp. 95–97; Bodenger, pp. 26–42, 389–90. The figures on the costs and the number of applicants who passed the 1820 means test, the number of people composing their households, and the average number of years veterans received relief are derived from a statistical analysis of a random sample of 877 claims found in Record Group 15, "Revolutionary War Pension Files."

9. Daniel P. Moynihan, *The Politics of a Guaranteed Income: The Nixon Administration and the Family Assistance Plan* (New York: Random House, 1973), pp. 113–235.

10. *Annals of Congress*, 17th Cong., 2d sess., 1822–23, p. 283.

11. "Revolutionary War Pension Files," Record Group 15. The sample was taken from microfilm publication M805, which consists of 898 reels containing the applications and selected correspondence.

12. *Niles' Weekly Register*, February 26, 1820.

13. Lawrence Stone, *The Family, Sex and Marriage in England, 1500–1800* (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), pp. 4–10, 21–29, 651–87, 759–81; Peter Laslett and Richard Wall, *Household and Family in Past Time* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 1–89; Kenneth W. Wachter, Eugene A. Hammel, and Peter Laslett, *Statistical Studies of Historical Social Structure* (New York: Academic Press, 1978), pp. 105–11.

14. *Annals of Congress*, 16th Cong., 1st sess., 1819–20, pp. 852–54.

15. On the life-course perspective, see Tamara K. Hareven, ed., *Transitions: The Family and Life Course in Historical Perspective* (New York: Academic Press, 1978), pp. 1–64. The life-course perspective seeks to describe and analyze the interconnections among individual, household, and social developments within a historical context. By contrast, cohort and life cycle approaches examine slices of a population which are usually divided by age groups. The data in this study indicated that the age of the applicant—except for those few over seventy-five—had little to do with the circumstances described in the claims, thereby severely limiting the value of either cohort or life cycle analysis. Life course more closely fitted the data because of its focus on individuals who are in a "continuous interactive process" with their families and community—a process shaped by demographic and economic factors and social values. For an assessment and application of the life-course perspective to the aged which emphasizes the demographic factors in determining individual choices, see Daniel Scott Smith, "The Course, Norms and the Family System of Older Americans in 1900," *Journal of Family History* 4 (Fall 1979): 285–98.

16. Asher Russell, "Revolutionary War Pension File," S40368 (hereafter cited as Pension File); John Ward, Pension File S35378.

17. Icabod Beckwith, Pension File S34023; James Grator, Pension File R21885.

18. Abraham Taylor, Pension File W26508.

19. Henry Buzzell, Pension File S45529.

20. Henry Hallowell, Pension File S32800; Michael Waggon, Pension File S40636.

21. Joel Atherton, Pension File W23471.

22. Joseph Craven, Pension File S34612.

23. William Worster, Pension File S35118.

24. Nathan Mann, Pension File W9908; Daniel Davis, Pension File W3519.

25. James Worren, Pension File S15152.

26. Bartholomew Stevens, Pension File W25074.

27. Phineas Hamblett, Pension File S44407.

28. The selection was made from the list of persons who had once or were still receiving benefits as of 1834. This list amounts to a census of all applicants. See *The Pension Roll of 1835* (Baltimore: Genealogical Printing Co., 1968), 1:67. In my monograph (in preparation) on the pensioners, life-course studies are being developed for all the Continental veterans in Boxford and Salem, Massachusetts, and in Peterborough, New Hampshire. This methodology will permit comparison between Continental veterans who did and who did not apply for the pension as well as the development of case histories linking individual veterans with their households and communities. The concentration on one region should provide other historians with a solid basis for similar life-course studies of veterans from other regions.

29. Rufus Burnham, Pension File S34125. Burnham's claim resembled that of many other veterans. He was the head of a nuclear household (45 percent of the cases), one of nearly half of the applicants in their mid-sixties to early seventies. Like most veterans Burnham was infirm and a tenant farmer who had few possessions. Also, he was burdened with debts.

30. See above, n. 4. According to the sample data, 16 percent of the applicants in 1820 were rejected, most because of excessive wealth. One-third of these applicants were restored to the rolls under the 1823 amendment.

31. The discussion of Rufus Burnham was composed from a wide range of sources. See *Massachusetts Soldiers and Sailors of the War* (Boston, 1896), pp. 865–66; *Vital Records of Boxford* (Topsfield, Mass., 1905), pp. 18, 121; Sidney Perley, *The Dwellings of Boxford* (Salem, Mass., 1893), pp. 70–71, 227–28; Sidney Perley, *The History of Boxford* (Boxford, Mass., 1880) pp. 219, 228–31, 237–38, 283, 384; *An Abstract of the Valuation of Real and Personal Property in the Town of Boxford for the Year 1855* (Salem, Mass., 1856), p. 18; Essex, South District Court, *Grantee Deeds*, Docket 112, 169, Docket 113, 188; *Grantor Deeds*, Docket 141, 215, Docket 145, 20, Docket 151, 146; South District Court, *Probate Court Records*, Documents 4155, 4163, 4164, 55912; and Pension File S34125.

32. Letter, J. L. Edwards, War Department clerk, to Jeremiah Nelson, U.S. representative from Massachusetts, May 7, 1822, in Rufus Burnham, Pension File S34125.

33. Pension application, April 8, 1823, Rufus Burnham, Pension File S34125.

34. Gerald Grob, "Reflections on the History of Social Policy in America," *Reviews in American History* 7 (September 1979): 293–306.

35. For discussions of poverty and benevolence during this period, see David J. Rothman, *The Discovery of the Asylum* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971), pp. xiii–xx, 155–205; Raymond A. Mohl, "Poverty, Pauperism, and Social Order in the Preindustrial American City, 1780–1840," *Social Science Quarterly* 52 (March 1972): 940–44. These two sources develop the social disorder–social maintenance explanation of early nineteenth-century responses to poverty. Lois Banner, "Religious Benevolence as Social Control: A Critique of an Interpretation," *Journal of American History* 60 (June 1972): 23–41, summarizes the role of religion and the enlightenment in early nineteenth-century philanthropy. See also Paul Goodman, "Ethics and Enterprise: The Values of a Boston Elite, 1800–1860," *American Quarterly* 18 (Fall 1966): 437–50; M. J. Heale, "From City Fathers to Social Critics: Humanitarianism and Government in New York, 1790–1860," *Journal of American History* 58 (June 1976): 21–41. These two studies argue that civic stewardship was a principal motive initiating and guiding responses to poverty. It should be noted that all of the above studies use local societies, exemplary persons, state practices, or a combination of these to develop their cases. For a recent study of urban poverty and relief, see Priscilla Clement, "The Response to Need, Welfare and Poverty in Philadelphia, 1800 to 1850" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1977).

36. For studies dealing with the effect of poverty on family structure and the impact of pensions on family relations, see Michael Anderson, *Family Structure in Nineteenth Century Lancashire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), and his "The Im-

pact on the Family Relationships of the Elderly of Changes since Victorian Times in Governmental Income-Maintenance Provision," in *Family, Bureaucracy, and the Elderly*, ed. Ethel Shanas and Marvin B. Sussman (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1977), pp. 36–59.

Emergency Assistance and Special Needs Programs in the AFDC System

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This paper studies emergency assistance and special needs programs that are tied to the AFDC grant system. It notes that the specialized programs are currently more common in states that have high AFDC benefits and reduced commitments to a standardized calculation of income-maintenance grants. On the other hand, it finds that AFDC emergency programs are apparently larger in states with low AFDC benefits and more emphasis on standardization. These results are explained in the terms of historical trends toward bureaucratization and resulting state strategies designed to strike a balance between discretion and standardization and between meeting needs and controlling expenditures.

Recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) often encounter serious financial difficulties that cannot be anticipated by the basic income-maintenance grant. A fire may occur, an appliance may break down, a medical problem that requires a special diet may develop, an AFDC check may be lost, or the client may simply be unable to make ends meet with the aid normally provided. To cover such circumstances, states may develop public emergency assistance and special needs programs. These efforts are defined as cash or cash-equivalent grant programs that meet both occasional unexpected financial problems and chronic needs for extra funds.

The specialized programs are clearly of crucial importance to some public welfare recipients. Without them, certain financial problems

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cannot easily be solved. However, these programs have received only limited attention; their history, growth, and implementation have not been fully considered.[1]

This paper examines some special grant efforts for AFDC recipients. It places these programs in historical context, describes them, and enumerates which state characteristics relate to their implementation. It also suggests some of the policy implications of the discussion.

From Individualization to the Flat Grant

The importance of separate emergency assistance and special needs programs has increased as the AFDC system has changed over the last decade. Formerly, the AFDC system included a good deal of individualization. The income-maintenance grant was calculated on a case-by-case basis, and it was the responsibility of the caseworker to decide just how much financial aid was needed for food, rent, clothing, and other expenses. In this system separate emergency assistance and special needs programs were seldom considered, as unexpected financial problems needing special coverage could be incorporated in the caseworker's calculation of the individual's AFDC grant.

During the late 1960s the individualized grant system fell into disrepute, and states were under pressure to limit those individual calculations that enabled emergency and special needs to be met by the basic grant. Because workers spent considerable time deciding the levels of benefits for each client, it was believed that the individualized system must be costly to administer. Individualization also appeared to lead to many errors because of the complicated calculations made necessary by a policy of fitting the benefits to the unique situation of each client. These problems were of vital concern since the AFDC caseload increased rapidly during the late 1960s, and states were under pressure to minimize the financial burden by controlling costs and errors. By the middle of the next decade, states could be financially penalized by the federal government for a high error rate.[2]

Many critics believed individualization created moral dilemmas. Researchers documented problems with systems in which workers had some discretion over the amount of aid clients received.[3] It was argued that discretion created inequalities. For example, workers could limit aid to families they believed were not living up to middle-class expectations. In this way they could indirectly control the behavior of clients by financially rewarding those who complied with their expectations and punishing those who did not.

A final problem seemed to arise from the fact that workers who calculated individualized grants necessarily dispensed unequal amounts

of aid to clients with similar incomes and family structures. In opposition to this result, critics stressed the philosophical principle of "horizontal equity,"[4] which states that equals should receive equal benefits. It should be up to clients to decide how best to use the funds, it was argued, and individual needs and desires of clients in similar financial situations should not be relevant in calculating grants. Many experts believed that a reduction in worker discretion would increase the equity of benefits.

Equity became one of the major concerns against which many policy reforms were measured as the 1960s progressed. For example, in hearings on one welfare reform package, Martha Griffiths, then chairwoman of the Joint Economic Committee, stated: "Personally, I am for the law applying equally to all, and this is the purpose of the entire investigation of income maintenance programs. This work began because of the inequality in the law. It is dedicated to equality in justice."[5] Minimizing discretion came to be viewed as a way of improving social justice.

Congress never directly voted for a change in the structure of the AFDC grant, but pressures to control errors and philosophic change led most states to make alterations. Many adopted what has been called the "flat" grant, which calculates benefits solely on the basis of family size and structure, other income, and, in line with other federal laws, work expenses. Individual needs are not considered. The flat grant reduces the time it takes to calculate benefits while it helps to minimize errors. In addition, the flat grant limits the discretion of workers, thus reducing their ability to control clients. By definition, it results in greater horizontal equity.

By 1980 the flat grant had been widely adopted. Only three states had flat grants before 1960, but by 1980, forty-six had at least a partial flat grant (some of these states allowed regional differences for shelter costs).[6] Of thirty-three states reporting dates on which they adopted the flat grant, the earliest claimed 1969, the latest 1975.[7]

The flat grant symbolized a major change in the operating philosophy of AFDC. In the income-maintenance side of welfare, in particular, standardized bureaucracy came to be the ideal. Efficiency, speed of service, the reduction of errors, and treating equals similarly were the bywords. Some states retained a degree of individualization in income maintenance, but most relegated individualization to social services or to specialized grant programs.[8]

Developing Emergency Assistance and Special Needs Programs

The importance of emergency assistance and special needs programs under a flat grant system is apparent. A large number of income-mainte-

nance recipients can be expected to require additional financial support on occasion, and some recipients also have special continuing needs. The flat grant, however, does not allow workers to dispense more aid when a need develops. Separate specialized programs are often the only public mechanisms that can meet individual problems.

Three AFDC-related specialized programs compensate for needs that cannot be met by flat grants. The first is AFDC–Emergency Assistance (AFDC-EA), which states were permitted to implement by federal law in 1967.[9] In the AFDC-EA program the federal government matches state contributions toward emergency aid. Under this optional program, states can dispense aid only to families threatened by destitution. In addition, a client family may receive only one grant, covering no more than thirty days worth of goods, within any twelve-month period.

The AFDC-EA program was not necessarily intended to deal with needs arising from the adoption of flat grants. Nevertheless, the program clearly helps to compensate for the lack of flexibility in the basic program. Many states adopted the emergency program about the same time they developed a flat grant. The earliest implementation was in 1967, most states with AFDC-EA began programs between 1973 and 1975.[10]

The second specialized program which helps compensate for the inflexibility of the flat grant system is AFDC–Special Needs. Special needs benefits are matched by the federal government at the same rate as the basic AFDC grant, and are available only to AFDC recipients. In fact, special needs money is generally distributed as part of the AFDC grant and is subject to AFDC's review of errors. Many states traditionally labeled all items for which individualized calculation was possible "special needs." The items were standardized in the late 1960s and early 1970s in the effort to reduce individualization.

Some states currently combine a normally flat grant with a few well-controlled expenditures labeled as special need provisions. These modern special needs programs are administratively separate from the AFDC grant. Thus, if a client receives a specific approval, and a letter from a doctor proving need, special needs programs may allow ten extra dollars for a special diet or aid to an unborn child. Again, there is evidence that states adopted some administratively separate special needs provisions to compensate for limits in the flat grant. Of the thirteen states reporting the date for adoption, nine implemented a program between 1968 and 1979.[11]

A third way to compensate for needs not provided for by flat grants is to implement a state-funded program. A few states have preferred this alternative to the slightly rule-bound AFDC-EA program and to an AFDC-Special Needs program limited to AFDC recipients and reviewed for federal aid-reducing errors. Other states use a statewide program to supplement federal programs. Wisconsin (although just implementing AFDC-EA) adopted the first type of state plan and developed an emer-

gency energy loan program and a disaster program as alternatives to AFDC—EA. Michigan adopted the second type of state plan, using state funds to provide aid to clients who are ineligible for federal programs or who have exhausted their eligibility. Some consistency between the adoption of a flat grant and the state programs is apparent; thirteen of the sixteen states reporting the date of adoption implemented a state program between 1968 and 1979.

Variation in Implementation

The three programs are adopted at the option of the states and are used very differently in different states. According to the latest evidence, twenty-two states rely on the AFDC-EA program. Thirty-five have what they call AFDC–Special Needs programs on their books, but many of these programs do not fall within the definition of special needs aid.[12] Some states list under AFDC–Special Needs the availability of geographic rent differentials or federally required work-expense allowances. In the survey on which this paper is based, only nineteen states claimed to use AFDC–Special Needs to meet emergency and special needs situations. Twenty-one states claimed to have a state-run emergency program.

How much is spent on special programs? Complete data on the cost of emergency aid and special needs do not exist for all programs. Many states could not give complete data for state-funded programs, while AFDC–Special Needs financial data are often hopelessly entangled with the costs reported for AFDC grants as a whole. But national data for AFDC-EA are available and are reported in table 1. As can be seen, expenditures for AFDC-EA vary widely, even when the size of the AFDC program is taken into account. The AFDC-EA expenditures represent 0.5 percent of AFDC expenditures in Pennsylvania, and over 3 percent in Ohio. The proportion of AFDC recipients who receive a grant for emergency needs can be quite high (the calculation requires comparing the monthly AFDC caseload and the yearly AFDC-EA caseload to take into account the once-a-year nature of Emergency Assistance). Ninety-two percent of grant recipients receive emergency aid in Wyoming and 56 percent in West Virginia. On the average, AFDC-EA expenditures equal 1.1 percent of AFDC expenditures and include 27.7 percent of the caseload.[13]

Clearly, it is important to determine what accounts for these differences in the number and size of programs states implement to cover emergency and specialized needs. Such an analysis would help determine the exact role the specialized programs play in public welfare and would thus have implications for policy. The remainder of this paper provides such an analysis.

Table 1

AFDC and AFDC-EA Caseload and Expenditures in One Year
(March 1978–February 1979)

	Number AFDC-EA Families	Average % AFDC Caseload	Average AFDC-EA Payment per Family ($)	Average AFDC Payment per Family ($)	AFDC-EA Expenditures ($)	% AFDC Expenditures for AFDC-EA
Connecticut*	17,537	38.3	135.38	328.50	2,374,167	2.0
Delaware	3,093	27.9	15.98	214.57	112,240	.4
District of Columbia	6,025	19.3	181.11	233.53	1,093,018	1.2
Kansas	4,786	20.3	153.82	236.87	736,224	1.1
Kentucky	17,852	29.6	212.86	167.89	3,800,089	3.1
Maryland	15,695	21.1	176.84	197.19	2,775,646	1.6
Massachusetts	19,396	39.5	273.51	315.59	13,510,599	3.4
Michigan	48,906	21.0	151.00	350.00	7,381,999	.8
Minnesota	15,863	33.7	219.56	303.17	3,482,961	2.0
Montana	393	6.5	80.99	215.23	31,828	.2
Nebraska	1,544	12.5	180.00	256.44	277,949	.7
New Jersey	6,799	21.4	296.34	293.14	2,014,859	.4
New York	80,295	22.0	214.00	379.93	17,183,759	1.0
Ohio	93,304	56.5	168.94	225.20	15,763,701	3.5
Oklahoma	3,409	12.0	203.28	218.91	693,007	.9
Oregon	5,585	12.6	122.38	275.54	683,513	.5
Pennsylvania	2,857	1.4	138.12	292.36	391,605	.05
Virginia	1,477	2.6	132.67	204.11	195,956	.1
Washington	12,480	25.0	315.28	313.28	1,309,085	2.3
West Virginia	14,344	55.0	74.30	170.69	1,065,820	2.0
Wyoming	2,156	92.0	82.31	225.00	177,462	2.8
Average		27.3	170.90	257.99	3,718,000	1.1

Source.—U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, *Public Assistance Statistics*, monthly reports (Washington, D.C.: HEW Office of Research and Statistics, March 1978 through February 1979).

* Figures not for a full year. Connecticut suspended its AFDC-EA program in July 1978 and restored it on December 1, 1978.

Explaining the Variation

The historical analysis suggests a framework for developing hypotheses to explain variations in the adoption of emergency and special needs programs. It suggests that the provision of specialized aid must be viewed as something of a dilemma for all states. Such aid may seem necessary to compensate for the trend toward standardization, but it threatens to disrupt the goals that the flat grant is meant to ensure. Despite attempts to limit coverage by statute, specialized programs inevitably require workers to dispense variable amounts of aid on short notice. The programs thus reintroduce discretion. To some degree er-

rors will occur, simplification will be reduced, and horizontal equity will be sacrificed. There is a trade-off between providing for specialized needs and maintaining a standardized system.

The resolution of the dilemma may depend upon the strength of a state's commitment to the flat grant and all it stands for. True, all states have simplified their grant system to some extent and have been affected by the recent trends. But the extent to which the trends have been accepted and implemented varies. Two sets of hypotheses are suggested.

One argument is that states that have attempted to resist the ideology and practice of the flat grant in general may be more likely to implement the specialized emergency and special needs programs. This argument implies that the specialized programs are a means by which states that distrust standardization maintain some of the flexibility the flat grant threatens. In other words, specialized programs may be more common in states in which individualization is apparent in other ways. A corollary is that states that are more committed to the flat grant may be less likely to implement the programs. This argument suggests some correlates: behaviors and attitudes supportive of reducing error, increasing efficiency, and ensuring equity in the system as a whole may be related to the limited adoption of emergency and special needs programs; attitudes and behaviors in support of individualized treatment in the overall program may have the opposite effect.

This line of reasoning suggests that other attributes of the AFDC system may affect the provision of specialized aid. Emergency programs entail some expense, and it is possible that states that are more able to accept the cost will adopt emergency programs more often. In addition, because the federal-state match in AFDC varies, with larger matches accruing to states with lower average per capita income, states with lower matches may be more likely to adopt emergency programs. These states are by definition richer, and can more easily afford to pay for a specialized program. Further, because the states with a low match receive fewer federal dollars compared to state dollars in AFDC, the low match in the federal AFDC-EA program and the burden of a state-financed emergency program may be more typical and thus more acceptable to them.

These hypotheses are based on compatibility. That is, they assume that states with an environment that supports individualization and high costs are more likely to adopt discretionary and somewhat costly emergency programs. An alternative possibility is that the patterns of adopting the program will be based upon compensation. This point of view implies that states use emergency assistance and special needs programs to compensate for limits in individualization inherent in the standardized AFDC grant. Officials who are committed to standardization, yet realize its problems, may turn to specialized programs while avoiding any other individualization. In other words, in states in which

the new standardization has been implemented furthest, special circumstances are met least well in the basic AFDC program, and specialized programs may often develop to fill the gap.

According to the compensation hypothesis, states with a high degree of standardization in the basic program can be expected to adopt more emergency and special needs programs. States with more flexibility in other ways may be less likely to adopt separate specialized programs. Along the same lines, perhaps states with a lower AFDC grant in which needs are not met sufficiently will also adopt specialized programs to compensate. States with a high match and lower average incomes may turn to specialized programs to meet some needs of the larger number of relatively poor people in the geographic area.

In short, two alternative sets of hypotheses develop. The compatibility principle suggests that states will adopt emergency programs less often when equity is stressed, when efficiency and standardization demands are high, when the grant is flat, when the AFDC grant is high, and when the match is low. Compensation predicts just the opposite.

Data and Methods

The alternative sets of hypotheses can be tested with data from a recent survey of emergency programs. As part of the study, questionnaires were sent to officials in all fifty states and in the District of Columbia. Replies were received from forty-five of the fifty-one units, a very high response rate. However, the response rate is lower on most individual questions.

The questionnaire included an executive "interview" in which a high-ranking official was asked about the overall AFDC system and the nature of the emergency and special needs programs. These questionnaires were supplemented with federal records to obtain expenditure levels for AFDC-EA, to determine if the grant is flat, and to determine the size of the ADFC grant.

The dependent variables in the study, measures of the emergency effort, are directly obtained from the survey. One is the number of emergency programs a state has varying from zero to three. The second is the 1979 expenditures of the AFDC-FA program divided by the total grant expenditures. The second dependent variable involves only the one program for which complete data exist.

Independent variables.—As part of the interview schedule, state executives were asked to rank how important a number of goal items were in the present operation of the AFDC system, and how important the executives believed the goals should be. In many instances, these goal

items represent factors hypothesized to be important in the emergency assistance effort. For example, five goals seem to represent a course of action consistent with the recent philosophy behind the flat grant. These include the goals of making sure the basic financial needs for clients are met, making sure that some clients are not treated more favorably than others, keeping forms and procedures simple, verifying needs and resources, and increasing the efficiency and controlling the costs of program administration. Two goals measure courses of action consistent with the more traditional, discretionary orientation. These are being sensitive to the unique financial circumstances of each client and providing workers flexibility to make decisions about cases that do not quite fit the rules.

The executives' perceptions of the importance of these goals at present are the basis of two of the independent variables. An operational definition of equity, standardization, and error control can be obtained from the first five goal items. Because these items correlate with each other closely, one factor averaging the five is sufficient. On a six-point scale, this index of goals has a mean of 5.00.

Each of the two goal items that reflect the traditional orientation may be correlated with the dependent variables to assess the role of this set of procedures (the items are not combined because they do not correlate closely with each other). The item that involves treating clients uniquely has a mean of 4.4. The flexibility item averages 3.8. The lower means for these items as compared to the first set supports the claim that standardization is the current trend.

The use of goal items has been controversial in recent years, and some object to analysis even partly based on them.[14] Many claim that goals are often reported in a manner that represents wishes rather than the realities of organizational behavior. To deal with this problem officials were asked to differentiate current from desired goals. Current goals presumably represent operating principles and so are appropriate for this analysis.

Goals are thus one type of measure of the actual operations of these agencies. In fact, they correlate with some objective measures of the AFDC system.[15] They are not perfect measures, but they reflect the system to some degree.

To answer concerns about goals as a measure, the question whether the basic income-maintenance grant is flat or not was added as an alternative indicator. Presumably, because the flat grant represents the desired product of the change in philosophy over the past ten years, states with a flat grant demonstrate a high commitment to error reduction, horizontal equity, and ease of administration.

To measure the financial resources of a state, two variables are taken from federal reports. These are the 1979 standard grant for a family of four, and the federal percentage of the federal-state AFDC match. The match is not lower than 50 percent federal in any state.

Table 2

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN GENERAL PUBLIC WELFARE CHARACTERISTICS AND THE NUMBER OF EMERGENCY PROGRAMS

	Grant Standard	Federal AFDC Match	Equity Goal Index	Unique Goal	Flexibility Goal	Flat Grant
Correlations between the number of programs*	46	−28	−32	−01	−01	−23

* N = 41

Analysis and Results

Tables 2 and 3 present the correlations between the independent variables and the two measures of the size of the emergency effort. Statistical significance tests are not reported because the data involve the universe of programs (minus nonrespondents), not a random sample, statistical significance is not a meaningful concept. For analysis purposes, it is assumed that any correlation above 20 in absolute value is worth considering. Indeed, if this were a sample, a correlation of about this size would be statistically significant in most cases. It is best to consider the correlations with each dependent variable separately.

Number of programs —Table 2 reports the correlations between the independent variables and the number of emergency programs adopted. Many of these correlations are well above the 20 cutoff point. According to the table, when the equity and standardization index is higher, there are fewer specialized programs adopted in the states. In addition, flat grants are correlated with the adoption of fewer programs. Further, when the AFDC-grant standard is higher there are more specialized programs, and there are also more programs when the federal financial

Table 3

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN GENERAL PUBLIC WELFARE CHARACTERISTICS AND THE SIZE OF THE AFDC-EA PROGRAM

	Grant Standard	Federal AFDC Match	Equity Goal Index	Unique Goal	Flexibility Goal	Flat Grant
Correlation between the size of programs*	−37	49	38	31	07	24

* N = 21

match is lower. The two measures of the traditional orientation do not relate to the number of programs

Taken as a whole, these results strongly support the consistency argument. As predicted by this view, states more committed to the flat grant and to other measures of equity and standardization are less likely to adopt emergency and special needs programs. At the same time, states with a commitment to larger AFDC grants have more specialized programs as well. Richer states, those with lower federal matches, also adopt more specialized programs.

In short, states committed to the flat grant seem to prefer not to adopt discretionary emergency assistance and special needs programs. The desire to limit discretion in the AFDC program as a whole is apparently reflected in decisions to shun the discretionary specialized programs. The results imply also that states with a commitment to a higher AFDC grant support the cost of many specialized programs. Perhaps a willingness to support clients in the overall program is reflected in a willingness to pay for many emergency assistance programs.

The data also indicate that states with a lower federal match in AFDC support the formation of more emergency and special needs programs. Perhaps such states, used to dispensing a high percentage of their own funds for public welfare, are less reluctant to support the AFDC-EA program, which has a limited match. These states may also be more willing to support state programs, which have no federal match at all.

Program costs.—Table 3 reports correlations between the measures of the nature of the AFDC system and the costs of the AFDC-EA program. There are some large correlations in this case, but they demonstrate surprising reversals from the results involving the number of programs. Emergency assistance costs are actually higher when the basic grant is flat and when states have a commitment, as measured by goals, to a standardized welfare system. On the other hand, one goal measure, the commitment to individualization, relates to smaller emergency benefits. Finally, the emergency-grant costs are lower when the state standard is higher, while costs are higher when there is a higher federal match for AFDC. This last result is quite significant and in itself explains about one-fourth of the variance.

Clearly, then, the combined information on program costs supports the compensation point of view. States more committed to a flat grant, less committed to individualization, and with a lower standard, have a larger AFDC-EA program. Thus, costs are higher for specialized discretionary programs when AFDC itself is less discretionary and less costly. Further, a high match also relates to higher AFDC-EA costs. As has been mentioned, a high match implies a low average income; perhaps the relation indicates that states with high needs due to low incomes support comparatively larger emergency programs as a way to meet needs.

A close look at these results, however, reveals two competing explanations. One is that higher AFDC-EA costs result from demands for assistance from clients in flat-grant states and in states with lower basic grants and lower incomes. Thus, it may be argued, when the AFDC grant is insufficient and inflexible and when need is high, there are many individuals who simply cannot meet their needs with the basic grant. These individuals may report many financial problems, and individual workers may tend to use emergency assistance in response.

The other explanation is that the compensation for a flat grant or a limited grant represents a conscious strategy. Perhaps states with a rigid or limited basic grant, or with a low average income, attempt to use specialized programs to meet the most severe needs clients face. The officials may establish program rules that encourage the use of the emergency program.

The possibility that intentional state policies are at least partly responsible for the validity of the compensation argument seems to find support in state-by-state questionnaire data. In Wyoming, for example, a large emergency program is adopted solely to pay in-kind medical expenses that cannot be paid out of restrictive medicaid programs. Thus, emergency aid is used to compensate for an inadequacy in basic coverage in a relatively poor, nonliberal state. In West Virginia, emergency assistance is available for an unusually large range of needs. It is used to meet almost any need that may occur as a result of the low AFDC grant level and high levels of poverty. In both cases, an intention to compensate for inadequacies in the basic grant is exemplified. In general, it seems that states that believe that they do not meet basic expenses very well use emergency aid to meet needs more fully.

It must be remembered that this compensation principle operates only for a subgroup of states, those that have an AFDC-EA program. Over half the states do not have this program, and among these are many with a low flat grant, a high federal match, and a strong commitment to standardization, error reduction, and equity. Some states with these characteristics adopt a large AFDC-EA program and others have no program at all.

Interpretation and Conclusion

Clearly, the historical analysis suggests that increased standardization in all states affects the adoption of specialized programs. But the data analysis suggests three patterns of reaction. First, states more inclined to resist the flat grant and its underlying principles implement many specialized programs. Thus, more liberal states with high basic grants

and less commitment to standardization, horizontal equity, and error control are more likely to adopt emergency programs.

Second, some states with a lower basic grant standard and a higher commitment to equity and standardization adopt a few emergency programs. In these states AFDC-EA costs are likely to be higher, apparently because emergency aid is utilized to compensate for inadequacies in the basic grant. It seems that some officials, realizing that the basic grant cannot cover all problems, utilize emergency assistance to compensate for some of the more pressing needs. Because states in this group usually adopt only a few emergency programs, commitment to fewer specialized programs is balanced by a commitment to at least one large one.

Finally, there are some flat-grant states with a lower-than-average state grant that do not adopt many emergency programs at all. In these states the basic grants are small and inflexible and emergency and special needs are not well met.

In sum, state policy relating to emergency and special needs programs is closely bound up with policies surrounding the basic grant. The size and composition of the grant and the philosophy of the entire income-maintenance system set up expectations in which decisions about emergency and special needs programs are made. According to the different backgrounds, wealth, and administrative and legislative philosophies of the states, emergency programs are implemented in quite different ways across the country.

Implications for policy.—In light of these results, what reforms in the emergency and special needs programs seem most promising? The proposal (not yet implemented) from the Reagan administration is that AFDC-EA should be combined with the emergency energy program, a federally funded program in which each state receives a predetermined appropriation. This proposal suggests that the total budget for the two programs should be reduced 25 percent from current expenditures.

One implication of the proposal is that many of the current disparities in state efforts for AFDC-EA may remain; states that have historically spent more on the AFDC-EA program will apparently continue to receive larger federal appropriations for their emergency effort. The proposal also does not deal with state disparities in the use of AFDC–Special Needs or state emergency aid. If this proposal is adopted, the disparities between states in use of emergency and special need programs may not change. If one desires a standardized emergency and special needs program across states, obvious alternative proposals arise. The greater the extent to which rules and policies are standardized, the greater the conformity of results. It is possible to make the adoption of an emergency program mandatory and to specify which groups of clients and circumstances must be covered. It is even possible to dispense to states a flat amount to meet emergency needs—an idea suggested in Carter's legislative proposal.

In making this suggestion, one must keep in mind some of the relations between the specialized programs and the AFDC system. Specialized programs seem to be used to fill gaps caused by the trend toward the flat grant. High-grant states less committed to standardizing their program and some lower-grant states more committed to standardization seem to use the programs to compensate for the limits of the basic AFDC grant. It is possible that the existence of a specialized program actually provides a safety valve. Some states may use the program to deal with the worst crises clients face under a flat-grant system, thereby reducing political pressure to increase the grant or make it more flexible. Politically, the existence of an emergency program may thus dampen support for change in the overall program.

It is important to avoid adopting an emergency or specialized needs program at the expense of providing adequate grants to all recipients in the AFDC program. Nevertheless, attempts to increase grants, particularly in these hard times, should not lead to overlooking reforms in emergency and special needs programs. Surely states are better off having a specialized program that meets some needs, rather than having no coverage of special circumstances of clients at all.

Notes

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1. There are a few governmental reports on emergency assistance, however: Minnesota Department of Public Welfare, Office of Evaluation, Division of Field Review, "Aid to Families with Dependent Children–Emergency Assistance," mimeographed (Minneapolis, July 30, 1976); Comptroller General, *Should Emergency Assistance for Needy Families Be Continued?* (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 1978); Calumet Institute, Inc., *Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Needy Families under AFDC-EA and Other Public Assistance Programs: Unpublished Report to the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Research and Statistics* (Washington, D.C., December 1979).

2. Sec. 403(h) of the Social Security Act.

3. Joel F. Handler and Ellen Jane Hollingsworth, *The Deserving Poor: A Study in Welfare Administration* (New York: Academic Press, 1971), chap. 4; Joel F. Handler, *The Coercive Social Worker: British Lessons for American Social Services* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973).

4. As discussed in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Income Security for Americans, Recommendations of the Public Welfare Study* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974).

5. Ibid., p. 10.

6. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Family Assistance, *Characteristics of State Plans for Aid to Families with Dependent Children* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980) (hereafter cited as *Characteristics of State Plans*).

7 The survey questionnaire from which these numbers and dates were gathered is described in the section on data and methods, later in this article.

8 *Characteristics of State Plans.*

9 Sec. 406(b)2 of the Social Security Act.

10 As reported in the executive questionnaires to be described.

11 As reported in the executive questionnaires.

12 *Characteristics of State Plans.*

13 Costs are kept low mainly by specializing the types of circumstances covered. The majority of states define only a few items as necessary. Typical is New Jersey's AFDC-EA program, in which "homelessness" is defined as the only condition for receiving a specialized grant. In the extreme case, this includes coverage of many essentials such as food, but usually only natural disasters, fires, or evictions lead to a specialized grant.

14 Herbert A. Simon, "On the Concept of Organization Goal," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 9, no. 1 (1964): 1–22; Ephraim Yuchtman and Stanley E. Seashore, "A System Resources Approach to Organizational Effectiveness," *American Sociological Review* 32, no. 6 (1967): 891–903; Edward Gross, "Universities as Organizations: A Research Approach," *American Sociological Review* 33, no. 4 (1968): 518–44; Amitai Etzioni, *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations*, rev. ed. (New York: Free Press, 1975), chap. 1.

15 The goal of verifying needs and resources, e.g., correlates significantly ($r = .33$) with a "verification scale" developed in *A Public Assistance Databook* (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 1977), p. 198. And, according to the same source, the goal of treating clients uniquely correlates with mandating face-to-face counseling interviews for all clients—a behavior consistent with traditional efforts to maintain individualization ($r = .37$).

Work in Welfare: Past Failures and Future Strategies

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Since 1967, work for welfare recipients has been promoted by the federal government as a strategy for reducing AFDC costs and caseloads. The WIN program, the "thirty and one-third" exemption, and social services have all been attempted in the service of this goal. Over a decade later, it is apparent that none of these efforts have been successful in increasing the work behavior of AFDC recipients. In essence, there has been an ideological but not a pragmatic governmental commitment to work. What is suggested here is a work program that will avoid past failures and make a positive contribution to this objective.

Since 1967 a major emphasis in welfare policy has been on work for welfare recipients as a means to reducing Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) costs and caseloads. The AFDC caseload is comprised mainly of welfare mothers. To effect this goal, the 1967 amendments to Title IV-A of the Social Security Act created the Work Incentive Program (WIN) which made mandatory the registration of every "appropriate" AFDC recipient for work and training, a new focus on social services largely geared to reducing dependency, and the "thirty and one-third" work incentives. Neither the WIN work "requirement" nor the thirty and one-third work incentive appeared to have any effect on the work behavior of AFDC mothers. Social services, too, have had the same negligible impact on this goal. The rate at

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which AFDC mothers work while they are on welfare has remained at a constant 14–16 percent of the caseload,[1] case closings for employment-related reasons also have been stable at about 7 percent.[2] By the early 1970s, work for female heads of families became increasingly acceptable as more and more nonwelfare female heads entered the labor force. Paradoxically, hope for work as a strategy for cost and caseload reduction was all but abandoned and aspects of administrative reform such as error control became the focus of governmental action. In effect, government has engaged in the rhetoric but not the reality of a consistent, coherent, and committed policy to promote work.

Work Requirements: WIN

The failure of the WIN program to service a significant portion of the caseload and to culminate in an adequate amount of job placements has been well documented. These outcomes can best be understood within the context of WIN's selection practices, program components, and enforcement procedures. WIN's ambitious attempt to include and service a huge number of recipients conflicted with funding levels that were inadequate. For the last five years, only $365 million per year was allocated to WIN—$165 per registrant, a sum that affords any service to only 10 percent of registrants.[3] To ameliorate this dilemma, a large proportion of the caseload was exempted from the requirement to register, and many of those in the system were left in "holding" or "unassigned" nonproductive statuses. Programmatically, WIN has always been heavily involved in ancillary activities and less directly in work. Initially, such program components as orientation, counseling, and basic education took a large toll of limited resources. Although several mandated program changes later moved WIN from education and institutional training to on-the-job training and now to job search, making jobs available has been a minor effort. By 1980, although the institutional training component had decreased to a level which absorbed only 7 percent of funds, supportive services still commanded one-third of the budget while "intensive employment services" and job placement accounted for only 18 percent.[4] Finally, WIN is less a work requirement than a registration requirement. Participation, especially for women, has been voluntary with very few sanctions applied to either men or women.

The history of WIN sanctions illustrates both congressional and bureaucratic ambivalence about enforcing WIN as a work requirement. Before 1978, sanctions for noncompliance consisted of a three-month period where the noncooperating client was deleted from the AFDC

budget. A second refusal netted an additional six-month grant reduction, while all other members of the family continued to receive their regular grant allowances. In fiscal year 1978, there had been 49,824 "Notices of Intended Deregistration"[5] nationally, but only 21,111 of these were actually sanctioned.[6] This oversight of half of the persons who were intended to be sanctioned documents the unwillingness of welfare agencies to pursue this route. In 1978, a court order removed fixed sanctioning periods and mandated the grant reduction only if and for so long as an individual refused to cooperate, with a maximum penalty of forty-two days.[7] Fiscal year 1980 saw only 28,702 "Notices to Deregister,"[8] of which 11,101 became sanctions.[9] This drastic reduction in intentions to sanction is attributable to the new law which so reduced the penalty period as to make the sanctioning procedure futile. On June 9, 1980, via Public Law 96-25, Congress amended the WIN legislation returning again to fixed sanctioning periods.[10]

Selection processes that drastically diminished the proportion of the caseload that could benefit from WIN, program activities that were not job focused, and minimal enforcement procedures had the effect of mitigating the intended purposes of the WIN program. It is not surprising, therefore, that there was no apparent impact on the work behavior of AFDC mothers.

Social Services

Social services as a strategy to promote work was first evident in the 1967 amendments. Unlike the services legislated by the 1962 amendments which had a rehabilitative focus, in 1967 services under Title IV-A (AFDC) were to be concrete and directly tied to work. Self-support for AFDC recipients was explicitly enunciated as a primary goal for social services. The new law also contained two stipulations that later had significant consequences for this goal: *an inclusion of former and potential recipients into the group of service eligibles, and permission for state welfare departments to purchase services from private and other public agencies.*

Despite the clear emphasis on work for AFDC recipients in the amendments, practice after 1967 was not significantly oriented in this direction. Within AFDC, only a small proportion of services were work related and those, to a great extent, went to nonworking recipients. A substantial amount of funds was diverted from AFDC recipients to the "former and potential" category and supported services that had no bearing on work.[11] Resistance to implementing the intent of Congress reflected the ambivalence of both the federal and state welfare agencies

regarding the dictum of work for AFDC mothers. At the same time, encouraged by the opportunity of open-ended federal funding, states substituted federal dollars for state dollars and greatly expanded their social service expenditures. Provider pressure additionally resulted in enormous increases in some services via the mechanism of purchase.[12]

As a result, in 1972 Congress put a $2.5 billion yearly limit on the federal contribution and also ruled that 90 percent of service funds were to be used for welfare recipients. In interpreting this legislation, a now conservative Department of Health, Education, and Welfare attempted to reinstate the focus on work for AFDC recipients through various efforts at producing regulations. However, the continuing and powerful protests of several interest groups such as providers, social agencies, and state legislators prevented such regulations from becoming a reality. The conflict was finally resolved by the passage of the 1974 amendments which replaced Title IV-A services by a new Title XX, almost totally reversing the work-welfare initiative of the 1967 amendments.[13]

Title XX retained the self-support goal but added a "preserving, rehabilitating and uniting families" goal that took precedence. It extended services to the middle class by eliminating welfare status as a determinant of eligibility and tying it instead to the state's median income, and made some services available to all without regard to income. It created exacting day-care standards, so that custodial child care on a scale large enough to service working mothers was no longer feasible. Only 50 percent in distinction to the previous 90 percent of service funds in each state were mandated for welfare recipients through AFDC, SSI, and Medicaid.[14]

Title XX effectively squeezed the welfare and near-welfare poor out of the services arena and took the focus of services off of work. Although still touted as an aid to work for welfare mothers, ensuing practice has belied this myth. Predictably, each year the nonwelfare segment of services recipients has increased and co-opted more and more limited service funds. In 1976, the first year of Title XX's operation, 40 percent of funds were spent on AFDC recipients, by 1980, only 25 percent was allotted to them. Similarly in 1976, 31 percent of service recipients were also in receipt of AFDC, while in 1980 only 18 percent were in this category.[15] The extent to which services were work related under Title XX is also significant. Employment, education, and training services in fiscal year 1978 accounted for only 9 percent of all service expenditures, with only 2 percent going to AFDC recipients.[16] Day care for children that was "AFDC training and job related" represented only one-third of all day-care costs, while day care for "income eligibles" took up over 50 percent of the costs.[17] It can be seen therefore that Title XX focused neither on serving AFDC clients nor on services related to work. The intent that social services become a strategy for enabling work in AFDC has been subverted by the ambivalence of the

welfare bureaucracies and the strong opposing interests of other groups. As a result, this mechanism never became a reality and had no impact on the work activity of AFDC mothers.

Work Incentives

The thirty and one-third exemption of earned income stemmed from the belief that recipients would choose to work if they were permitted to keep part of their earnings. The decreased "tax rate" on earnings did not, however, have the intended impact on the work effort of AFDC mothers. Work incentives in AFDC are substantial; they include work expenses, child-care expenses, and the thirty and one-third exemption, all of which are disregarded in computing the AFDC grant. In recent years, however, many new entitlement programs have come into effect. Benefits from Medicaid and food stamps are also reduced as a result of work, and so the total cumulative tax rate makes work a costly alternative to welfare.

Work effort is sensitive not only to incentives, but also to benefit levels. While higher incentives should produce more work, lower benefit levels may have the same effect. Although AFDC benefits have been eroded by inflation, they have nevertheless continued to rise. In 1967 the average monthly payment for a family of four was $162; by 1977 it was $281.[18] Furthermore, the total benefit package has been upgraded by the addition of Medicaid and food stamps. Medicaid alone provides the equal of $165 per month to a four-person family in high-benefit states like Massachusetts.[19] When this package is pitted against the typical wages that AFDC mothers can earn in their current type of jobs, the rewards of welfare tend to outweigh the rewards that can be accrued from work.

The effect of high incentives and low benefits can be seen in the history of work effort in the southern states. Most of these states had their own work incentives long before 1967, that is, they paid only part of what the AFDC family "needed" and permitted working clients to keep earnings between the need standard and the payment standard without penalty. In addition, they paid extremely low benefits. Until 1967, the southern states had the highest proportion of AFDC mothers who worked. But, between 1967 and 1977, in five southern states, the percentage decline in the segment of AFDC mothers who work ranged from 40 to 60 percent. This radical decrease in work effort can be attributed to two factors: reduced work incentives and increased welfare benefits. The gaps between needs and payments that had permitted recipients to keep their earnings have narrowed considerably. Between

1967 and 1977, the percentage increase in the proportion of need that was paid varied from 20 to 196 percent, thereby substantially eroding work incentives in these states. At the same time, the percentage increase in the average monthly payment for a family of four ranged from 11 percent to 135 percent during these years. It is notable in table 1 that the two states with the greatest increases in benefits and reduction in incentives (Florida and Alabama) were the states where the greatest decrease in work effort occurred.

In the south, the thirty and one-third work incentive was tempered by the effects of reduced method-of-budgeting incentives and higher benefits. Since the national proportion of those who work remained the same, it is clear that in states that had no previous incentives, the new exemption increased work effort to some extent. However, as a national policy committed to increasing work effort, it could not compete with decreasing incentives in the south and increasing benefit levels throughout the country.

In spite of the evident failure of WIN, social services, and work incentives to promote work, the alleged commitment to work has not disappeared. Some states have requested and received waivers of federal restrictions in order to conduct demonstration projects in work for AFDC recipients; others, like Massachusetts, have recently set up special "work and welfare" departments to institute work. In light of this persistent interest in work, it should be fruitful to look at both the work experience of AFDC women and their actual work potential.

Work Experience

Although, as noted, only a small proportion of AFDC mothers work while on welfare, such statistics are deceptive, since they capture work at only one point in time. A closer look at their work experience reveals a rather different picture. Among current AFDC female heads, only 25 percent were never employed.[20] Census and other surveys show that from 30 to 50 percent work at some time during the year.[21] To supplement such survey data, Rainwater and Rein took a sample of women who were ever on welfare in a five-year period from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics and analyzed their work behavior. From 44 to 62 percent had income from their own earnings in each of the five years. It was not necessarily the same women who worked each year.[22]

It is clear that, as a group, AFDC mothers are not strangers to the world of work. Many more work during the year than each month, indicating great turnover between work and nonwork status and short periods of work. Several studies have documented this irregular, part-

Table 1

PERCENTAGE OF CHANGE 1967–77

State	Work Effort	Work Incentive	Benefit
Florida	−60	−196	135
Tennessee	−17	21	11
Mississippi	19	−20	17
Alabama	60	−85	99
South Carolina	17	50	31

SOURCES.—U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social and Rehabilitation Service, National Center for Social Statistics, *Findings of the 1967 AFDC Study* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), pt. 1, Table 38; pt. 2, Table 129; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration, Office of Research and Statistics, *1977 Recipient Characteristics Study* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), pt. 1, Table 25; pt. 2, Table 16; U.S. Department of Human Services, Social Security Administration, Office of Research and Statistics, *Aid to Families with Dependent Children: Standards for Basic Needs* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1977; July 1967).

time, part-year work pattern.[23] It is this practice combined with relatively low hourly wages that results in small net annual earnings. Moreover, many of the incomes derived from such sporadic work patterns come from "secondary labor market" jobs that afford neither fringe benefits nor job security.

While the attachment to work is continuing, it is not constant. Work may take place in conjunction with welfare or between welfare periods. It is, therefore, a necessary but not sufficient source of income and additional sources are needed to comprise an adequate total income. Welfare is the major source for these female heads of households; other public transfers such as unemployment insurance—a less-used provision—and income from private transfers like child support payments, gifts from kin and friends, and rent from boarders are still another addition. The income package is unstable as sources and amounts change with changing life circumstances, as the result of each income component producing a relatively low yield. The value of total income has been difficult to estimate as many of these components are derived from informal quarters, but this also varies over time.

Work Potential

There is clearly a demonstrated propensity for work, but how employable are these AFDC mothers? It is always difficult to distinguish those able to work from those unable. We know from many studies, however, that certain personal characteristics generally have a positive effect on work effort. These are having a high school education, a work history,

a marketable skill, few children of older ages, and the ability to earn a reasonable hourly wage.[24] The AFDC caseload has been typically regarded as a homogeneous group that is essentially unemployable. In fact, it contains several subgroups with varying degrees of work capability.

In 1977 the distribution of these work-related characteristics among all AFDC female heads was as follows: 24 percent of them had either completed high school or attended some college, and 75 percent had worked at some time during their lives. Of those who had worked, 32 percent had been in white-collar occupations, 15 percent in skilled or semiskilled blue-collar jobs, and 32 percent in service industries. Only 10 percent were unskilled laborers and 8 percent private-household service workers. Forty-three percent had no child under six years of age, and 17 percent of these had no child under the age of twelve. Forty percent had only one child and an additional 27 percent had two children. Earnings among those who were then working were on the average of $332 per month, while their earnings as a proportion of all nonassistance income were 75 percent. It is not known what part of the caseload had *all* of these characteristics that contribute to work proclivity, but given these statistics, it would seem likely that a sizable group of such recipients does exist.

In fact, the incidence of female heads on AFDC with these personal attributes has increased. Ten years earlier, in 1967, substantially smaller proportions of the caseload were in these categories, as shown in table 2.

The foregoing changes yield two alternative explanations. First, in the general population, more women are now working, earnings are higher, and families have become smaller; these patterns are reflected in the AFDC caseload. A somewhat competing view focuses on the kind of female heads that are now entering AFDC. If high participation rates among traditional welfare-risk families have essentially exhausted this population as some studies indicate,[25] then new recipients are being drawn from different strata of the population. Some clues to the strength of this hypothesis can be found in two Massachusetts surveys, one of that state's ongoing AFDC caseload and another of new recipients. Of the new recipients, 46 percent were high school graduates, while only 32 percent of the basic caseload had achieved this level of education. The average number of children in the new families was 1.9 and in the ongoing group, 2. The occupational mix of the new recipients with a work history was 30 percent clerical and sales, 30 percent semiskilled, and 26 percent service work. Of the total caseload, only 27 percent were in clerical and sales, 22 percent were semiskilled, and as many as 36 percent did service work.[26] The entering cohort of recipients, by these measures, was clearly more employable.

Table 2

PERCENTAGES OF AFDC MOTHERS
WITH WORK-RELATED CHARACTERISTICS

	1967	1977
High school graduation or some college	18	21
Work history	75	75
Occupation		
White-collar	15	32
Blue-collar	11	15
Service industries	28	32
Unskilled laborers	19	10
Private household service	20	8
Number of children		
One child	21	10
Two children	23	27
Ages of children		
No child under 6	39	13
No child under 12	12	17
Average monthly earnings	$135 (36)	$332 (75)

SOURCES.—U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Social and Rehabilitation Service, National Center for Social Statistics, *Findings of the 1967 AFDC Study* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1970), pt. 1, Tables 10, 11, 8, 55, pt. 2, Tables 99, 97B; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration, Office of Research and Statistics, *1977 Recipient Characteristics Study* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, June 1980), pt. 1, Tables 30, 28, 1, 16, pt. 2, Tables 10, 9A.

NOTE.—Numbers in parentheses represent the proportion of nonassistance income.

Thus far, we have noted that although Congress had espoused a belief in work for the AFDC mother, the three strategies of work requirements, social services, and work incentives fell short of achieving this goal. Part of this failure was due to the lack of a strong commitment to a work policy. But the idea that work is a solution to growing AFDC costs has persisted and appears most recently to have been more vigorously revived. In looking at the kind of attachment that AFDC female heads have to the labor force, we observe that, although it is tenuous and sporadic, it is nevertheless substantial. In addition, some significant portion of the caseload is endowed with characteristics that indicate employment potential.

Despite the fact that work strategies were not effective, the question remains as to why more AFDC mothers do not make a positive work decision on their own, given their work experience and their work potential. A small proportion do work while on welfare and attain a somewhat larger income package than they would if they did not work. Some also occasionally work without reporting it, thus maximizing the welfare grant without penalty. Still others attempt work without welfare supplementation, but find it unreliable and insufficient in meeting their needs, and so return to welfare. For those who do work

full-time and year-round, and some poor female heads do elect this option, then resulting incomes are usually either less than or equivalent to an income derived completely from welfare. The trade-off between the benefits of work and the benefits of welfare and the attending complication of the necessity to manage a home and care for children produce a rational decision that precludes work.

Work Strategies

Given these conditions, future policy in regard to work has limited options. Government can reduce welfare benefits, raise the wages of existing jobs, supply better jobs, require work, or accept the situation and consider welfare a viable alternative to the low-wage job market.

Reducing benefits to all AFDC recipients penalizes those in the system who are not or not easily able to work. The Better Jobs and Income Program, President Carter's attempt at reform, and subsequent welfare reform proposals attempted to mitigate this dilemma by dividing the relevant population (male and female heads) into employables and nonemployables and providing lower guarantees for the former. Such a solution of formally differentiating subgroups and affording some lower benefits than others is not feasible in a program that is comprised mainly of mothers. All AFDC mothers are caretakers of children; it is this status that insures their categorical eligibility, whatever their degree of work capability. It is significant that in the AFDC unemployed-parent segment of the program, there is a 100-hour-per-month limit on work beyond which eligibility does not exist; this restriction acts as a proxy for establishing a lower benefit for families that contain a recipient who has no child-care responsibilities and whose employability status is unequivocal.

Raising the level of wages in existing jobs also does not seem to be a realistic alternative. If implemented on a broad scale, the cost of this kind of undertaking would be prohibitive. Costs could be contained if such an effort applied only to AFDC recipients, but problems of equity between them and the working poor would inevitably arise. The possibility also exists that wage subsidization could lead to purposeful wage depression by employers. Despite this, an attempt was made to institute a variant of the wage subsidy with the creation of the WIN tax credit in 1971, provided to employers who hire WIN registrants. Significantly, in 1977, although 36,000 such slots were authorized, only 5,000 employers claimed the credit.[27] Furthermore, it appeared that the program was not acting as an incentive to hiring welfare recipients but as a subsidy to already existing hires. Speculations on the low rate of par-

ticipation include the possibilities that employers are not aware of the program, that WIN registrants work in small, unstable firms that either do not make enough profit to pay taxes or are able to avoid taxes, and that many workers do not work beyond the thirty days necessary to establish eligibility for the tax credit. These problems with the WIN tax credit program might indeed emerge in a more generalized attempt to institute a wage subsidy.

The option of accepting AFDC as a non-work-oriented program or "reforming our expectations" as Bradley Schiller has put it[28] is not workable in the context of federal program constriction, overall cost cutting, and shrinking resources. Furthermore, while the number of AFDC families actually decreased slightly in the years 1977 to 1979, 1980 saw the beginning of what appears to be yet another upswing.[29] Ways to contain costs and caseloads will inevitably be sought, and work for recipients persists as the primary mechanism in the service of this goal.

Jobs Provision

The initiative of actual jobs provision for welfare recipients was an essential component of the Better Jobs and Income Program and has become more and more focused on the policy horizon in the last few years. Several variants of a jobs approach are reflected in the demonstration projects that some states have recently undertaken. Supported Work Projects, the Work Equity Project, and Jobs Clubs have been addressed to different groups in the welfare population and have used different strategies to promote work. What is common to all of them, however, is an emphasis on jobs. For the most part, it is too early to tell whether these demonstrations can be effective if extended nationwide.

If it is jobs that are on the agenda, given the limitations on resources and the need for concrete results, it is with great selectivity that such a goal should be pursued. It is my tenet that the welfare population can be differentiated according to certain employment-related criteria, and that a proportion of recipients have a considerable amount of employment potential. The size of this relatively employable group may range from a quarter to a third of the AFDC caseload, but may be even larger. For this segment, it may not be necessary to provide costly training and full-time child-care services. And since this is a much smaller category, resources that are typically dispersed over the entire caseload as in the WIN program could be targeted on such a group with the single purpose of jobs provision.

In the last year or two, the WIN program has emphasized intensive job search by participants in the hopes that private-sector, unsubsidized employment could thus be obtained. The result was the same kind of low-paying, low-level jobs that would have been procured without such programmatic intervention and a concomitant cessation of employment after short periods of time.[30] Even during WIN's early years, despite extensive training and services, those participants who ended their WIN careers with jobs experienced the same constraints.[31] Public service employment, another favored strategy, had similar outcomes.[32] All of our previous encounters with work and training programs suggest that such jobs both in the public and the private sector are either not taken or taken and left very quickly.

Unattractive jobs, whether engaged in by welfare recipients on their own or foisted on them by the welfare bureaucracy, are not competitive with the total welfare-benefit package. Training to upgrade the skills of large numbers of recipients that would enable them to obtain better jobs is too costly an enterprise. A better alternative may be to provide better jobs to a smaller, more employable portion of the caseload. These need not be career-ladder jobs with tremendous mobility potential, but would pay somewhat more than the minimum wage, include fringe benefits such as medical care, and make possible some modicum of job stability. The only service that would be essential in addition to jobs provision is after-school child care that might be attached to the public school system. The cost of such an effort for one-quarter to one-third of AFDC mothers could be minimized by the use of existing resources, that is, some priority for recipients in job markets such as city, state and federal civil service, Title XX contracts, and CETA. Currently only 16 percent of CETA participants are also AFDC recipients.[33] Such a program would additionally make an ideological commitment to the belief that work and welfare are necessarily and formally linked.

Work requirements in principle have been attached in some measure to all work and training programs and to all welfare-reform proposals, but have failed in fact to produce work. For a work requirement to be effective, it should (1) contain a reasonable definition of who is required to work, (2) make jobs available, (3) provide whatever service is needed to make work possible, and (4) enforce sanctions for noncompliance while preserving the rights of recipients in relation to these sanctions. As a work requirement, WIN was not able to effect work. It attempted, in principle, to include almost all recipients and had a very broad definition of eventual employability, however, it did not make many jobs available, provided training to only a minority, and failed to enforce its sanctions.[34] On the other hand, in a venture that was focused on a clearly defined, selected job-ready group, that provided a needed service to all participants, and that adhered to appropriate sanctions, a

work requirement could become viable, meaningful, and equitable, and a logical adjunct to the implementation of the program

Current Developments

As part of the current administration's initiative to reduce the federal budget, Congress passed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Bill of 1981 (Public Law 97-35) in late July. Effective October 1, 1981, it contains many radical cost-cutting eligibility provisions for the AFDC program. These are expected to save $1 billion in federal funds and a like amount in state funds each year. As a result, some 500,000 AFDC families or 11 percent of the caseload will become ineligible,[35] and 300,000 will have their benefits reduced.[36] Here, I will address only those provisions that are directly related to work for AFDC recipients. These are the statutes that concern work incentives, work requirements, and jobs provision.

Work incentives must now include a seventy-five-dollar flat monthly rate for general work-related expenses, a child-care exemption of up to $160 per month for each child, and a thirty-dollar disregard of earned income per month and one-third of the remainder. The thirty and one-third exemption is applicable for only four months while the recipient is on assistance, and cannot be repeated until he or she is off assistance for a full twelve months. Furthermore, the above work incentives must be applied in the above order.

Changes in work requirements include permission for states to establish a "Community Work Experience Program" (CWEP) "to improve the employability of participants through actual work experience and training . . . in projects which serve a useful purpose."[37] A recipient is required to work in these public service jobs a specified number of hours to equal his AFDC grant divided by the minimum wage. Exemptions from CWEP parallel those in the WIN program, except that a person already working eighty or more hours a month need not participate, and a recipient with a child under three years of age is excused (WIN regulations exempt those with children under six).

Other work requirements permit states to institute WIN demonstration projects in lieu of WIN for a period of three years to be approved by the secretary of Health and Human Services, and to change the WIN exemptions to include: (1) children under age nineteen who are attending secondary or vocational schools (previously those attending college were also exempt), and (2) the parent or other caretaker relative of a child under six who is "personally providing care for the child with only very brief and infrequent absences from the child"[38] (this until

now having been simply "the caretaker of a child under 6"). Furthermore, the unemployed-parent segment of the AFDC program has been revised from certifying either parent in an intact family as the unemployed parent to eligibility for only the "principal earner"—that parent who has earned the most in the preceding twenty-four months. If that parent refuses employment, aid to the entire family ceases, whereas before, only the mother or father was deleted from the AFDC grant.

The jobs provision aspect of the new law permits states to establish "Work Supplementation Programs" which are, in effect, job subsidization programs to include jobs in government, nonprofit agencies, and proprietary agencies offering day-care services. States will decide which groups of recipients are eligible, but taking jobs will be optional for recipients. To support such subsidies, AFDC benefit funds matched by the federal government will be the primary source, but states will be permitted to supplement such funds with money they save by lowering the standard of need throughout the state, instituting different needs standards in different parts of the state, varying needs standards for different categories of recipients, adjusting benefit levels to take into account benefits from other programs, and reducing or eliminating the earned income exemption.[29]

Work Incentives

In contrast to some of the work-requirement features of the new law which are optional, changes in work incentives are required of state welfare agencies. In essence, the new provisions drastically reduce incentives by raising the tax rate on earnings and concomitantly lowering benefits for working recipients. The seventy-five-dollar flat work-related expense was paid "as incurred" before, with some states setting more liberal maximums and, in fact, averaged ninety-five dollars monthly in 1979. Inflation would have increased this figure by 1981.[30] But even more critical is the order in which the thirty and one-third disregard is to be applied. Up until now, thirty dollars and one-third of remaining earnings were exempted first; the new regulation puts this "one-third of the remainder" last, after work expenses and child-care expenses, when remaining income is substantially lower. Still more significant is the total elimination of the thirty and one-third after its application for four months, and its unavailability until a full twelve months of nonassistance status has passed. Except for a brief four-month period, the tax rate on earnings will now revert to 100 percent. The problem is further complicated by a related provision of the new law which sets AFDC eligibility at 150 percent of the state's

need standard, so that many working recipients will exceed this maximum when the disregard stops. A letter from the governor of Massachusetts to the secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services expresses the fear that "if a recipient anticipates that his income will render him ineligible, he might voluntarily terminate employment or reduce his earnings before the end of the fourth month."[41] It is clear that whatever efficacy work incentives had before will now be largely diminished, and that this is bound to have a negative effect on work effort.

Work Requirements

The major innovation in work requirements is the Community Work Experience Program (CWEP), which—despite the stipulation that the payment of aid is not to be construed "as compensation for work performed . . ."[42] and despite the fact that certain safeguards protect participants—is "workfare" nevertheless. As such, it provides poor work situations and no salaries; and although the program is supposed to prepare recipients for labor-market jobs, it is difficult to see how, under these conditions, it can provide either training or motivation. CWEP does not offer work incentives, nor does it call for strict sanctions, with the penalty for noncompliance being the deletion from the budget of only the uncooperating individual, as it is in the WIN program. While CWEP is optional for the states, participation will be mandatory for whichever groups of recipients the states deem eligible. Furthermore, states will now be permitted to induct mothers with children of ages from three to six into the program. Giving the states this kind of leeway without the federal intervention that imposed restraints on WIN participation may create work requirements that are much more restrictive than WIN.

Another modification in the new law concerns WIN demonstration projects. "A state shall be free to design a program which best addresses its individual needs, makes best use of its available resources, and recognizes its labor-market conditions."[43] Other than criteria for participation which must be uniform throughout the state, "the components of the program may vary by geographic area or by political subdivision."[44] These conditions again give a great deal of leeway to the states in the design of a program and may, in fact, lead to more stringent practices than are currently in effect in WIN. Massachusetts is a case in point. This state has designed a variant of WIN which is more comprehensive than WIN and also more constrictive. One of its components is CWEP, which may be mandatory even for mothers with children from

three to six years of age. In addition, the entire family ceases to receive AFDC payments if the program participant defaults. The principle of failure to cooperate for "good cause" is also in jeopardy. "Under the demonstration, the Department of Public Welfare will simplify the adjudication process by limiting 'good cause' for refusing to seek, accept and maintain work, by eliminating counseling periods and imposing meaningful sanctions."[15] These strictures apply to all segments of the demonstration program, not only to the CWEP segment, as the law mandates. The plan may not be approved by HHS, but it is interesting to note that a liberal state like Massachusetts has taken such a hard stance.

Changes in the law also are relevant to the unemployed-parent program. In *Califano v. Westcott* (1979)[16] the Supreme Court ruled that mothers' as well as fathers' unemployment could be considered the basis for eligibility, which meant that the father could be employed and the family receive benefits on the basis of the mother's unemployment. Contrary to expectations, in December 1980, only 6,000 families or 3 percent of the caseload received AFDC unemployed-parent grants because of the unemployment of the mother.[17] Nevertheless, the new law limits such eligibility by selecting one parent, the principal earner, that parent who has earned the most in the preceding twenty-four months. Although the new regulations do not refer to the employment of the other parent, in the spirit of the new law it seems very likely that further regulations or other federal guidelines will establish such employment as a condition of ineligibility. Thus, work effort in intact families will, as a result, be limited to one parent and so be diminished.

Jobs Provision

The jobs provision segment of the new law, the Work Supplementation Program, or WSP,[18] permits and encourages states to provide a job alternative to the AFDC benefit for recipients who choose such an option. The state welfare agency can subsidize jobs in certain sectors of the economy, it can also decide on the types of jobs to be subsidized, the wages to be paid, and the duration of such jobs. Thus, there is no safeguard in the federal regulations regarding any of the conditions that adhere to work opportunities. It seems improbable, therefore, that state agencies will (1) select recipients who are employable and job ready; (2) provide jobs that pay more than the minimum wage, and (3) provide jobs that afford stability and fringe benefits, since no such protective mechanisms are inherent in the federal law.

The other issue in the WSP is funding. Basic funding will come from AFDC benefit funds that would have been available had the state not had such a program. But the new regulations give the states permission to obtain additional funding for job subsidization from some rather unlikely sources. States will be permitted to reduce and vary the standard of need by geographic location, by recipient category, and by the availability of other program benefits. They will also be able to reduce the needs standard throughout the state and to reduce or eliminate the thirty and one-third work incentive if they deem this advisable in relation to the WSP. In short, states will now be able to pay differential benefits to different groups of recipients, or simply reduce the AFDC grant overall at their own discretion and without benefit of a uniform federal policy directive.

Such stipulations have extraordinarily significant effects on the principles and intent of the entire AFDC program that should not go unnoticed. For one, not treating recipients uniformly is discriminatory, against the stated purpose of the Social Security Act and may, in fact, be unconstitutional. Second, allowing different payments to different groups of recipients represents an attempt to categorize employables and unemployables without any safeguards attending such decisions. And third, reducing or eliminating the work incentive for those voluntarily choosing employment is in direct opposition to the work-incentive principle, and will undoubtedly work against increasing work effort.

Summary

It is quite evident that the overall reduction of work incentives will lead to diminished work effort, that the federal work requirements will result in restrictive state practices, and that job subsidization may fall short of providing jobs that have attractive wages, stability, and fringe benefits. However, since the states have so much leeway under the new law, both in terms of electing programs and in their implementation, future practice will very much depend on state initiatives. A state could, for example, take the WSP option and implement it in a creative and nonpunitive manner, paying heed to sound participation principles, and affording jobs with some promise. States also are not compelled to institute workfare, although they must enforce the reduction of work incentives. The new law has provided many restraints to and some incentives for a committed, coherent, and conscientious work policy in AFDC. The route that the states choose will be decisive.

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Ideology and the Welfare State: An Examination of Wilensky's Conclusions

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In *The Welfare State and Equality* (1975), Harold L. Wilensky found no relationship between ideology and the development of the welfare state. By restricting an examination of his data to Western nations, the authors found a -75 percent correlation between a rank ordering of states according to the percentage of the GNP spent on social security and a rank ordering of states according to their distance from a central European point. These findings could be interpreted through the application of Hartzian theory, but the findings also indicated that the differences between commitment to social security might also be accounted for in the differences between the internal dynamics of mono-ideological states and multi-ideological states.

In this article we seek to challenge Wilensky's thesis that ideology has no bearing on the development of the welfare state by using data from his work *The Welfare State and Equality: Structural and Ideological Roots of Public Expenditure*.[1] Our bias is toward a historical interpretation of events, and from this perspective Wilensky's conclusions regarding ideology in the development of the welfare state are questionable. We did, however, accept his general proposition that the development of massive social security systems in various countries is dependent on the attainment of a requisite level of wealth. Up to now, wealth has been derived from industrialization, except for the Arab states. There, wealth has recently come from the sale of primary resources, and data from these sources may alter the general proposition

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We intend to analyze some of the data provided by Wilensky in an effort to develop support for two notions: first, that within a group of states with common backgrounds, ideology has a strong role to play in determining the percentage of the Gross National Product (GNP) which these countries will expend on social security, and, second, that among this group of nations there is no relationship between the wealth of a nation and the percentage of the GNP expended on social security. On the basis of the results obtained, we intend to offer an alternative interpretation for certain observable variations revealed by our analysis of data. We especially want to present an interpretation of the role of ideology in the welfare state, to suggest reasons for the pattern of development our analysis of Wilensky's data disclosed, and to recommend the inclusion of certain data for any further comparisons of welfare states.

The Background of Wilensky's Thesis on Ideology and the Welfare State

In the past two decades, thinking about the welfare state has been profoundly affected by Wilensky and Lebeaux's *Industrial Society and Social Welfare*.[2] Their thesis was that as nations industrialized, there was both an increase in wealth and an increased need for social welfare as the result of industrialization. The increase in wealth, in part, had to be diverted toward various welfare programs to compensate those who, one way or another, had succumbed to the hazards of industrial society. This common experience with industrialization has produced social security programs that appear to have a high degree of similarity. Such programs as unemployment insurance; retirement, survivors', and disability insurance, health insurance, workmen's compensation, and financial assistance for those not qualified for these insurances are part of the institutional framework of the welfare states.

In 1975, Wilensky pursued his studies of the welfare state further using a statistical approach to uncover its determinants. His findings, in *The Welfare State and Equality: Structural and Ideological Roots of Public Expenditure*, generally supported his earlier thesis. He found that ". . . economic growth and its demographic and bureaucratic outcomes are the root cause of the general emergence of the welfare state."[3] Although we do not agree with this claim, it has been widely accepted. The following statement, however, has drawn both support and criticism: "In any systematic comparison of many countries over many years, alternative explanations collapse under the weight of such heavy, brittle categories as socialist versus capitalist economies, collec-

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tivist versus individualistic ideologies, or even democratic versus totalitarian political systems."[4]

Commenting further about ideologies in specific countries, Wilensky revealed more specifically the nature of collapsing explanations. "Sweden and the USSR may represent extremes in the meshing of words and deeds. Sweden is the most egalitarian in practice, and its political theorie comes close to its practice; the USSR is most egalitarian in ideology and it is the least egalitarian in practice. The United States is far from the Soviet Union in its ideology, but closer in its practice. The failure to separate official rhetoric and popular sentiment from welfare practice creates great confusion in discussion of the welfare state."[5]

This definitive statement on the absence of any ideological roots in the development of the welfare state was welcomed by at least two of his reviewers and challenged by another. One supporter noted that ". . . he quickly rules out explanations relying on such sloganizing polarities as socialist versus capitalist economies," and so on.[6] Another, with more restraint, said: "Wilensky confirms the findings of Cutright, Pryor, and others that nations at the same level of economic development provide roughly the same levels and types of social security and welfare services, whether these nations are socialist or capitalist, democratic or totalitarian, collectivist or individualist."[7]

The skeptic, on the other hand, noted that ". . . Wilensky seems to accept uncritically, the symbolic universe, assumptions, methods and semantics of the positivistic social sciences and the established order."[8] Wilensky's statement on ideology appeared in the midst of an ongoing debate on the origins of the welfare state. It seems that participants in this debate would follow their own ideological position in choosing sides.

Those who rule out ideology as a factor in the development of the welfare state—Wilensky, Cutright, Dye, Pryor, and others—espouse the determinism of a positivistic social science that excludes that which cannot be reduced to statistics. Their product is what Mills called "abstracted empiricism."[9] Thus, Pryor readily rejects any role for ideology, and dismisses the idea by quoting Edmund Burke's statement that ". . . the age of chivalry is gone. That of sophisters, economists, and calculators has succeeded, and . . . glory . . . is extinguished forever."[10] The sentiment is not unlike that of Dickens's staunch utilitarian, Mr. Gradgrind, who rejected "fancy" and wished for only "facts." The welfare state, from this perspective, is the product of impersonal forces, and appears *sui generis*, untouched by human hands.

The nondeterminists—phenomenologists, gestaltists, existential sociologists, historians, and others—are willing to accord man's will, expressed as choice, a role in the development of the welfare state. Wilensky's critic, Gil, comes from the Rankian school where culture is perceived not as part of the "natural order" but as an artifact of man, a

creation of his will. Hartz[11] and Horowitz,[12] whose ideas we borrow to interpret our findings, are similarly willing to accord a role for man in the development of the modern state. The welfare state, as part of a culture, is perceived as being fashioned by human hands as a reaction to certain social conditions, also created by man. One way of stating this case is that the welfare state is a product of human will that appears *ex post facto* to have been shaped by impersonal forces.

Our position is sympathetic to the nondeterminists, but strengthens their view with mathematical analysis wherever possible. We maintain that, in order to grasp the fuller meaning of the phenomenon of the welfare state, both the impersonal forces and the nature of man's struggle with them have to be understood.

An Analysis of Wilensky's Data

The point of divergence between Wilensky's approach and ours centers around the nature of ideology and its relationship to culture and civilization. Among Wilensky's selection of ideologies are two sets of countries, one labeled "liberal-democratic states" and the other "totalitarian states." Included in the liberal-democratic states were such geographically, culturally, and economically diverse nations as the United States of America with a gross national product per capita of $3,542[13] in 1966 and India with a GNP per capita of $67 in 1966. The totalitarian states were a geographically, culturally, and economically coherent group among which the per capita GNP in the same year varied only from $1,331 (Czechoslovakia) to $421 (Yugoslavia).

Since ideology is a component of culture, and complex civilizations contain a variety of cultures or subcultures, it seemed more reasonable to us to choose countries, which have had many historical experiences in common and so constitute a single civilization, than to compare, as Wilensky did, some sixty-four nations with diverse origins and several civilizations. The choice was made to limit the nations to be examined to those belonging to the West: (1) European nations and their colonies that follow the traditions of Western Christianity; (2) those that are liberal-democratic states; and (3) those that had, in 1966, a per capita GNP of $1,000 or more. The difference between the development of the welfare states within this group of countries appears in the percentage of the GNP expended for welfare, if differences do exist.

Some eighteen Western countries fit these criteria. When arranged in rank order according to the percentage of the GNP expended on social security in 1966, these countries appeared to fall into three distinct groups. Using the international average of the sixty-four countries in

Wilensky's study, which was an expenditure of 7.6 percent of the GNP, the highest group expended double that average, or 15.2 percent or more of their respective GNPs, on social security. The middle group expended less than 15.2 percent of the GNP on social security, but more than half as much again as the international average—from 11.4 to 15.1 percent of the GNP. The lower group expended in excess of the international average of 7.6 percent, but less than 11.4 percent. These three groups were labeled arbitrarily mature welfare states, moderate welfare states, and reluctant welfare states. The name for the lowest group was borrowed from the paperback edition of Wilensky and Lebeaux's *Industrial Society and Social Welfare*, in which the United States was referred to as the reluctant welfare state.[14] The United States, the country with the greatest per capita GNP in 1966, spent only 0.3 percent more of its GNP on social welfare than the international average (see table 1).

It was evident at a glance that the three groups, with some singularities, fell into a relatively neat geographical relationship (see fig. 1 for visual support of this statement). Our assumption was that distance is related to culture, hence to ideology. How to test this geographic relationship was a problem. Measurement from the geographic center of Europe might have provided a desirable fixed point, had this point been established. In its absence, Vienna was chosen as a fixed point, for two reasons. It lay near the heart of Old Europe, in the midst of an area where important historical events that shaped European society took place, and it was near the edge of the main land mass which is being

Table 1

Eighteen Western Countries in Rank Order According to the Percentage of Their GNP Expended on Social Security in the Year 1966

Country and Classification	Percentage of GNP Expended	Country and Classification	Percentage of GNP Expended
Mature welfare states		Reluctant welfare states	
Austria	21.0	Canada	10.1
West Germany	19.6	Switzerland	9.5
Belgium	18.5	Australia	9.0
France	18.3	Iceland	8.7
Netherlands	18.3	United States	7.9
Sweden	18.3	Group average	9.0
Luxembourg	17.5		
Italy	17.5	General average	14.5
Group average	18.6		
Moderate welfare states			
Britain	14.4		
Denmark	13.9		
Finland	13.1		
Norway	12.6		
New Zealand	11.8		
Group average	13.6		

FIG. 1.—A scatter diagram showing the relationship between the distance from Vienna and the percentage of the Gross National Product spent on social security by eighteen Western nations

considered. Thus, the measurements ran from Vienna to the various capital cities.

A second problem arose when the question of former colonies such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States was considered. What should be done about distances that incorporated long water passages? We chose to rank *order* the countries according to distance, so that we could compare that rank order with the percentage of the GNP expended on social security.

An interesting inverse correlation between the percentage of the GNP expended on social security (y) by the eighteen nations and the distance from a fixed point in Europe (x) developed. In order for the correlation to have a meaningful interpretation, x is looked at here not as geographic distance, but as the assumed indicator of the strength of factors associated with ideological differences such as the presence of a social democratic party, Parson's pattern variables, or another unidentified factor.

The formula for Spearman's coefficient of rank correlation was employed, where $\rho = 1 - 6\Sigma(y - x)^2 / n(n^2 - 1)$, and n is the number of pairs of values considered. This formula was corrected suitably in the case of tied observations, in which $\rho_c = [n^3 - n - 6\Sigma(y - x)^2 - \frac{1}{2}(t^3 - t) - \frac{1}{2}(u^2 - u)] / [n^3 - n - (t^3 - t)]^{1/2}[n^3 - n - (u^3 - u)]^{1/2}$, where t = the number of ties in x and u = the number of ties in y. A value of −.7 was obtained, a fairly high negative value.

If the data of 1966 are used as indicators, it appears that as one moves from the assumed cultural center of Europe outward, countries in this group of eighteen tend to spend less of their GNP on social security. The question arises as to whether the general finding that wealth was positively related to expenditure on social security was the same among these nations as among the poorer ones. To assess this question, the eighteen countries were ranked according to their per capita GNP (rank x). This ranking was compared with that of these same countries according to the percentage of the GNP expended on social welfare (rank y). Again, we found a relatively high negative correlation between rank x and rank y, namely −.6825 (see table 2). Within these countries there appears to be a negative relationship between per capita GNP and the percentage of the GNP expended on social welfare, quite the reverse of what Wilensky found to be the case when all sixty-four countries were examined (see table 3). It must be remembered that Wilensky's data formed the base for our calculations. It appears that ideology does play a part in the development of European and colonial welfare states, and that there is a distinct pattern that suggests that states in this group do not "provide roughly the same level and types of

Table 2

A Comparison of Distance from Vienna of Eighteen Western Nations with Their Percentage of Expenditure of the GNP on Social Security

Country and Classification	Rank x	Rank y	Country and Classification	Rank x	Rank y
Mature welfare states			Reluctant welfare states		
Austria	1	18	Canada	15	5
West Germany	2	17	Switzerland	3.5	1
Belgium	3.5	16	Australia	17	3
France	8	14.5	Iceland	14	2
Netherlands	9	14.5	United States	16	1
Sweden	11	12			
Luxembourg	6	12			
Italy	5	12			
Moderate welfare states					
Britain	10	10			
Denmark	7	9			
Finland	13	8			
Norway	12	7			
New Zealand	18	6			

Note.—ρ = −.751554. Rank x is according to the distance from Vienna; rank y is according to the percentage of GNP spent on social security.

Table 3

A Comparison of the Percentage of the GNP Expended on Social Security and the GNP per Capita of Eighteen Western Nations Where the GNP per Capita Is in Excess of $1,000 per Annum in U.S. Funds for the Year 1966

Country and Classification	Percentage of GNP Expended on Social Security	per Capita GNP*	Rank Y	Rank X
Mature welfare states				
Austria	21.0	1,225	1	17
West Germany	19.6	1,871	2	10
Belgium	18.5	1,690	3	13
France	18.3	1,866	4.5	11
Netherlands	18.3	1,497	4.5	16
Sweden	17.5	2,677	6	2
Luxembourg	17.5	1,926	6	9
Italy	17.6	1,097	6	18
Moderate welfare states				
United Kingdom	14.1	1,532	9	15
Denmark	13.9	1,977	10	7
Finland	13.1	1,657	11	14
Norway	12.6	1,819	12	12
New Zealand	11.8	1,940	13	8
Reluctant welfare states				
Canada	10.1	2,288	14	5
Switzerland	9.5	2,335	15	4
Australia	9.0	1,980	16	6
Iceland	8.7	2,550	17	3
United States	7.9	3,542	18	1

Note.—$\rho = -.6825$
* U.S. dollars

social security and welfare services."[15] We suggest that these findings fit into existing general theory about the ideological differences within this group of nations, and that the singularities we noted earlier may be interpreted by that theory, that is, the differences shown by Switzerland, Iceland, and New Zealand. These countries are not within the geographic pattern that was uncovered by our analysis of the data. They are islands apart from the mainstream of development, where a combination of historical development, isolation, or economic factors appear to account for the differences.

Ideology and the Welfare State

The territory in Europe in which the mature welfare states are located is one with a history of social change and ideological conflict that has affected the structure of formal social welfare from the time of the "laicization" and "centralization"[16] of poor relief in the sixteenth century to the present time. Ideologies have special reference to political and social plans, and Western Europe, since World War II, appears to

have developed along parallel social and economic lines. Therefore, it seemed reasonable to us that the affluent parts of Europe and the West would be distinguished from the rest of the world in the development of the welfare state. This much our analysis has shown.

We are left, then, with several questions about the pattern of development revealed by our examination of Wilensky's data. These are: What are ideologies? How do they interact? Why did the anti-ideologists pass over what, in retrospect, seems like a highly visible development? How may we interpret this development on the basis of our findings? What about the singularities we observed? What general direction may be pursued for further study? These questions we attempt to briefly answer here.

The nature and interaction of ideologies.—An ideology is a set of relatively coherent beliefs or dogmas on the ideal form for a social, political, or religious state, or for the world. The exponents of an ideology are usually subgroups within a society, but in some societies, virtually all members may subscribe to a single ideology. The ideology is expressed as a series of related ideals and principles, some of which are exclusive to the ideology. There is a personal commitment to an ideology on the part of its adherents, and the ideology acts for them as a guide to individual and groups goals, and sets the standard for desirable social behavior.

In Canada, for instance, there are three political parties that hold certain social and political beliefs that are a base for social and economic policy. These are the Communist party, the New Democratic party (Social Democrat), and the Social Credit party. There are also small splinter parties. The two major political parties, however, are the parliamentary parties—the Liberal and Progressive Conservatives—and these have a less well-defined political stance. In broad terms, they are for "free enterprise" and against "too much" public intervention in economic affairs. Their platforms vary from time to time in order to attract the broadest possible support. They represent the status quo to which the other three parties react with specific and relatively permanent plans for their reform.

Canada is an example of a state where two or more groups of ideologists vie for political power. It is multi-ideological. The United States of America is a state where two parties akin to Canada's parliamentary parties are committed to one basic ideology, but contend that each can interpret it better than the other. The two parties have no viable competitors offering an opposing ideology. America is a mono-ideological state.

Within multi-ideological states, the nature of ideological interaction has some effect on social and political processes, identifying new social goals, and changing or modifying policies and programs. Where ideologies are dramatically opposed, as they were in Spain, a revolu-

tionary condition is likely to occur. Where the competition is less than revolutionary in nature, and the rules of political competition are accepted by all, there is likely to be a degree of accommodation to one another by the competitors. This accommodation has led one researcher, Kaime-Caudle, to conclude that ideology ". . . is not as important in shaping legislation as it may appear." He notes, however, that although opposition ideologies may lose a political contest ". . . their programs and attitudes can and do sway many whose political alignments are uncertain and changeable, and in this way influence government . . . ."[17] An ideology does not have to be represented by a government in power to affect policy, as Kaime-Caudle suggests.

Although the Social Democratic party in Canada has only obtained power at the provincial level, it is cited as the significant factor in moving Canada from a conservative position to the right of the United States, to a state far more liberal in its social policies than America.[18] Where an ideology has been dominant for a period of time, as social democracy has been in Sweden, the effect is more pronounced, for it seems to have altered the structure of competing parties. "First the Centre, then the Liberal, and finally the Conservative leadership abandoned their ideological hostility to activist state policies . . ." in Sweden.[19] The examples given here point strongly to the existence of an effect on the development of social policies and programs by competing ideologies in a multi-ideological state.

The anti-ideologists.—We did not anticipate that those who spoke with such assurance about the absence of ideological development on the welfare state had failed to define ideology and the interaction of ideologies adequately. The problem encountered by the anti-ideologists in their attempt to measure the effects of ideology on the development of the welfare state is that the instruments used were not sufficiently discriminating. For Wilensky there are but four "political systems" in the world: liberal democratic states, totalitarian states, authoritarian oligarchic states, and authoritarian populist states.[20] Cutright relies on the Political Responsiveness Index, a scale that measures, in essence, the degree of democracy within a state.[21] It appears that Pryor's measurement is chiefly scorn.[22] None of these writers define ideology in specific terms.

We contend that, beyond failing to identify the nature of ideology in specific terms, the anti-ideologists appear to perceive ideologies in relatively static terms. Wilensky, particularly, focuses on the content of ideologies in a literal fashion, and not on the role of ideologies in society. Although the content of American and Russian ideologies differs widely, both countries are mono-ideological states. America is wholeheartedly a free-enterprise Lockean state, and Russia is equally wholeheartedly communist and Marxist in orientation. Both countries

prosecute ideological deviants, in America this is done through political action as in the cases of Joseph McCarthy and Richard Nixon. Russia exercises more control through suppression of ideas in the media, through the secret police, and through the courts. As mono-ideological states lacking a political dialectic, the development of the welfare state in America and Russia is similar. They both differ from Sweden, a multi-ideological state where debate on substantial issues abounds and the welfare state is well established.

An interpretive theory.—We are concerned with a theory that interprets our analysis through the best fit of ideas. It must account for the singularities observed—namely, Switzerland, Iceland, and New Zealand—and also the pattern our analysis disclosed. It is our belief that the Hartzian theory is best suited for the task of interpretation.

Louis Hartz, in *The Founding of New Societies*, suggests that Europe has been convulsed with conflicts that had their roots in competing, and sometimes warring, ideologies.[33] As European states have matured, they passed through four stages of development: the feudal state, the Whig state, the laissez-faire or free-enterprise state, and the social democratic state. Not all European states have followed this progression. Some have remained fixed at a level of development, and others have regressed at times.

The progression of states through these stages of development appears to rest on two continua: corporate-individual and authoritarian-democratic. The feudal state was both corporate and authoritarian, the Whig state was individualistic and authoritarian. The free-enterprise or liberal state was and is both individualistic and democratic, and, the social democratic state of modern Europe is democratic and corporate (see fig. 2).

Since World War II, the politics of the European nations appears to have moved toward the social democratic phase of development. Those at the center of Western Europe seem to have progressed further or differently than the peripheral European states. This movement is dependent on the persistence of groups which adhere to the older ideologies against whom the adherents of the new ideology can react. That is,

	Authoritarian	Democratic
Corporate	I-Feudal or Tory	IV-Social Democratic
Individual	II-Whig	III-Liberal

Fig. 2.—The progression of European ideologies

movement toward social democracy is dependent on the presence of authoritarian and liberal elements in society. Each turn of the revolutionary wheel is fueled by energy generated through opposition to the previous dominant ideology and the remnants of older forms.

Three of the five reluctant welfare states are former colonies of a single European state that have become independent nations, one by revolution and the others by negotiation. In Hartzian theory ". . . when a part of a European nation is detached . . . it loses the stimulus toward change that the whole provides."[24] The ideology prevalent at the point of separation becomes the foundation for the development of a national identity. In the United States, the free-enterprise ideology and democratic individualism is transformed into Americanism. Advocates of new ideologies in America appear as traitors. In our opinion, Bell, Cutright, Pryor, and Wilensky speak from this confusion between ideology and national identity.

The other former colonies, whose break with the European motherland was not as severe as that of the United States, appear to have developed the welfare state somewhat beyond that of the United States, but generally short of the European level. The problem Horowitz posed for the difference between socialism in America and in Canada[25] seems relevant to the various positions on the welfare state: Why is the development so much stronger in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand? The singular difference between America and these countries is the absence of a clear break; latter-day immigrants from Britain and Europe carried to these new lands the same mixture of social beliefs held in the old land. National identity was never firmly fixed to any ideology in these countries as it was in America. Remnants of Tories, Whigs, and Liberals still remained in these societies to allow a somewhat weaker dialectic to be maintained.

The breakdown of the eighteen Western nations into three groups was made on the basis of the percentage of the GNP spent on social security only. The United States may be in a class by itself, apart from Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, establishing four categories of welfare states. These would be, central European states, peripheral European states, former colonies with European ties, and the United States of America. Thus New Zealand would be the most advanced of the former colonies so far as the development of a welfare state is concerned. Isolation, economic development that had to rely heavily on state intervention, and immigration of people from Britain seem to have led to a search for collective security beyond that of Canada, for example, a nation with somewhat similar conditions.

If this argument successfully disposes of New Zealand, only Switzerland and Iceland remain to be accounted for as notable singularities. If the feudal experience carried over into the present by conservative remnants is also a factor in developing a welfare state, Switzerland has had

an atypical experience in Europe since 1291, when the first cantons were freed from feudal overlordship by special arrangement with the emperor. The Swiss have been a nation of free men without the traditional pattern of political leadership common in Europe, with a degree of direct democracy at a local level, and with a cabinet selected from all parliamentary parties. The presidency of the federation revolves among the major parties in turn. Thus, Switzerland could not be measured with an ordinary European standard because it does not have a national government with a high concentration of political functions and political power as generally found in Europe.

Iceland is another European anomaly somewhat different from Switzerland. Iceland was settled first by Irish Christians, and then by Norwegian Vikings. Is Iceland to be considered as being on the periphery of Europe, the further outpost; or, is Iceland a colony that fits with the English-speaking former colonies? Historically, it has been a dependency of both Norway and Denmark, and has also had a long history of parliamentary rule, unlike most modern European states. The ambiguous position of Iceland is further complicated by a recent comment by Magnusson to the effect that "In 1970 some 15.2 percent of the national income went to the net social security expenditure . . . Social insurance accounts for about 80 percent of net social security expenditures . . . ."[26] Even allowing for all possible distortions in measurement, it seems highly unlikely that in four years expenditures would rise by more than 50 percent. We believe that further investigation, beyond the scope of this article, would be needed to identify Iceland's status as a welfare state of high or low degree. We suspect that there may be problems associated with the way in which expenditures on social welfare are reported, particularly in the areas of what is counted as welfare expenditure and what is counted as ordinary government expenditure.

Some concluding observations.—There are two major approaches to the study of the development of the welfare state. One school of thought is represented by Wilensky, Cutright, and Pryor, who look at "hard facts"; these facts are in the form of statistics relating to the wealth of a nation, the expenditures of its government, and other gross indicators of its economic and social development.

A second approach is that of comparing in some detail the structure and processes of social security in relation to other social and economic policies, resources, and the cultural and social value systems of nations. This approach calls for the examination of "soft facts" as well as the more concrete statistical information. Woodsworth,[27] for example, has recently completed a study of three nations combining both hard and soft facts.

Some problems are inherent in an approach that relies almost solely on statistical information. What unseen realities lie behind the statis-

ties and the researcher's selection of them? We infer that Wilensky assumes that he is examining phenomena within a natural order that has a degree of stability and predictability. The illusion is sustained because "the International Labour Organization . . . is able to publish comparative reports in which the same terminology and concepts are generally applicable."[28] This kind of data also supports the illusion of cause-effect relationships; thus, an issue as complex as the concept of ideology and ideological interaction escaped attention because it was not perceived properly. Yet, as we demonstrated, the evidence was there.

This criticism does not deny what is valuable in Wilensky's approach; it simply suggests that abstract data are blunt instruments to employ on more delicate material that connects with human aspirations and human will. The value of his study lies in the continued exploration of some means of reducing to manageable proportions the complex outpourings of data from governments and other agencies, such as the International Labour Organization.

Hartzian theory, as we have used it, is also a blunt instrument that offers interpretations of a general nature. It does, however, suggest that other factors should be taken into account in a study such as Wilensky's. Our concept of the mono-ideological versus the multi-ideological states lends support to Hartzian theory, and might be a profitable avenue for exploration. We wonder what differences exist among mono-ideological states in their attempts to retain ideological purity. What is the nature of the ideological competition within a multi-ideological nation? What direction does it take? Again, are there differences among states in the nature and direction of interideological conflict? How is a cohesive state maintained when there are areas of ideological disagreement? Is the welfare state the area where disagreements find a focus, or does the welfare state serve a cohesive function, where differences are minor and substantial areas of common agreement exist? It would seem at this point in our speculations that the very existence and the strength or weakness of a social democratic party within a state appears to affect the development of a welfare state, but that is not so much an observation as it is a hypothesis.

Another avenue that might be worth exploring since it appears to be related to the values of society is the particular interplay within a state of Parsonian pattern variables, such as self-orientation versus collectivity, universalism versus particularism, and ascription versus achievement.[29] Similarly, the fluidity and rigidity of class lines, and the degree of ressentiment[30] and anomie[31] in a nation are likely to affect decisions on welfare expenditures. But, as these and other factors are introduced as possible influence, we get further and further away from the simplicity of static abstract symbols and cause-eff[illegible] relationships, and closer to the chaos of reality.

In the second approach to the study of the welfare state, the focus is less on the similarities of national systems, and more on differences among states, and the meaning of particular forms of difference. This approach calls for the examination of individual cases, so that we see how within a nation "the national programs become consistent with and reinforce each other in such a way as to reveal distinct national cultural traditions, politics, and geography as much as they do national economics."[32] One is then able to discern to what degree social security was structured so as to fulfill or manifest national myths, either of a free-enterprise state, a social democratic state, or other ideals.

By pursuing this second approach, one moves toward the danger, from the positivists' point of view, of including subjective, value-laden material that would not fit the formula of a utilitarian social science. Yet, human beings continue to seek meaning and persist in making moral judgments. Should the means of evaluating the relative merits of social security serve as a base for moral judgments? Is the percentage of the GNP spent on social welfare a reflection of the amount of welfare generated by social security programs? Or, should we deduct from these totals the harm, the humiliation, and lost opportunities for a meaningful life that are part of such programs as the American AFDC program, or General Welfare Assistance in Ontario? Should we also deduct the incidences of criminality, idleness, disability, deviance, and indicators of poor health, or the high rates of infant mortality? This kind of national cost accounting would bring us closer to the ability to assess the moral stature of a nation and perhaps disclose the real impact of ideology on the development of the welfare state.

Notes

1. Harold L. Wilensky, *The Welfare State and Equality: Structural and Ideological Roots of Public Expenditure* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).
2. Harold L. Wilensky and Charles N. Lebeaux, *Industrial Society and Social Welfare* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1958).
3. Wilensky, p. xiii.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p. 39.
6. Winnifred Bell, "Book Review," *Social Casework* 56, no. 7 (July 1975): 442.
7. Thomas R. Dye, "Book Review," *Journal of Politics* 37, no. 4 (November 1975): 1065–67.
8. David Gil, "Book Review," *Annals, American Academy of Political and Social Science* 425 (May 1976): 195-96.
9. C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination* (New York: Grove Press, 1961), chap. 3.
10. Frederick L. Pryor, *Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1968), p. 31. Pryor is quoting from Edmund Burke.

Reflections on the Revolution in France," in *Edmund Burke: Selected Prose*, ed. Philip Magnus (London: Grey Walls, 1948), p. 69.

11. Louis Hartz, *The Founding of New Societies: Studies in the History of the United States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada and Australia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964).

12. Gad Horowitz, *Canadian Labour Politics* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968).

13. Unless otherwise noted, all data refer to the year 1966, and all per capita GNPs are in American dollars. Wilensky obtained the social security expenditures of the countries we include from the International Labour Organization, *The Cost of Social Security, 1964–1966* (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 1972), pp. 317–23. He provided factor costs GNP—not market price.

14. Norman L. Wilensky and Charles N. Lebeaux, *Industrial Society and Social Welfare* (New York: Free Press [paperback ed.], 1965).

15. See Dye (n. 7 above).

16. Robert M. Kingdon, "Social Welfare in Calvin's Geneva," *American Historical Review* 76, no. 1 (February 1971): 50–69.

17. P. R. Kaime-Caudle, *Comparative Social Policy and Social Security: A Ten-Country Study* (Bath: Martin Robertson & Co., 1973), p. 45.

18. Horowitz, see chap. 1.

19. M. Donald Hancock, "Post-Welfare Modernization in Sweden: The Quest for Cumulative Rationality and Equality," in *Politics in the Post-War State: Responses to the New Individualism*, ed. M. Donald Hancock and Gideon Sjoberg (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 237.

20. Wilensky, p. 138 (n. 1 above).

21. Phillips Cutright, "Political Structure, Economic Development and National Security Programs," *American Journal of Sociology* 70 (March 1965): 537–50.

22. See Pryor (n. 10 above).

23. The description of ideological evaluation is taken from Hartz (n. 11 above).

24. Hartz, p. 3 (n. 11 above).

25. Horowitz, p. 4 (n. 12 above).

26. Sigurdur A. Magnusson, *Northern Sphinx: Iceland and the Icelanders from the Settlement to the Present* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977), p. 155.

27. David E. Woodsworth, *Social Security and National Policy: Sweden, Yugoslavia, Japan* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977).

28. Ibid., p. 4.

29. Seymour M. Lipset, "Revolution and Counter-Revolution—the United States and Canada," in *The Revolutionary Theme in Contemporary America*, ed. Thomas R. Ford (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1965).

30. See Edgar Z. Friedenberg, *The Disposal of Liberty and Other Industrial Wastes* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1976), and Max Scheler, *Ressentiment* (New York: Schocken Books, 1972). Friedenberg illuminates graphically the effect of ressentiment in American society. Scheler brought Nietzsche's ideas into a usable system for social analysis.

31. See Robert K. Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie," in *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957), pp. 131–60, and Leo Srole, "Social Integration and Certain Corollaries: An Exploratory Study," *American Sociological Review* 21, no. 6 (December 1956): 709–16. If ressentiment is a condition of the middle classes, anomie affects the lower class group, becoming stronger the further down one goes.

32. Woodsworth, p. 6.

Scientific Imperatives in Social Work Research and Practice

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This article examines recent assertions regarding shortcomings of method and prescription alleged to occur within the field of social work research. It attempts to clarify misinterpretations of scientific thought and to correct misinformation presented in a recent article in this journal. The major purpose of this article is to set forth, in this author's opinion, a sounder view of the use of scientific imperatives in the conduct of social work research and practice.

In a recent article, Heineman[1] claimed that "social work has adopted an outmoded, overly restrictive paradigm of research" which has caused "important questions and valuable data to go unresearched." She further claims that "the social work research literature has generally embraced the prescriptive approach of logical empiricism" and that "the requirements of logical empiricism have been used prescriptively to limit the permissible range of research questions and data and to define service effectiveness." According to Heineman, "this approach has arguably inhibited social work from developing a discipline-specific body of knowledge." These are very serious accusations, indictments, or concerns; it is, therefore, important to examine Heineman's assertions in some detail.

It is the thesis of this article that Heineman has set forth a number of fallacious conclusions which she arrived at through the use of faulty

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logic, misinformation, and a basic failure to understand the fundamental tenets of scientific thought and behavior. The concern of this article is not that Heineman is misled as an individual, but that her arguments and conclusions could severely mislead others who may give some credence to her thesis through a hasty and uncritical review of it. In order to reduce the risk of such an occurrence, it is therefore necessary to examine and disclose at least the basic flaws in her analysis.

Logical Empiricism

The fundamental thesis of Heineman's article is that social work has adopted "logical empiricism" as a model of science, and a substantial portion of her article is devoted to the task of showing that logical empiricism is an outmoded paradigm. Logical empiricism is defined by Heineman in her note 3, where she says that it derives from empiricism and logicism. Heineman defines empiricism, in the same note, as the belief that "all *certain* knowledge comes from experience" (emphasis added), and she states that the central tenet of logicism is that propositional logic is truth preserving.

I can see four aspects of logical empiricism, as represented by Heineman, that one might regard as being objectionable: (1) that knowledge is certain and unchangeable, (2) that knowledge comes from experience, (3) that one might use propositional logic; and (4) that propositional logic is truth preserving. Much of what we think we know simply cannot be regarded as certain, and the history of science clearly demonstrates that our understanding of the world and the universe changes as new information about them is obtained. The history of empirical science has also taught us to be very wary[2] of any propositional logic (including mathematics) whose nouns are not tied firmly to real-world referents.[3] The suggestion that any logic is truth preserving is risky because such a statement implies the existence of some absolute truth in the Platonic sense. Yes, these three aspects of Heineman's logical empiricism are highly objectionable. But what about the modified assertion that "all . . . knowledge comes from experience"? Whether Heineman would reject that assertion is not clear from anything she presents in her article.

Except for the business of experience,[4] it does appear that logical empiricism is a flawed model of science—and it was experience that so taught us. Even so, logical empiricism is a fairly harmless brute unless and until it amasses a following of social work researchers, and that is a matter of grave import to Heineman's entire thesis.

Over the past twenty years or so I have had occasion to speak, often at length, with a rather large number of social work researchers. My general experience has been that (1) none of them has ever expressed the conviction that our knowledge of the world is certain and unchangeable, (2) they indeed seem to reject the use of propositional logic that is not grounded by real-world referents, and (3) I never hear them advocating the pursuit of some ultimate Platonic truth. In short, I do not see a long train of social work researchers following dutifully behind the logical empiricism villain. In all candor, the social work researchers I have known and talked with *do* act as though they believe that an understanding of how the world works can be obtained from experience, that is, they claim that it is very difficult to acquire an understanding of the world through the use of nonexperience![1]

The Heineman Syllogism

Actually, Heineman never pointed to any specific researcher and then claimed that he or she follows the three evils of logical empiricism: pursuit of certain and unchangeable knowledge, use of propositional logic that is not grounded by real-world referents, and pursuit of some absolute Platonic truth. What she did do was accuse social work research of doing so. I have not met social work research or shaken its hand, but according to Heineman it is clearly social work who is the principal actor and who "has adopted an outmoded, overly restricted paradigm of research." The important point here is that "social work" is merely a label, a term, to attach to an ever-changing collection of entities who call themselves social workers, but social work is not an entity that has adopted anything. Nonetheless, Heineman personified social work and then, in effect, advanced a common Aristotelian syllogism.

A substantial part of Heineman's article is devoted to the argument that logical empiricism is an obsolete paradigm of science, and that is the major premise of her syllogism. Her minor premise, generally stated, is that social work research has adopted the approach of logical empiricism, and the conclusion of her syllogism is that, therefore, social work research is based on an outmoded paradigm of science. It might well be possible to grant the major premise because it has some things that just do not measure up—to experience? However, the minor premise is simply untenable. It rests on the law of the excluded middle and relies on a personification of social work and social work research—which are not acting entities capable of adopting anything.

In all fairness to Heineman and her concerns, the straw man of logical empiricism (which she erected), in the main, does not appear to be a suitable model to follow. If those who do research and also call themselves social workers happen to subscribe to the three evils of logical empiricism, they would do well to reconsider the evidence of science and its history. However, the extent to which some social workers who do research might adhere to such folly has not been established by the personifications and syllogistic reasoning advanced by Heineman. Unless and until she is willing and able to cite author by author its directly subscribing to the three evils of logical empiricism, Heineman's claim that social work research is based on the outmoded model of logical empiricism stands as an unsupported and vacuous assertion.[6]

Strictures on Precious Data

Heineman asserted in her article that social work has caused important questions and valuable data to go unresearched and that logical empiricism has been used to limit the permissible range of research questions. There are several points to consider in this regard. First, Heineman did not identify even one researchable question that social work researchers are preventing from being addressed. Presumably there were several that she had in mind, but she did not name them. Second, she never once indicated how these social work researchers are going about the business of actively suppressing the study of valuable data. A third point to consider is the simple fact that Heineman never identified what was contained in all those valuable data that are being suppressed, nor did she indicate what criteria were used in judging their value. Actually, she levied these charges against, not researchers, but social work—a personified nonentity. Heineman did complain that not much research has been devoted to the client-practitioner relationship. In that she is simply wrong. There is a large literature devoted to that topic. Perhaps she wants more, or perhaps she feels that what has been done is simply worthless. Whatever she had in mind, her claim that not much has been done is simply an uninformed assertion.

Heineman also claimed that logical empiricism is used to limit the permissible range of research questions. She never told us what was included in that restricted range or what lay beyond it. She also never told us who was using logical empiricism or how they were going about the business of imposing upon us a restricted range of permissible questions to be investigated. In short, Heineman has again ventured a set of hollow and unsupported complaints. Because of her

complete vagueness in this matter, we do not even know what she is talking about.

The essential point of all this, about which Heineman seems to be totally unaware and uninformed, is that social work research is a free enterprise conducted largely on a voluntary basis by those who wish to engage in it. Researchers are not an organized group of personnel who operate under the direction of some chief researcher called social work who is driven by the tenets of logical empiricism. Heineman is completely free to disagree with the methods or findings of any one or several specific researchers, and she is free to decide, for herself, that all of their work is wholly irrelevant if she chooses. She is *not* free to dictate to scientists that which they will do research on. The sheer beauty of it, however, is that Heineman is also completely free to do her science. She can start a new school of empirical or nonempirical science (logical or otherwise) if she wishes and if she thinks that is a worthwhile enterprise.

None of this is to suggest that there is not a distinct sociology of research which suggests that what is accepted by senior scholars in any field as appropriate ways of conducting research has a powerful effect of limiting the range of work done. However, this is a phenomenon that seems to persist regardless of whether one subscribes to the Heineman version of logical empiricism or to some other set of rules for testing the quality of scientific evidence.

Philosophy versus Science

Throughout her article, Heineman complains about science and turns to the philosophers for solutions. She complains about social work research being prescriptive while writing an intensely prescriptive article. Her prescription is that social work research turn to the modern philosophers and learn from them how to proceed. Heineman should read Heineman, who says, quoting Simon, that "concerns with how scientists ought to proceed are 'interesting questions of philosophy, but they turn out to have little relation to the actual behavior of scientists.' "[7]

If there is anything that history has taught science (my personification), it is to be wary of philosophers. The lesson should not be abandoned. It was the emergence of science in terms of brutish empiricism that so long ago finally solved Zeno's paradox.[8] It was none other than Hegel who claimed on philosophical grounds alone that it was not possible to find any new celestial bodies in the solar system. He did that one year before astronomers discovered the asteroid, Ceres.[9] Heineman

(p. 379) quotes Fodor as saying, "I think that there is a strong temptation to say that the larger viruses are not inferred entities any more—specifically because of the electron microscope. Yet it is possible to maintain that the argument from shadows on the plate to viruses on the slide is fully as complex as the argument from spectroscopic results to vegetation on Mars." Now, I do submit that, given this argument, a clever mind is probably very capable of "proving" that (1) large viruses do not exist, (2) vegetation, full-blown, does exist on Mars; and (3) possibly both! One can do truly wondrous things with the mind and to the universe when one is permitted to use only argument. That is the key. The scientist does not live by argument alone but by evidence, raw, brutish empiricism—experience. What that means is that one must relate argument to the real world as experienced by poor, hapless, fallible *Homo sapiens* in order to settle arguments about the real world. Arguments, taken alone, do not and cannot settle other arguments about the real world.

To the extent that we engage in arguments about other arguments, we engage in philosophy. To the extent that we engage in arguments and settle them in terms of experience, we engage in science.[10] However, Heineman urges reliance upon the "findings" of philosophy and fails to recognize that philosophers do not produce findings. Philosophers produce conclusions based on arguments and scientists produce findings based on evidence, observations, and experience.

Heineman makes the statement that "if practicing scientists had embraced prediction as the only [they do not] adequate form of explanation, Einstein's equation of mass and energy ($E = mc^2$) would not have been accepted until the atom was split in 1932." She also claims that "quantum theory cannot be understood in terms of observable entities." She misses the point entirely.

Quantum theory and relativity are expressed in the language of mathematics, and they must, therefore, be understood in terms of that language. However, the genius of quantum theory and relativity is that the language of their mathematics pretends to have its nouns and verbs based upon a correspondence with real-world observable entities.[11] Indeed, physicists were not willing to entertain Einstein's proffered explanations until they first checked the consistency of his mathematical language and then recognized a correspondence between his propositional arguments and their own experience of the real world, as expressed in the language of their own propositional arguments. After recognizing that Einstein's propositional arguments seemed to do a better job of explaining relations among observable entities under certain conditions, other physicists were not willing to accept his propositions as constituting an explanation of observed phenomena until those propositions were supported in terms of predictions that were confirmed years later by direct observation.[12] Yes, they did await the split-

ting of the atom in 1932, and they awaited a number of other experiments as well.

What does all this have to do with social work research? Quite a lot, I think. When social work researchers are told (or conjure up in their own heads), for example, the notion (theory) that mental disease is something that exists somewhere or somehow within the victim, they set about to find it. They do that by trying to define it with sufficient precision that they can then observe it. If they can define it and if they can observe it, there is a good chance that they can measure it. The purpose of measuring it is then to be able to describe it in a systematic way and with greater precision. However, if the method used to measure the disease does great violence to the definition of it, the measurements will not do a good job of representing the very thing they want to study. So, they call their measurements an operational definition and they call the original definition a construct. In order to determine whether reasonable people can agree that the measurements do a good job of representing the original definition, scientists claim, as did Goldstein (whom Heineman criticized), that it is important to distinguish and compare the operational and construct definition of "disease."

Now, scientists sometimes engage in tremendously strange behaviors at this point. If they find they cannot define or observe this construct called mental disease, they conclude that it does not exist, and they give it back to the philosophers with a new name. They call it a mentalism. The philosopher may choose to play with the mentalism for eons but the scientists turn their attention back to observable entities. It was this kind of thinking that led this author to state elsewhere that "if you cannot measure a client's problem it does not exist," and "if you cannot measure a client's problem you cannot treat it."[13] It was this kind of thinking that also led Gingerich to claim that "if you cannot measure your treatment it does not exist," and "if you cannot measure your treatment you cannot administer it."[14]

Objectivity, Measurement, and Error

Heineman's article deals at length with the notion of objectivity. She says that social work somehow or other assumes objective data to be distortion free, "objectivity can be seen to be a particular species of report", "objectivity does not refer to how nature really is but to how scientists find it in a given context" (as quoting Schmidt), and "objectivity is inherently impossible."

I do not know who in social work Heineman has spoken with about the use of objective data, but none of the researchers I have talked with

has ever told me that he has distortion-free data of any kind. If one dared to propose such a thing in the classroom, even our beginning students would simply laugh him out of the room. As for objectivity being some species of report, she is simply dead wrong. Objectivity is a prescription or a result, depending on context. The prescription is that one produce definitions and descriptions of procedures and methods with sufficient clarity that other researchers will be able to reproduce (replicate) the study. If the effort to be objective is such that other researchers will be able to (and do) replicate the study, then objectivity is a result—one has conducted an objective investigation.[15] If, in addition to the use of objective methods and procedures, the replicating scientists are also able to obtain highly similar findings, we can then say that we have objective evidence to support the original scientist's statements about the findings. Moreover, the two scientists (or more) do not have to agree on world views. If a psychoanalytic researcher has conducted an objective study in the sense described above, a behaviorist can replicate the study faithfully—and vice versa. They might even get the same results, although differences in world view might cause them to render different interpretations of those results.

Objectivity does not correspond to how scientists "find" nature at all. It merely characterizes the extent to which others can understand what they do and how they proceed. Heineman's assertion that "objectivity is inherently impossible" is simply incorrect—or it has validity in the realm of some nonexistent Platonic idealism. If we follow Heineman's prescription that we seek "satisficing" solutions rather than purist ideals, it is quite accurate to say that scientists do regularly achieve a highly satisficing degree of objectivity!

In order to illustrate Heineman's failure to understand the distinction between objective observations and a theory used to interpret those observations, consider her statement that "people holding different theories about the same object do not even see the same thing." In order to support that assertion, Heineman refers to Norwood Hanson's suggestion that Tycho Brahe "would believe the sun rose and Kepler would think the earth moved so the sun came into view." Well, it is a simple fact of history that Kepler desperately needed Tycho Brahe's meticulous observations of the planets in the night sky, and when he got them, he established three laws of planetary motion.[16] Brahe and Kepler may have held different theories, but they indeed saw the same thing. It may well be true that "perception is theory dependent" in the sense that our beliefs about how the world operates may influence what we choose to observe. However, perception is not theory dependent in the sense that different theories prevent us from making remarkably similar observations about the real world.

Heineman attempts to make her case by suggesting a postulate of logical empiricism (I cannot find this in her definition of logical em-

piricism) which says that "theories and concepts which do not lend themselves to definition by measurement operations cannot be studied fruitfully." However, she failed to point out that the postulate holds for any science—including the version she presumes to advocate. Bostwick and Kyte define measurement very simply as a "process involving the assignment of symbols to properties of objects, according to rules."[17] Let Heineman show us even one example of a validated research finding that has improved our knowledge and understanding of the real world but which did not basically conform to the definition of measurement provided by Bostwick and Kyte. One might be tempted to think of the awesome knowledge produced by Darwin in unraveling the mystery of evolution through his nonquantitative investigation of terrestrial species. However, Darwin was meticulously systematic in assigning symbols to objects according to rules in order to represent their properties or attributes.

Heineman complains a great deal about the use of tape recorders, objective data, and the prescription that we use "indicators that can be reliably and validly measured."[18] What are the alternatives?—to use unobjective, invalid, and unreliable measurements or descriptions of the phenomena that concern us and about which we wish to learn and understand? Is this the model of science that Heineman would have us subscribe to in order to create a viable basis for practice? Quite the opposite, I should hope, and a careful review of the research literature in our field does strongly suggest that our knowledge has been greatly impeded in proportion to our refusal or inability to develop objective, reliable, and valid measurements (descriptions) of the variables we must work with and understand as researchers and as practitioners.

Testable Models

A major complaint in Heineman's article had to do with the prescription that we use testable models in social work research and practice. She complained of Reid's "prescription" that we use "testable models . . . whose targets for change, interventions and outcomes can be operationalized in terms of indicators that can be reliably and validly measured." She labels Carl Hempel as a logical positivist (as a "bad" thing) and then complains of his statements: "Although no restrictions are imposed upon the invention of theories, scientific objectivity is safeguarded by making their acceptance dependent upon the outcome of careful tests. These consist in deriving, from the theory, consequences that admit of observational or experimental investigation, and then checking them by suitable observations or experiments."

Hempel may well have subscribed to some of the evils of logical positivism or logical empiricism—I frankly do not know. If he did, he erred. However, it is a most extreme error to discard everything the man said merely because he was one of them.[19] The consequences of rejecting Hempel's and Reid's prescriptions are grave and enormous. Their rejection implies that we freely generate theories about the workings of the world, and that we avoid the painful or difficult task of determining whether, in terms of experience, they are even plausible. For social work practice, this implies that we be permitted to use untested theories of practice, intervention strategies that may do no one any good, and even that we use unreliable and invalid data or observations. The rejection of Reid's and Hempel's prescriptions will very possibly lead to the adoption of witchcraft, sorcery, and astrology as models of social work practice.[20]

As for social work research inhibiting the development of a discipline-specific body of knowledge, such an assertion is merely absurd. The history of social work shows rather clearly that the greatest inhibition to the use or development of new knowledge has been the obstructionist behavior of those devout believers in a few theories of practice that have yet to be validated in terms of the prescriptions offered by Reid and by Hempel—or by the best of modern science in general. Faith in a theory does not make it valid, and it has often been the zealous exercise of faith in an untested theory that has been responsible for the crass suppression of knowledge and free inquiry in the classroom and in the field of practice. More so, I daresay, than exercise of the normal demands for rigor in the conduct of social work research.

Concluding Remarks

As I said at the beginning of this article, it matters little whether Heineman as an individual is correct or not. What does matter is that she may well have misled some readers into believing a set of unfounded conclusions in support of which she provides not one shred of evidence. Worse yet, the form and structure of many of her arguments suggest that social workers do not need or require the development of empirically validated models of practice, and that prescriptions to develop and use reliable and valid observations about the real world could well be a set of misled objectives.

Heineman was quite willing to interpret the psychology of scientists as a "wish" for a certain, knowable world. She is quite right that the wish for such a world is not proof of its existence—that was the essential point behind William Gordon's statement which she criticized. I

think Heineman is correct in suggesting that scientists do wish for a dependable and knowable world. Although they have learned much about the risks of claiming or pursuing certainty in some absolute Platonic sense, the wish for or belief in a knowable world does not appear to be an unreasonable one. Moreover, scientists have shown that ours is a knowable world. After all, our species has climbed out of the slime of our terrestrial history and developed a complex body of validated knowledge about the world in which we live. It has done that by systematically observing—experiencing—that world. Nothing more.

None of this is to suggest that Nature gives up her secrets easily. She does not. Those secrets have been extracted by a wondrous tool we call science. The basic tenets of science are routinely offered to our students, and they are routinely used by those who do social work research. Even so, a few are offered below which I believe will help to advance and validate the knowledge base of our profession.

1. All knowledge is ultimately based on experience.

2. A basic purpose of science is the study and description of relationships among variables.

3. A fundamental aim of the scientist is to generate propositional statements about how the real world operates and to test the veracity of those statements against systematic observation and experimentation by using observable entities.

4. Logical systems that are not grounded by real-world referents are of no use to science.

5. Constructs that cannot be defined, operationalized, and then measured are mentalisms that are useless to an understanding of the world in which we live.

6. The development and validation of testable models of how the world operates (including the world of social work practice) are essential to the development of new knowledge.

7. The validity of any theory (including theories of social work practice) cannot be established if it is not capable of refutation through experience.

8. Our understanding of how the world and the universe operate will improve with new observation and new experiment.

9. Science is a self-corrective process that develops and validates knowledge through reliance on imperfect observations of observable entities.

Notes

1. Martha Brunswick Heineman, "The Obsolete Scientific Imperative in Social Work Research," *Social Service Review* 55 (1981): 371–97.

2. Perhaps "caution" would be a better word here, at least in the sense of asking to

which extent there can be demonstrated a one-to-one correspondence between observable entities and the nouns and verbs of the logic system.

3. In a wonderful little book, first published in 1938, Stuart Chase (*The Tyranny of Words* [New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1959]) presented a popularization of the then emerging field of general semantics and drew heavily on the staggering contribution of Alfred Korzybski's *Science and Sanity* (Lakeville, Conn.: Institute for General Semantics, 1933). Although heavily influenced by logical positivism (there was not much else that was "better" at the time), Chase's book presents a penetrating and convincing discussion of the value of tying nouns of language to observable entities—the latter he and Korzybski refer to as "real-world referents."

4. *Actually, Heineman has derogated the definition of "empirical" by injecting the concept "certain" and hence the implication that empiricism involves the pursuit of absolute Platonic truths.* A much better definition, I think, is in the 1980 *Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary*, s.v. "empiricism," which describes empiricism as "the practice of relying on observation and experiment. . . ." Here and in the remainder of this paper I equate the word "experience" with this definition of empiricism.

5. I am acutely aware of my own personifications, such as "the history of science has taught us . . . ," and perhaps I should have said that "we have learned from experience over long periods of time."

6. If Heineman had conducted a careful and thorough review showing that the bulk of published social work research followed or advocated these evils, she would have thereby performed a corrective service. She may still do that, if she is so inclined, but we should await the evidence before accepting her thesis.

7. This is a point well argued by Martin Goldstein and Inge F. Goldstein in their book *How We Know: An Exploration of the Scientific Process* (New York: Plenum Press, 1978). Goldstein and Goldstein also present a superb case for the role of art in science.

8. Chase (n. 3 above), pp. 152–55. Carl Sagan (*Broca's Brain* [New York: Ballantine Books, 1979], pp. 49–172) presents a very useful discussion of the nature of paradoxes and their role in the development of knowledge.

9. Ibid., p. 235.

10. One might here ask, "What is argument about whether the argument is settled by experience?" One might answer, "Philosophy!" Such a question is commonly regarded as a form of metalanguage. Philosophers might well debate the question endlessly, but scientists must get on with the business of doing science. In doing so, they seem to have settled the question by returning to experience, and they are likely to depend on that answer unless and until some equally good or better one is provided.

11. It is quite true that much of quantum mechanics and relativity get very far away from observable entities when expressing theory (propositions about relationships) in verbal or mathematical terms. However, support for the correctness of such theories is ultimately obtained in terms of observable entities. See esp. Edward Teller, *The Pursuit of Simplicity* (Malibu, Calif.: Pepperdine University Press, 1980).

12. One of the truly great achievements of Einstein was his assertion and partial demonstration (remarkably supported by subsequent experiment and observation) that the laws of physics are the same for all observers regardless of their position in the universe—that the laws of physics are independent of who observes them. In this, he established, not a system of "relativity" as it is popularly *misunderstood*, but a set of universal constants. According to Nigel Calder (*Einstein's Universe* [New York: Penguin Books, 1979], p. 13), Einstein considered referring to his work as "invariance theory" rather than as relativity.

13. Walter W. Hudson, "First Axioms of Treatment," *Social Work* 23 (January 1978): 65–66.

14. Wallace Gingerich, "Measuring the Process," *Social Work* 23 (March 1978): 251–52.

15. If this is what Heineman meant as a "species" of report, it would have been clarifying and helpful for her to have so indicated. If she had some other meaning in mind, it also would have been clarifying had she revealed that.

16. Carl Sagan, *Cosmos* (New York: Random House, 1980), pp. 58–62.

17. Gerald J. Bostwick, Jr., and Nancy S. Kyte, "Measurement," in *Social Work Research and Evaluation*, ed. Richard M. Grinnell, Jr. (Itasca, Ill.: F. E. Peacock Publishers, 1981).

18. Heineman attempts to soften her textual assertions by her comments in her n. 7 (p. 392). However, even there she underplays the enormous value of obtaining or producing reliable and valid data. Moreover, she implies in this note that Reid (and perhaps other researchers as well) are guilty of advocating such tools under the belief that they provide the only credible source of therapeutic observation. Her implicit statement is simply inaccurate.

19. It is very difficult to resist regarding such a behavior as a form of intellectual racism. In some social work circles, e.g., a person is often discredited these days by merely being labeled as a behaviorist or Freudian. Let us test ideas rather than sling discrediting labels such as logical positivist or (now a new one) logical empiricist.

20. By refusing to employ and require the prescriptions of Reid and Hempel, we have come to the point where just about anything can now pass for "therapy" (music, dance, basketball, jogging, surfing, etc.), and just about anyone who chooses to do so can call himself or herself a "therapist." Little or no evidence of effectiveness is required, little or no concern is exercised with respect to the possibility of harmful side effects, and we too often lack the courage to even confront a blatant charlatan who wants to merely converse with clients and charge them money for that. See Thomas Szasz, *The Myth of Psychotherapy* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Anchor Books, 1979).

The National Women's Trade Union League

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This paper traces the history, development, and activities of the National Women's Trade Union League from 1903 through the 1950s. Biographical data are presented throughout to illustrate the divergent backgrounds of the prominent women involved in the league. The league was a social reform organization of the Progressive era which was formed with the intent of assisting unorganized women workers to become unionized. The paper concludes with an analysis of the current status of women in the labor force.

Introduction

This paper will trace the history, development, and activities of the Women's Trade Union League from 1903 through the 1950s. The league was one of several social reform organizations of the Progressive era, and stemmed from the same impetus which gave rise to such organizations as the Women's Christian Temperance Union, the Consumer's League, and others. It represented the convergence and unification of privileged women and working-class women, with the major intent of assisting unorganized women workers to become unionized. It was unique in that it was deeply committed to developing the leadership abilities of working-class women to enable them to assume full responsibility for the leadership of the organization. In this endeavor it

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was successful, although it failed in its attempt to organize working women.

Part I will discuss the league's historical background and activities from 1903 to 1930. Part II will discuss the 1930s, Part III, the 1940s and 1950s. Biographical data will be presented throughout to illustrate the divergent backgrounds of the prominent women involved; and Part IV will present an analysis of the current status of women in the labor force.

I. Historical Background and Origins: 1903–30

The founding of the National Women's Trade Union League (WTUL) in 1903 was an expression of a fusion of educated, middle-class women, professional and nonprofessional, and working women. The common effort was on behalf of the latter.

In the continuing absence of any consistent effort by the American Federation of Labor (AFL) or its affiliates to organize women, the league came into existence at a series of meetings held during the regular convention of the AFL in Boston at Faneuil Hall. A small group of trade unionists and others interested in the organization of women, and male delegates primarily from the garment unions, attended these meetings. The initiative to organize came from John R. O'Brien, president of the Clerk's International Protective Union, Mary Kenney O'Sullivan, bookbinder, Leonora O'Reilly, Mary Morton Kehew, a wealthy Bostonian who had been trying to organize working women in trade unions since 1892, the philanthropist and socialist economist William English Walling, and that dynamic trio, Jane Addams, Lillian Wald, and Mary McDowell.[1] The new organization was to look after the special interests of working women.

Mr. Walling's suggestion for the League was the outcome of a trip abroad where he had been impressed by the work of the Women's Trade Union League in Great Britain. A further connection to the English league was acquired with the attendance of two British fraternal delegates to the AFL convention, James O'Grady and William Mullen. They participated in these meetings and contributed suggestions and encouragement.[2] The interests of Addams, Wald, and McDowell were neither passing nor perfunctory. After the founding of the WTUL, they continued to be active in league affairs until a new generation of leaders emerged. These leaders were from the shops of the garment and allied trades, and carried the league through its most influential years.

Samuel Gompers greeted the new venture kindly, although somewhat condescendingly. In his autobiography he wrote: "I gave it my cordial cooperation because I hoped it would lead to genuine trade union work. . . . I defended the movement against the dubious, and tried to contribute counsel for its guidance."[3]

The new organization adopted a very brief constitution which stated that "membership was open to any person who will declare himself or herself willing to assist those trade unions already existing, which have women members, and to aid in the formation of new unions of women wage-workers."[4] To insure this aim, membership on the executive board was to be divided as follows: "The majority shall be women who are, or have been, trade unionists in good standing, the minority of those well known to be earnest sympathizers and workers for the cause of trade unionism."[5]

This balance was not actually achieved, however, until after 1907 when new leadership emerged from the ranks of women working in trades: Mary Anderson and Emma Steghagen of the shoe workers, Rose Schneiderman of the cap makers, Agnes Nestor and Elizabeth Christman of the glovemakers (both among the handful of women who have ever held posts as national union officers in this country), Melinda Scott of the hat trimmers, Josephine Casey of the railway ticket takers, Stella Franklin of the department store clerks, Elizabeth Maloney of the waitresses, and Maud Swartz of the typographers.[6] One cannot overestimate the opportunity the league afforded such women to enhance their growth through action and the exercise of responsibility. These options were largely denied within the AFL.

No working woman served as president of the league until Maud Swartz assumed the post in 1921. Until that time it was held by a succession of wealthy women who were completely devoted to their task: Mary Kehew, Mrs. Charles Henrotin; and Margaret Dreier Robins, who was president from 1907 until 1921.[7]

In 1892 the AFL appointed Mary E. Kenney O'Sullivan to organize women workers. She was a bindery worker who had organized the women of her trade in Chicago into a "Ladies Federal Union." During her brief tenure of five months, she worked with women in a number of industries in New York and New England. The federation officials were not enthusiastic supporters of her work, and it was discontinued long before she had received a chance to prove its value. Her interest in organizing women continued, however, and she served as assistant factory inspector in Illinois under Florence Kelley and participated in shoe and textile strikes.[8] Ten years later she participated in the founding and organization of the Women's Trade Union League.

Leonora O'Reilly's parents migrated to America from Ireland in order to escape the mid-nineteenth-century famines. During the depression of 1873 her father died, leaving her and her mother in bitter want

Leonora remembered her mother returning at night with bundles of work from the shirt factory on which she labored until midnight, while Leonora performed the household tasks. Winifred O'Reilly took her daughter to labor and political rallies as an infant. In 1881 at the age of eleven, Leonora went to work in a New York collar factory, earning one dollar per dozen finished collars; in three years, the rate declined to fifty cents per dozen. In 1880 she joined the Knights of Labor and took part in her first strike.[9] At this time she and others organized the Working Women's Society, which led to the formation of the Consumers' League. She was befriended by such influential women as Josephine Shaw Lowell and Louisa Perkins, who eventually made it possible for her to leave her factory and go to school. She also became a very influential friend to such socially creative people as Lillian Wald, Felix Adler, William Dean Howells, Margaret Dreier Robins, Mary Dreier, and others. Although she never returned to factory work, she remained an active force in the labor movement with a primary concern for women. After teaching for several years at the Manhattan Trade School for Girls, she became an organizer for the Women's Trade Union League, of which she was a founder. She also helped bring into existence the unions in the garment trade which exist today.[10]

Margaret Dreier, who came from a wealthy background, became interested in the newly founded New York Women's Trade Union League in 1904. Shortly thereafter she married Raymond Robins who had struck it rich in the Klondike and was devoting his time to the promotion of religion, organized labor, and reform politics. They moved to Chicago where they occupied a tenement in the slums. Both were romantics, caught up in Progressivism, and for the next twenty years they dedicated themselves to reform.

Margaret worked mainly as a suffragist and leader in the Women's Trade Union League. "There are times," she wrote, "when it makes me quite heartsick to realize that it is my money alone which enables me to carry out the plans, and that whatever intelligence or character I have would be useless if it were not for that."[11] It is quite apparent from her activities, however, that her fortune was the least of her assets. She was physically strong, and this enabled her to weather the discomforts of extensive travel on uncomfortable trains, and the strains of functioning in an atmosphere of continual crisis. At its peak, the Trade Union League was involved in one strike after another, and even when the strikes went well, which was seldom, they were exhausting. Her strength has been characterized as a willed discipline, and her generous nature was one reason why she was indispensable to the league. "The working girls were prickly and insecure, quick to detect slights and resentful of patronage."[13] Margaret Robins created a warm, friendly atmosphere which smoothed over feelings ruffled by tactless league allies. Her deliberate policy was to make conventions informal, dis-

garding elaborate parliamentary protocol typical of large feminist gatherings. She encouraged fun, complete with cheers and songs, among women who had spent their lives working in dreary factories. Her greatest ambition was to make the league a self-sustaining organization of trade union women, and to this end she deliberately cultivated leadership in promising working girls, making the league as attractive to them as she could. According to Floyd Dell, a socialist and feminist sympathizer, "she went to the workers to learn rather than to teach—she sought to unfold the ideals and capacities latent in working girls rather than impress upon them the alien ideals and capacities of another class."[14] This was not true in a literal sense because she did have a preconceived notion of what the league should become. However, it does reflect certain qualities which distinguish her from other leisure-class reformers.

As this article will disclose, the great irony of her career was that, in making the league a true working-class body, she undermined its influence in the union movement. She came close to despising Gompers and the executive council of the AFL at times, but was not intimidated by them. She was convinced that AFL support was essential to the league's success and extracted more money from it than it really wanted to give. Although this was not much, without her the league would have gotten even less. "When she retired in the 1920s, it became clear that only her social position, personal influence, and determination had given the League influence with the AFL, whose executives had little use for her, as they had even less use for the women of their own class who succeeded her."[15] This was not her fault, but it frustrated her greatly. Although some of her efforts failed, she succeeded at giving thousands of working women opportunities for growth and service that never existed before. Working-class women were largely excluded from the benefits of feminism and progressivism, but through the league, some at least were brought into effective unions, and those who became active league members became involved in exciting and rewarding work.[16]

Mary Anderson and Agnes Nestor are two notable examples of union women involved in the league. They believed that persistent organization could lead to effective unionization. Mary Anderson came to the United States from Sweden in 1889 at the age of sixteen. She worked ten hours a day in a Chicago shoe factory and quickly became convinced that unions were essential. By age twenty-three, she was president of the Stitchers Local 94 of the International Boot and Shoe Workers Union. She never married and by 1913 became an important organizer for the league. She eventually became the only woman on the executive board of the International Boot and Shoe Workers Union. In 1910, Hart, Schaffner, and Marx, a big clothing firm in Chicago, reached a collective bargaining agreement with the United Garment Workers

Union, and Mary acted as negotiator between the union and the company.[17]

Because her major work involved convincing young working women to join unions, she wrote propaganda on the importance of labor organization. In one article she reminded women that the union movement "means better wages and shorter hours. Better wages mean a home, a real home—and shorter hours mean family life, a life where father, mother and the children have time to be with one another and learn together and play together."[18]

Convincing women of the union's worth was difficult. Young women did not understand the meaning of arbitration, and did not know why they should strike. Many of the Chicago factory women were young immigrants who had difficulties with language and were afraid of the repercussions they would suffer from management if they joined unions. Furthermore, union women found union men uncooperative. The AFL gave them only token approval, no money to hire organizers, and no voice in running the AFL.[19]

Agnes Nestor was born in Michigan in 1880, and came to Chicago at the age of seventeen to work as a glovemaker. She joined her local union and became vice president of the International Glove Workers Union of America, as well as an organizer for the Women's Trade Union League. She became president of the Chicago branch of the league in 1913 and worked closely with Mary Anderson. Both women were good speakers and tireless organizers. In 1909 Agnes Nestor lobbied in Springfield for the ten-hour day for working women, and for women's suffrage. In 1909, the establishment of the ten-hour day for women in Illinois was considered a major victory for working women.[20]

Nestor and Anderson both served on presidential committees to help coordinate women workers for the World War I effort. Nestor was on the Women's Committee of the Council of National Defense, and Anderson worked in Washington for the Women in Industry Service. In 1920, Anderson became the head of the women's bureau in the Department of Labor, where she remained for twenty-five years. Nestor returned to Chicago and to union work after the war.

Throughout this early period the league worked for an eight-hour day for working women, equal pay for equal work, and a minimum wage scale. Also included in its platform was the goal of full citizenship for women.[21] After the war, the league broadened its platform to include advocacy of the League of Nations, Wilson's Fourteen Points, support for Bolshevik Russia, and the public ownership and worker control of all public utilities including mines, stockyards, and grain elevators.[22] Although some of these aims demonstrated a broader perspective, the primary aim of the league was to organize women workers

After 1920, organizing women became increasingly more difficult. The leading women all came to realize that as women, regardless of lass background, they were viewed differently from men. Women vorkers were discriminated against precisely because they were women. Organizing women was especially difficult because of women's own ears of being assertive. Most women believed that they were working emporarily and that they would soon get married and no longer need o work. The disappointment came, however, when the underpaid vorkingmen whom they married could not afford to support them. Thus, these women often returned to work, receiving less money for the ame work that men performed.

The war did not increase the real wages of working women by much. n reality it was more of a shifting of groups than an actual jump in numbers of those working for payment. In fact, the female share of the vork force declined during the period 1910–20 from 23.4 to 21.4 perent. "Where women retained their new jobs after the war, it was beause they were cheaper to employ and more docile than men."[23]

While the percentage of women in the work force did grow during he 1920s, the greatest increase took place in the most difficult jobs to rganize. The number of employed married women grew from 1.9 to 1 million, while the percentage of women workers in professional ccupations increased from 11.9 to 14.2 percent. Clerical work rose om fifth to third place in the list of female occupations.[24] The unmaried industrial worker who was the backbone of the women's labor novement declined in importance, while married professionals and lerical workers multiplied. Taking into account the high unemployent rate, which never fell below 10 percent after 1924, one can easily e why only 2.94 percent of all working women were unionized in 924, and why the income gap between male and female workers conued to grow.[25] The discrepancy in pay rate between male and female killed and semiskilled workers increased from 22.8 cents per hour in 923 to 26.9 cents in 1929. For unskilled workers, the differential velled from 6.3 cents per hour to 10.2 cents.[26]

Progress was slow, but modest successes in the garment, textile, and gar-making industries before 1920 encouraged the league to continue ushing for union organization. A major difficulty for the league was nancial. Before the war, its resources were pitifully inadequate, and e postwar recession caused its receipts to fall by 50 percent. In 1921, it nceled its biennial convention for lack of funds and discontinued ublication of its journal, *Life and Labor*. Despite a financial recovery 1923–24 when the league took in almost 50,000 dollars, revival was ore apparent than real. It was highly dependent on donations for its nds, as membership dues and union contributions brought in little ore than rent money. Uncertain funding sources kept the league in

debt, and when contributions declined in 1921, the league undertook what proved to be a permanent retrenchment. Apart from New York and Chicago where some organizing work continued, the league's only significant activities were its training school and its legislative office in Washington. The school closed in 1926 for lack of funds, leaving the Washington office as its most visible enterprise.[27] Ethel Smith, who operated it, was responsible for getting the league into the Women's Joint Congressional Committee in which she played a key role. She also enjoyed the confidence of William Green, Gompers's successor. O'Neill states:

> This counted heavily with the League's executive board and after heated debate, in the face of some feeling that legislation for emancipated working women was no longer appropriate, it was finally decided to move the national headquarters to Washington, and consolidate with the legislative office. On a reduced scale the League paid its way as a base for veterans like Ethel Smith, Rose Schneiderman, Mary Dreier (Margaret's sister), and Elizabeth Christman during the depression. They were a skeleton crew, for the League no longer attracted ardent youth. In 1950 when it voted to disband, the principal officers had been with the League for over thirty years.[28]

The AFL continued to demonstrate how little it valued the league. In 1921, the league made an attempt to persuade the Federation's Executive Council that it should issue separate charters to women in industry where the affiliated international unions refused them membership. The council denied the request, and the vice president told them he opposed female locals because women were not permanent workers. Locals should be integrated and officiated by men who were committed to their trade." Treasurer Tobin of the Teamsters said he would fight to the end to keep women coal-team drivers who were dirty, unkempt, and shoeless."[29] When the league pointed out that discrimination against women was unfair because the AFL admitted immigrants, Gompers replied that "the AFL did indeed discriminate against Mongolians, or any nonassimilable race, and would continue to do so."[30] Margaret Robins and her associates took their proposal to the next AFL convention. They knew defeat was certain but hoped, at best, to work a change in sentiment. Gompers remained evasive, and while assuring the league of his support, never defended the women when they were opposed at the international level. Robins did not trust him and perhaps he sensed it. Even if Gompers respected her personally and approved of her feminist connections, he remained opposed to most of the welfare measures endorsed by the league, such as minimum-wage and maximum-hour laws, social insurance, national health schemes, and most kinds of government labor-management relations.

The league's commitment to the AFL was increasingly destructive. As O'Neill states: "Louise Altheimer, noting the League's failure to act

n its own initiative after the AFL refused to grant separate charters to male locals, observed: "It is only by showing their strength, and their apacity for independent action if not recognized on an equal footing ith men, that the wage earning women can hope to gain their rightful lace beside the men with whom they must compete in industry."[31] dded to this was the league's abandonment of organizing work, alough this was its original goal. Since the war, the league had become creasingly preoccupied with its internal structure and less involved ith its organizational work. In 1926, when its school for organizers as disbanded and its real contact with working women severed, the ague's educational committee voted to concentrate on training branch fficers.[32]

In all these ways, the internal contradictions and built-in weaknesses anifested themselves in the 1920s. The National Women's Trade Unon League's inability to organize an army of working women guaranted that female employees would continue to be leaderless, anonyous individuals in a corporate society where organization was the nskilled worker's only salvation.

I. The 1930s

ne of the Women's Trade Union League's most energetic workers uring the difficult decade of the 1920s was Rose Schneiderman, who ecame its national president in 1928 and remained in that office for the ext twenty years. She started working in a department store for $2.75 a eek in 1907, and later became a cap maker and participant in the aist-makers' strike in 1909. In 1908, she became an organizer for the ague. She had seen firsthand, as had Nestor and Anderson, the evils of eatshop conditions and the exploitation of women workers.

Under the New Deal administration, Rose Schneiderman became the ly woman member of the National Recovery Administration's Labor dvisory Board. Because of her knowledge and experience on labor fairs, she participated in the NRA's task of setting work codes for dustries and dealing with wage and hour issues. Although she was ot a member of the Democratic party (she was part of Sidney Hillan's American Labor party), she was a close friend of the Roosevelts. 1937, she became the secretary of the New York State Labor Department, a position she held until 1944. Like Mary Anderson, at the omen's bureau she worked within the structure of government and enly believed in the need for working women to receive protective eatment. She had faith in the democratic and capitalistic structure

and thought that the system could and would adjust itself to accommodate working women.[33]

Rose Schneiderman and the league had been old friends of Eleanor Roosevelt. One story has it that after FDR's election in 1933, Eleanor visited Rose and asked her about the league's budget. When she heard that money was tight, she pledged to give $300 a week for twelve weeks.[34] Eleanor had a long-standing commitment to working women and their need for protective legislation. Despite Schneiderman's friendship with the Roosevelts and her position on the Labor Advisory Board of the NRA, the league did not seem to make a positive impression on administrative actions. According to Sochen, many codes devised by the NRA had lower wages for women doing the same work as men; the difference ran from five cents to twenty-five cents an hour. In Fall River, Massachusetts, in the garment factories that had traditionally employed women, women were working a forty-eight-hour week earning a maximum of fifteen cents an hour for a total weekly wage of $7.20. A study of Baltimore male garment workers showed that their wages ranged from $8.25 for a forty-hour week to $10.19 for a fifty-hour week. In the textile mills of the South, women worked nights and suffered under terrible conditions.

New Deal agencies such as the CCC did not employ women, although over 1,000,000 of the unemployed were women. In 1935, out of 1,600,000 workers engaged in government projects, only 142,000 were women. The Economy Act of 1933, especially article 213, discriminated against women when both husband and wife worked for the government. The article stated that if layoffs were necessary, the wife should be dismissed first as an economy measure. According to the Federal Office of Education, married women were barred from teaching in more than fifty per cent of the representative American cities. Various states passed laws barring jobs to a married woman whose husband had an income above $100.00 a month.[35]

The situation did not look good for the working women of America. The discrepancy was inordinate between women working for five cents an hour in an unventilated textile mill, and Frances Perkins as secretary of labor. It does indeed seem tragic that, at a moment in history when a president and his wife were committed to women's rights, and when there existed a significant number of women's organizations and leaders who could provide the expertise for responsible governmental positions, a serious economic depression prevented the realization of women's equality. The dilemma of working women, however, was also tied to the whole labor-union movement. Sochen states: "As labor won its right to organize and bargain collectively under the New Deal, union women, especially in the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, benefitted too. But even union women did not receive identical pay and benefits with union men. Unorganized working women (at

as unorganized working men) were the greatest sufferers during epression."[36]

e Women's Trade Union League was too weak and underfinanced effective during the 1930s. Few women in the general public ght about the woman working within the oppressive environment textile factory.

The 1940s and 1950s

e 1940s, the spirit of the 1910s had disappeared, the cautious, but is work of the league of the 1920s and 1930s had gone. The le- and lower-class women activists slipped quietly into oblivion.

e Second World War brought women into the factories in great ers, it saw the creation of Rosie the Riveter, and many women ed military uniforms. Women left home to work for the national Those women who, in steadily increasing numbers, remained in ork force after the war held lower-paid jobs in the factory and killed positions in offices. Women did not advance in the medical gal professions, nor did they become bank executives or decision s in corporations. The quality of employed women's work did se in proportion to their numbers.[37]

the 1950s, middle-class women, who in the past had the time, tion, and inclination to work for women's causes, lost their initi- According to Rothman, they no longer went to college in the numbers. In 1930, 13.7 percent of college students were women. in 1950, 30.2 percent were women. They married earlier, had en, moved to the suburbs, and engaged in a set of self-contained ime-consuming activities.[38] Although women continued to be s, the nature of the organizations they joined were different. The en's Trade Union League neither interested nor attracted the ban woman whose major organizational efforts were concentrat- the Parent-Teachers Association. The Women's Trade Union e voted to disband in 1950.

The Present

mpediment of the growth of women in trade unions continues to rious problem. Large numbers of women workers are still unor-

ganized because they work at low-paid trades in which men have little interest, and which present special problems of organization. In the fields of office work, retail and domestic work, wages lag far behind the levels of those industries where organized male unionists have won massive improvements, and from which women are, for the most part excluded. Even in those trades where women predominate and where large numbers of them are organized, they are only sparsely represented in union leadership.[39]

Despite the states where equal pay laws are on the statute books unequal pay continues to be the rule for women. A parallel is suggested with an earlier period when the first factory laws designed to protect women from certain abuses were passed. The laws remained essentially ineffective for, as Florence Kelley observed, those most deeply concerned were disfranchised and had no weapons to compel enforcement. Today, equal pay laws in states like New York remain largely ineffectual. This is not because women cannot vote, but because they have minimal representation in the leadership of trade unions which could compel the enforcement of equal pay legislation.[40] According to Rothman, the disparity in wages between men and women has widened over the past decades. In 1963, the median earnings of full-time, year-round women workers were 63 percent of those of men workers. In 1973, the figure dropped to 57 percent. Among clerical workers, women in 1965 earned 72 percent of the salaries of men, in 1973, they earned 61 percent. Women in professional and technical work earned 66 percent of men's salaries in 1962, and 63.6 percent in 1973. These figures do not necessarily indicate that employers were biased against women. Market forces have been at play. The number of women entering the work force, particularly in the less skilled positions, has been so great as to depress the pay scale. Women with higher educational achievements, however, are in greater demand for skilled positions and so have fared better. The other cause for the worsening position of women is occupational barriers due to sex stereotyping. It remains strong enough to crowd women into a few occupations and thus reduce their wages. A very rigid sense of what constitutes women's work still dominates in the work force and in society, and the consequences of that rigidity are apparent in the lower earning power of women.[41] A reduction of sex stereotyping in jobs at a time when unemployment has been rising has had the effect of bringing more women into jobs that were exclusively male. Although an absence of sex discrimination cuts both ways, it means that gains for women in some occupations are offset by losses in others. For example, the number of male elementary school teachers rose from 140,000 in 1960 to 231,000 in 1970, counterbalancing advances made among women carpenters and electricians, according to Rothman. Between 1972 and 1976, attempts to end stereotyping in the Bell Telephone System led to an increase in the

number of women in managerial positions, as well as a decrease in the total number of women working for the company. The number of male telephone operators has climbed more rapidly than the number of female operators. In all, Bell Telephone now employs 15,000 women, and in 1974, it employed 25,000 women.[42] The efforts to enforce rules against sexual discrimination have neither been wholehearted nor effective. Perhaps the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment may well represent a victory for the values of the women's movement, but, it will be the task of a future historian to evaluate whether it will assist in advancing the actual position of women, in particular the women in the labor movement.

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25. O'Neill, p. 247 (n. 17 above).

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27. Ibid., p. 245.
28. Ibid., p. 246.
29. Ibid., p. 247.
30. Gompers, p. 190 (n. 3 above).
31. O'Neill, p. 241 (n. 12 above).
32. Ibid., p. 249.
33. Sochen, p. 123 (n. 17 above).
34. Ibid., p. 58.
35. Ibid., p. 162.
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37. Ibid., p. 172.
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39. Flexner, p. 329 (n. 4 above).
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The Ideology of Some Social Work Texts

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Fourteen introductory social work textbooks published during the 1970s were reviewed, by means of a comparative content analysis, to ascertain their ideological and sociopolitical assumptions. Virtually all were found to contain assumptions about the political economic structure of society, the nature of social class and social class relationships, and the nature of social change. Contrary to our expectations, most authors stated their assumptions quite explicitly. A spectrum of assumptions was constructed, and the implications for using these textbooks were discussed.

Introduction

Introductory textbooks occupy an important though sometimes ambivalent status for social work as for other professions. In a sense, a textbook is a teacher whose influence on students is derived from its ability to impart basic concepts and perceptions which will persist long after the books themselves have been discarded. A profession should be as concerned with the nature, quality, and content of its texts as with the qualifications of those who teach in professional schools. By and large, however, this is not the case. Decisions to publish textbooks are influ-

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enced more by the economics of the publishing industry and by imperfect market research than by a profession's own assessment of students and teachers' needs. The decision to adopt a particular textbook is a consumer decision which leaves individual faculty members and faculty groups vulnerable to the pressures which affect all consumers in contemporary society.

The ambivalent status of textbooks emerges from two disparate sources: the concerns of the publishing industry and the intellectual concerns of the academic milieu. In different ways, both are somewhat isolated from the realities of social work practice. Both tend to emphasize the explicit content of textbooks, since for various reasons the currency of that content is equated with the value of the book. In the process, both may ignore the subtle ideological aspects of texts, though these are the elements whose impact on the social work profession lasts the longest. This article is an attempt to correct the imbalance in both perspectives by analyzing the ways in which introductory social work texts, through their definitions and descriptions of professional social work activities, develop explicit as well as implicit views of the social and political contexts in which these activities take place. In order to analyze these views, one must also ask how a text defines professional practice itself, both explicitly and implicitly. In short, this article is concerned with the manifest and latent ideological content of introductory social work textbooks.

Manifest and Latent Ideological Content

Discussing textbooks in another discipline, Anyon has noted

> the possibility that an ideology is expressed in the content that might, despite the claim of objectivity, serve the interests of some groups in society over others. Ideology is defined here as an explanation or interpretation of social reality which, although presented as objective, is demonstrably partial in that it expresses the social priorities of certain political, economic, or other groups. Ideologies are weapons of group interest; they justify and rationalize, they legitimate group power, activities, and needs. An ideological version of a historical period, for example, involves information selection and organization that provides an interpretation of social events and hierarchies that predispose attitudes and behaviors in support of certain groups.[1]

The present use of ideology as expression of group interest may be distinguished from the use of the concept as a symbol system and world view. The interest theory of ideology also has a different focus from the view *that ideology is a rationalization of cultural, social, or psychological strain*.[2]

At the manifest level, books contain many statements of fact and value. Some authors are more meticulous than others in identifying which statements are which. They are aware of students' natural tendency to view even idiosyncratic statements by authors of texts as definitive statements on behalf of the entire profession. Consequently, the latent content of textbooks may be as important as the manifest. It is now clear, for example, that latent content about appropriate gender roles informed earlier social work texts.[3] Ideological content about sex and sexism, race and racism, the role of government in social welfare, and theories of human and social behavior characterized past generations of social work texts. Some of this content was invisible at the time and has been made apparent by hindsight. Part of it, however, was not indiscernible and might have lent itself to systematic study had this been attempted.

Whatever answer one accepts to the sixty-five-year-old question, "Is social work a profession?" there is widespread agreement on the need to examine the value bases and world views which inform the teaching and practice of social work. Critics of social work practice, as well as those who question its full-fledged professional status, are generally in agreement that it does possess one aspect of a profession—a self-conscious system of values, an ideology. What Gil calls the "clusters of related and mutually reinforcing values" which combine to form coherent ideological systems represent the generalized and abstracted choices of the social work profession about social goals. Although there has been considerable debate during the past twenty years about the chief attributes or emphases within social work's ideology, the existence and fundamental consistency of that ideology have rarely been challenged. It is also widely acknowledged that social policies and programs will be based on prevailing ideologies and on "particular constructions of social reality implicit in such ideologies."[4]

These clusters of values, or ideologies, also provide the foundation for the principles of professional ethics. According to Levy, such value preferences derive from the social work profession's incorporation of those societal values "that apply to professional conduct and condition the community's or society's sanctioning of the profession." The ethical concerns of social work, therefore, "derive from values to which it has committed itself and which constitute premises for the professional conduct of its members."[5]

Yet, there has been little challenge to or examination of the underlying assumptions about the political and social structures of the society within which social work operates and on which work ethics are established. As Mannheim pointed out, each profession or social institution has an ideology immanent within its substance and process.[6] The operative set of assumptions about the political and social order can be masked by a posture of professional objectivity or by a declaration of

the profession's universal and incontrovertible mission and ideals. Yet unstated ideological positions behind the professional mystique have been shaped by the prevailing ethos of the society and the relationships between the profession and established political and social institutions.

In fact, dominant social values have strongly influenced social work practice since the emergence of the profession. The earliest social workers accepted the prevailing ethos which established the goals of practice: "to Americanize the immigrants and impose industrial discipline on the working class."[7] Around the turn of the century, Gladden remarked that the urban mass—the bulk of social work's clientele—"must be civilized, educated, inspired with new ideas."[8] As the social work profession became a part of the institutional fabric of American society, the tendency to obscure its ideological underpinnings grew stronger.

In his landmark article, "The Professional Ideology of Social Pathologists," C. Wright Mills pointed out that "if the members of an academic profession are recruited from similar social contexts and if their backgrounds and careers are relatively similar, there is a tendency for them to be uniformly set for some common perspective. The common conditions of their profession often seem more important. . . . Within such a generally homogeneous group there tends to be fewer divergent points of view . . . ."[9] Reviewing a selection of social problems texts, some of them widely used in social work curricula of their time, Mills argued that the perspectives of authors, while not explicit, are predetermined by the facts selected for analysis and discussion. This phenomenon is particularly acute among social workers, because, as Mills pointed out, their "similarity of origin and the probable lack of any continuous 'class experience' of the group of thinkers decrease their chances to see social structures rather than a scatter of situations. The mediums of experience and orientation through which they respectively view society are too similar, too homogeneous to permit the clash of diverse angles which, through controversy, might lead to the construction of a whole."[10] In other words, "ideas and theories derived from training provide a basis for ideologies and a means of communicating, often in a taken-for-granted way, with immediate colleagues and interested outsiders."[11] For example, nativist and agrarian biases led authors of the texts Mills reviewed to view urban ethnic diversity and nonassimilation as social problems. Bigotry and discrimination, however, were not defined as social problems.

The implication of Mills's finding is that schools and teachers of social work have a clear responsibility to make explicit the ideology on which the theory and practice of the profession are based. It follows that the basic texts which introduce students to major practice concepts and issues should be written in such a manner that their ideological assumptions are stated clearly. Before we began our study of textbooks,

it was our impression that the ideological underpinnings of texts convey subtle ideological messages about the nature of society, social class, politics, economics, and cultural values; and that these are expressed as "givens" by the textbook authors, while alternative world views to these "givens" are not presented. We assumed that all practice texts were "political" because of the phenomena with which social work is concerned, but we thought that rarely was such political content stated openly.

Support for the expectation that texts will have latent political content may be found in the reflections of Elliot Mishler, who questions whether social behaviors in general have any meanings divorced from their personal and social context.[12] He addresses what he calls "the context-stripping methods of our traditional model of science" and points to the significance of context in a situation of therapeutic communication. He might well have been addressing himself to the several definitions of professional practice, activities which lose their meanings when they are divorced from their social and institutional context. Carol Meyer makes this point in telling fashion: "Constructs of any kind focus our vision, thus we must at least be aware of the myths and metaphors we use, for they are fictions that might serve as the basis of an idea. But when the fictions are mistaken for reality, we tend to clasp them as our truth."[13]

Since all texts acknowledge, with varying emphases, the role of environment or context in the formation of individual and social problems and in the development of appropriate interventive modes to solve them, a writer's view of the environment and its components has a significant impact on a book's description and analysis of the tenets of social work practice. Students who use a text acquire a definition of practice skills based on conceptions of the political and social order without necessarily understanding the ideological foundation on which the author has constructed a practice edifice. Uninformed acceptance of such definitions may, in the long run, be counterproductive for the professional goals espoused by both teachers and students. It is naive, at best, to expect students to develop into competent practitioners unless they recognize the relationship between the theories on which their practice is based and the consequent perspectives on social problems and social policy derived from them. One motivation for undertaking the present study was the hope that increased awareness of the underlying assumptions which inform concepts of social work practice will make that practice more consistent with the articulated values of the profession and more effective in the attainment of its goals.

A caveat is necessary. It is not our position that social work practice can be enriched only by a careful examination of its ideological underpinnings, nor is it our position that an understanding of political, social, and economic forces and the perspectives one takes on them are

the sole determinants of effective professional practice. Immanent ideologies should neither be ignored nor magnified; rather, they deserve careful study and explication. This is what has been attempted here.

Method

In selecting the books to be analyzed, we quickly realized that the proliferation of texts makes an exhaustive review impossible. Our intention was to obtain an accurate impression of the range of ideas within social work texts during the 1970s, a decade within which the majority of current practitioners received their formal educations. To achieve this objective, several initial criteria were developed for the selection of texts to be reviewed: (*a*) the book was a general, introductory text in social work and/or social welfare, (*b*) the book was intended for use as a primary or supplementary text for students in undergraduate or beginning-level graduate courses, and (*c*) the book was published during the 1970s.[11]

The next step in choosing a concise list of appropriate texts was obtaining information and advice from publishing houses and current social work literature. A survey was undertaken of thirty leading publishing houses which produce social work books. Citations in journals and nontextbook social work literature were gleaned from the bibliographies of introductory courses in several undergraduate and graduate programs. This process produced a pool of approximately twenty-five titles, which was reduced by the development of a stratified sample in which texts from the following categories were included: (*a*) texts which focused on the profession of social work as a whole, (*b*) texts which focused on the field of social welfare as a whole, (*c*) texts aimed primarily at the undergraduate level, (*d*) texts aimed primarily at the graduate level, and (*e*) texts which reflected the influential directions of social work practice during the 1970s. A list of ten books was produced and circulated to colleagues and other social work educators for suggestion and modification, and the final result was a list of fourteen texts (see Appendix A for a list of the texts reviewed).

The next step was to develop a list of questions which would be used in analyzing the approach of texts to a variety of ideological and sociopolitical questions. The questions selected were: (1) What assumptions does the book contain about the political-economic structure of society? (2) What assumptions does the book contain about the nature of social class and social class relationships? (3) What assumptions does the book contain about the nature of social change? In addition, gener-

al implications for a definition of social work practice were noted for each book.

An attempt to answer these questions has been made through the use of a comparative content analysis of the fourteen texts. This analysis examines the explicit content of each book with regard to the questions listed above, the nature of supporting evidence, particular perspectives, the stated conceptual framework of the text, the relative weight given to particular topics or points of view, and the implicit assumptions of the texts as revealed in their use of language, sequencing or weighting of causal factors, and linkages or lack of linkages of subjects and interpretations. We did not expect that each question would be addressed directly by each author; rather, the aim was to extract a fair statement of various authors' positions.

In an effort to moderate subjectivity, specific page references to texts enable the reader to examine the evidence we used to reach the conclusions. Also, the technique of comparative analysis itself provides some check on subjectivity by ensuring that any biases will be applied similarly across the board. The findings are presented in Appendix B, tables B1 and B2.

Conclusions

The limited number and the nature of the questions posed in this analysis do not provide a comprehensive review of the complete manifest and latent ideological content of the textbooks which have been studied. However, the questions do permit some observations to be made about the study's findings, the world views contained within the various texts, and the usefulness of the analysis.

A first finding of the analysis is the extent to which ideology is manifest in some of the texts reviewed. One may decry the fact that some authors of introductory social work texts leave their ideological content latent, do not make explicit their assumptions, or try to ignore the political implications of their world views, descriptions of the social work profession, and frameworks for describing practice. At the same time, one must praise those authors who make their ideologies explicit so that students and teachers may select and discuss these issues openly. The textbooks by Loewenberg, and Middleman and Goldberg are two examples among several of books which have quite different ideological bases but work hard to make these bases explicit and accessible to the student. A hypothesis proposed earlier is not supported by the review to date: only a few of the books we analyzed appear blind to any ideological stances at all.

On the other hand, there are clear differences among the books reviewed as to social, political, and economic content, and it seems that these differences are quite important for the education of professional social workers. In a sense, one can distribute these introductory textbooks over an ideological spectrum. The temptation is to visualize such a spectrum as covering a range from "Left" to "Right." These terms are used a bit unconventionally here; they do not imply that the authors adhere to all of the political views commonly associated with Left or Right positions. Rather, the idea is of a scale whose polar points describe conceptions of the relationship between societal forces and individual experiences. The Left pole, then, encompasses the position that individuals' lives are circumscribed and heavily influenced, if not determined, by political, economic, and institutional patterns within society. The Right pole attributes to individuals and families a great deal of leeway to determine their individual and interpersonal experiences.

No one book reviewed took either polar position. Rather, the books seemed to form three clusters, with a few texts occupying unique positions on the heuristic spectrum. Those books on the Left, which relate private troubles most directly to public issues and view social work as fundamentally related to social change, are by Romanyshyn, Middleman and Goldberg, Macarov, and Richan and Mendelsohn. A "centrist" position which acknowledges clearly the connections between social work clients and societal forces and events but does not deal with the need for social, political, and economic changes as overtly is taken by Pincus and Minahan, Meyer, Loewenberg, and Compton and Galaway. A third position views societal forces as part of the field within which individuals and families exist but stresses this connection largely for the purpose of understanding how to work better with those individuals and families. It avoids some questions about social change and includes Friedlander and Apte, Siporin, and Goldstein.

Three books are more difficult to classify: Federico, Morales and Sheafor, and Wodarski and Bagarozzi. Each contains a good deal of immanent but unacknowledged ideological content. The positions of the authors must be inferred and the political implications of their views of social work and social welfare elicited by the reader's analytic process. It is difficult to discern consistency in these books' ideological content.

This rough scaling of the books raises questions about the utility of the analysis. The bases on which teachers, curriculum committees, or faculties choose textbooks are not always clear. Such a scaling might be useful in the process of textbook selection. It could be employed in three ways. First, some faculties, faculty committees, or individual faculty members are committed to particular ideological positions. While teachers have the same responsibility as authors to make their ideologi-

cal positions overt and accessible to students, it makes sense for some teachers to utilize textbooks whose ideological content is consonant with their views. Simply put, a teacher reviewing a text for potential use should ask the kinds of questions posed in this analysis of the text and reach an acceptable answer. Second, some faculties and teachers are committed to teaching a comparative perspective on the hypothesis that such an approach best equips students to take a conceptual and analytic stance toward their education and their practice. In such cases, use of more than one textbook and direct teaching of the different ideological positions and their effects seem indicated.

A third way in which analysis of the kind reported here may be useful is in the differential selection of texts for different student populations and curricula. For example, some of the texts reviewed do not add much to the education of students headed for careers in the macro or systemic levels of social work practice. Those books labeled Left on the scale above suggest themselves particularly for students moving toward careers in group work and community organization; they also provide at least a basis for analysis for students moving toward administrative careers. Some of the centrist books may have particular utility for students committed to clinical practice. The atmosphere of a university and its social work program, the content of other courses, and the modal backgrounds of students all need to be considered in reaching a decision about a text.

Epilogue: Ideology and Social Work Education

George and Wilding have commented on the ways in which the evolution of social work in the United States reflects the conflict of capitalist and socialist value systems.[15] They argue that one cannot acquire an understanding of social work practice and of social policy unless these value systems and their impacts are understood. In addition, derivatives of these two value systems deserve study. It follows that an analysis of the values that inform social work texts is an essential step in the further development of social work curricula.

For over a decade, however, there has been confusion about the prevailing ideological assumptions of social work education. Galper has pointed out, for example, that often this confusion manifests itself in dissonance between the stated goals of social work practice and the conditions students experience in agency settings.[16] The absence of critical analysis of the societal context of practice in the selection of classroom and textbook content and the corresponding lack of critical

analysis from the agency point of view combine to further such confusion.

Contemporary assaults on social work policies and programs explode the myth that social work practice can generally be taught in an apolitical way. Given the current climate and resurgent interest in the ideological underpinnings of social welfare and social work practice, latent and manifest ideological contents need examination throughout social work education.

Although decisions about texts and courses are not usually based on the answer to the question, "Is social work a profession?" they are based, in part, on the answer to the often unstated query, "What sort of profession is ought social work to be?" The ideological contents of texts and courses will have a great deal of impact on answers to this question for coming decades.

Notes

1. Jean Anyon, "Ideology and United States History Textbooks," *Harvard Educational Review* 49 (August 1979): 361–89, esp. 363.

2. Ibid., footnote. It is not our purpose to pursue these subtle distinctions here, though we see substantial commonalities among the three definitions which may outweigh the differences among them.

3. See *Social Work*, vol. 21, no. 6 (November 1976), an issue entirely devoted to women. Of particular relevance are the remarks in the section "Attitudes and Theories" in Diane Kravetz, "Sexism in a Woman's Profession," in ibid.

4. David Gil, *The Challenge of Social Equality* (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1976), pp. 33–34.

5. Charles Levy, *Social Work Ethics* (New York: Human Sciences Press, 1976), pp. 81–83.

6. Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1936).

7. Christopher Lasch, *The Culture of Narcissism* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1978), p. 154.

8. Ibid., p. 165.

9. C. Wright Mills, "The Professional Ideology of Social Pathologists," *American Journal of Sociology* 49 (September 1943): 161–79, esp. 166.

10. Ibid., p. 171.

11. Stuart Rees, "How Understanding Occurs," in *Radical Social Work*, ed. Roy Bailey and Mike Brake (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976), p. 71.

12. Elliot Mishler, "Meaning in Context: Is There Any Other Kind?" *Harvard Educational Review* 49 (January 1979): 1–19.

13. Carol H. Meyer, *Social Work Practice* (New York: Free Press, 1970), p. 33.

14. This criterion, which was thought necessary in order to control to an extent for changing social and political conditions, meant that for some books we reviewed later editions have since been published.

15. Vic George and Paul Wilding, *Ideology and Social Welfare* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), p. 118.

16. Jeffry Galper, *Social Work Practice: A Radical Perspective* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1980), p. 233.

Appendix A

Textbooks Reviewed

Compton, Beulah, and Galaway, Burt. *Social Work Processes.* Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1975.

Federico, Ronald C. *The Social Welfare Institution: An Introduction.* Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath & Co., 1973.

Friedlander, Walter A., and Apte, Robert Z. *Introduction to Social Welfare.* 4th ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974.

Goldstein, Howard. *Social Work Practice: A Unitary Approach.* Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1973.

Loewenberg, Frank. *Fundamentals of Social Work Intervention.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.

Macarov, David. *The Design of Social Welfare.* New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1978.

Meyer, Carol H. *Social Work Practice.* New York: Free Press, 1970.

Middleman, Ruth R., and Goldberg, Gale. *Social Service Delivery: A Structural Approach to Social Work Practice.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1974.

Morales, Armando, and Sheafor, Bradford W. *Social Work: A Profession of Many Faces.* Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1977.

Pincus, Allen, and Minahan, Anne. *Social Work Practice: Model and Method.* Itasca, Ill.: F. E. Peacock, 1973.

Richan, Willard, and Mendlesohn, Allen. *Social Work: The Unloved Profession.* New York: New Viewpoints, 1973.

Romanyshyn, John M., with the assistance of Annie L. Romanyshyn. *Social Welfare: Charity to Justice.* New York: Random House and Council on Social Work Education, 1971.

Siporin, Max. *Introduction to Social Work Practice.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1978.

Wodarski, John, and Bagarozzi, Dennis. *Behavioral Social Work.* New York: Human Sciences Press, 1979.

Appendix B

Analyses of Texts

Table B1

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FOURTEEN INTRODUCTORY SOCIAL WORK/SOCIAL WELFARE TEXTS

Authors	Assumptions about Political-Economic Structure of Society	Assumptions about the Nature of Social Class and Class Relationships	Assumptions about the Nature of Social Change	Implications for Definition of Social Work Practice
Morales and Sheafor	Peculiarly ambiguous stance. Pt. 1 is fairly benevolent and optimistic about a free market economy and range of redistributive programs (68-70) despite "hodgepodge" characterization (71). Pt. 2 has frequent overt and implicit criticism about institutionalized forms of discrimination (289-311) but these are attributed to ignorance or cultural insensitivity of the dominant population, without allusion to issues of broader political economy.	No specific reference to issues of social class. "Special populations" are defined largely in terms of racial, ethnic, sexual or cultural oppression; their problems are not connected to the overall functioning of American society.	Recognizing that "social change efforts have always been part of social work" (343) the authors take a pragmatic view and leave to each social worker the weighing of the consequences of social activism (69, 129-29, 343).	Preference for client "empowerment" to direct or radical action by social workers themselves (344-46).
Loewenberg	Agrees with Parsons that "at the highest level of generality . . . there is . . . a single relatively well-integrated and fully institutionalized system of values in American society" (10). Since the preservation of these values, particularly the work ethic, takes precedence over the satisfaction of human needs, the political and social structures they "inform" not only comprise the "content" of social work practice but also set limits to the help social workers can offer (29, 122).	Clearly views social class distinctions and racial and cultural biases as acute problems linked to the broader political and social structure (101). Argues that "every society will resist those changes which it believes will threaten the established order" (85).	Both social problems and social change are viewed as multicausal (13-19). Distinguishes between societal and social change, the former within and the latter outside established institutional arrangements.	Makes room for bringing about change by social intervention both at the individual and systemic levels (13-19).

Wodarski and Bagarozzi	Takes an essentially narrow view of the role of political and social institutions which exist simultaneously to guarantee individual rights and stimulate or reinforce appropriate individual behavior Assumes that "laws of social behavior can be formulated" to solve and prevent problems (253, 258 323) provided that adequate experimentation is conducted and perceives no potential conflict between such experimentation and individual civil liberties	Since the approach tends to focus on individual behavior there is little discussion of social stratification either as a cause of problems or a factor in their treatment The social learning theory woven into the analysis presupposes the absence of structural barriers to behavioral change, despite the explicit critique of the effectiveness of existing social and political structures	Takes a naive view of relationship between social actions and social change—argues, e g , that a first step in a social action strategy should be the demand for more adequate social conditions in return for political support, to be followed, where necessary by various "punishment strategies," including economic boycotts (264-65)	Stresses the importance of macro level intervention, but change strategies are described largely in terms of promoting adaptive individual behavior to existing environmental conditions or value sets rather than attempts to alter or remedy social conditions
Richan and Mendlesohn	Political structure viewed as neither monolithic nor benevolent Despite a "liberal" veneer the political and social structures and its representative institutions are basically uncomfortable with social work goals when these goals venture outside the realm of psychological intervention Weak support for social equity out of a need to avert social disorder Divergent analysis includes two notions—political structure oppressively manipulates social workers or failures arise from insensitivity ignorance and pettiness—and does not decide between them (11 32-33, 4	Recognizes that social stratification and its consequences provide the major justification for the existence of social work and for the profession's failure to engage the problems of the poor in a meaningful way (191)	Considers social change the outcome of "macro" environmental forces in the economic social, and political systems shaped through the interaction of organized interest groups and classes Criticizes the lack of such activity among social workers (150, 189, Mendlesohn predicts hat social change will occur in spite of the efforts of social workers whose "professionalism" is eroding activism 93	Richan calls on social workers to close the gap between their rhetoric and their practice (140-42) Mendlesohn goes further to attack the profession for its failure to act on social realities, its tendency to help and its tendency to help prop up the system in bad times and good

Table B1 *(Continued)*

Authors	Assumptions about Political-Economic Structure of Society	Assumptions about the Nature of Social Class and Class Relationships	Assumptions about the Nature of Social Change	Implications for Definition of Social Work Practice
Compton and Galaway	Considers political and social structures as aspects of an environment often in disequilibrium with the needs or aspirations of individuals. One aspect of these structures is the incessant demand for "a minimum degree of conformity and compliance by its participants" (122). Implies that the democratically-conceived institutions of the United States have "strayed or evolved into a complex and disordered society" (24).	Regards social class as an important variable in the origins of individual and social problems and, particularly, in the formulation of appropriate interventions (98-99, 123, 175, 179, 197, 217, 221, 437). Ironically, the awareness of social class distinction is applied solely toward the enhancement of individual rights and potential.	Conception of social change complements the views on social class. Sees social change as gradual and multicausal. Criticizes views of change which focus only on the deepest levels of personality or the macrolevel of society. Like the Loewenberg text, considers changing the environment and the individual as complementary, evolutionary processes.	In this "complex and often disordered society," "the function of social work" is to mediate the individual-social transaction as it has worked out in the specific context of those agencies which are designed to bring together individual needs and social resources" (24). This mediation should occur on the level of the individual, family, and community.
Siporin	Regards the political and social structures as "significant components of the environmental system whose purpose is to attain maximum productivity, [develop] and [reward] ability, [protect] the inept or less able . . . and [make] optimal use of the more and less able in the social division of labor" (4). The political structure reflects the framework of public institutions which provide necessary resources of facilities to meet demonstrated social and political structures to maintain the mutual goals of individual self-realization and societal well being . . . (19-20).	Makes no special distinction for social class differences as either a cause of social dysfunction or a factor in its correction. At no point does Siporin indicate that class is an inescapable element in the etiology or treatment of individual and social problems, although it can be an intervening variable in some circumstances (221-35).	Does not specifically define social change; appears to equate it with social reform—legislative change, reorganization of existing social institutions, shifting priorities in the distribution of resources or the provision of services, and a reorientation of cultural value to produce different concepts of social need (8, 16, 26, 140, 249, 317, 342). Concern with the dynamism of social processes underscores acceptance of the crescive aspect of change.	Social workers must be cognizant of the part society and its institutions play in shaping personal distress and an individual's alternatives of action (240). Social workers must also act to counter the tendencies of the social and political structures to direct services and resources away from the most needy classes (316). Gives considerable attention, therefore, to the role of social workers in "public and collective efforts to resolve public issues . . . and to effect institutional reform and social change" (6).

Macarov	Pointedly argues that "the political structure, as well as the [political] process can affect" the development of social work practice (105). Describes the economic motivation for social welfare as "either a desire to reduce the cost of social problems or because sufferers from such problems hurt the economy in various ways" (110). Considers the political structure of the United States as designed to serve the interests of a modified free-market economy within a modern industrial society.	Makes few specific references to social class, but the position on the role of economic and political systems in shaping society and its problems implies a recognition of a dynamic view of class and the significance of class distinctions in the distribution of resources and power.	Social change is viewed on the macrolevel, i.e., as fundamental alterations in the manner by which resources are produced and distributed, in the subsequent reordering of the social hierarchy and the political institutions which reflect it, and in the impact of technological advances on social life and culture (234).	Social workers should be aware o the economic, political and ideological context in which practice occurs. They should b conscious of the political and economic motivations behind the creation of social welfare institutions, particularly of th role social welfare has played a vehicle to maintain social control and existing political economic relationships.
Meyer	Emphasis is primarily on urban settings. Views individuals in American society as fighting a battle for individualization against the powerful forces of industrialization (10–11). While there is some room for individual perceptions to make a difference, "the decline in the influence of the family and the resultant loss of intimacy in people's lives" (98) poses severe dangers of the submergence of individuals and their needs.	Social class is *not* presented as an important mediating concept between the individual and society; social institutions are. Thus class relationships are not crucial in the analysis.	Social change is presented as occurring on three levels (23–25): (a) in basic institutions, (b) within individuals themselves, and (c) at a middle level which focuses both on individuals and on social institutions. Social institutional change is crucial in the analysis for the "ecological perspective" on the contemporary city (73–75).	Social workers must be cognizant of the constant and dynamic interaction between political and economic forces and individual phenomena.

Table B1 (*Continued*)

Authors	Assumptions about Political-Economic Structure of Society	Assumptions about the Nature of Social Class and Class Relationships	Assumptions about the Nature of Social Change	Implications for Definition of Social Work Practice
Friedlander and Apte	Views the political structure of society as incremental and progressive in the sense that more humane and effective measures evolve from incremental progress. Progress is brought about by the impact of individuals and small groups who assume social leadership and bring about reform and change	Particularly sensitive to historical continuities (e.g., 35-37) overtly utilizes social class as a concept in social analysis	Social change is viewed largely in formal terms and measured by the passage of legislation establishing or eliminating programs for social welfare	Emphasis on efforts to produce change in a rational manner largely as a result of the efforts of effective leaders. Little, if any, concern is given to the problem of differential accessibility to leadership roles
Goldstein	Takes an essentially benign view of society. Unique among the books reviewed in that it regards industrial society as having split into the very rich and the very poor (21-22)	Views industrial society as split into two major classes, the very rich and the very poor. Attention is paid to the embeddedness of individuals in regional and national political economic or social processes	Has a rationalist view of social change, i.e., rejects all forms of determinism, including social determinism	Social work viewed as fitting into the general goals and processes of society, as made clear by the concern with the processes by which social work practice is legitimated. Social work is "an expression of society's recognition and concern with conditions which militate against salutory forms of social living by its members" (6)

Romanyshyn	Asserts that "social welfare can not be understood apart from our society—its material, scientific and human resources and its structure of values that allocates [them]. Economic growth and the democratization of society have transformed our notions of welfare. . . . In the transition from pre-industrial to 19th century *laissez-faire* capitalism to our present post-industrial society, varying and often conflicting concepts of welfare have developed" (5).	Spells out with considerable care and clarity the relationship between social class and economic organization.	The nature of social change is intertwined with the search for justice, a central ideological theme. Less clear about the fundamental drive or energy which impels social change other than the moral imperatives which arise from perceived injustice.	Social workers must acknowledge the societal causes of individual problems and the collective responsibility of service providers to "redress inequities, develop capacities and open new opportunities to participate in society" (27-28). Social work should focus, therefore, on economic, social, and political issues and how they may be resolved in "a manner consistent with our concept of justice" (28) rather than on problems.
Federico	Tends to view society as a whole, its forms, and its institutions as givens. Devotes considerable effort to underscoring changes in social institutions (e.g., the family) but gives scant attention to historical change in the organization of society as a whole. The history of social welfare is presented as a series of rather discrete actions and event. Little mention of the interrelationship among values and social, political, and economic phenomena.	Sees historical developments as the outcome of actions by individuals and groups—e.g., "a group of committed citizens called Progressives" (23)—who respond to social conditions, with no specific relationship to the class division of society.	Emphasis placed on continuity of issues, ways in which similar issues reappear at various times in history. Considerable attention paid to the point that expressions of social values are defined differently by different generations. Fundamentally optimistic about social change, reflected in view of the history of social welfare as "the progressive expansion of the group for which responsibility is felt from the family to the entire society" (12).	Identifies traditional methods as casework, group work, and community organization and also "new practice perspectives" which stress generic commonalities described as "in an early stage of development" (153). Attributes to some renewed legitimacy of the "use of conflict, when necessary, to insure the rights of the needy" (153). New perspectives include Teare and McPheeter's twelve roles and Dolgoff's seven modes of intervention, as well as Bisno's typology of social work interventions. All social workers are to be competent in all methods.

Table B1 (*Continued*)

Authors	Assumptions about Political-Economic Structure of Society	Assumptions about the Nature of Social Class and Class Relationships	Assumptions about the Nature of Social Change	Implications for Definition of Social Work Practice
Pincus and Minahan	Quite self-analytical about views of society. Regards it as a power reservoir into which individuals and institutions concerned with human welfare should learn to dip. Attempt made to cite and reinforce Mills's distinction between private troubles and public issues as well as Schwartz's warning against drawing too rigid a dichotomy between them (13-14)	Concept of social class analytically employed, with emphases on the middle class and the poor but little mention of elite social strata	Sees change as occurring in both crescive and planned ways. Remarks that "the reliance on planned change itself ultimately rests on a number of value assumptions: man should not passively accept his condition, but actively intervene to change it; men should make rational use of valid knowledge; man should be future oriented and plan ahead and so forth" (43)	Takes a sophisticated approach to social agencies as economic and political entities. Urges social workers to make conscious use of knowledge in change efforts on both individual and societal levels (143)
Middleman and Goldberg	Begins with attack on overconsumption and the use of capitalist concepts of human service delivery. Views societal segments as pitted against each other by "the economic-political exigencies of the times," "for it is simply incomprehensible to find and attack the more abstract common enemy—a system of economic arrangements that has produced an industrial technology far out of line with the social arrangements needed to live with it" (4). In short, economics and political institutions are the sources of many private troubles	Views the composition of social classes and the relationship between them as the outcome of the political-economic structure of society. Regards the nature of social class relationships as essentially one of conflict rather than cooperation or accommodation	Of all the texts reviewed, this is the most explicit about the nature of social change. Social change refers to fundamental changes in the economic arrangements within society and the corresponding changes in the relationships between individuals and society. Also refers to ecological concerns about the relationships between people and natural resources, as well as to the possibility of normative change in values placed on production and consumption	While emphasis is placed on the relationship between individual problems and societal institutions, it is made clear that a social worker need not await major social change in order to help individuals and small groups. An understanding of the social and political-economic context of practice is essential, however, as is an awareness of the role of values in defining social problems and their alternative solutions

Table B2

Summary of Ideological Content of Fourteen Social Work Social Welfare Texts

Authors	Political-Economic Structure Assumptions	Social Class Assumptions	Social Change Assumptions	Social Work Practice Assumptions
Morales and Sheafor	Ambiguous, two parts strike different notes	No specific reference to class	Pragmatic view: each worker needs to decide	"Empowerment" strategies favored
Loewenberg	Explicit: derive from structural-functionalism	Class distinctions linked to structure	Centrist, emphasizing potential and limits	Two levels: individual and systemic complementary
Wodarski and Bagarozzi	None explicated, imply incremental view	Not viewed as major element	Simply linked with individual behaviors	Individual level and macro-levels of intervention
Richan and Mendlesohn	Two explicit views: incremental and radical	Major concepts for social work	Viewed as outcome of macro forces	Call for rapprochement between words and deeds
Compton and Galaway	"Complex and often disordered society"	Important for origins and problem solutions	Gradual and multicausal	Micro and macro change efforts complementary
Siporin	Explicit: social welfare linked to society	Viewed as intervening variable	Social reform and redistribution of resources	Unity in diversity is theme
Macarov	Political-economic systems shape society	Implies dynamic view of class distinctions	Fundamental changes in resource distribution	Social work as part of social welfare system
[illegible]	Individualization vs industrialization	Not crucial: institutional change is vital	Centrist: emphasizing three levels of change	Ecological perspective
Goldstein	Essentially benign view of societal progress	Increasingly two classes, rich and poor	Rationalist, nondeterminist	Fits general societal goals and processes
Romanyshyn	Postindustrial society linked with social welfare	Important, based on economic system	Intertwined with search for social justice	Moral imperatives are important
Federico	Social structure seen as givens	No explicit consideration	Optimistic about social progress	Series of practice principles
Pincus and Minahan	Society as power reservoir explicitly	Used as major analytic concept	Interrelated with resource allocation and power issues	Sophisticated view of agencies is noteworthy
Friedlander and Apte	Optimistic, sensitive to historical continuities	Overt emphasis in historical analysis	Formal terms, often measured by legislation	Social work as implementation of policy
Middleman and Goldberg	Economic-technical roots of social problems	Class distinctions crucial	Economic changes needed to enable human changes	Link private troubles with public issues

Problems of Implementing Social Welfare Policy: Welfare and Education in Israel

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This paper examines the abilities of the ministries of education and welfare in Israel to implement their policies and programs on the municipal level. Significantly, each provides services which are the primary responsibility of the national government. The focus is on the vertical administrative linkages between the national ministries, municipalities, and other bodies involved in the implementation of ministry policy. The issue to be dealt with is the degree to which these linkages help the respective ministries to implement these policies and the extent to which local authorities and others influence these policies.

Many political scientists assume that unitary political systems are able to implement domestic policies better than federal political systems. Whereas territorial jurisdiction in federal systems can significantly influence, even veto, national policies and programs, their unitary counterparts are less powerful. Consequently, unitary systems are considered more likely to deal successfully with domestic social problems.[1]

By almost any definition Israel is a unitary political system.[2] All

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thority lies with national institutions which delegate limited and specific powers to local authorities. The latter have no independent constitutional authority and require the approval of the Ministry of Interior to enact municipal ordinances, budgets, and taxes. To test the assumption about implementation and unitary systems this paper examines the ability of two ministries in Israel, education and welfare, to implement their policies and programs on the municipal level.[3] Significantly, each provides services which are the primary responsibility of the national government. The focus is on the vertical administrative linkages between the national ministries, municipal authorities, and other bodies involved in the implementation of ministry policy. The question to be dealt with is, To what degree do these linkages help the respective ministries in implementing their policies, on the one hand, and to what extent do local authorities and others influence those policies, on the other? The linkages studied are the arrangements for provision, funding, employment, regulation, and supervision. As Wirt argues, "The way in which a state distributes its authority to subordinate administrative and political agencies could condition the kinds of outcomes achieved."[4]

This paper is in the tradition of studies on implementation by Pressman and Wildavsky, Derthick, and Bardach which ask whether "the intergovernmental system succeeds or fails in translating general policy objectives into concrete and meaningful public services."[5] At the same time it touches on issues raised by Lineberry and by Levy, Meltsner, and Wildavsky about the allocation of policy outputs—who gets what, how, and where.[6] While their interest is with actual resource allocation within a city, this paper studies the potential effect of the linkages on the distribution between municipalities in a single country. It is also concerned with the issue of input equality, in terms of services provided.[7] Ideally, equal provision means that any citizen eligible to receive services from either ministry will also have access to similar services provided by equally competent professionals regardless of the municipality in which he or she lives.

Although based on the case study of a single country, the findings and anlysis are of considerable interest and value. The unitary character of the political system and the centralized role and function granted both ministries makes Israel an ideal case in which to examine the hypotheses concerning the ability of unitary systems to implement national policies and programs. Similarly, Israel's size facilitates a study of distribution of policy outputs within a single political system. The findings lend themselves to comparison with similar works on the effects of administrative arrangements for implementation of welfare and educational systems in both unitary and federal systems. They also permit evaluation of theoretical works on resource allocation in different types of political systems.

Study and Findings

This study is based on field research I conducted during the summer of 1977 to evaluate the actual provision of welfare and educational services in five Israeli communities—Beer-Sheva, Rechovot, Ramle, Kiryat Gat, and Gedera.[8] The five are typical of various categories of Israeli communities in population, size, ecology, demography, and type.[9] In addition, I reviewed relevant literature on implementation and education and welfare policies in Israel.[10]

Using an approach influenced by Grodzin's and Elazar's studies of municipal services in American communities, I investigated the roles and functions of the municipality, national ministries, and public and private bodies in the arrangements for provision, funding, employment, regulation, and inspection of the respective municipal services. An open-ended questionnaire was used in extensive interviews with the mayors, municipal department heads, and senior staff of the five communities.

The centralized nature of the political system and the exclusive formal policymaking roles of the two ministries contribute to a reasonable expectation that they will be able to implement policies and programs in accord with declared priorities and objectives. The Ministry of Welfare is committed to meeting the special needs of the socially deprived and to helping them participate in the social, economic, and educational systems.[12] Similarly, education is seen as a major way to alleviate social and economic inequality and to "advance . . . individual excellence."[13] "The goal of public policy [is] to equalize education opportunity, and to 'democratize' secondary and higher education by reducing the social economic barriers to their accessibility."[14] Since 1960 the ministry has pursued a compensatory policy of "differential treatment according to needs" for communities and schools, depending upon the number of culturally disadvantaged students.[15]

These objectives call for fairly uniform and standard services adjusted for need on the municipal level. However, the field study and other evidence reveal an unequal distribution of resources by both ministries without a correlation to need. The poorer "problem" communities offer fewer services, by less qualified professionals, than the more established communities. The findings are as follows.

Distribution of welfare services was uniform to eligible persons in local communities only in financial assistance to the needy and to persons in special categories, in the placement of eligible persons in institutions sponsored or supervised by the ministry, and in those services delivered directly by the ministry at the local level.[16] However most other services are neither uniform nor adjusted to need. Social services for families, youth, the elderly, and the retarded, rehabilitation

programs, and community services vary significantly in terms of provision, scale, and quality among the five communities. The differences reflect the social, economic, political, and professional resources of the particular municipality. The poorer communities provide less and are thus least able to meet the needs of eligible clients.

The situation in education is similar. While fixed services such as prekindergarten, kindergarten, primary, and secondary schools are provided in almost all the communities, the level, diversity, and quality of the services and staff vary significantly. While some differences are due to ecological factors of size and location, for smaller communities unable to provide what larger communities can the problem is more complex.[17] There is a class and cultural imbalance in the provision of municipal education facilities and services. The significant difference, which cuts across the urban-rural and size divisions, is between places inhabited predominantly by "old timers" and those populated almost exclusively by more recent immigrants from non-European countries.[18] The latter communities have inferior schools and teachers. Despite similar services, therefore, children receive very different educations depending on where they live.[19]

These findings are surprising when we consider the government's commitment to equality of opportunity and the unitary character of the political system. A partial but important explanation is found in the vertical administrative linkages between the different levels of government responsible for policy implementation. As Ostrom argues, "Institutional arrangements *do* make a difference."[20] The following sections analyze how the various linkages affect implementation of policy and programs of the ministries of welfare and education, respectively.

Provision

Welfare.—The local welfare agencies, municipal officials, the ministry, and other governmental, public, and voluntary bodies are involved in at least four different and complex arrangements for the delivery of municipal welfare services. In the first, ministry personnel provide the services directly at the local level.[21] This maximizes the ministry's implementation role while minimizing local input and influence. In the second, the local agency administers ministry financial and material assistance programs and refers eligible persons to institutions or programs operated or coordinated by the ministry. In both cases, the local agency, under ministry supervision, processes the recipients and the participants at little local expense. While in principle the ministry

makes policy, issues guidelines, and supervises implementation, the local agency influences, even within the context of its delineated role, the character of the particular service or program.

In the third arrangement, the local agency operates the social service programs of the ministry, which funds most of the budget, issues guidelines and regulations, and inspects the local operation. The municipality, however, has the prerogative to decide on the provision and scale of the services.

Finally, voluntary, private, or other local or national bodies in cooperation with the local welfare agency and or ministry, supply certain services. This arrangement gives the local voluntary organization or autonomous body influence over both policy and program. Nevertheless, the local welfare agency and, to a lesser extent, the ministry exert influence: the ministry both funds and regulates many of these bodies, and the local agency's refusal to cooperate can hinder their efforts significantly. Moreover, in the case of local public corporations for services to the elderly, the mayor, in accord with corporation guidelines, appoints the members of the local executive board.

Education.—For purposes of analysis municipal educational services can be divided into two categories: kindergarten and primary, and prekindergarten and secondary systems. In each the roles, functions, and influence over program and policy of the ministry, municipality, and other bodies differ significantly.

In the summer of 1977 kindergarten and primary grades one through eight were part of the compulsory school system.[22] While the law and ministry regulations require the municipality to build, equip, operate, and maintain these schools, the ministry provides curriculum, programs, and professional staff including principals and teachers. Importantly, the ministry offers these services and resources for two different educational systems, state religious and state secular.[23] Elected municipal officials decide whether to operate schools of one or both national systems.[24] Parents may choose either system for their children or may elect to send them to a ministry-recognized private school.[25]

In addition, there are a number of optional and required supplementary and special education services in the primary schools. In both systems considerable freedom is given to the local municipality to determine the extent, level, quality, and allocation of the services.[26]

The second category includes prekindergarten and secondary education institutions, whose provision by municipalities, voluntary women's organizations, and other religious, political, and governmental bodies was voluntary in 1977.[27] Although here the roles and influence of the participants are different, as with compulsory education the ministry depends on others to implement its policies.

Municipal secondary education takes one of three forms: academic, vocational, and comprehensive with both vocational and academic

programs. In general, municipalities provide either academic or comprehensive high schools, while private organizations and other ministries operate national networks of vocational schools.[28] The municipality and private sponsors build, equip, and maintain their respective secondary schools and hire teachers and principals. The ministry in turn provides guidelines for administration, finance, pedagogy, and hiring of staff. The municipality sets admission criteria and determines placement within its schools. Although in principle individual sponsors set policy for independent vocational systems, both ministry and municipalities use financial and other means to influence those policies.

In conclusion, there are many providers of educational services on all levels in Israeli municipalities. Technically, the ministry does not provide services directly; rather the local department of education and other private and governmental bodies implement ministry policies and programs. *Since the arrangements for provision are the foundation* of the other vertical linkages, they give the municipality and other school operators some influence over ministry policy and programs. The extent of that influence is determined by the character of other linkages.

Funding

Welfare.—The ministry funds 100 percent of certain categories of financial assistance for the needy without limiting the number of eligible recipients to a particular community. Here the role of the local agency is technical: to determine eligibility and level of support according to ministry guidelines and inspection. The agency's input is, therefore, inversely proportional to the quality of ministry regulation and inspection. In other categories of financial and material assistance, the ministry allocates a set sum to the local agency. The sum is usually insufficient to meet the needs of persons eligible according to the ministry criteria, and a supplement from the municipality is often required even for minimal provision. Because some communities are more willing and able to provide additional funds, the level of provision of these ministry services may reflect the level of the municipal supplement. In any case, the local agency decides how to allocate the limited aid to those eligible persons.

A similar arrangement exists for social services. The ministry usually funds up to 75 percent of operating costs, and the municipality must provide the balance in the form of matching funds.[29] Although the

financial involvement of the ministry suggests greater influence at the municipal level, this is not always the case.

In principle this arrangement gives elected councils the power to veto provision of a particular welfare service or program. Moreover, the amount of local contribution can determine the level of service provided. A decision to withhold or limit matching funds may reflect either the councils' inability to raise the money or their opposition to the program. In the former case, the ministry can offer to fund 100 percent of the operating costs; in the latter, however, pressure or promises of financial support are unlikely to sway the local agency which depends on municipal approval of its activities.[30]

The funding arrangements also grant potential influence over local services to the Ministry of the Interior, which is required by law to approve municipal budgets in general and additional positions in particular. In practice, municipalities have to justify budget and personnel increases to a representative of the Ministry of the Interior, who has the power to prevent an increase in welfare job lines, or in funding for general or particular programs.

Education.—There are different arrangements for the funding of educational institutions and services in the municipalities. Capital expenditures and operating budgets are discussed separately.

While the municipality is responsible for financing the construction of compulsory and noncompulsory state education facilities, the ministry controls access to funding sources and must approve the arrangements and terms. Projects are financed through low-interest loans and grants from the national lottery, banks, the Ministry of Education, and the Education Fund of the Jewish Agency.[31] The city must also contribute a portion which can be in the form of land for the facility. Many sponsors of recognized trade schools are eligible for similar loans for capital development.[32]

Although these arrangements place the burden on the municipality and can result in a refusal to build, the ministry can absorb the entire construction cost, especially in poorer municipalities. In newly developing areas, the Ministry of Housing will build schools and kindergartens according to Ministry of Education criteria. The Ministry of Education transfers funds to Housing without the direct involvement of the local authorities.[33]

The funding arrangements for the operating budget are more complex and demonstrate the disparity between formal arrangements and actual practices. In theory the local authority funds the operating, secretarial, and maintenance expenses of all state schools in its jurisdiction and some recognized and trade schools as well.[34] It also pays the salaries of similar personnel in state kindergarten and primary schools. The private sponsors of recognized and trade schools pay the salaries of their teachers and principals.[35] In addition, the ministry

subsidizes the municipal operating budget for general education and for specific programs on the basis of financial need, the number of culturally deprived pupils, and services provided.[36]

Finally, a portion of the expenses of noncompulsory education is covered by a scaled tuition fee, which is subsidized under different arrangements between the ministry and municipalities.[37]

In practice, ministry subsidies and grants do not cover all of the operating expenses of the municipal local departments of education. While they are a very significant factor, especially for poorer communities, they are inadequate to guarantee a minimum provision of services throughout the country. Consequently, many supplementary programs, including those designed to compensate the culturally deprived, are adversely affected in poorer cities. Moreover, many communities resent the cost they incur in providing educational services they regard as a national responsibility. They are reluctant to expand services even though a large proportion of the projected cost will be absorbed by the ministry. The partial dependence on local funding thus makes social services reflect the values and resources of the municipality.[38]

Employment

Welfare.—Certain elements in the procedures for recruitment and employment of professional staff for local agencies suggest national standardization and common professional socialization. For example, the ministry trains social workers, issues criteria and requirements for professional positions, approves their hiring, sets national pay scales, and provides continuous training and educational programs for new as well as experienced employees.[39] Factors other than the size and needs of the local population, however, determine differences between localities in the quantity and quality of staff.

Part of the problem is that it is the responsibility of the municipality to recruit and hire its own professional staff. Certain municipalities lack the matching funds. Others may simply disagree with the need to hire as argued either by the ministry or by the local agency. In addition, it is difficult for some municipalities to attract qualified persons. A serious shortage of trained social workers and professionals in Israel is compounded by the reluctance of many to seek employment outside of major population centers. As a consequence, certain poorer and more remote municipalities lack qualified personnel. Positions remain vacant or are filled by unqualified persons, which drastically reduces the quality or provision of services, and over ading is common. The problem is not necessarily one of geographical location, however. Despite

its proximity to both Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, the city of Ramleh has serious problems recruiting certified social workers. The problem is most acute in Gedera, which is also centrally located near Rechovot. Prior to 1977 there were no qualified applicants for positions in social work. Rechovot and Beer-Sheva are less plagued with this problem, and Kiryat Gat lies somewhere in the middle.

Finally, the employment arrangements of the local agency directors further reduce ministry influence. While the appointment of a local director is subject to ministry approval, the director is an employee of the municipality. Thus, it is very difficult for the director to be disciplined by the ministry. At the same time, the director may turn to the ministry for political help when problems arise with municipal employers. In effect, an adept director can manipulate both "bosses" to enhance his or her own independence and influence.[11]

Education.—Many of the arrangements and procedures for the training and employment of professional staff in the municipal education systems favor a standard national system. The ministry is involved to some degree in the education, certification, employment, and inservice training of teachers in every system. Teachers in each system and level are paid by national scales. As with the welfare services, however, several factors contribute to wide variations in the number and quality of professionals in different communities.

In state kindergarten and primary schools the ministry's regional offices hire, employ, and assign teachers to individual schools in accordance with its own criteria. Formally, principals are hired by a ministry tender with representatives of the ministry, union, city, and/or its educational department participating. In practice, the ministry's influence is strongest in socially troubled and newer communities, and weakest in more established and politically powerful older cities. The municipality in turn hires and employs secretarial and maintenance personnel according to ministry guidelines on the number of positions.

In prekindergartens and high schools the city hires and employs all teaching staff in accordance with ministry requirements and national pay scales. Noncompliance may be the rule if qualified candidates are unavailable. High school principals are hired by tenders issued by the city with union and ministry participating in most cases.

The alternative recognized and vocational school systems hire and employ their own teachers and principals. Formally, they do so according to ministry guidelines, but compliance is a matter of available qualified personnel and ministry supervision.

As with welfare, many communities throughout the country have difficulty attracting enough qualified teachers. The shortage is most acute in developing areas, in problem neighborhoods in communities in the center of the country. This is so despite national salary scales, financial benefits for work in less attractive areas, and the role of the

ministry in the hiring, employment, and assignment of teachers.[12] In practice, the ministry is no more able than local welfare agencies to attract professionals to undesirable environments. The ministry cannot force teachers to accept assignments against their will. Over 70 percent of teachers are women, who, like their counterparts in social work, may subordinate their careers to husband and family. Many are reluctant to raise their own children in communities with inferior school systems. Therefore, better qualified and experienced teachers gravitate to more established communities with better schools.

A final factor which holds down the level of teachers in certain areas are the national teachers' unions. In the 1960s, for example, unions resisted efforts by the ministry to replace noncertified teachers with recent certified graduates of teacher training colleges. In effect, while they enhance the freedom of teachers and principals, the unions have significant influence on implementation of ministry policy and programs.[13]

Regulations

Welfare.—Israeli law requires that the government provide assistance for needy persons, but it does not grant the needy rights to welfare. The law further fails to specify what constitutes 'need,' what services are to be provided, or what can be considered 'adequate relief.' Ministry administrative guidelines and regulations clarify broad statutes, but detailed laws are absent. This gives the social work bureaucracy at all levels of government options in administering local services, reinforced by the Israeli view that financial support and other services are supplements to treatment by a social worker subject to the worker's professional judgment. Thus, it becomes important to determine whether regulations grant greater freedom of action to the ministry or to local agency personnel.

In recent years, the ministry has tried to standardize financial assistance through regulations governing eligibility, need, and payments, by training of local personnel to administer the programs, and by the use of a central computer for paying recipients. These regulations limit the options for municipal social workers in matters of eligibility and payment, the agency director must justify deviations in accordance with ministry guidelines. In general, the local agency observes regulations in matters of financial assistance.

In all other program areas, including limited financial assistance, decisions by the social worker determin allocation of a service or resource despite the existence of binding r gulations. While the ministry

may define eligibility, it is the social worker or clerk who decides whether or not the eligible person is to receive a service or portion of limited resources. As Lineberry has pointed out, the social workers are probably not exercising discretionary powers as understood in the literature. Rather they define the situation as ". . . thus more or less automatically invoking one or another decision rules." It is therefore relevant to ask whether or not their decisions reflect a single set of internalized "decision rules and routines."[44] Jaffe and others argue that the social workers operate under conflicting values and pressures, including commitments to the clients, the profession, the local agency, the municipality, and the ministry.[45] Therefore, their decisions probably do not reflect a single set of shared values and deviate from ministry policies.

On the other hand, the common educational and training programs of the ministry may contribute to a shared understanding and interpretation of ministry guidelines among professional workers in diverse communities. Such agreement is dependent, of course, on a common professional socialization of the workers and on the level and quality of ministry supervision.

Education.—In contrast to welfare, the law defines explicitly the responsibilities of the ministry and local government in the provision of compulsory educational services. In addition, the ministry issues comprehensive regulations covering all aspects of administration, finance, employment, and pedagogy in the state school systems.[46] These regulations are binding in principle and enable the ministry to set national policies. In contrast, the extensive regulations governing the provision of supplementary programs and services grant local authorities and principals considerable options in matters of implementation and allocation.

Similar ministry regulations govern recognized primary schools in principle. The ministry permits greater freedom, however, in the area of curriculum. Also, the professional staff of some of these systems, such as the ultraorthodox non-Zionist Agudat Israel, are trained in the movement's institutions and very much committed to its ideology.

In municipally operated academic and comprehensive high schools the ministry issues extensive guidelines for all aspects of administration, finance, staffing, and pedagogy. There is a standard curriculum for at least 60 percent of the school day. The remainder is chosen from various ministry options by local communities, school principals, and parents.[47]

In the case of private vocational schools the ministry issues regulations governing certain aspects of finance and administration, qualification of some professional positions, and a portion of the curriculum. In vocational schools other ministries and bodies issue additional regulations and guidelines for these areas. Here, as in other systems, the

[o]bservance of the regulations depends considerably on the arrangements [fo]r supervision.

[I]nspection

Welfare.—Ministry supervision is mostly instructional with little if any regulation of local activities. The findings here support the view that ministry inspection practices favor the independence of the local agency rather than the implementation of ministry policies.[18] Consequently, the local agency exercises greater influence in matters of program.

The shortcomings of the ministry's inspection system have several explanations. First, the ministry regulations fail "to provide overseers with tools of influence and enforcement, since they [*do not*] set limits on the types of activities that are tolerable."[19] Rather, they permit and even encourage discretion by the local agency. The role of the ministry's supervisor, therefore, is to "approve" violations rather than to enforce regulations. Second, even if a conflict were to develop as a result of a violation, the agency head is partially protected since he is a municipal employee and responsible primarily to the municipality. Third, the agency head may feel justified in rejecting the supervisor's view on the grounds that he is more experienced and understands the field situation far better than the often younger supervisor, who spends most of his time elsewhere. The emphasis given by the ministry and its supervisors to consideration of the unique circumstances in individual communities strengthens this position. It also leads to the ministry's acceptance of local operations which may deviate from ministry guidelines. Moreover, the ministry fears that demanding compliance to those guidelines could lead to inaction by the local agency. Fourth, the absence both of administrative hierarchy within the ministry and of coordination between its various services strengthens the influence of the local agency head while weakening the position of the ministry. The ministry is composed of competing units, each committed to expanding its own service and having its own supervisor at the local level. Should a local agency decide to cut a program against the wishes of a particular ministry supervisor, it might find support among other ministry supervisors who see an opportunity to expand their own service. Finally, each supervisor is so overloaded that he would find it very difficult to regulate local activities effectively.

Education.—The ministry through its various divisions and area field staff periodically supervises the administrative, financial, staff, and pedagogical aspects of municipal operations of primary and sec-

ondary state systems in general and of each school in particular. [In]struction on teaching methods and subject matter is also provided [by] the supervisory network. In principle, inspectors can issue directives [to] ministry and municipal employees to alter practices which viola[te] ministry regulations. The findings are inconclusive as to the extent a[nd] quality of ministry supervision.

Nevertheless, several factors work against effective supervision. Fir[st,] time and resources are limited. Despite the intricate supervisory app[a]ratus there are not enough people to carry out an acceptable minimu[m] of supervision and instruction throughout the country. Second, a[l]though most of the teachers are ministry-trained and employed, man[y] senior staff members at the local level resent less experienced supervi[]sors who visit from outside. Conversely, in practice, ministry supervi[]sors will not interfere with highly respected principals and the[ir] schools. Unions further enhance the independence of the teacher an[d] principal vis-à-vis the ministry and municipality. Third, it is question[]able whether extensive supervision raises the quality of services pro[]vided.

Finally, the ministry's supervision of the many educational systems is restricted by jurisdictional limits, which are reinforced by politic[al] pressures within the Knesset (parliament) and government coalition. For example, the law and ministry regulations called for ministry in[]spection of recognized schools and required them to follow directives of ministry inspectors. Opposition by Agudat Israel, however, led to a system of self-inspection formally responsible to an official in the min[]istry without authorization to "give their personnel any binding in[]structions."[50] Similarly, in practice, the vocational systems inspect their own schools despite formal authority and agreements for the ministry to inspect many aspects of their systems. A factor which en[]courages compliance by independent secondary school systems is the ministry's requirement that all secondary school graduates, regardless of system, pass standard tests in order to obtain a diploma. Moreover the ministry grants grading advantages to those schools who agree to comply with ministry regulations and supervision in matters of staff and curriculum.

Restrictions on ministry supervision are most conspicuous in reli[]gious state schools. All inspectors of the religious state schools are under the authority of the head of the Division of Religious Educa[]tion.[51] While the director general of the ministry and his representa[]tives can issue binding pedagogical and administrative directives to inspectors, principals, and teachers in state secular schools, they can issue only administrative directives to similar employees of religious state schools.

In conclusion, while the Ministry of Education's authority and actu[]al practices of inspection seem much more extensive and clearly defined

than welfare, jurisdictional barriers undercut the hierarchical system of inspection.

Conclusion

The findings and analysis of this study confirm the major accomplishments of Israel in providing national systems of welfare services and universal education. These are amazing achievements in the light of past and continuing problems of security, economy, and social integration. Nevertheless, the ministries of welfare and education fail to achieve the goal of egalitarian and standard services adjusted on the basis of need at the local level.[52] That failure is partly due to a lack of financial resources and trained personnel.[53] But the problem is also one of implementation: the inability of a very unitary political system to direct available resources in accord with policy goals. In both issues the vertical linkages account in part for the implementation shortcomings. Significantly, the linkages work in opposite directions: in welfare they enhance local input while in education they favor national institutions and interests. While the welfare system resembles a federal model, education is more unitary in character.[54]

In the welfare system consisting of the ministry, local authority, and local agency, the linkages transfer considerable policymaking to local authorities. Provision and funding arrangements allow local authorities to reject ministry programs and to determine the scale and content of those it provides. Professional staff are local employees responsible primarily to the municipality. The diversity of their training shows the lack of standard professional socialization that works against more uniform implementation. Finally, the lack of exact regulations, combined with the professional values of both implementors and ministry supervisors, encourages independent local decisions. This undercuts the ministry system of local inspection and allows local workers to become the crucial decision makers in implementing ministry programs and policy. Consequently, the provision of welfare services reflects the social, economic, political, and professional resources of the community.

In the case of education, the ability of the ministry to make and implement policy is hampered most by the arrangements for provision. Although education is highly centralized, actual provision is by several bodies over which the authority of the ministry varies widely.[55] Oligarchical control is exercised only over the state secular school system. The relative independence of these systems is enhanced further by other linkages which permit them to staff and supervise their own systems

Despite its efforts to insure conformity with its policies, the minis remains dependent on these bodies for implementation, and in pract they make policy in many spheres and subject areas.

While the provision linkage in education potentially limits impl mentation of ministry policy, it does not necessarily contribute to u equal provision of services at the municipal level. While certain aspe of funding, employment, and regulation favor standard provision the municipal level, others do not. First, as with welfare, better qual fied and more experienced teachers gravitate to more established an richer areas. Thus, the less desirable communities face high turnove and shortages of teachers at all levels. Second, ministry requirements matching funds for many services, including some designed to com pensate disadvantaged pupils make municipalities with limited re sources, serving primarily culturally deprived students, more reluctan than established communities to provide these services. "Therefor . . . by whatever criteria we apply, children and young people in [these poorer communities] . . . are educationally disadvantaged in compari son with their age peers in other places or regions."[56]

Finally, the study and analysis here suggest that successful impl mentation may be related more to the political salience of the issu than to the formal unitary or federal character of the political system. It is likely that the administrative linkages are dependent variables reflecting other independent characteristics of political institutions ideology, and social and economic conditions in Israel.[58] The findings here confirm Caiden's contention that the more important politica issues are administered in a more centralized manner.[59] While educa tion ranks second in importance only to defense, Israeli society and leaders have always regarded welfare ambivalently.[60] As a result, the issues of welfare and of the national governmental institutions respon sible for it failed to take priority in governments and political parties. This is confirmed by the decentralized operation of the Ministry of Welfare.

Similarly, the fragmentation of the center in education reflects both historical circumstances and the ideological cleavages in Israeli society. Before independence in 1948, national bodies of the Jewish community in Israel neglected secondary education and particularly vocational training. As a result, private, philanthropic, quasi-political, and other organizations filled this gap. After 1948 they influenced the establish- ment of a national education system that insured their independent role and function in vocational education.[61] More important, the rec- ognized schools, including Agudat Israel, and the state religious system reflect the lack of national consensus on fundamental issues in Israeli society. The high value placed on education combined with the sa- lience of ideological cleavages led political movements to demand the right to preserve their own educational systems, which existed before

the state. The success or failure of their efforts to sustain themselves depended on their political resources. Consequently, there are several state-supported national education systems in Israel, which inhibits the ability of a unitary and very centralized political system to make and implement national policy in this important area.

Notes

1. Eugene Bardach, *The Implementation Game* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977), pp. 16-51; Martha Derthick, *New Towns In-Town* (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 1972), p. 84; Daniel J. Elazar, "The Compound Structure of Public Service Systems in Israel," in *Comparing Urban Service Delivery Systems: Structure and Performance*, ed. Vincent Ostrom and Frances P. Bish (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1977), p. 49 (hereafter cited as "Compound Structure"); Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, *Implementation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), p. 81; and Carl Van Horn and Donald Van Meter, "The Implementation of Intergovernmental Policy," in *Public Policy Making in a Federal System*, ed. Charles Jones and Robert Thomas (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1976), pp. 39-62. Bardach strongly criticizes this assumption.

2. Elazar, "Compound Structure," pp. 58-60. Most political institutions, including political parties, are highly centralized.

3. In October 1977 the Begin government merged the ministries of welfare and labor to form the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. This research is concerned only with the services of the former welfare ministry, which as of October 1979 retained its organizational and programmatic identity and autonomy within the new ministry. For matters of clarity in sections on welfare, "the ministry" refers to the former Ministry of Welfare.

4. Frederick M. Wirt, "School Policy, Culture and State Decentralization," in *Policy Studies Review Annual 1978*, ed. F. Freeman (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1978), p. 462. Heidenheimer et al. write that "the functioning of subnational governments . . . cannot be ignored in a study of social policy. . . . Concentrate on crucial linkages between national policymaking and subnational policy implementation." (Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Hugh Heclo, and Carolyn Teich Adams, *Comparative Public Policy* [New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975], p. 2).

5. Van Horn and Van Meter, p. 42.

6. Robert L. Lineberry, *Equality and Urban Policy: The Distribution of Municipal Public Services*, Sage Library of Social Research, no. 39 (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1977), pp. 19, 20; and Frank Levy, Arnold Meltsner, and Aaron Wildavsky, *Urban Outcomes: Schools, Streets and Libraries* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).

7. Lineberry, pp. 31-33. Also see his discussion of access to alternative services (p. 176).

8. The Settlement Study Center of Rechovot, Israel, sponsored the research which evaluated the provision of municipal services.

9. Gedera (population 5,900) is representative of small towns whose residents are mostly Oriental Jewish immigrants with a minority of more prosperous veteran settlers. Beer-Sheva (101,000) has a municipal administration similar to those of the largest Israeli cities. Rechovot (57,600), a large medium-size veteran city located in the center of the country, serves as a marketing and technological center. Ramle (37,900), a small medium-size city and poorer than neighboring Rechovot, has mostly Oriental populations with a 15 percent Arab minority. Finally, Kiryat Gat (22,400) is typical of the more than thirty "new towns" established as planned communities since 1950. (Figures are for 1977 and are from *Social Profile of Cities and Towns in Israel* [Jerusalem: Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, 1978], pp. 15-17.)

10. Randolph L. Braham, *Israel: A Modern Educational System* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966); Gerald E. Caiden, *Israel's Administrative C...* (Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, 1970); Avraham Doron and Ralph Kr... "Ideology, Programme and Organizational Factors in Public Assistance: The C... Israel," in *Journal of Social Policy* 5, no. 2 (1976): 131–49; Avraham Doron, *C... National Studies of Social Service Systems—Israel* (Jerusalem: Ministry of Labour... Social Affairs, 1976); Eliezer Jaffe, "Poverty in the Third Jewish Commonwealth," *Journal of Jewish Communal Service* 52, no. 1 (Fall 1975): 91–99; Aharon F. Kl... berger, *Society, Schools and Progress in Israel* (London: Pergamon Press, 1969); J... Neipris, *Social Welfare and Social Services in Israel: Policies, Programs and Issues... Late Seventies* (Jerusalem: Paul Baerwald School of Social Work, Hebrew Unive... 1978); and Moshe Shani, "Improving the Direction and Coordination of Welfare S... vices," *Social Security*, nos. 12–13 (March 1977), pp. 22–31 (Hebrew).

11. Morton Grodzins, *The American System* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 196...; Daniel Elazar, *Cities of the Prairie* (New York: Basic Books, 1970).

12. Braham, p. 14; Doron, p. 118; Kleinberger, pp. 161, 275–91; Lineberry, pp. 2...; and Elad Peled, "Education," in *Israel: Social Structure and Change*, ed. Mic... Curtis and Mordechai Chertoff (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 197...), 389–95.

13. Braham, p. 156.

14. Kleinberger, p. 275.

15. Ibid., p. 297, and Braham, pp. 7, 8.

16. See Frederick A. Lazin, "The Effects of Administrative Linkages on Impleme... tion: Welfare Policy in Israel," in *Policy Sciences* 12 (1980): 193–214 (hereafter cited "Effects of Administrative Linkages").

17. Lineberry, pp. 62–64.

18. Braham, pp. 96, 97. Rural kibbutzim, including those on the periphery, genera... have excellent school facilities and staff.

19. The quality of schools may differ significantly within a municipality. Wh... boarding school systems are extensive, especially at the secondary level, they vary ... quality and are inadequate redress for unequal facilities and services at the municip... level (Peled, p. 393; also see Lineberry, pp. 175–76).

20. Elinor Ostrom, ed., *The Delivery of Urban Services: Outcomes of Change* (Bever... Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1976), p. 8. Also see Martha Derthick, "Intercity Diffe... ences in Administration of the Public Assistance Programs: The Case of Massachuset..." in *City Politics and Public Policy*, ed. James Q. Wilson (New York: John Wiley & Son... 1968), pp. 243–66 (hereafter cited as "Intercity Differences").

21. These services include adoption, probation, rehabilitation institutions, and re... dential care for the retarded and delinquents (Neipris, pp. 23, 24). They are not evaluate... in this study.

22. In 1977 free compulsory education included kindergarten, eight years of prima... school, and one year of secondary school. After 1977 the Begin government extende... compulsory education to the tenth grade and abolished all tuition fees for secondar... education.

23. Peled, p. 298. The Education Law of 1953 formally abolished the then existin... ideological trend systems of political movements and replaced them with state system... and recognized schools (Walter Ackerman, "'Reforming' Israeli Education," in Curt... and Chertoff, eds., p. 398).

24. The municipality sets school registration and school assignment policy in accord... with ministry guidelines and approval. However, for reasons of overcrowding the hea... of the municipal education department may transfer students in violation of the mini... try-approved plan.

25. Christian groups have their own schools. The kibbutzim also "maintain and operate a vast network of educational and cultural institutions" (Braham, p. 15). These systems as well as the separate systems for Arab and Muslim Israelis are not discussed here.

26. These decisions are made by the local authorities but with ministry participation and in accord with ministry guidelines. Some compulsory services are not provided.

27. Major sponsors include the Histadrut (AMAL system), ORT, WIZO, Alliance Israel, and Hadassah. The Jewish Agency (Youth Aliyah system), the Ministry of Labour

n educational system for working youth and apprentices), Ministry of Agriculture (agricultural schools), Ministry of Welfare (schools for retarded and problem youths), the Ministry of Defense, and others.

28. Here too, municipal secondary schools and the ministry services are either secular or religious in orientation.

29. The ministry determines the percentage paid by the municipality according to the city's financial needs and resources (Doron, p. 115; Chaim Kalcheim, "The Municipality of Jerusalem and the Government Ministries: A Case Study in Central and Local Government Relations," mimeographed [abstract, n.d.], p. xxxv).

30. The local agency is legally responsible to the municipal council and has no independent sources of funding.

31. In effect, the Education Fund, which is restricted to noncompulsory education, funds these institutions.

32. Kleinberger, pp. 132–133, and Braham, p. 11.

33. The local authority probably has to repay the Ministry of Housing (Braham, p. 6).

34. The Ministry of Education reimburses certain municipalities for maintenance of schools and all for many of the expenses incurred in providing one year of compulsory high school.

35. The ministry may reimburse Agudat Israel for 90 percent or more for teachers' salaries. Kleinberger writes, "In short, *Agudat Israel*, owing to the political pressure it is able to exercise . . . has succeeded in securing for its independent system of education almost all the benefits of state institutions, without accepting most of the obligations and controls involved in that status" (pp. 132–133).

36. A percentage of the local portion of funding is provided by a block grant from the government.

37. "Secondary education . . . is heavily subsidized through a program of graduated tuition so that children from needy families may attend despite economic restraints" (Peled, p. 392).

38. This evaluation conflicts with the argument made by Heidenheimer, Heclo, and Adams in their discussion of the unimportance of the relatively small financial municipal contribution to education in England (p. 32).

39. See Derthick's discussion of common socialization ("Intercity Differences," pp. 5–60). Four Israeli universities offer a B.A. in social work and the ministry operates a three-year training program to certify high school graduates as social workers. In addition, the universities, in cooperation with the ministry, offer a one-year professional conversion course in social work to college graduates.

40. To compete, Ramle, with ministry knowledge, offers higher salary grades than ministry guidelines permit.

41. Doron, p. 125; Derthick, "Intercity Differences," pp. 247, 251–60; Kalcheim, p. xxiii. The findings here indicate that the local agency head exercises considerable power and influence over the practices and programs in his agency.

42. See Heidenheimer et al. discussion of how different salary scales contribute to an unequal distribution of good teachers in the United States (pp. 132, 137). The ministry's university scholarship program increased the supply of teachers, but poor planning led to overtraining in some disciplines and undertraining in others (Kleinberger, p. 240).

43. Kleinberger, pp. 152, 165. The unions have slowed down efforts to universalize and democratize secondary education (S. Martin Lipset, "The Israeli Dilemma," in Curtis and Chertoff, eds., pp. 349–60, esp. p. 353). Lipset's sharp criticism of the Israeli education system concludes that it "unintentionally . . . does not permit [the] underprivileged to succeed" (p. 353).

44. Emeberry, pp. 155, 65.

45. Eliezer Jaffe, "Problems of Loyalty in Social Work," *Social Security*, nos. 12–13 (March 1977), pp. 171–79 (Hebrew).

46. Kleinberger, p. 176. In effect the ministry prescribes the curriculum, texts, and lessons for each grade with some modification for special needs and different levels of pupils.

47. In theory, parents, in consultation with the principal, can alter up to 25 percent of the curriculum (Elazar, "Compound Structure," p. 76).

48. Kalcheim, pp. v, xxiv.

49 *Van Horn and Van Meter*, p. 50.

50 Braham, p. 132.

51 The head of the branch for state religious education is appointed with the approval of the Council for Religious Education, an independent public body which is controlled by the National Religious party. The head of the branch can appeal decisions of the director general of the ministry directly to the minister (Kleinberger, pp. 127, 130).

52 Lineberry, pp. 31–33, and Harold Wilensky, *The Welfare State and Equality* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 52, 87–90. Wilensky hypothesizes that "the greater the authority of the central government vis-à-vis regional and local units, the higher the welfare state spending and the greater the program emphasis on equality" (p. 27).

53 Ackerman, pp. 106, 107; Braham, p. 157.

54 Heidenheimer et al., pp. 98, 99, 101, 265. Nevertheless the powers of local authorities in welfare in Israel should not be equated with that exercised by German *Länder* (p. 58).

55 See Witt's classification of centralization of authority, pp. 463–65.

56 Kleinberger, p. 282.

57 Elazar, "Compound Structure," pp. 73, 74; and Ira Sharkansky, "Local Government in the Welfare State" (paper prepared for workshop in Financial Problems of European Cities, Berlin, March 27–April 2, 1977) (mimeographed), p. 9. Both authors emphasize the degree of bargaining between local governments and national ministries.

58 Heidenheimer, pp. 258, 261.

59 Carden, p. 98.

60 Lazin, "The Effects of Administrative Linkages," pp. 206–8.

61 Kleinberger, p. 138.

Debate with Authors

Comments on "The Obsolete Scientific Imperative in Social Work Research"

Ludwig L. Geismar
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I have read with interest Martha Brunswick Heineman's criticism of research approaches giving primacy to methodological rather than substantive requirements ("The Obsolete Scientific Imperative in Social Work Research," *Social Service Review* 55 [September 1981]: 371–97). I wondered, however, why Heineman zeroed in on logical empiricism as the culprit for the kind of research ritualism she was describing.

Logical empiricism, as the author herself pointed out, flowered between the 1920s and 1950s and contributed greatly to the growth of empirical social science, which heretofore had lacked a broad philosophic formulation. It is hard to say whether the contemporary philosophy of science that Heineman speaks of arose in opposition to or was inspired by logical empiricism.

The fact is that such empiricist excesses as absurd reductionism or phenomenal absolutism are not the stuff that social work research is presently made of, nor do social work researchers as a group affirm these days that explanation and prediction are synonymous. The declaration that "complex treatment models and situations can be simplified or reduced to time-limited treatment situations . . ." (p. 385) is neither logical empiricism nor any kind of research methodology but just another form of treatment faddism which pervades the field at the present time.

This reader was particularly puzzled by Heineman's statement that social work research is characterized by "discrete canons of scientific acceptability, which are used to evaluate service models and research findings" (p. 371) embodied in the work of two writers. She must surely be aware of the fact that social work research, whether it be in the form of "how to do it" writings or substantive inquiries, covers a wide spectrum of approaches. These range from the narrowly behavioristic to the qualitative-comparative. None of these has a monopoly on the social work research market or can claim to best represent the research enterprise.

Social Service Review (June 1982).

Heineman's attack on logical empiricism is less a critique of social work research than it is a game of putting up and shooting down straw men. Her "alternatives," which include the views that a good theory is a better explanation rather than the only correct one or that electronic data-gathering devices can introduce different data biases, represent widely accepted mainstream thinking among social science and social work researchers. To depict the author's alternatives as the antithesis to an orthodox, obsolete philosophy (where does one find it nowadays?) does little to further the movement toward more effective models of social work research.

Author's Reply

Martha Heineman Piper*
Chicago, Illinois

I was most interested to learn from Ludwig Geismar that the field of social work research is so eclectic and up to date that my article merely brought coals to Newcastle. Unfortunately, since Geismar cites no authors, books, articles, or statistics in support of his contentions, it is impossible to know on what he bases his optimism. On the other hand, my conclusions about the current state of social work research are supported by citations of the work of over thirty of the most prolific and prominent social work researchers. Geismar's assertions that my conclusions are both unfounded and also based on the work of only two authors is thus most puzzling. In his desire to dismiss my argument as the setting up and demolishing of straw men, Geismar also neglects to mention that I described a prevailing stance toward research, not a monolithic one (see my article, pp. 391–92, n. 2).

Since Geismar indulges in unsupported impressions, I would like to add one or two of my own. In my experience, social workers who submit articles to the leading journals for publication, try to get dissertations approved, or apply for research grants, jobs, or tenure do not, in fact, find the field of social work hospitable to research methodologies or interests which are not consonant with the assumptions of logical empiricism. On the contrary, a perusal of dissertation abstracts and the articles selected for publication in research journals indicates not only the continued hegemony of positivist assumptions and prescriptions but also a distressing absence of critical and analytic discussion of the foundations of social work research.

* Formerly Martha Brunswick Heineman.

Book Reviews

The Benefits of Old Age: Welfare Policy for the Elderly. By Elizabeth Kutza. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981. Pp. xvi+187. $5.95.

The Benefits of Old Age is a well-written, intellectually stimulating book of general import, as well as of value to policymakers, academicians, and students of social welfare.

Having noted a series of significant facts about the demographics of the aging and the extent of the federal budgetary commitment to older Americans, the author describes the eight principle benefit programs with an accompanying analysis which identifies their goals, sometimes complementary, sometimes conflicting in each one individually, and in all collectively. It is her conviction that federal policy is more accurately discerned in such a program analysis than in studying explicit a priori policy statements.

The significance of the work transcends the important deliberation of the 1981 White House Conference on Aging. As the great budget debate of the summer of eighty-one draws to a close, it becomes apparent that programs for older persons come away relatively unscathed. However, inevitably both service and income transfer programs will be exposed to greater scrutiny as curtailed federal revenue strains create new debate within the context of cries for a balanced budget and strengthened defense.

The author develops a conceptual framework for policy analysis which readers should find interesting. There is a good but all too brief section on the relationships of academic inquiry and political process.

Before disclosing her bias, she does a thorough job of pinpointing the conflicting goals of social adequacy (i.e., that individuals have sufficient goods for a decent life) and horizontal equity (i.e., that people are treated fairly in the light of their contribution) which might also be viewed as the conflict between social welfare goals and social insurance goals. She makes explicit the policy question of the redistribution both between and within generations.

Rarely does one find a book that is timely and timeless, interestingly written and technically superior. I will recommend it to my students and feel it would be a modest but wise investment for anyone seriously interested in the field of aging, as well as for those more generally interested in social welfare policy.

Charles J. Fahey
Fordham University

Family Care of the Elderly By Dwight L. Frankfather, Michael J. Smith and Francis G. Caro. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1981. Pp. xviii+12[illegible]. $17.95.

Family Care of the Elderly is a particularly appropriate book for these times of reduced social welfare budgets and increased emphasis on the family and the private sector. Theoretically, family care has the advantages of being both less costly and more humane than institutional care. Family care is believed to coincide well with American values because it relies on strong family ties and intergenerational responsibility. The authors of this book examine these and other aspects of family care both empirically and analytically. While they remain strong advocates for home-based care, they argue for it not because it is less expensive than other modes of care, but because it provides the disabled elderly with better life circumstances.

There are two focuses to this book. The first is an evaluation of a home-care demonstration project, the Family Support Project, conducted by the Community Service Society of New York City. The second focus is a stimulating and challenging analysis of the broader issues surrounding home care. This latter analysis includes a proposal for an alternate and as yet untried model for delivering home-care services.

The home-care project that the authors evaluate in chapters 2–6 involved assisting families caring for a disabled elderly relative. The families usually had one member who took principal responsibility for the care of the disabled individual, who either lived in his or her own home or with the supporting family. The demonstration project aided the family by providing mutually agreed upon services whose receipt was contingent on the family's continued participation in providing care. The services available included transportation, counseling, personal care, housekeeping, assistance with relocation, and weekend relief. In practice, most families received the services of homemakers several times weekly.

Frankfather et al. perform an exploratory evaluation of the home-care project because administrative constraints prevented the utilization of a control group design. Through the presentation of both quantitative and qualitative data they provide considerable insight into the operation of the home-care program over a two-year period. Not only is the program assessed in terms of costs and administrative procedures, but the stability of family efforts and their need for assistance, satisfaction with the program, and the congruence of staff and family understandings regarding problems, needs, and services are explored. There is no assessment of the efficacy of home care in preventing or reducing institutionalization because of the lack of a control group; however, the number of persons institutionalized during the two-year study period is reported.

What makes this evaluation of home care stand out is its careful attention to the knotty philosophical and practical issues surrounding the provision of care for the disabled in a noninstitutional setting. These issues are broader than the particular project described, but they are addressed in the context of the experience of the Family Support Project. Among these issues are equity, program costs, eligibility determination, and program objectives. These problem areas are considered for the case of the small Family Support program and from the view of home care as a nationally available entitlement.

The authors correctly point out that the public provision of services on a national basis to enable families to care for their disabled elderly may not in the aggregate save money, even if it reduces current rates of institutionalization. The reason for this is the likely pent-up demand for these benefits from presently unaided families caring for elderly family members. They also discuss the

difficulties a national program would experience in providing equitable treatment to elderly persons with a family member who can provide care and to those without family. Providing greater benefits to those without family may discourage families that can provide support from doing so. Finally, they recommend that family-care benefits, as in the Family Support Project, be based on the severity of disability. Acknowledging the great difficulties in measuring disability, they propose a specific measurement device that focuses on functional abilities and excludes such criteria as morale and satisfaction.

The authors make some noteworthy points in their discussion of the goals of home care and the appropriate standards for judging its performance. They argue that for the disabled elderly, the model of service should be based on maintenance, rather than rehabilitation and education. In their maintenance model, the users determine which services they need and choose their own providers. The model, which they describe in detail in chapter 7, is built around a family-care voucher whose value is determined by the severity of disability. The authors argue that this model would allow families and disabled persons the freedom to choose only those services they deem appropriate without the coercion and perhaps unnecessary counseling of professionals. Because they have no data that can be used to test the feasibility of this plan, it is difficult to judge whether it is superior to the program they have favorably evaluated. Certainly, their own description of how disability measurement and accountability in such an alternative might operate leaves one with the impression that it may not be easy to implement.

Finally, while the focus of the study and the discussion of alternatives center exclusively on the elderly who are disabled, the techniques employed in the demonstration project and the issues raised in the analysis are equally applicable to families caring for disabled persons who are not elderly. Preventing institutionalization of severely disabled persons of all ages has been a goal of public policy for quite some time. Efforts to mainstream disabled children and ensure that the handicapped have access to public buildings are examples of our public commitment to enable disabled persons to remain part of our community. To date, there is surprisingly little cross-fertilization between the literature on the aged disabled and the literature on the nonaged disabled, although, with a few exceptions, the problems facing these groups are similar. Families caring for disabled persons, whether they are young, middle aged, or elderly, can equally benefit from services that provide support and relief. I hope the use of the word "elderly" in the title of this book does not prevent those interested in family care for disabled persons of all ages from reading it. The evaluation of the Family Support Project enriches our understanding of how family care operates as an alternative to institutionalization, and the analysis of home care as a national entitlement for the disabled gives us much to ponder.

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Family Therapy Techniques. By Salvador Minuchin and Charles Fishman. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981. Pp. 303. $15.00.

Minuchin is well known as one of the pioneers in the evolution of the family therapy field, particularly for his development of theory and techniques of operationalizing theory. His structural approach has gained an increasing recognition in recent years. *Family Therapy Techniques*, along with Minuchin's *Families and Family Therapy*, provide a very comprehensive conceptual and

operational guide to the art and science of family therapy. The book defines the enormously complex process of treatment of families with great clarity. The authors' sensitivity and extraordinary humanness in combination with their solid conceptual framework makes reading the book engaging and enjoyable. Their techniques are consistent with their theory. Descriptions and explanations of these techniques sound simple, yet they are not easy to learn; the mastery of them requires more than just reading or observing. The authors suggest that wisdom through living and an expansion of one's repertory of behavior are the requirements of an effective family therapist. An effective therapist has to have a wide range of use of self, be spontaneous, and be guided by his cognitive map of the family in the context of the therapeutic system. The authors begin the first chapter of the book by posing a paradox—techniques "must be mastered" (p. 1), but once the mastery is achieved, they must be "forgotten" (p. 1). They explain the paradox by saying that "if the therapist becomes wedded to techniques, he becomes a craftsman" (p. 1) and by remaining a craftsman, "his contact with patients will be objective, detached and clean, but also superficial, manipulative for the sake of personal power and ultimately not highly effective. Only a person who has mastered the technique and then contrives to forget can become an expert therapist" (p. 1). Using an analogy of a master painter, the authors stress development of therapeutic spontaneity, an art of joining the family; the family therapist should not be constrained by techniques but by different family contexts within which he finds the freedom of spontaneous actions. The therapeutic spontaneity is trained spontaneity—another paradox. The concept, however, is an important one, for any spontaneous action taken out of context would lose its effectiveness and become irresponsible behavior. Thus, a creative use of techniques is possible only when the therapist lets himself be guided by his experience of the family and by his cognitive map.

The authors' description of their training model also demonstrates the harmony between concepts and practice taught. Their inductive methods of training put emphasis on integration of theory into practice through observations, live supervision, videotape seminars on theories conceptualization, etc. It is an intense and extensive training model and an innovative one compared with other training models. Institutions began to adopt the model for training as its effectiveness became known.

Chapter 2, "Families," is a description of the authors' systems model of looking at a family and its members. The authors use the term "holons" (p. 13) to describe the complex dynamics of multiperson transactions in the family as well as the differentiated subsystems. It is truly an ecosystemic view which does not sacrifice the individual. "Each holon—individual, the nuclear family, the extended family, and the community—is both a whole and a part, not more one than the other, not one rejecting or conflicting with the other. A holon exerts competitive energy for autonomy and self-preservation as a whole. It also carries integrative energy as a part. The nuclear family is a holon of the extended family, the extended family of the community, and so on. Each whole contains the part, and each part also contains each other in a continuing, current and ongoing process of communication and interrelationship" (p. 13). The authors also integrate the developmental model in looking at all holons. They postulate that developmental changes in the individual affect the family and that changes in the family and extrafamilial holons affect individual holons. This is a useful concept, as it designates a health model rather than a pathology model. This developmental system model sees "the family holons evolving over time with each individual holon incorporating the concept of self in context. Individual holons have personal historical determinants of self as well as the cur-

ient input of his social context. The constant interactions among holons at different times require actualization of different segments of the self, while different context calls for different facets" (p. 14). Families come to therapy when they are stuck along the developmental spiral. This occurs when they are unable to meet the demands for different levels of functioning resulting from either internal or external fluctuations. Therapy is "the process of taking a family in the direction of their own evolution" (p. 27). Thus the model gives a quick guide to setting therapeutic goals. The therapist as a product of his particular culture and as a holon in his family at a particular stage of development must, therefore, guard against categorizing a family's experience based on his own world view.

"Joining" in chapter 3 speaks to the therapist's taking some sort of leadership position in the therapeutic system. Therapeutic joining is defined as "more an attitude than a technique, and it is the umbrella under which all therapeutic transactions occur" (p. 31). Joining is more than simply supporting a family; it also carries at times challenging functions. Joining also involves the therapist's use of self "with different levels of involvement" (p. 31) with the family. The authors' description of the joining process and the clinical examples are refreshing, particularly in the manner and language used—ordinary conversational speech. The aims of joining are to search for areas of strength and to track for diagnosis.

The emphasis on preparation for the initial session calls for professional discipline. Chapter 4 is devoted to the rationale and guides for formulating a working hypothesis based on the information gathered at the intake telephone call. The authors warn against stereotyping a family by theorizing in advance without actually getting to know the family. The initial hypothesis has to be tested, discarded if incorrect, and reformulated so as to ascertain a cognitive map of the family for planning treatment strategies—"the actual dance of therapy" (p. 63). The authors list various types of families commonly known to family therapists which are helpful guides for formulating the structural hypothesis and providing clues to possible areas for exploration. Since working with a family is a very complex task which demands that the therapist monitor his own cognitive and emotional processes as well as that of the family members, such a conceptual guide for planning is extremely helpful.

Chapter 5 delineates the structural model of conceptualizing family dynamics and the process of change, for which techniques serve as a "pathway to change" (p. 64). The author compares theoretical views of Carl Whitaker and Jay Haley on the family and their goals and technique of therapy. "The structural approach sees the family as an organism: a complex system that is underfunctioning. The therapist undermines the existing homeostasis, creating crises that jar the system toward the development of better functioning organization. Thus the structural approach has elements of the existential and strategic frameworks. Like the strategist, the structuralist realigns significant organitions to produce change in the entire system. And like the existentialist, the structuralist challenges the family's accepted reality with an orientation toward growth" (p. 67).

The techniques of structural therapy lead to family reorganization by challenging the family organization. The word "challenge" highlights the nature of the dialectic struggle between the family and the therapist within the therapeutic system.

Seeing the presenting symptoms as a "protection" of the family homeostasis, the author conceptualizes strategies of helping families to change. These strategies involve the family's view of the problem and the way it arranges itself around the symptom. They also involve challenging the existing family struc-

ture as the structure determines the family member's world view. Transforma-tion of the family structure will change its world view. Sensitive joining through active participation in the system and guidance by the cognitive map of the family are well illustrated in clinical examples.

From chapters 6 through 12, various special techniques are described, giving practical suggestions as well as conceptual guides. The chapter on "Refram-ing" shows how the problem or problem behavior is redefined positively. This is carried out by translating the presenting problem of one family member into a multiperson problem which then alters the family's view of reality. The chapter on "Enactment" has excellent examples of actual sessions with ample conceptual guides. Repeatedly one is impressed with the simplicity of lan-guage the therapist uses by joining the family's style of language. Every move the therapist makes is done with an implicit cognitive map in mind. The therapist intervenes to increase the intensity, to create boundaries of individual holons, and to promote alternate transactions. At the same time, he probes the nature of the problem and the flexibility of the system. Every move of the therapist seems purposeful yet spontaneous and effective in getting the desired responses from family members.

Chapters 13 to 15 take the reader to the heart of therapeutic "dances"—the ongoing process of bringing about changes in the family—and once again the authors remind the reader of the concept of "self as both a whole and a part of a whole" (p. 193)—"the self-in-context" (p. 14). The concept of complementarity is exquisitly explained and illustrated through the clinical examples. The task of the therapist is one of helping the family members see the complementary aspects of selves as parts belonging to a whole that is larger than the individual selves. The chapter on "Realities" follows in natural order, as the chapter elaborates the process of challenging family members' views of reality from the perspective of complementarity. The author's exposition on the concept of reality has a philosophical profoundness, and one cannot help but reflect on oneself. Reality is "the meaning we give to the aggregate of facts that we recognize as facts. And there is one more step. Reality has to be shared with others—others who validate it" (p. 209). The authors cite Herbert Mead's con-cepts of dialectic exchange between self and context and H. S. Sullivan's theo-ries of interpersonal psychiatry, to argue the limitations of the individual theo-rists and sociologists, both lose "the rhythm of dance" in transactions with significant others in the reality construction" (p. 201). The authors' theoretical view of the "self-in-context" gives the therapist leverage to zoom in on the individual family members' experience as well as focus on the system as a whole.

The therapist can change the individual members' world view as related to the family and the family's view of reality as pertaining to the individual. The task of the therapist is not easy. He needs to keep his goal in mind while being aware of the constraints inherent in the family's and the therapist's own per-sonal view of the world. The authors' explanation of these constraints resem-bles the concepts of resistance and countertransference. Yet, unlike the objec-tive role of the therapist in analytically oriented therapy, the therapist cannot be detached. He needs to participate actively through affiliations and enter into shifting coalitions, while maintaining "therapeutic reality" (p. 214) according to the therapeutic goal.

The chapter on "Paradox" by Peggy Papp is a surprising addition to Minu-chin's techniques. The inclusion of this technique is consistent with the au-thors' basic view of "realities." "Reality can be seen only from the perspective that the therapist has in the system. As a result, reality is always partial, and any truth is a half-truth" (p. 4). Papp points out that the use of paradoxical

interventions is reserved "for those covert, long-standing, repetitious patterns of interaction that do not respond to direct intervention" (p. 215). It is a reassurance to know that there are conceptual guides to the use of this technique, and Papp does a superb job.

A family "teaches the therapist something fundamental about therapy: every family has elements in their culture, which if understood and utilized, can become levers to actualize and expand the family members' behavioral repertory" (p. 262). This statement in chapter 17 on "Strengths" instantiates the authors' humility and their endless search for improving therapy rather than becoming dogmatists. Search for strength in individuals and the family system is a cornerstone of this therapeutic approach. It is indeed a humanistic approach that encourages individual competence and gives hope. "Despite mistakes, unhappiness, and pain, there are also pleasures: spouses and children give to each other in ways that are growth encouraging and supportive, contributing to each other's sense of competence and worth" (p. 268). Skills for tapping the strengths of family members by reframing and helping them to adopt alternatives for problem solving are indeed impressive. The authors speak to the differences in the therapist's strategies and goals. One is based on the linear model which focuses on the individual pathology, and the other on the circular systems model which expands the focus of exploration beyond the individual deviance and allows the search of unused alternatives to move the family. "Dysfunctional components are merely those segments of the full family potential that, at this point, are available to the family organism" (p. 277). Without mentioning the concept of resistance as related to the concept of change, the chapter implicitly addresses this issue and how to work through it.

With the closing chapter the reader is reluctant to let go of the proximity to the authors experienced throughout the book. Minuchin speaks to the reader about his trials, errors, and triumphs. There is no arrogance or defensiveness; rather there is humility. He warns against becoming "craftsmen" (p. 1) and reminds us of the mistaken notion that one can learn to do family therapy by learning the theory and techniques through reading and watching. Reading this book makes one aware of the need for much experience and extensive supervision. The authors have done a superb job of pulling together and organizing very complex material. The value of the book cannot be overstated. Along with Minuchin's book *Families and Family Therapy*, this book should be considered a must on the reading list of family therapists, students, and educators.

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Culture and Social Work: Education and Practice in Southeast Asia. Edited by Peter Hodge. Hong Kong: Heinemann Educational Books (Asia), 1980. Pp. xiii+120. $20.00.

This brief monograph is an important addition to the growing body of literature dealing with social work education and practice in Southeast Asia. The focus of this presentation—designing, implementing, and evaluating cross-cultural learning in field and class—is germane to the work of all social work educators. Inevitably in today's world they deal with multi-cultural-racial-ethnic realities and concerns.

The account consists of three parts: (1) Kenneth Chau's salient notes on Chinese culture, (2) Mildred Sikkema's cogent analysis and assessment of a three-year cross-cultural learning experiment carried on by the faculty of the Department of Social Work, University of Hong Kong, based in Hong Kong and in the Philippines, and (3) Myrna L. Blake's sensitive analysis and assessment of an experiment in cultural learning carried on in a community action project involving young women industrial workers in a semirural community in Penang, Malaysia.

Chau's notes on Chinese thought and philosophical traditions provide a lucid and useful foundation that enables the reader to understand more fully the section of the monograph dealing with the experiences of Hong Kong Chinese graduate social work students in intensive field work experience in the Philippines. Teachers who work with Chinese students attending universities in the United States and other countries will find Chau's explication very useful in their work as well.

Sikkema's analysis and assessment of cross-cultural learning deals with the Hong Kong experiment for which she was educational consultant. She compares it with her own experiences with graduate social work students of Western background at the University of Hawaii, in a similar cross-cultural learning experiment. Cognitive and affective aspects of learning and teaching are carefully explained. The reader is treated to a remarkably clear explication of the sharpened sensitivities that lead students and faculty to reach for new ways of responding in situations where the "languages" of behavior and tradition as well as the spoken language require the newcomer to deal immediately with the strange and unknown.

As the students cope with the culture shock and gradually find some solid ways for working in accordance with agreed-upon goals, they use their knowledge, understanding, and skills of practice in new ways. Most important they gain some degree and depth of knowledge about themselves not readily available through other less potent and challenging learning-teaching situations and opportunities. The crucial nature of the teacher's role in assisting the student to place this intensive, affective learning within a cognitive framework for further professional integration and use is well conceptualized and documented.

Blake points up the differences between learning about and experiencing another culture. Her analysis encompasses the processes of change in the project itself (viewed as the change agent), in the semirural community in Penang, Malaysia, in the migrant workers, and in the staff members themselves. The findings show that the degree of success of such programs depends to a large extent upon the staff members' sensitivities to and understanding of the informal as well as the formal aspects of behavior and responses of the community and migrant workers. Inaccurate perceptions based on different, unexamined cultural assumptions result in serious misunderstandings, conflicts, and difficulties. Verbal and nonverbal cues and communications are demonstrated to be critical in the learning and effective actions of the staff.

These approaches to cross-cultural learning and teaching offer thought-provoking analyses and assessments of specific experiments. Social work faculty in many countries will find this small volume stimulating and useful in their own educational thinking and efforts.

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The **Implementation Perspective** By Walter Williams Berkeley and Los Angeles University of California Press, 1980 Pp xi+136 $11 95 (cloth), $3 95 paper)

Although its subtitle states that it is "A Guide for Managing Social Service Delivery Programs," *The Implementation Perspective* is not so much a guide for managers of social service programs as it is a book about the concept of the "implementation perspective" which, according to the author, holds that the central focus of policy should be on the point of service delivery "The implementation perspective redirects concern to that crucial spot where social programs and projects get put into place and operate in the field" (p ix) The book, therefore, is another in the series of recent publications on implementation, as differentiated from those that deal with policy analysis, which is concerned with the substance and development of major policy decisions made by legislative bodies and high level executives Williams's thesis is that social action programs, such as those of the War on Poverty of the 1960s, fail not so much because of the policies themselves but because of shortcomings in program management and delivery

Implementation is defined as "the stage between a decision and operations the hard step after the decision, involving efforts to put in place—to make operational—what has been decided " (p 1), to "bring together communication, commitment, and capacity so as to carry out a decision into action" (p 3) Initial chapters elaborate on recent research and evolving theory underlying the implementation perspective and trace the history of federal grants-in-aid, particularly for social services programs Major federal grant programs of the 1960s and two pieces of the Nixon administration's New Federalism legislation, the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) and the Community Development Block Grant program of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, are discussed in greater detail in order to illustrate the problems of implementation, especially when implementation is shared by one level of government that establishes overall policy and provides a major part of the financing and another level that operates the programs Subsequent chapters deal with the dynamics of implementation the constraints on top managers to actually direct programs and the political, technical, and organizational factors that affect the process of moving from policy decision to operations such as the ambiguity of legislation and the discretion exercised by program staff, whether administrators or front line workers

The final chapters are more prescriptive, what steps can be taken to achieve better implementation through information, technical assistance, and various control measures At times, the author is rather "preachy " Although he acknowledges that the main problem lies in the nature of social problems and social service programs ("Social problems are complex and hard to treat," p 87) his advice often is little more than a series of assorted homilies Thus, Williams notes, on the one hand, that " nobody knows what to do about a number of problems" (p 95) and, on the other hand, contends that deficient technical assistance strategies are to blame and that more and better qualified staff should be shifted to the field to treat technical assistance issues (pp 95, 96) One is left wondering how the usual middle-level bureaucrat who, in all probability, is an ordinary mortal, can achieve overnight omniscience Williams does not say, beyond offering a number of dos and don'ts based mostly on his own experience and observation An implementation strategy is then presented, a social agency strategy of governance underpinned by an implementation per-

spective that focuses on performance goals and the actual provision of servi
The main thing that top executives have to keep in mind is that they must
pend on managers and staff in organizations over which they have little di
control They cannot tell staff exactly what to do but must rely on capa
building, rather than regulation, to achieve policy goals

The book probably will be a disappointment to two groups interested
implementation—the academics whose interests lie in extending theories
organization and management, and administrators who are involved in
day-to-day operation of agencies The former undoubtedly will already be
miliar with the voluminous literature on formal organizations and the dyna
ics of organizational change as well as that of the management sciences I
political context of organizational change and implementation of social servi
programs has been more extensively examined by such authors as Steine
Derthick, and Lynn Most agency executives and managers are familiar wi
the adage, "laws do not administer themselves," and are acutely sensitive to tl
political aspects of administration While they might find the book readable
will not be very helpful as a guide to action

One must, however, appreciate Williams's emphasis on implementation
being directed at the point of service delivery, a point usually taken for grante
but not always explicitly taken into account in policy development or progra
planning And there is ample evidence that programs designed for the poor
disadvantaged often do not reach or serve their beneficiaries as intended

The implementation perspective has special relevance in the context of th
current administration's attempt to redirect federal domestic policy by curtail
ing the federal role in social welfare, shifting responsibility to the states an
localities, and consolidating the many federal categorical grant programs int
a small number of block grants While the states may suffer a loss of federa
funds because of the "caps" on the block grants, they will have wide discretion
in the administration of programs and funds and be free of the detailed regula
tions that accompanied the categorical grants Thus, Williams acknowledges
the need in state and local planning and management to focus on the point of
service delivery

The Implementation Perspective is not about the substance of policy and
program, of course But one can be carried away with management and forget
that at the point of service delivery for the front-line staff and clients—be they
individuals, families, groups, or communities—the important thing is the
availability, nature, and adequacy of the program, that is, the benefits and
services—whether cash, medical care, housing, job opportunities, day care or
counseling. Implementation will not make up for program shortcomings

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Promoting Competence in Clients: A New/Old Approach to Social Practice
Edited by Anthony N Maluccio. New York Free Press, 1981 Pp xiv+370
$15 95

If you were to ask several noted theorists how their field of interest might
contribute to enhancing clients' competence, the result might be this book
The excitement in reading this collection lies in learning how each author
accepts the challenge and in learning what new thinking is evoked as each
focuses on the subject of competence Since this book takes as its subtitle "A

New Old Approach to Social Work Practice," each author might have been asked to respond explicitly to the model proposed by the editor in the first chapter. In this way, a model might be further developed and refined. At times the authors appear to disagree with the premises and practice principles offered in the first chapter (see, e.g., Naomi Golan, p. 78). However, such differences, which I would consider constructive for promoting further discussion, are rarely made explicit.

Rather than thoroughly defining an "approach to" practice, this is a collection of articles focusing on a theme: promoting clients' competence. As such, it is both thought provoking and useful in its practice suggestions. I have some questions to raise later about the practice approach given in the editor's first chapter, but first I would like to call attention to some interesting aspects of the collection as a whole.

In her chapter, "The Physical Environment and Social Work Practice," Carel B. Germain elaborates on her earlier work dealing with people-environment transactions by providing a method for analysis of the physical environment. She provides examples of the resources and opportunities necessary for individuals and families at various points in the life cycle. Connections are made between the physical environment and human cognition, perception, emotion, and action. In accordance with transactional ideas, all of these characteristics are seen as continually affecting and being affected by one another. For example, the important point is made that the physical environment exists for clients not merely in its descriptive, objective sense but as it is perceived owing to cultural and emotional characteristics. Examples are provided to aid understanding of the interplay of personal and environmental aspects and to show potential interventions which flow from the analysis.

Naomi Golan, addressing competence in transitional and crisis situations, emphasizes that competence should not be construed as pertaining only to action in the sense of observable behavior. While she states that "success in carrying out meaningful life activities leads to improved coping skills, enhances personal well-being, and encourages further attempts to cope," she goes on to note that "cognitive and affective ego functions—thought and feeling—affect the executive function of the ego-action. Conversely, action affects thought and feeling. . . . This point becomes important in discussing intervention strategies, when we consider *action-oriented* tasks and *thinking-oriented* tasks" (p. 78).

Similarly, Ruth Middleman, in discussing structured, goal-oriented, competence-building groups, emphasizes the importance of explicit, planned experiences dealing with values, feelings, cognitions, and behaviors. She states: "The key emphasis is on the *person* and on *experiencing* rather than on a specific content vehicle or task. Cognitive material is present but is always related to the person's feelings, meanings, perceptions, and values" (p. 195). Middleman's article is a remarkable example of conveying, through the style of the article itself, the methodology of the approach under discussion. It would be interesting to know what the conceptual rationale was for placing this article on skill building through group work in the section of the book called "Working with the Environment."

Of the many excellent chapters, I have chosen to focus on those of Germain, Golan, and Middleman because they seem to achieve a broader yet more detailed consideration of person-environment transactions than has sometimes been evident in writings from the transactional perspective. On the one hand, the physical environment receives more analytic attention than it had previously. On the other, the impact of the intrapersonal system—thoughts, feelings

perceptions—on human transactions is also emphasized. This breadth, I believe, is essential if the transactional paradigm is to explain the observed realities of practice.

The breadth of practice reality seems better addressed in the book as a whole than it is in the approach described in the first chapter. Realizing it is easier to critique than create, I will nevertheless raise some issues for the sake of promoting further discussion. Although various definitions of competence are given, drawing upon other fields, the view of competence which is to be used as a basis for this book is not altogether clear. Competence is said to consist of three types of components, "capacities and skills," "motivational aspects," and "environmental qualities" (p. 8). Does this mean that motivation is to be judged as a competence in itself? Even though the psychological literature might suggest that people's drive toward exploring and affecting their environments be assessed as a competence, I wonder about the utility of such a concept for social work. It would seem to me more useful to assess people's physical, mental, and social abilities (competencies) to achieve certain goals and separately to assess their motivation to achieve the goals. Interventions would be quite different if people were able but uninterested or, conversely, interested but unable. Jan Moore-Kirkland, in a fine article on "Mobilizing Motivation: From Theory to Practice," does not appear to view motivation as a competence. Indeed, she states that "motivation [is] a process that takes into account the interaction among client, worker, and the environment" (p. 33). She makes the important point that all behavior is motivated, including that which is called resistance. "Lack of motivation" is merely a catch phrase for behavior that is directed other than in the direction the worker thinks best.

Turning from the issue of definition of competence to definition of the practice approach, there appears to me to be a discrepancy between Maluccio's delineation of important variables and those considered important by other authors. Owing to the brevity of presentation of the practice approach, I cannot tell to what extent the discrepancies are based on conviction and to what extent, on Maluccio's selectivity for the sake of emphasis. For example, Maluccio heavily emphasizes cognition and interventions addressed to clients' actions, giving little attention to interventions addressed to perception and emotion. All of the authors whom I mentioned earlier in this review address all of these aspects depending on the characteristics of the situation.

Maluccio suggests that assessment focus on clients' competence. So far so good. If I had to choose, I would focus on competence and not on incompetence. Do I have to choose? Let me raise an issue that is larger than this book. Pathology, incompetence, and deficit are not nice words. There must be better words to capture the inadequacies that people experience in themselves just as they experience them in their environments. However, where there are constructive ways of thinking, perceiving, and feeling, there are sometimes also the opposite from the clients' own point of view. These characteristics of people, acknowledging that they have been formed through interaction with the environment, may now interfere with further positive interactions. They may need attention before an action focus can work. Stamping out words like "pathology" (p. 11) will not take away serious personal problems when they exist. Is not the challenge rather to decide, together with clients, what problems, personal or environmental, most need to be addressed and what ways seem best to address them? If people treaters and environment changers are to come together in a unified approach to practice, truly intervening according to the needs of the situation and not according to personal preference, it will do no good to ignore any

aspect of the people-environment spectrum even for the sake of making a positive point

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Social Learning and Change. By Howard Goldstein. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1981. Pp. xvi+500. $19.50.

The first thing to be said is that *Social Learning and Change* is not about social work practice from a behavioral perspective, as might be inferred from the title. Rather, Professor Goldstein has undertaken an extraordinary challenge. He has attempted to offer a conceptualization of the nature of human action and change and to translate his formulation into principles for social work practice. This book is a scholarly, well-organized discussion of a "social learning" model for practice. "'Social' refers to the interpersonal context of change . . . ; 'learning' refers to the cognitive activities and processes that are the media for productive problem-solving, change, and growth" (p. ix).

At no time in the history of the profession has there been a greater need to define a conceptual base for social work practice. Currently, diversity seems to be one of the hallmarks of social work practice, and it may not be possible to reach consensus on the values, purpose, knowledge, and methods of social work. However, it is essential that the diverse perspectives be articulated explicitly so that we can progress toward understanding the issues on which there is agreement and begin to resolve those issues on which there is disagreement.

Goldstein, in his earlier book, *Social Work Practice: A Unitary Approach*, expressed an optimistic appraisal of this process: "The issue, it seems to me, is not whether adequate knowledge is available, but how this knowledge can be systematized and ordered so as to afford the profession a coherent foundation for practice" (*Social Work Practice: A Unitary Approach*, p. xi). Goldstein has practiced what he has preached. The book is indeed a coherent synthesis of a great deal of sociological, philosophical, and psychological knowledge. In addition, Goldstein accomplished two tasks which are essential to the development of practice knowledge. First, for a book about change to be complete it must present a discussion of the author's assumptions about the nature of people and their place in the world as well as a description of the nature and process of change. The second task is to address those elements of practice on which there is consensus. Chauncey A. Alexander ("Sound Work Practice: A Unitary Conception," *Social Work* 22, no. 5 [September 1977]: 407–11) has defined them as value, purpose, sanction, knowledge, and method. Each of these tasks has been accomplished very well.

The book is organized into three major sections. In part 1, "Learning and Change: Philosophical and Theoretical Foundations," the existential humanistic philosophic assumptions on which the book is based are developed. In two extensively researched and documented chapters, the author establishes what appear to be the two principle assumptions of social learning: (1) that behavior is best understood as a function of the purposes toward which it is directed rather than as a function of prior events which "cause" behavior, and (2) that variation in human behavior can be explained in large part by the differences in meanings which people attach to events in the environment. In part 2, "Self, Perception, and Learning," a "self theory" of human action is

suggested in which perception (defined in phenomenological terms) and so learning are the processes through which people adapt to their environme In part 3, "The Process of Social Learning and Change," Goldstein brings philosophy and theory together into a discussion of the applications of theory and social learning to human services Of particular interest were author's emphasis on the worker as a person in transaction with the client, his discusson of involuntary clients Case examples in part 3 were well cho and were of great help in understanding the social learning model

For all of its good points, the book is not without some problems Throu out the book, and particularly in chapter 2, Goldstein has a penchant demonstrating the clarity and contribution of his concepts by selectively ou the limitations of the other well-known theories. Contrasting one's own id with those of others is essential to intellectual discourse However, the auth discussions of particular behavior and psychodynamic theories seem aimed creating a polemic rather than discussion His disclaimer that "admittedly have done some disservice to this sample of theories if only by radically co pressing them I have arbitrarily selected and simplified certain aspects of ea theory so as to make my point" (p 74) substantially understates Goldstei misrepresentation of these theories Unless Goldstein is suggesting that s theory is the last word in understanding human behavior (which, to his cred does not appear to be the case), these gratuitous polemics are unnecessary a distract the reader from the fact that his view of humanity and human chan can stand on its own merits. His treatment of social systems and role theory more kind Nevertheless, his comments on systems theory suggest that he h forgotten the very important point (which he made in his first book) th understanding the social system means understanding not only the nature the interactions between the components but also the characteristics of tl components Social learning is not really an alternative to a systems approac Rather, it is an addition to the understanding of people within a social syste

My second comment is a caution Goldstein promises us in his introductio that social learning is a commonsense approach Indeed, by part 3 because the meticulous way in which he has "walked" the reader through his ideas i parts 1 and 2, the practice concepts and examples do make sense The book however, is not for the skimmer or novel reader Goldstein has worked hard t get a lot of information and new concepts into a reasonably sized book Th result is a prose style which is often difficult This book must be studied

Overall, Goldstein has produced a very credible, usable model of people in transaction with their environment. Those who prefer an existential phe nomenological perspective on the world will find a well-formed critique an valuable assistance for using that position in practice For those, who have found other explanations of human behavior to be useful and parsimonious *Social Learning and Change* will provide (1) a stimulating, thought-pro voking alternative view and (2) an important reminder of some of the common elements of social work practice For those of us who continue to be in the process of forming and refining our ideas about people and change, this book is a contribution to the range of plausible ideas we are trying to synthesize

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Brief Notices

Women and Violence. By Miriam F. Hirsch. New York: Van Nostrand Rein-
hold Co., 1981. Pp. xxv+385. $17.95.

A scholarly, yet lucid work on the abuse of women from anthropological,
ociological, and psychological perspectives. The author discusses the biologi-
al and behavioral differences in men and women as well as women's minority
atus throughout history. The causes of aggression and violence are evaluated
with reference to genetic and environmental factors and to the theories of
Dollard, Freud, and Bandura.

The Right to Welfare and Other Essays. By T. H. Marshall. New York: Free
Press, 1981. Pp. viii+181. $15.95.

A volume of T. H. Marshall's major essays on social policy and administration
ince his retirement from the London School of Economics in 1956.

What's Happening to the American Family? By Sar A. Levitan and Richard S.
Belous. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. Pp. ix+206.
16.50 (cloth), $5.95 (paper).

The authors propose that recent changes in the structure of the family are
ecessary rather than destructive. Modern trends in courtship and marriage,
irth, child rearing, and employment are discussed. Suggestions are given about
e roles that government and private institutions can play in assisting Ameri-
an families.

ee Enterprise without Poverty. By Leonard M. Greene. New York: W. W.
orton & Co., 1981. Pp. 191. $12.95.

urrent efforts to aid the poor, aged, and disabled perpetuate a dependency
stem. Greene offers an alternative program, the Graduated Income Supple-
ent, which he believes will provide econo[illegible] security for all.

Group Care for Children: Concept and Issues Edited by Frank Ainsworth and Leon C. Fulcher. New York: Methuen, Inc., 1981. Pp. xvi+308. $17.95 (cloth), $9.95 (paper).

Group care is now a widely accepted principle and this book underscores its emergence as a distinct field of study and practice in the United States and England. As an alternative perspective it gives a cohesive framework for children's services.

The Minimum Level of Unemployment and Public Policy By Frank C. Pierson. Kalamazoo, Mich.: W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1980. Pp. xii+191. $8.50 (cloth), $5.50 (paper).

This study investigates the role of the government in reducing persistent joblessness even when the employment rate is high. The author states that until a method of balancing short- and long-term economic goals through public policy alternatives is obtained, this problem will remain unresolved.

Psychotherapy with Families: An Analytic Approach Edited by Sally Box, Beta Copley, Jeanne Magagna, and Errica Moustaki. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981. Pp. xii+179. $16.95.

A study resulting from a clinical workshop based on the Adolescent Department at the Tavistock Clinic. It views the family as a system and approaches it from the perspective of two developments, object relations psychoanalytic practice and group relations.

Readings in Community Work Edited by Paul Henderson and David N. Thomas. Winchester, Mass.: Allen & Unwin, 1981. Pp. x+198. $29.50 (cloth), $11.95 (paper).

Designed to give community work students a historical context for their work and the major themes within their area of study. This collection of carefully selected articles provides a comprehensive introduction to community work.

Growing Up Free: Raising Your Child in the 80's By Letty Cottin Pogrebin. New York: Bantam Books, 1981. Pp. xii+641. $8.95.

A guide to achieving role-free parenting, this book shows that traditional child-rearing methods may harm children, whereas nonsexist rearing is beneficial.

The Limits of Professional Power: National Health Care in the Federal Republic of Germany By Deborah A. Stone. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981. Pp. xi+212. $18.50.

Focusing on West Germany, whose health care system employs government-mandated peer reviews and power groups of patients and insurance doctors, the

thor compares this system with regulatory procedures practiced in the United States. Her analysis points out the difficulty in transferring a program successfully from one country to another.

The Welfare Mothers' Movement: A Decade of Change for Poor Women? By Susan Handley Hertz. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1981. Pp. x+193. $19.50 (cloth), $9.50 (paper).

An examination of the welfare mothers' movement in the state of Minnesota. The author discusses the opportunities and constraints experienced by welfare mothers in their efforts to unite and to obtain their goals.

The Family's Construction of Reality. By David Reiss. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981. Pp. x+126. $26.00.

This work suggests some new methods for understanding the processes that keep a family together and that pull it apart. The basic premise underlying the author's theory is that each family constructs its own paradigm in order to make sense of the world and to coordinate its own activities.

Training for Uncertainty: A Sociological Approach to Social Work. By Brian Heraud. Library of Social Work. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981. Pp. x+153. $20.00.

Stressing the interaction that takes place between teachers and students, the author examines the processes of social work education. These processes involve numerous uncertainties which create conflicts for students in the transition from education to profession.

Growing Young. By Ashley Montagu. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1981. Pp. xii+306. $12.95.

The author claims that human beings are not intended to become ossified adults. Our childlike traits should continue to grow and develop even as we get older. A definite link exists between physical and mental aging; those young in mind will not age at the expected rate.

Community Organization for Urban Social Change: A Historical Perspective. Edited by Robert Fisher and Peter Romanofsky. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981. Pp. xviii+259. $29.95.

This is the first historical work on this significant movement, which is usually treated as a recent phenomenon. The eight essays which comprise this book are written by historians, political scientists, and community activists and are nationwide in coverage.

Sex and Pregnancy in Adolescence By Melvin Zelnik, John F. Kanner Kathleen Ford. Sage Library of Social Research, vol. 133. Beverly Hills, C Sage Publications, 1981. Pp. 272. $20.00 (cloth), $9.95 (paper).

A comparison of two studies, one in 1971 and the other in 1976, of the se activity, contraception, and pregnancy outcomes of adolescent women authors discuss the complex problems involved and point out that there a easy solutions, as yet, in social policy attempts to address the issue of mo motherhood.

Models of Influence in Psychotherapy By Patrick Pentony. New York Press, 1981. Pp. xiv+210. $16.95.

The author analyzes the one element common to all modes of psychother the phenomenon of influence. He states that each system of therapy confor to one of three models: the placebo model, the resocialization model, or contextual model of interpersonal influence. This work brings order to variety of approaches subsumed under the practice of psychotherapy.

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Selected materials representative of the Community Mental Health Center Pr gram during the 1970s. Four themes are addressed: the development and imp of the CMHC program, CMHC management, service delivery, and communi organization.

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Government and Voluntary Agency Relationships

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The concept of "voluntary agency" is being radically but almost imperceptibly revised under the press of events in the world of social welfare organization and finance. The term now embraces traditional nonprofit social agencies, proprietary agencies offering similar services often financed by the public sector, social programs financed by industry for its employees, and the family as a primary service provider. This evolution demands a major reconsideration of the new relationship between government and the voluntary agency.

Changing Context for Social Problems

From the earliest days of the republic, there has existed some symbiotic relationship between organs of government, at local, state, and federal levels, and varieties of voluntary organization. Consideration of the relationship between government and voluntary organization in 1982 is best carried out with an understanding of the underlying cultural, economic, and social changes since the New Deal in the 1930s, which provide the context for contemporary relationships.

Whatever views we hold about the suitability of the relationships which existed before the 1930s, it seems reasonable to postulate that the following major changes, which may alter the ways we approach the next decade, have occurred within the past forty years.

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The objectives of welfare programs, under whatever auspices, h[illegible] been enormously expanded. Before 1935, a few most urgent needs w[illegible] the object of social attention While the presence of unmet need and [illegible] potential of prevention were recognized, the major emphasis was [illegible] eking out whatever funds happened to be available and stretching th[illegible] as best one could In the intervening years, policy and programm[illegible] have grown to encompass entire populations at risk everywhere in [illegible] nation and have offered to reduce social needs by major interventions a preventive nature [1]

Social needs and human needs have been increasingly recognized the results of a complex interaction of forces and as unresponsive simple or single function actions. This has led to a great increase in [illegible] professionalization of human services and to accelerated specializati[illegible] of many service functions More staff with better training and know[illegible] edge and more varied teams of specialists have replaced generalists a[illegible] volunteers.

The costs of such programs have increased at a rate unpredicta[illegible] only a few years ago Attempts (in the interest of equity and fairness [illegible] reach all persons suffering from like handicaps, efforts to introdu[illegible] scientific knowledge into practice, and the pace of inflation have contributed to a level of resource cost which far exceeds the past Th[illegible] costs surpass the capacity of philanthropy to finance even the ma[illegible] part of the limited and specialized functions. As a result, most volu[illegible] tary programs depend on external, public sources to sustain them

Despite this shift in context, not only have voluntary organizatio[illegible] persisted and survived but their numbers have proliferated New [illegible] specialized services for previously overlooked segments of the popu[illegible] tion (e.g., racial minorities or the middle class) have flourished, ove[illegible] despite the high failure rate of many new ventures Such volunt[illegible] associations provide services often of an experimental or demonst[illegible] tion nature, advocacy that draws public attention to unmet needs, [illegible] supplementary services augmenting basic mass services provided un[illegible] public auspices.[2]

The traditional voluntary, nonprofit association represents only [illegible] element in a broader classification of organizations actually concer[illegible] with social welfare. This contemporary classification of "volunta[illegible] now includes at least the following:

1. Proprietary organizations offer services very similar to those [illegible] fered by the conventional philanthropic agency. For example, nurs[illegible] homes and home care agencies serve the seriously disabled, and [illegible] care programs are available for children. In health areas, volunt[illegible] ambulatory health care settings and nonprofit hospitals function very much the fashion of proprietary organizations They limit "fr[illegible] care or restrict services to full-pay clientele. This essentially propriet[illegible] sector plays a significant part in the development of national pol[illegible]

social agencies which are openly proprietary have emerged in limited sectors in the American society primarily to provide nursing-home care, home health care services, and day care for children. Originally, these proprietary organizations were created to provide services to persons able to pay the full market cost, while the conventional nonprofit agency took care of those without the means to pay. However, over time and with the growth of public investment in the human services, the proprietary agencies began to compete with the nonprofit organizations to secure public funds to provide presumably equivalent services to dependent populations whose needs were subsidized by tax funds. The major stimulus for this development took place during the Nixon administration. It was argued that proprietary organizations, under the prod of economic criteria, would be able to offer in a more efficient, less costly fashion services equivalent to those provided by nonprofit organizations, which were viewed as being lax in the management of their operations.[3]

2. Business and industry play an increasing role in meeting human needs.[4] Recent studies indicate that as much as one-third of the total wage bill in the United States pays for so-called fringe benefits, which supplement take-home pay and have the character of social benefits for employed workers. Some of these benefits—for example, unemployment insurance—represent obligations placed upon industry by national and state legislation. Most, however, have been assumed as a result of labor-management negotiations. In addition to such fringe benefits, a number of industries directly offer human services. The extent to which this new development affects government and voluntary relations or distorts the equitable distribution of human services has not yet been thoroughly explored. Most fringe benefits are health benefits, primarily hospitalization and ambulatory medical care, and are slated to employees of large industries and sometimes to their family members. However, it is important to recognize that certain progressive industries have, in addition, provided generous insurance supplements for unemployment and retirement and in some cases have financed such services as day care for children of mothers working in those industries and recreation and socializing activities for employees. This development is limited to the employees of the involved industries, mainly the major basic industries of the nation and, even then, family members of employed workers are not always included. Despite the distortion which these developments introduce into the spectrum of human services, it is by now clear that such industrially underwritten or developed services can no longer be ignored if one is considering the relationship between government and voluntary services.

3. Finally, note must be taken of the family as a primary social service unit. It is only under the impact of budget constraints and recession that the age-old concern about the relationship between fami-

ly well-being and public responsibility has been reactivated and, once again, has become a major policy matter.

The family is again discussed as the "primary social service agency." In many areas, certainly as regards the care of the elderly and the care of children, the family remains the primary source of support in cases of distress, illness, or any personal difficulty.[5] Only recently has it been recognized that basic social trends in the composition and social functioning of the family require a reconsideration of the limits as well as the potential of family supportiveness. Some 20 percent of older persons lack any surviving family members. Their needs, therefore, cannot be met by recourse to the supportiveness of a family network. In addition, the fact that about half of the work force is made up of women, the majority of whom are mothers, suggests that the nature of family responsibility has changed as women have entered the mainstream of economic life. Evidence is mixed about the extent to which this tendency has been accelerated by the rising economic expectations of society which bring women into the work force along with men to augment family income for the purchase of luxury goods, or, alternatively, to what extent this trend is due to inflation and inequities in the distribution of the national income, which require families to have two wage earners in order to maintain minimum decent standards of living. There have also been major changes in mores and in family composition, with a growth in the number of single-parent families.

Whatever the causal explanation, it is clear that the underlying support of family members needs to be reevaluated. With more adult family members in the work force, the labor of family members at home can no longer be taken for granted. What remains unresolved is whether the increase in family income makes it possible for the nation to treat the family as a financial resource which can be relied upon to purchase any social services its members require. The fact that average income may be only $20 thousand a year for a family of four suggests that the financial margin for the marketplace purchase of services is not unlimited. Transient and inexpensive services can certainly be purchased. However, major catastrophes such as severe disability due to sickness, injury, or birth defect clearly exceed the capacity of the average family to purchase requisite services. Thus, any reasonable observer must consider whether family members should be expected to leave the work force in order to provide physical care for dependent family members or whether their contribution to the economy is such that a public provision—through tax or through charitable contributions—is warranted to replace the services their labors in the past provided.

In speaking of government-voluntary relationships in the 1980s, we must consider all of the following: conventional, voluntary, philanthropic service agencies or associations; proprietary service agencies; industry-, labor-, and business-financed human services; and the family

Questions for the 1980s

The election of a Republican administration with a clear new social policy forces attention to governmental and voluntary interrelationships. This new policy was expressed in an election platform that emphasized that "charitable works performed by private citizens, family, social, ethnic, and religious organizations are much to be encouraged."[6] This has been a standard formulation in the past fifty years. New with this administration, however, is the intent to divest the federal government of much of the responsibility for social programs which it has accumulated over the past fifty years and to transfer this responsibility either to the marketplace, to conventional charitable organizations, or to local and state government for services. If these expressions are translated into government policy, there will be in the next few years a major redivision of responsibilities between government and nongovernment sectors of American society.

The question of objectives or purpose for any human services will confront policymakers. Are governmental-voluntary relationships expected to achieve preventive, curative, and maintenance goals for all persons affected by particular conditions? If full penetration of an at-risk population is the objective, then it is unlikely that philanthropic associations can independently provide the requisite sources. Conversely, if a residual purpose is adopted by public policy, then the question is merely how to distribute existing public welfare revenues among needs which vastly exceed the resources. Planning in the public sector would resemble traditional planning among voluntary agencies.

Such a question leads to a concern about the specific objectives of the voluntary associations. Is the voluntary sector to be considered a primary or a residual provider of services? If it is to be a primary provider of services, will the resources made available from any public or private source be sufficient to underwrite the development of mass voluntary service programs comparable to the mass programs under public auspices and administration?

Will the philanthropic agencies move to become a network of advocates on behalf of human needs? Will they be primarily concerned with indicating what needs can be met and then advocating as vigorously as possible by political and other means tax-supported and general community funds to underwrite the demonstrated services on a mass basis? As advocates, will they find a common framework and direct their efforts toward enlarging the total and national tax investment in a coherent and plausible service strategy? Or will philanthropic and other voluntary organizations continue to advocate their own specialized needs and thus compete with other equally specialized advocacy groups? Will the voluntary sector concentrate on trying to increase the portion

of the gross national product "pie" to be made available for human services, or are the advocates to compete with each other for a share of a shrinking section of the pie?

When these theoretical questions are dealt with, there remains a crucial concern about the capacity of the voluntary sector to perform a new set of functions and to discharge enlarged roles in a new partnership with government. This question of capacity has several forms. The most immediate and pressing is undoubtedly that of the fiscal capacity of the voluntary sector, however defined, to meet mass needs in any area. We have touched upon the fiscal capacities of the family. Some section of the population is capable of meeting all the needs of all of its members, but this percentage is relatively small, probably less than 10 percent. Another 30–40 percent is probably capable of meeting modest demands for a short period of time, and perhaps as much as half of the population at the margin of financial independence is only capable of meeting minor human needs by withdrawing from the labor force or by significantly reducing their standards of living.[7]

If we turn to philanthropy as a fiscal resource, we can use the evidence developed by the Urban Institute of Washington in their recent analysis of the impact of federal financial cutbacks on philanthropy. In 1980, some 2–3 million local and national groups distributed approximately $100 billion in goods and services through philanthropic channels. In that year, such groups received about $45 billion in federal grants. The Urban Institute estimates that, given the present federal budget projections through 1984, income for voluntary organizations will decline between 1981 and 1984 by over $27 billion, of which approximately $18 billion would have been directed toward social welfare programs and the balance for education, health, and so on. In the field of social welfare, including social services, employment, and community development, the total reduction would be in the order of 36–37 percent.

Is there any basis for believing that private philanthropy can make up this estimated shortfall? Business contributions to nonprofit organizations do not appear promising. In the last year, major business corporations provided about $2.5 billion, or less than 5 percent of the amount contributed by nongovernmental sources. Only a quarter of the nation's corporations make donations to charity at all, and these tend to average about 1 percent of taxable income. Corporate giving is further limited by many legal constraints that obligate managers to make corporate contributions to charity only where such contributions can be demonstrated to benefit the economic health of the corporation and therefore, not to affect adversely the well-being of the stockholders on whose behalf managers of corporations function. While numerous examples can be found of corporations making contributions for human services, especially in inner city areas where the risk of social turbu-

lence and disorder are real and are feared by corporate structures, these contributions in the past have been relatively small and have not had a long history.[9]

Another commonly considered resource is private foundations. It must be recalled that foundations have been conveniently conservative in the investment of their capital assets. The state of the stock market and the economy has massively reduced the real value of assets held by corporations, with a corresponding major reduction in the financial capacity of private foundations. In any event, the total funds available through foundations for philanthropic giving fall short of the reductions in promised governmental support.

A remaining resource is fund raising from the general public. In 1980, private individuals gave almost $40 billion to nonprofit agencies. Before becoming too optimistic about this potential, it is important to recall that about $22 billion of these contributions went to churches for religious purposes other than social welfare.[10] It is uncertain whether the financial support of religious organizations receiving such contributions can be shifted so that more can be used for social services. But even if that is possible, it is unclear whether such shifting of financial resources will benefit church members only or the general public. The more affluent churches are unlikely to have large numbers of very poor members, and poorer members of the society are probably members of poor churches that lack the fund-raising capacity of the more affluent.

Finally, apart from money, one needs to consider the capacity of private organizations to meet mass human need, as presented by the mentally ill, the destitute, the disabled, or children. The crowning achievements of private philanthropy have been in small, dedicated organizations with much flexibility and imagination. There is as yet no evidence that these small private organizations, if they convert to mass service organizations, will be more humane, more effective, less regulation ridden than the large public bureaucracies that are so vigorously criticized.[11]

Logic suggests that as organizations increase in size the proportion of income devoted to administration control increases. Administrative costs can be offset by economies of scale and increases in productivity. Since human distress is less responsive to standardized or automated treatment, there may be no economies of scale or superior productivity. If voluntary organizations shift to large-scale structuring in the fashion of large-scale governmental agencies and large corporations, their practices and structures will be transformed.

It is uncertain that the supporters and leaders of voluntary organizations are really interested in managing large-scale organizations transformed along bureaucratic lines. The momentum of leadership for evolution in these directions appears to be lacking. On the other hand, if there is an interest in creating large-scale voluntary organizations

capable of serving many thousands of persons, the supporters of this approach will need to examine constantly what changes take place in the services they extend. Will such services have elements of individuality, human concern, and flexibility, which characterize the conventional small agency, or will these large operations become indistinguishable from the large public and business operations they are intended to replace? If they become indistinguishable, from one another, we may ask whether the entire exercise is justified.

Proprietary organizations are often said to be more efficient and therefore more economical, but the evidence is very mixed. Small voluntary organizations are often more costly on a per case basis than large-scale public organizations.[12] This could be attributable either to low volume, which means a higher unit cost, or just to the price of organized flexibility, which is inevitably higher than the price of routinized programs. If proprietary forms of service are less costly, this may be accounted for by a reduction in quality.

The effects of reductions in quantity or quality are debatable. There is no good measure of whether a reduction in the volume of services is necessarily adverse or an increase necessarily beneficial in dealing with any significant social problem. The entire past evolution of human service programs is still obscured by the lack of solid evidence about the comparative results from different combinations of service modalities in relation to explicit human needs. This difficulty is due, in part, to the lack of adequate standardized definitions of human need.

The current environment questions the capacity of voluntary organizations to make social policy without recourse to government. If, in fact, the federal government persists in retreating from responsibility for making social policy in meeting human needs and turns this over to business and philanthropy, does the voluntary sector have the capacity to make policy which is equitable throughout the nation? This policy making will inevitably confront a question of balance, in the distribution of national resources and responsibility, between government and proprietary forms of organization on the one hand and nonprofit voluntary organizations on the other.[13]

If the volume of human services provided through proprietary and business channels is to be increased, social policy must consider tax incentives introduced through government policy, permitting proprietary firms to deduct from income and other taxes the costs of providing services. The ability of profit-making firms to write off as accelerated depreciation the capital cost of initiating any service program would be a related benefit, one that is generally not available to nonprofit organizations. There is an urgent need to reexamine how the laws favor and disfavor various voluntary approaches.

Approaches to human service through proprietary organizations are likely to result in attention to services consumed by families capable of

purchasing them or services available only to members of sufficiently large-scale fringe-benefit and service programs for employees. But this attention omits entirely persons employed in small-scale industry not amenable to the organization of services within the industry. Most newly created employment in the nation is found in small units with relatively few employees, which are not easily able to develop service programs as part of their business operations. And, of course, there remains the perennial difficulty that such approaches omit adequate attention to the service needs of families whose incomes are marginal at the subsistence level without a cushion for the purchase of any services.

If we adopted this policy, we would be creating dual systems of service in which those human-service consumers who are better off financially and are employed in certain kinds of industries are relatively well provided for, while all the rest are attended to by less adequate and probably second-class service arrangements. The consequences of such a division for the health of local and national coherence and communality would have to be tested.

Options for the Future

Given the complexity of the problems that confront American social welfare organizations in the 1980s, at this stage we can only outline some of the alternative approaches that will undoubtedly be debated vigorously in the coming period. What will probably be at stake is a redefinition of the sense of nation and community. American citizens working through the innumerable variety of social organizations and through government will be engaged in a complex debate over the nature of their society. The society can be more or less caring about the needs of its members; it can be more or less concerned about building a coherent, unified society or about the development of a society polarized between haves and have-nots, and it can have its policies and activities carried forward through an intricate network of associations each functioning independently and competitively, or it can have a variety of activities carried on according to some national aim and purpose.[11]

An alternative approach is to seek a reversal in the expressed position of the national government and return to the trend of development of the past fifty years. If one assumes for the moment, however, that the trend line of the past cannot be continued, that even if the federal government retains a major responsibility for human welfare it will not be as extensive as in the past and will not grow as rapidly, then some of the questions which arise remain very similar to those which

have to be answered if there is to be a substantial cutback in fede responsibility.

At the present writing, if we proceed on the assumption that hum need will not be neglected, that the "truly needy" will not be ignor by their fellow citizens, and that average citizens will not be beggared meet these needs, then the following alternative choices can be co sidered.

The transfer of some functions to private philanthropy will involv at a minimum, an increase in the readiness of individual citizens corporations to increase vastly their contributions to nonprofit philan thropic organizations in order to pick up a part of the burden bei off-loaded by the federal government.[15] There is no way of telling no whether a substantial shift to private philanthropy can be accomplishe on some unified basis through the collaboration of voluntary organiz tions—collaboration which in the past has not succeeded in creating unified set of policies—or whether it will take place through the com petition of innumerable special interest voluntary associations compet ing for funds. If the latter occurs, it is likely we will see certain human needs better attended than others regardless of their significance, a decided by the popularity of certain human needs as compared t others. As it has in the past, the voluntary sector will face a dilemma: vanguard health research affecting a very small part of the populatio remains more popular and better funded than the nutrition and pre ventive health care of children in low-income families.

Another option is to expand further the role of proprietary profit making human-service agencies, a role which may be characteristic of the United States. At least in the fields of long-term care for physical and mental illness and day care for children, the evidence to date sug gests that the proprietary approach, indirectly subsidized by taxes, will reach at least half of the population and, at worst, will reach that half which has proportionately fewer social needs than families of limited income. The outcome would be a two-tier system in which the ex panded proprietary services reach more and more middle- and upper class families, without a compensating attention to the needs of the less affluent.

An increase in corporate responsibility could take several forms. At the least revolutionary level, businesses could be encouraged by exhor tation, persuasion, or tax incentives to give substantially more than 1 percent of their taxable income to philanthropic community services. This approach will undoubtedly be hampered by a long history of economic and legal constraints placed upon corporate activities to con centrate their charitable gifts in areas which are of benefit to the corpo ration, not to the recipient. If these difficulties can be overcome, the contribution to community philanthropy would necessarily compete with corporate incentives to develop their own human services on be-

half of their own employees. In some European countries, certain functions such as unemployment and health are mandated on business by law. If changes in the American scene take place as a result of a withdrawal of governmental responsibility, the prior interest of business enterprises to serve their own employees first, rather than serving the general community, will certainly be sharpened and would require serious attention.

The potential for family members to increase substantially their services to their own members remains an untested area. The evidence available is that family members do help to the maximum extent of their capacity, although a very small proportion of middle- and higher-income families may possibly do more than at present, especially for a severely retarded handicapped child. Any significant increase in family responsibility for human services needs to be evaluated in light of the radical changes which have taken place in social structure in recent decades. The fact is that a large proportion of the population is now made up of single-parent families with single wage earners whose incomes are, on average, two-thirds of the income of the average family of four (i.e., two-thirds of about $15–$20 thousand per year), marriage and remarriage have eroded family commitment to members who have experienced a succession of divorces, and the combined pressures of inflation and rising expectations have made most families with two parents two-worker households. All these facts militate against a quick responsiveness on the part of families to greatly increase the scope of their present services to family members.[17]

Over a long period, it is possible for expectations to change; the expectation of improved standards of living for working-class and middle-income families may be moderated so that a certain portion of the combined earnings of two-earner families will be diverted from the purchase of goods, higher education for their children, or retirement to the current care of the elderly, needy children, the disabled, and so on. Whether in such circumstances families will also be able to increase significantly their philanthropic contributions to support other than members of their own families remains an arguable point about which the evidence is not encouraging.[18]

Whether or not wealthy families, the upper 10–20 percent of families, can also be encouraged to increase greatly their philanthropic contributions to make up some of the expected shortfall in public financing is not only problematic but, more to the point, runs counter to the purposes of the present administration, which expects that the resources of these families would be diverted to investment in business enterprises rather than to philanthropy.

The remaining option is to restore the positive foundation on which government responsibility should rest (rather than recede from it) in a manner congruent with the values and beliefs of most citizens about

government. With a clear national foundation, voluntary organizatio[ns] can plan for themselves. One such foundation could be a leaner, sel[ec]tive, and more easily understood role for government to replace t[he] open-ended, diffuse role that has emerged in recent years in which a[ny] and all human dilemmas are seen as a first and major obligation [of] government.

The historic rationales for government action have been maintai[n]ing the cohesiveness of a civil society and assuring all citizens fa[ir] protection against major unavoidable hazards of life (e.g., hunge[r], disability, homelessness). In recent decades, these basic needs have bee[n] met by universal public programs, assured fairly to all citizens. Suc[h] programs (income, work opportunity, medical care) reach the depen[dent], the poor who work, and those above the poverty line who are [at] risk of falling below it. Other, more problematic human ills, such [as] discrimination and prejudice, while serious, may not lend themselve[s] to uniform government welfare action, and equality of outcome in li[fe] condition (e.g., equality in income) is not yet a goal accepted by mos[t] citizens. Equity of opportunity, however, is still a widely accepted goal. Pursuing the option described in these two paragraphs calls for a re-newed government-voluntary agency social contract in which limita[-]tion of governmental scope is accompanied by stronger governmen[t] action in a few areas—for example, a fairly devised income mainte[-]nance program. This approach at least assures a platform of justice and equity on which wide support might be built.

On balance, therefore, the period ahead may be characterized by substantial confusion, uncertainty, and groping for a reasonable bal-ance between government's view of its responsibility and the capacity of other, nongovernmental organizations to meet significant human needs in light of social changes and the levels of expectation that mod-ern society has generated. Answers to difficult questions will not come from a national administration ideologically committed to the belief that such answers are not government's business. Whether competing voluntary interests can find a consensus for redefining a social contract with government remains a hope; it is not a demonstrable likelihood but it is a reasonable hope if a just and equitable society is the objective.

Notes

This is a slightly modified version of an article initially prepared for the U.S. Report to the International Conference on Social Welfare, Brighton, England, August 1982.

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15. *The Economist* (August 22, 1981), pp. 23–24.

16. This is an unlikely prospect. See *The Economist* (August 22, 1981), p. 24, and Salamon and Abramson.

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Social Change: Settlement Houses and Saul Alinsky, 1939–1965

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Both Saul Alinsky and the settlement houses worked with the neighborhood as a unit in achieving social change. In many ways, Alinsky's methods were opposite those of the settlements. Alinsky emphasized conflict, whereas the settlements traditionally stressed consensus across social class lines. In four cases, Alinsky groups came into contact with individual settlements. While each settlement reacted differently, in no one case could the Alinsky-settlement interaction be regarded as a success by both sides. Nevertheless, both the settlements and the Alinsky-sponsored groups made significant and worthwhile contributions toward achieving social change.

Managing to survive through periods of reform as well as reaction, the settlement house has been involved with social change for almost one hundred years. Usually called "neighborhood centers" today, they still seek to meet the needs of their neighborhoods through the provision of educational, recreational services, and through social change efforts. However, the settlements were most prominent in reform during the Progressive Era.[1] Since then, their influence has declined. Why?

Historians have suggested various reasons for the decline of the settlement house role in reform. Roy Lubove and Clarke Chambers have stressed the rise of professionalism—social work schools, the search for a teachable method, and the reliance on psychology for much of that method—as inhibiting reform in the social work profession.[2] In the 1920s, social work became concerned more with individual adjustment

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rian with social change. Focusing on the 1930s, I emphasized the rise of the Community Chest (now called United Way) with its additional layer of bureaucracy, conservative outlook, and control over funding as inhibiting reform in settlement houses.[3] In the three decades following the Great Depression, still another possible reason has emerged: the settlement houses' own social change methods were criticized as ineffective.[4] While all three of these factors—professionalism, the Community Chest, and traditional social change methods—tempered the settlements' influence on social reform, the one factor historians probably know least about is how the settlements went about seeking social change.

The years 1939–65 are particularly interesting in this regard because they show the settlements, agencies with a long tradition of commitment to reform, surviving through a period of conservatism and then being challenged as too "old-fashioned" by much of the social work establishment associated with the War on Poverty. The prototype for the War on Poverty was Mobilization for Youth, a program characterized by storefront agencies and participation of the poor in direct-action tactics such as rent strikes to pressure landlords into repairing their tenements. George Brager was the first director of the action phase of Mobilization for Youth. Looking back on the 1960s, Brager recalled the "voguishness" of Saul Alinsky's direct-action methods.[5] Saul Alinsky was the settlement houses' most important single challenger. Another settlement critic in the Alinsky vein was the noted sociologist Herbert Gans. In *The Urban Villagers* Gans describes how a particular settlement with its well-to-do board favoring urban renewal was almost totally unresponsive to the needs and desires of its ethnic neighbors.[6] Settlement workers themselves were on the defensive, as Lucy Carner's acknowledgment betrays: "Periodically the cry goes up that settlements are no longer needed."[7] It was not just that government agencies were increasingly dominating the social welfare field, but the War on Poverty actually breathed new life into private agencies by making extensive federal grants available to them. In fact, the grant proposal for Mobilization for Youth actually originated with a settlement house, New York's Henry Street. Furthermore, the antipoverty program, like the settlements, had a strong neighborhood focus. Yet settlement houses were hardly central to the War on Poverty. Their lack of influence was largely due to the fact that their fundamental nature clashed with other trends in social welfare as exemplified by Saul Alinsky. How settlements adapted to meet the challenges posed by Alinsky and his followers would be crucial.

Settlement houses have changed significantly over time. In their early days, the "settlement method" consisted of educated, well-to-do people taking up residence in the slum by living in the settlement house. By doing so settlement workers sought to replace the air of superiority

characteristic of nineteenth-century social workers with neighborliness. Settlement workers also acquired a certain "legitimacy" in their attacks on social problems through their residence in the slums. Since few of the original settlement house workers could even boast of having had one social work course (social work education was a thing of the future), they had to justify their demands for change on grounds other than professional training. They did so by actually living in the slums. If the city was not picking up the garbage in the neighborhood, settlement workers not only had firsthand knowledge of the situation but also had a right to complain, since it was their garbage that was not being picked up. Thus the neighborhood was the focus, and residence in the neighborhood was the method. However, by 1970, even though a couple hundred settlements still existed, only four had residents.[8] Settlement workers were justifying themselves by pointing to their master's degrees and relating to their clientele as professionals. Gone was the practice of "settling" in the slums.

Although the number of settlement workers residing in the houses declined, the settlements were slow to professionalize. Some social work schools began offering a group work curriculum in the 1930s, but few social work school graduates took jobs in settlement houses until after World War II. By this time, the middle-class volunteer worker, who had from the beginning supplemented the services of the residents, had largely disappeared. Living and working in a settlement house had lost its initial glamour and excitement. To replace residents and volunteers, settlements had to hire more paid staff. Salaries and the expense of maintaining a major physical facility tied settlement houses to the values of the philanthropic establishment. The increasing influence of the Community Chest also inhibited reform while it encouraged professionalization.[9] However, even with professional workers the settlement house has refused to become specialized in its services.

While the settlement method of residence had given way to professionally trained workers by the post-Depression years, the original focus on the neighborhood has shown remarkable continuity. The wide-ranging concern for neighborhood needs was what distinguished the settlement from a purely recreational center. Although a good deal of recreation still went on in the settlements, it was not merely recreation for recreation's sake. Through recreational programs, settlements or neighborhood centers managed to maintain their neighborhood relationships even in times when little support existed for reform. That the physical facility of the settlement housed these recreational activities gave the settlement an identity and an air of permanence in the neighborhood. Those settlement houses that lost touch with their neighborhoods, usually by abandoning recreational programs, soon went out of existence. Part of the settlement method was the use of recreation to

maintain a neighborhood relationship through periods of reform as well as conservatism.

The settlement house approach to social reform has generally been a cooperative, consensus-building one, utilizing traditional channels. The tendency to emphasize cooperation may have been due to the fact that settlements were traditionally a mixture of well-to-do board members and contributors, middle-class staff, and lower-class clientele. Or the cooperative approach may have resulted from the desire of settlement workers to build bridges among the different urban classes that had lost touch with one another as people separated into class-stratified neighborhoods. In any case, part of this cooperative approach placed the settlement worker in the role of interpreter of the poor to the well-to-do and to the larger community.

Alinsky Attacks Settlement House Methods

Historically, settlement workers tended to speak for their neighbors in the slums. They carried more credibility with the larger community when they actually lived in the settlement neighborhoods. However, as residence of settlement workers in the settlement houses declined and virtually disappeared after World War II, settlement workers did not change their methods of social action. They continued to hold conferences, pass resolutions, write their congressmen, testify at hearings, "interpret" the poor to the rest of the community, carry out innovative projects, organize community councils, and run their usual programs. Generally, they refused to listen when radical community organizer Saul Alinsky told them that the settlements were no longer in touch with their neighborhoods, that they did not know the influential neighborhood leaders, and that they did not know what the neighborhood really wanted.[10] Alinsky also stressed an adversarial rather than a cooperative approach in bringing about social change. His ideas were in vogue in the 1960s; the settlements were not.

Although Alinsky's reputation grew at the same time that community organization was emerging as a separate discipline in social work, professional community organization prior to the 1960s betrayed little of Alinsky's influence. When Alinsky was organizing the Back of the Yards Council in 1939, the National Conference of Social Welfare was trying to define community organization.[11] Later the University of Pittsburgh School of Social Work developed its specialization in Social Intergroup Work. The focus seems to have been on relationships among groups and not on mobilizing for community action in terms of

effective pressure tactics. Pittsburgh's approach fit in with the tr
toward the establishment of community councils. These were typic
sponsored by welfare federations, the policymaking and money-di
bution arm of the Community Chests, although settlement houses
casionally took on the task of providing these councils with a pro
sional worker.

Before the 1960s, most community organization graduates wen
work for United Funds and Councils. It was hardly a booming spec
ty. Only seventy-eight social work graduates in 1960 specialized in
field. When they organized and staffed community councils, their m
goal was the coordination of social services through meetings atten
largely by social agency professionals.[12] This was precisely w
Alinsky had criticized fourteen years earlier as "monthly social g
togethers for a small group of professional people who wallow in th
egos as self-anointed saviors of the people and commiserate with o
another on the poor benighted people of the neighborhood who do
have sufficient intelligence to know what is good for them."[13] Alins
was also critical of community councils for acting as the tools of co
servative business interests that donated to private agencies. He claim
that back in the 1930s, employers in the Mohawk Valley got settleme
houses and other agencies to set up a community council—a coun
which then accused CIO organizers of being outside, Communist ag
tators. He claimed the tactic was repeated in 1965 when he was d
nounced as an outside agitator on arriving in Rochester to organi
FIGHT (Freedom, Integration, God, Honor, Today). As Alinsky sa
it, he was more of an "insider" than those denouncing him because th
black community invited him to come to Rochester, and "That's mo
than any other agency can say."[14] In other words, community counc
formed by settlements and United Funds or Community Chests did no
represent the poor.

Nevertheless, settlement house social action efforts tended to be trad
tional and directed by professional workers who lost touch not onl
with their neighborhoods but with their boards as well. The controve
sy over the passage of resolutions, a ritual at annual National Federa
tion of Settlements (NFS) conferences, illustrated this problem. Prior t
1951, resolutions on national and international issues were written by
resolutions committee and then passed at the national conferenc
However, when local upper-class board members were given a large
role in the national organization, one of their first actions was to ques
tion how accurately the resolutions represented local (meaning "their
attitudes. As a result, the resolutions procedure was revised to requir
that copies of all resolutions be sent to member settlements forty day
in advance of the national conference. Furthermore, in publicizing the
resolutions, sending them to interested congressmen and governmen
officials, the NFS was required to state that they represented the con-

sensus of the national delegate body and not necessarily the opinions of individual houses.[15] However, some board members still objected to the passage of resolutions and the inclusion of opinions in testimony before congressional committees. In 1958, the procedure was changed again to require that resolutions first pass the NFS board before being submitted to the conference delegates.[16] Since local board members accounted for about half of the NFS board at this time, they came close to having a veto over resolutions. In 1961, the board actually vetoed resolutions favoring national health insurance for the aged and the Youth Opportunities Act.[17] Thus, broadening the constituency of the NFS to include local board members had a conservative effect.

Settlement House Methods of Social Action

The controversy over resolutions did not stop the settlement workers in the NFS from furthering certain legislation in the 1940s and again in the 1960s through congressional testimony. Some of the testimony was bolstered by data gathered from member settlements. Settlements contributed to the passage of the 1949 Housing Act, which launched the major program of public housing construction.[18] Because the settlements were interested in several other areas of legislation, the NFS board decided in 1949 to split up the responsibility for going to Washington among various houses. Veteran settlement house leader Helen Hall prepared guidelines for settlement staff who wished to testify on behalf of minimum wage laws, inflation, health care, civil liberties, and federal aid to public education.[19] In the 1960s, NFS legislation activities became more sophisticated with the employment of Mrs. Field Haviland in Washington. Her job was to keep track of proposed bills and notify the NFS so that its lobbying efforts would be more effective.[20] In addition, Fern Colborn of the NFS staff gathered data from eighty-two settlements which she used to convince the House Ways and Means Committee to revise the Aid to Dependent Children program to include families with an unemployed father present, the most important revision in that program since it became law in 1935. The NFS also gathered material used in testimony on behalf of what later became Medicare.[21] In recognition of their efforts, NFS representatives were invited to witness the signing of the laws creating Medicare, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and new housing programs.[22]

Most NFS efforts in social action involved the poor only passively. Testimony was usually given in Washington about the poor by settlement workers, not by the poor themselves. The closest the NFS came to

involving the poor directly prior to the 1960s was through the Wash-
ton legislative conferences organized approximately every two y
beginning in 1946. The conferences had two purposes. First, they g
settlement neighbors a chance to express their opinions directly to t
congressmen in Washington. Second, they provided settlement work
with an opportunity to educate their neighbors in the legislative p
cess.[23] Because of travel expenses, few neighbors west of Washingt
D.C., were able to attend.[24] Also, delegates participated essentially
observers until 1970 when some National Welfare Rights Organizat
members tried confrontation and several meetings with congressm
were disrupted.[25] The conferences were generally more education o
ented than action oriented.

On the local level, settlements sought to involve their neighbors
social action through the traditional program. In the early days of
settlement movement, a number of houses had staged forums of l
ture discussions on social issues. Some of these continued into
1940s. In 1940, the Hull-House Forum featured sessions on "Relig
"Race, Nationality and Democracy," and other topics.[26] The typi
forum flitted from topic to topic and never went beyond passive edu
tion to direct action. Sometimes the groups got sidetracked into se
help projects, as was the case with the Hill District People's Forum
Irene Kaufman Settlement in Pittsburgh. An interest in housing led
a clean-up, paint, and plaster campaign. This group also organiz
block parties and other social activities.[27]

In 1958 Philadelphia settlements employed twenty community o
ganization workers,[28] an indication of the growing acceptance by se
tlements of the importance of this service. These workers function
with varying degrees of dominance over the groups they served. Oft
it was the community workers who instigated the formation of soci
action groups. For example, a community worker suggested that
group of merchants who were faced with a poorly drained street org
nize a committee and complain to the city departments involved. Th
merchants were quite surprised when the committee complaint brough
results.[29] Another community organizer had no success until he hit o
the idea of promoting flower boxes. From there the worker intereste
neighbors in the creation of tot lots and in housing code enforcement
Other workers became heavily involved with urban renewal groups. I
Pittsburgh a settlement worker helped organize the East Liberty Ci
zens Renewal Council. He was elected vice-president of its board an
chairman of its Neighborhood Organization Committee. The counc
was instrumental in bringing about several changes in the renew
plan for its area, such as saving some good homes from demolition
To be effective, community workers often had to overcome the fact tha
they were of a different religion, nationality, or race and were regarde
as "outsiders" by those they were organizing.

One of the problems in community organization was that not all neighborhoods were homogeneous. In cases where a neighborhood was split by rival nationality or racial groups, some settlements felt they had to exert control to get the groups to work together. At Hull-House the Mexicans distrusted the Greeks so much that they were unable to form a coalition strong enough to preserve their neighborhood from demolition.[32] In Philadelphia, Friends Neighborhood Guild felt it had to take the lead in a certain neighborhood because of rivalry and lack of leadership among thirty small groups.[33] While settlement workers did not like to think of themselves as domineering, they did think that their domination was sometimes necessary.

Settlement neighbors occasionally formed their own groups, then turned to the settlement for professional leadership. The settlement worker could help with formal organization and the development of leadership, and could help the members become more articulate. However, if he or she became too dominant, the worker could defeat the goal of stimulating community life.

To further neighborhood organization, the settlements worked with both welfare federations and the Office of Civil Defense. One of the projects of civil defense during World War II was the Block Plan whereby people living on individual blocks would be organized into block clubs. The objectives were to involve as many people as possible at the grass-roots level in such projects as collecting scrap tin, and to develop leadership and neighborhood harmony. Settlements assisted in block organization by contacting local women who in turn called their blocks together.[34] These block clubs were quite successful in involving large numbers of neighborhood people. Although the block clubs disbanded after the war, the technique was not forgotten.[35]

After the war and into the mid-fifties, the dominant community organization technique was the community council. Councils varied from those made up almost entirely of professionals representing their agencies, to those which tried to involve people actually living in a neighborhood. Typically, councils were sponsored by the local welfare federation, and settlements were supposed to be involved only in providing resources. However, the federations did not have sufficient staff to service the councils, nor were they particularly successful in developing indigenous leadership. By 1949 more than half the community councils organized in Pittsburgh had failed, and Pittsburgh was indicative of what was happening elsewhere.[36]

Philadelphia's settlements returned to emphasizing block clubs in the mid-fifties and were followed by a few settlements in Chicago and Cleveland. The block clubs formed block councils and worked on such projects as limiting neighborhood taprooms and getting more recreational facilities and public housing. Thus, this style of community organization was developed in advance of the War on Poverty

Neighborhood Residents on Settlement Boards

The War on Poverty stressed "maximum feasible participation" of the poor in policymaking roles. Depending on how appointments to it were handled, the settlement board could put neighbors in policymaking positions as well as give them access to influential people in the larger community. Traditionally, boards contained wealthy businessmen, professionals, and other socially prominent people. Prior to the advent of the Community Chest, settlements depended on boards for fundraising. That situation has persisted in New York City and Chicago where there are no Community Chests. Elsewhere, however, since the Community Chest appeared, settlements have been free to pick board members for qualities other than their reputations as donors and fundraisers. In spite of a growing tendency to appoint more neighborhood people, almost all settlement boards remained dominated by well-to-do people into the 1960s. While many were undoubtedly conservative, others were "innovators and even critics of the conservatism of their economic and social peers."[38] These well-to-do people provided the settlement with the means and contacts whereby the settlement house could interpret itself and its neighbors to the larger community.

However, the pressure to appoint neighbors to the boards came from a variety of sources. In 1913, Cleveland's welfare federation specifically requested the appointment of representatives from organized labor as well as from neighborhood racial and nationality groups.[39] Apparently the response was token, for NFS consultant John McDowell found it necessary to make a similar recommendation to Cleveland settlements in 1916.[40] An additional problem in seeking local board members was to find those who were really leaders in their community. Cleveland's University Settlement was successful in involving a local councilman, and at one point had both Leonard Franks and Ralph Perk on its board.[41] Perk later became mayor of Cleveland. Franks was especially active in putting together a neighborhood civic association. Sometimes, however, the local members were not especially influential, even in their own communities. Paul Jans, who in 1959 headed a Philadelphia settlement, complained that as more neighbors appeared on boards, the settlements lost influence in the larger community.[42] Nevertheless, the trend got added impetus in the 1960s from the War on Poverty's requirements for citizen participation. A number of settlements wanted federal grants, and neighbors on their boards were a help in getting them.[43] Generally speaking, a mixed board with some truly representative people from the neighborhood appears to have been the best arrangement, provided a settlement did not depend on its board for money.

In summary, the major change in the settlement approach to social action was the replacement of residents with professional workers. Settlement workers stressed working through traditional channels. These included passing resolutions at the NFS level, testifying before congressional committees, educating their neighbors through conferences and forums, forming them into social action groups and community councils, and occasionally admitting them to board membership. However, it is also important to note that several traditional approaches were largely absent. Occasionally, settlement workers got involved in politics by endorsing and working for candidates, but this kind of political involvement was relatively minor. Also, although some of the original settlement leaders, most notably Jane Addams, author of the minor classic, *Twenty Years at Hull-House*, had been superb publicists for the movement, this sort of talent had largely disappeared from the settlement movement. By the 1960s, the public was more interested in what the poor themselves had to say than in what settlement workers had to say about the poor.

Alinsky's Methods of Social Action

Toward the end of the Great Depression, an alternative approach to the cooperative one used by settlement houses emerged. This approach to community organization stressed conflict and giving the poor the power to speak for themselves. The man chiefly responsible for this approach was Saul Alinsky. He specialized in organizing people who were thought too apathetic, too down-and-out, to do anything about their situation. His tactics involved going into a neighborhood on a temporary basis, finding indigenous leaders among the poor themselves, shaking people out of their apathy by personalizing social problems, building anger against a "villain" or finding a scapegoat, pitting the poor against other groups in conflict situations, setting concrete and attainable goals, utilizing direct-action tactics, and eventually withdrawing his leadership to let the people's organization carry on under its newly found power. Alinsky was a superb publicist of his methods, a speaker in demand, and, like Jane Addams, author of a minor classic (*Reveille for Radicals*). Through his Industrial Areas Foundation he was in the business of creating conflict-style community organizations. Between 1939 and 1965, four of the organizations he created came into contact with settlements. Thus, settlements had several opportunities to become involved in an alternative approach to social action. Each of the four settlements responded differently.

The first settlement to have an experience with a group organized by Alinsky was the University of Chicago Settlement, located in the neighborhood of Alinsky's first people's organization, the Back of the Yards Council. The Welfare Council of Chicago regarded the formation of the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council in 1939 as "a natural reaction to the up-to-then traditional community council with its middle-class professionals seeking to minimize conflict. The Back of the Yards thrived on conflict.[14] However, it was not until 1944 that conflict openly erupted between the council and the University of Chicago Settlement. In fall 1939, the settlement invited Saul Alinsky to speak on juvenile delinquency and his organizing efforts,[15] but it made no effort to join the Back of the Yards Council. A warning came in an interview given by sociology professor Ernest W. Burgess in April 1943 in which he said settlement houses were still in "the 'Lady Bountiful' stage of work and were controlled by board members from outside their communities." Lucy Carner of the Welfare Council replied to Burgess's criticism, saying that older agencies might more readily learn from Alinsky's area projects if these agencies were not attacked by the projects. Prophetically, she said, "If the Area Project finds that opportunity for success depends ... on discrediting other agencies, it can probably do sufficient damage to their reputations to put them out of business."[16]

The fight erupted in spring 1944 when the Back of the Yards Council opposed the suggestion that the Infant Welfare Society move into the settlement. The council charged that the settlement was anti-Catholic because it claimed that settlement staff had helped Catholic women get divorces, had given out birth control information, and had made derogatory remarks about the Catholic Church. The Back of the Yards Council also accused the settlement of being antilabor because it had denied use of its facilities to the CIO and had opposed a strike strongly favored by the neighborhood. It also accused the settlement of being anti-Semitic for allowing the local Kiwanis Club, which exluded Jews, to use its facilities. Finally, the council claimed that the house had "done nothing for the neighborhood" and was not developing indigenous leadership. Alinsky suggested that the settlement sell its building to the Back of the Yards Council, which badly needed facilities. The settlement categorically denied the charges and refused to sell.[17]

The settlement then tried to find a way out of the conflict. Board members held a series of interviews with the settlement's supporters, including President Hutchins of the University of Chicago who suggested the settlement leave the neighborhood if it felt the council was so strong that the settlement could not function. He went so far as to suggest that the settlement consider relocating in "the Negro district where the need is so great."[18] The suggestion was significant because ten years later Hutchins's successor forced the settlement to stop using

the name "University of Chicago" and urged the university community to keep its charitable efforts closer to home. The university was by that time in a major struggle to hold the line against deterioration in Hyde Park. Since the bulk of the board had always been drawn from the university community, the loss of university support in 1955 was devastating.

Meanwhile, in 1944 and 1945, the settlement's board was equally stubborn in ignoring what Saul Alinsky and the local Catholic bishop had to say. When it decided to get neighborhood opinion, it deliberately selected people who had already expressed their dissatisfaction with the Back of the Yards Council. They rather naively justified their biased selection by saying, "The favorable side of the picture had been painted by members of the Council itself."[49] In the end, the settlement requested to join the council and was rejected. It also announced good intentions to appoint neighborhood people to its board but never did so to any significant extent. Furthermore, its reputation never fully recovered from the attack.

The University of Chicago Settlement did become a member of the Back of the Yards Council in 1947, but it was never able to define successfully its area of responsibility in relation to the council or other neighborhood groups. What good feeling existed between the council and the settlement seems to have been based on personal relationships. For example, settlement headworker Bert Boerner was elected chairman of the Back of the Yards Youth Committee,[50] and his successor as settlement head, Daniel DeFalco, served as chairman of the Back of the Yards Council Recreation Committee.[51] Settlement membership had declined during the council attack; it revived with council membership, and churches resumed sending their groups to the settlement gym.[52] The council also offered occasional token financial support, such as $100 in 1947 to help repair the house roof.[53] However, when the settlement requested major help from the council to continue operating in 1962, it was not forthcoming. In the opinion of the council, the neighborhood churches had developed sufficient recreational programs for the area,[54] which implied that the settlement was not needed. The settlement, which had been lax in keeping up its contacts with the Back of the Yards Council,[55] faded out of independent existence a few years later and was absorbed by Chicago Commons.

Alinsky and Hudson Guild

The only case of a settlement inviting Saul Alinsky into its neighborhood to put together a "people's organization" was that of Hudson

Guild in New York City's Chelsea district. The New York Foundation had hired Alinsky to do a preliminary survey in 1955. However, because of Alinsky's controversial reputation, the foundation requested that Hudson Guild act as the sponsor for the area project and work out a proposal with Alinsky's assistance. The guild's director, Dan Carpenter, agreed to devote half his time as project director, and Alinsky was hired as project consultant. That meant that Alinsky would spend forty-eight days per year for three years in New York City advising the director (Carpenter), training staff, and guiding the organization. Alinsky not only fulfilled his contract but donated his services free of charge for a fourth year, during which his Industrial Areas Foundation donated a Spanish-speaking organizer. The outcome of their efforts was the Chelsea Community Council, which at its height contained representatives from ninety organizations. However, nineteen months after it was formally organized, nearly half the participating organizations (the non-Catholic ones) withdrew in protest over the conflict the Council generated. Eight months later the Chelsea Community Council disbanded.

Several explanations were offered for the failure. Dan Carpenter complained about Alinsky's methods of generating internal conflict and pitting one group against another. In fact, Carpenter himself became one of Alinsky's targets. Sanford Kahn, a community organizer for the project, cited a number of other reasons. Father Dunn, who was supported by Alinsky as president of the organization, may have been the wrong man for the job. Also, indigenous leadership could not be found and was not developed. However, what comes through in all accounts was the diversity of the neighborhood. Protestants, Catholics and Jews were all strongly represented. The neighborhood contained Puerto Ricans, blacks, and whites, and people of all income levels. In other words, it was a complete contrast to the homogeneous, working-class, Catholic Back of the Yards neighborhood. When Dan Carpenter and his Protestant, middle-class followers favored a subsidized housing project opposed by council president Father Dunn and his Catholic followers, Carpenter and the white-collar minority were ousted from the council. It is debatable whether the Chelsea Community Council accomplished anything constructive in its short existence.[56] Chelsea raises the question about how applicable Alinsky's methods are to neighborhoods without much homogeneity. It also raises questions about the role of the settlement in neighborhood conflict. Should the settlement be neutral or take a position and become a potential target?

Alinsky and Chicago Commons

When Saul Alinsky was doing a preliminary survey of Chicago's Northwest Side in 1961, the Chicago Commons director, Bill Brueck-

ner, invited him to dinner, a meeting that lasted eight hours. In his thank-you note Alinsky wrote, "I had two regrets—one of major proportion—to wit, that twenty years had gone by before this meeting (but let us try to make up for lost time) and the other a minor regret as to the kind of music you and I could have made in Chelsea if you had been there."[57]

Alinsky went on to put together the Northwest Community Organization, which included Brueckner's Chicago Commons, some other settlements, businessmen, neighborhood organizations, and Protestant and Catholic churches. This particular "people's organization" made a scapegoat out of the local ward committeeman, Matt Bieszcat, who told the Alinsky organizer bluntly, "Look, sonny, I own this area. Just keep your two cents out of it." Of course, the Northwest Community Organization did not. When the local alderman refused to pressure the city sanitation department to increase street cleaning and garbage collections, a hundred residents swept beer cans, dog droppings, and other debris into a trailer and dumped it all next to a tavern "owned by the alderman's wife." As a result, street cleaning in the neighborhood increased. One of the group's major victories came in 1963 when Mayor Daley appointed eleven of its members to the local fifteen-member Conservation Commission. The commission's goal was urban renewal through rehabilitation, not demolition, of buildings.[58] Bill Brueckner was one of the appointees.[59]

Brueckner gave the Northwest Community Organization steady support from the beginning. He urged an older, smaller neighborhood organization, the Near Northwest Side Planning Commission, to work within and to support the Alinsky group.[60] Within the Northwest Community Organization, Brueckner and his director of Emerson House, Clarence Lipshutz, functioned as conciliators, helping to minimize internal conflicts. In 1965, Clarence Lipshutz was elected president of the Northwest Community Organization.[61] This project represented the most successful cooperation between the settlements and an Alinsky organization.

However, the Northwest Community Organization was also a failure. The group never did develop indigenous leadership at the top level. It was not that Chicago Commons dominated the top positions or tried to control the organization, rather, with "establishment" leaders included at the start and with conflict minimized by them, no alternative leadership developed.[62] The settlement style, even at its best, did not work for Saul Alinsky.

Alinsky and Baden Street Settlement

A final example of a settlement in relation to an Alinsky organization is the case of Baden Street Settlement in Rochester and FIGHT. When

FIGHT began organizing in 1965, Baden Street Settlement hesitated to give its support. Meanwhile, the director of Rochester's Community Chest announced that no Chest funds would be used to support FIGHT, directly or indirectly. That meant that any agency staff working with FIGHT would have to do so on their own time. FIGHT retaliated by accusing the Chest of putting undue pressure on the settlement not to support Alinsky's efforts, and FIGHT publicly demanded the ouster of both the settlement director and the Chest director. When the settlement board finally decided not to apply to join FIGHT, two of Baden Street's board members, one of whom was elected executive vice-president of FIGHT, resigned.[63] Subsequently, Baden Street discontinued all community organization activities.[64] However, FIGHT went on to put pressure on the local poverty board[65] and on Eastman Kodak to hire more poor people.[66]

Settlement Houses Compared to Alinsky Organizations

Thus, several settlements had some rather bad experiences with Alinsky organizations. Except for Chicago Commons, a settlement tended to end up as a scapegoat at the hands of an Alinsky group. Perhaps the underlying reason for this was that the structure of the Alinsky groups was almost entirely opposite that of the settlements. Settlement houses were staffed by professionally trained social workers who regarded their jobs as permanent. Consequently, they were more likely to dominate their neighborhood organizations and withdraw their support if an organization adopted goals which met with settlement house disapproval, such as keeping the neighborhood white. Alinsky, on the other hand, relied on talented but not graduate-school-educated organizers who were sent into an area on a temporary basis to form a group and then pull out, leaving the group to set its own goals. Settlement houses had outsiders, representatives of the "establishment," on their boards. Alinsky groups regarded outsiders with suspicion. Settlements sought to build a bridge between the rich and the poor. Alinsky groups were clearly on the side of the poor and accentuated class conflict. The settlement building symbolized its permanent nature. Alinsky groups did not get bogged down with a large, expensive physical plant. Settlement houses preferred a consensus approach to problem solving. Alinsky emphasized conflict. Since both were interested in improving the lot of the poor, it is unfortunate that they did not work more in concert with each other. However, the settlements in general could also have been more sensitive and more flexible and could have learned more from Alinsky than they did.

Instead, the settlement house usually fell into the role of the Alinsky target. As George Brager explained in his text on community organizing, "Targets are selected on the basis of their power, or lack of power, to retaliate against the action system [i.e., the Alinsky group]. The settlement house—which, for a time, was the bete noire of Alinsky's contest tactics—was an easy mark. It did not have the power to retaliate, and if it did, it could not have been repressive because of its value system."[67] However, after the battles were over, Alinsky groups never thanked their scapegoats for serving that purpose or tried to undo the damage they had done to these institutions' reputations, let alone apologize.

Thus, particularly with reference to community organization, settlements found their influence diminished prior to and during the War on Poverty. A major reason was that they continued their traditional social action activities, such as passing resolutions and testifying before congressional committees, after dropping the practice of residence in the neighborhood. They had no good response to the question, "How do you know that's what the people really want?" Furthermore, innovations in community organization came from outside the settlement houses. Community Chests had been the primary sponsors of traditional community councils. The Office of Civil Defense had pushed block organization. Saul Alinsky was developing direct-action tactics. He was an innovator and also a very good publicist. Because he had a different approach to community organization than that of the traditional settlement house and because settlements that got involved with his groups usually handled themselves poorly, the reputation of settlements in general was damaged.

Nevertheless, both the settlement houses and Saul Alinsky contributed to social change between 1939 and 1965, but they made different kinds of contributions. Settlement houses sought to transfer some of the sense of mission with which World War II was fought to postwar social problems. As organized labor gathered strength on its own and immigrants were relatively scarce, settlement houses concentrated on consumer problems, race relations, and poverty. During the 1940s and 1950s, most settlement houses adopted more liberal policies in support of civil rights and integration. More and more, blacks were included among the houses' target clientele. Granted, by the 1960s many liberals and blacks wished settlement houses had done more for race relations. Settlement workers also functioned as advocates for better welfare programs. Indeed, those congressmen who wanted a national organization to gather data and testify on behalf of liberal programs, such as Medicare and the Unemployed Parent expansion of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, could count on leaders in the National Federation of Settlements. Always experimenters, some settlement houses took advantage of the more innovative public housing legislation to build nonprofit housing projects of their own. Others, their buildings

lost to urban renewal, moved themselves into public housing project quarters. Some loss of independent identity occurred, and housing projects themselves became controversial, but settlements tried to improve housing conditions. They also supported public concern with juvenile delinquency in the 1960s and played a significant role in translating that concern into the War on Poverty through their proposal for Mobilization for Youth.

Although the idea for Mobilization for Youth originated with a settlement house, by the time the federal government funded the action phase of the project, control had shifted away from the settlements to a board dominated by the New York School of Social Work. The shift was deliberate. Many social work professionals, including the Mobilization staff, criticized settlement houses for "having middle-class standards,"[68] for appearing intimidating to the hard-core poor unaffiliated with organizations, and for being unwilling to share power.[69] In other words, the pre–Great Society program most influential in pointing the way for the War on Poverty regarded settlement houses as too old-fashioned.

Alinsky succeeded where settlements failed—in giving the apathetic poor a sense of power through direct action and confrontation tactics, tactics generally avoided by the settlement houses. Alinsky's approach was more spectacular and dramatic than that of the settlements. He reached people with whom the settlements had had no success. Given the right circumstances, the conflict method could also produce specific results, particularly in the 1960s. The same people could hardly implement conflict and cooperation simultaneously, yet the settlements with their cooperative approach and Alinsky with his conflict approach could have indirectly reinforced each other and made a significant contribution toward reform. Most likely each would have benefited through more understanding and appreciation of the other.

In summary, settlement houses met the challenge to their traditional methods by making limited adaptations. They replaced residents with social work school graduates; at the same time, they clung to their cooperative, neighborhood-based approach. Alinsky and the War on Poverty discredited this approach in the 1960s, but reform movements come and go. Special interest groups emerge, may play a role in influencing policy, achieve their goal, and disintegrate. In the United States, however, settlement houses date back to 1886. For almost one hundred years, they have provided facilities for other social change groups. They have promoted a multiplicity of reforms on behalf of low-income people. They are around when reform is in and when it is not. They may not always be in the vanguard of reform, but reform movements need more than a vanguard. They need supporters to fall in behind the vanguard and to broaden the base of support for reform. Repeatedly, settlements have played this role. They have done so by

helping to build bridges among different groups of people, from their low-income neighbors to their upper-class board members, and they have utilized these relationships to promote change through cooperation. Perhaps because they emphasize cooperation rather than conflict, settlement houses have shown remarkable durability for an institution with a traditional commitment to reform. Indeed, what is most unique and significant about the settlement houses is their permanence in the midst of their advocacy of social change.

Notes

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1. Allen Davis, *Spearheads for Reform: the Social Settlements and the Progressive Movement, 1890–1914* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).

2. See Roy Lubove, *The Professional Altruist* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), and Clarke Chambers, *Paul U. Kellogg and the Survey* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971).

3. Judith Ann Trolander, *Settlement Houses and the Great Depression* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1975).

4. Bertram M. Beck ("Settlements and Community Centers," *Encyclopedia of Social Work*, vol. 2 [Washington, D.C.: National Association of Social Work, 1977], pp. 1262–66) suggests several reasons, including pessimism about the nature of mankind, more complex problems demanding a more specialized approach, and success of reformers like Ralph Nader who operate through mass communication from a national rather than a neighborhood base. Beck also cites dependence on the United Fund, government grants, and private foundations as tempering the reform impulse.

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6. Herbert Gans, *The Urban Villagers: Group and Class in the Life of Italian Americans* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), pp. 150–53.

7. Lucy Carner, *The Settlement Way in Philadelphia* (Philadelphia: Delaware Valley Settlement Alliance, 1964), p. 64.

8. Trolander, p. 172. The four were Henry Street and Lenox Hill in New York City and Gads Hill and Association House in Chicago.

9. This thesis is developed in Trolander. See also Judith Ann Trolander, "The Response of Settlements to the Great Depression," *Social Work* 18 (September 1973): 92–102.

10. Alinsky stated his ideas in, among other sources, *Reveille for Radicals* (New York: Vintage, 1969, originally published, New York: Random House, 1946) and *Rules for Radicals: A Practical Primer for Realistic Radicals* (New York: Random House, 1971).

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15. Board minutes, May 30–31, 1953, National Federation of Settlements (hereafter cited as NFS) Records, fol. 30, Social Welfare History Archives (hereafter cited as SWHA), University of Minnesota.

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18. Elizabeth Handasyde, *City or Community* (London: National Council of Social Service, 1949), p. 29.

19. Board minutes, February 4–5, 1949, NFS Records, fol. 28, SWHA.

20. Executive Committee minutes, April 8, 1961, NFS Records, fol. 33, SWHA.

21. Margaret Berry to "Board Members," March 20, 1961, NFS Records, fol. ..., SWHA.

22. NFS annual report, 1965–66, Henry Street Settlement Records, box 8, SWHA.

23. Board minutes, May 3, 1946, Goodrich Social Settlement Records, box 2, fol. 1, SWHA.

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Name-Calling in Social Work

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This study replicates an earlier investigation of the impact of professional social work training on the use of labels to describe clients. It was found that subjects had a consistent tendency to use negative labels when describing a role-played client. Unlike the original study in which the use of negative labels increased with the level of professional training, it appears that the practice orientation of the subject has more effect. Behaviorally oriented subjects are the least negative in their labeling.

In a provocative earlier study, "Name-Calling: The Labeling Process in the Social Work Interview," Case and Lingerfelt conducted an empirical investigation of the extent to which social workers label their clients.[1] Labeling was defined in that study as an inference with no behavioral referent. The authors constructed a series of videotape vignettes from social work interview situations. Two hundred social workers, from beginning undergraduates to experienced master's-level practitioners, viewed four vignettes and then responded to the question, "If you had to tell a professional about the person(s) in this situation, what would you say?" The subjects' responses were coded for labeling by scoring each noun or adjective referring directly to the interviewee as positive or negative, on a scale from +4 to −4. A total labeling score was then derived for each vignette by summing the scores of the labels.

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For the four vignettes, Case and Lingerfelt found that total labeling scores ranged from a low of −48 to a high of +7, with a mean of −10.3. Negative labeling clearly predominated. They also found statistically significant differences in labeling related to the level of education of the respondent. Case and Lingerfelt suggested that the increased use of negative labels which accompanied professional education may indicate increasingly selective attention to negative aspects of the client's behavior. Professional workers had a significantly higher negative labeling score (−15.9) than did graduate students (9.8) or undergraduate students (6.8).

The Case and Lingerfelt findings are disturbing since they suggest that increased professional education may lead to more negative and perhaps less accurate perception of clients. Negative labeling can have a number of unfortunate consequences for the treatment process. First, assessments based on subjective impression rather than objective description tend to be self-perpetuating.[2] Having labeled a client, the worker is inclined to attend selectively to client behaviors that support the label and to ignore behaviors, such as client strengths and competencies, that disconfirm the label.[3]

A second potential consequence of negative labeling is that it may be self-fulfilling. Some scholars have argued that mental illness is an ascribed status that, once gained, may tend to stabilize or reinforce deviant behavior. Institutions, professionals, and others interacting with the labelee will tend to regard him or her as deviant or ill, with the result that rule-breaking behavior comes to be stabilized and expected.[4] To the extent that social work assessment functions as a negative labeling process, it may actually worsen the behavior it is intended to help.

Because of the central role of assessment in the social work treatment process, and the potential negative impact of labeling on that process, we undertook a replication of the Case and Lingerfelt study. Although Case and Lingerfelt recommended the use of behavioral assessment rather than labeling, their study did not directly investigate behavioral assessment. It is possible, for example, that more experienced workers who use more negative labels also include more descriptive behavioral data in their client assessments. If such were the case, it would mitigate the greater use of negative labels among more highly trained professionals. The present study examines both labeling and behavioral description in subjects' responses. It was anticipated that increased professional education would result in more negative labeling. No prediction regarding the effect of education on behavioral assessment was made.

Several previous studies have indicated that the practice orientation of the worker may be related to the judgments the worker makes about the client. Specifically, behaviorally oriented workers were found to use fewer negative labels than traditionally oriented clinicians[5] and behav-

iorally oriented workers were found to be more accurate in their assessments of client's behavior than were traditionally oriented workers. Consequently, this study examined the effect of practice orientation on labeling and behavioral assessment. Specifically, behaviorally oriented subjects were expected to use fewer negative labels and to use more behavioral descriptions of the client's behavior.

Method

Subjects.—Subjects for this study included twenty-two social work graduate students and twenty-three field work instructors, all of whom were affiliated with a large urban university. The student subjects included six males and sixteen females, their average age was 33.6 years, and they had an average of 1.3 years of experience as a professional counselor or therapist (including field placement). The students were enrolled in advanced clinical courses in the graduate social work program at the time of the study. The field instructors included eleven males and twelve females, their average age was 40.1 years, and they had an average of 12.3 years of professional experience. The field instructors were employees of mental health, family service, and child welfare agencies and were active in the field instructors' association affiliated with the university.

Procedure.—A fifteen minute videotape of a dramatized initial assessment interview served as the experimental stimulus. The social work practitioner in the videotape was a well-known, experienced practitioner. The client, played by a student actor, was presented as a twenty-one-year-old male, depressed undergraduate student. The student actor was given extensive training in the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors consistent with depression as well as the biographical background data of the twenty-one-year-old student he was to play. The videotape was produced professionally and was introduced to the subjects as an actual intake interview.

Subjects viewed the videotape in a group setting in either their regular graduate classes or at a regular meeting of the field instructors' organization. In each case, subjects were informed beforehand of the research procedures and of their right to withdraw voluntarily from the study at any time with no adverse consequences. Just before viewing the videotape, subjects were given a personal information form containing the basic biographical data regarding the client. They were then shown the videotape, which was presented as an actual assessment interview. Immediately thereafter, subjects completed a research questionnaire asking for their clinical assessment of the client. Finally, they

were told that the videotape was actually a dramatized interview, and the purpose of the research was explained in detail

The research questionnaire asked subjects to write in their own words their "assessment or diagnostic impressions" of the client they had just viewed on the videotape. Subjects' responses were coded for labeling following the basic procedures outlined in the Case and Lingerfelt coding manual.[7] As in the original study, one-word nouns or adjectives referring directly to the client, conveying an evaluative connotation but containing no behavioral referent, were operationally defined as labels. Each label was assigned a numerical value from −4 to +4, as in the Case and Lingerfelt study. For example, terms such as "ambivalent," "uncooperative," and "sullen" were scored −2 whereas terms such as "normal," "intelligent," and "competent" were scored +2. The values assigned to labels were increased if qualifying words such as "extremely" or "very" were used, and decreased if words such as "seems" or "appears" were used. The values of labels were then summed to yield a total labeling score for each subject. A negative labeling score indicated a preponderance of negative labeling and a positive score a preponderance of positive labeling.

Behavioral descriptors, defined as any factual, incontrovertible word or phrase that refers to the client, his statements, or his environment, were also counted. Since facts have no qualitative value, each behavioral descriptor was simply given a value of one and the total for each subject recorded. Finally, the total number of words each subject wrote in response to the open-ended question was tabulated.

Subjects' responses were coded by trained raters, graduate students who assisted as part of their research course requirements. Reliability of the coders' ratings was assessed by employing five coders and twenty-four questionnaires selected at random from the total study. First, each rater coded each of the questionnaires and recorded the scores. Then all five raters discussed each questionnaire and established by consensus a "correct" labeling score and behavioral descriptor score for each of the twenty-four questionnaires. Each judge's initial codings were then compared with the correct codings for each questionnaire by computing a Pearson's correlation.

Findings

Reliability coefficients for the total labeling scores ranged from .90 to .96 with a mean of .93. The behavioral descriptor reliability scores ranged from .82 to .90 with a mean of .86

The total labeling scores for all subjects ranged from −22 to +3 with a mean of −8.18. Negative labeling predominated. The number of behavioral descriptors for all subjects ranged from zero to 8, with a mean of 2.73.

Effect of educational level.—Graduate student subjects had an average total labeling score of −6.82 compared with −9.47 for field instructors (table 1). Although the relationship is in the predicted direction, it falls just short of statistical significance ($F = 3.68$, df = 1,43; $P = .06$). When only negative labels were included, however, the relationship reached significance at the .05 level. Thus, the hypothesis that negative labeling increases with level of education is, with qualification, supported.

Educational level appeared to have no impact on use of behavioral descriptors. Although graduate students on the average used somewhat fewer behavioral descriptors (2.64) than did field instructors (2.83), the difference was negligible and did not approach statistical significance.

To ensure that observed differences were due to educational level and not years of professional experience, we made a similar analysis using years of professional experience as the independent variable. Differences in total labeling score and number of behavioral descriptors were negligible, and did not approach statistical significance.

Effect of practice orientation.—Subjects were asked to indicate on the research questionnaire which of three practice orientations best characterized their approach with clients. Sixteen indicated they had a behavioral orientation, twenty-four had an existential or humanist orientation, and five had a psychoanalytic orientation.

Consistent with our hypothesis, subjects with a behavioral orientation had a lower average labeling score of (−6.19) than did subjects with an existential or humanist orientation (−8.71); those with a psychoanalytic orientation had the largest labeling score of all (−12.00) (table 2). The effect of practice orientation on labeling was in the predicted direction and was statistically significant ($F = 3.18$, df = 2,42, $P = .04$).

Table 1

MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF TOTAL LABELING SCORES AND BEHAVIORAL DESCRIPTORS BY SUBJECTS' EDUCATION LEVEL

	Total Labeling Score		Number of Behavioral Descriptors	
Educational Level	*M*	SD	*M*	SD
Graduate students (*N* = 22)	−6.82	3.78	2.64	1.53
Field instructors (*N* = 23)	−9.17	5.35	2.83	2.10
All subjects (*N* = 45)	−8.18	4.79	2.73	1.83

Table 2

MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF TOTAL LABELING SCORES AND BEHAVIORAL DESCRIPTORS BY SUBJECTS' PRACTICE ORIENTATION

Practice Orientation	Total Labeling Score		Number of Behavioral Descriptors	
	M	SD	*M*	SD
Behavioral ($N = 16$)	−6.19	3.49	3.13	1.78
Existential or humanist ($N = 24$)	−8.71	4.01	2.67	1.97
Psychoanalytic ($N = 5$)	−12.00	8.86	1.80	.84
All subjects ($N = 45$)	−8.18	4.54	2.73	1.83

At first glance, the practice orientation of the subject appeared to influence also the number of behavioral descriptors used. Those with a behavioral orientation used an average of 3.13 descriptors, those with an existential or humanist orientation used an average of 2.67 descriptors, and those with a psychoanalytic orientation used only 1.80 descriptors. Although this relationship was in the predicted direction, it was not strong enough or consistent enough to reach statistical significance. Further analysis of the data revealed, however, that the number of behavioral descriptors was highly associated with the number of words subjects used to describe the client (Pearson $r = .75$). When the relationship between the number of words and number of behavioral descriptors was removed through covariance analysis, subjects' practice orientation had no effect on number of behavioral descriptors used.

Education and practice orientation.—A breakdown of educational level by practice orientation revealed an unequal number of subjects in the subgroups (table 3). Most student subjects classified themselves as behavioral in orientation ($N = 12$) or existential or humanist ($N = 9$). Only one student held a psychoanalytic orientation. In contrast, the field instructors consisted predominantly of those with existential or humanist orientations ($N = 15$) but included a few with behavioral

Table 3

MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF TOTAL LABELING SCORES BY SUBJECTS' EDUCATIONAL LEVEL AND PRACTICE ORIENTATION

Educational Level	Practice Orientation								
	Behavioral			Existential or Humanist			Psychoanalytic		
	N	*M*	SD	*N*	*M*	SD	*N*	*M*	SD
Graduate students	12	−6.50	3.63	9	−8.33	2.12	1	3.00	.00
Field instructors	4	−5.25	3.30	15	−8.93	1.86	1	−15.75	3.30

(N = 1) and psychoanalytic (N = 1) orientations. Because the design was so unbalanced, it was impossible to determine completely the independent effect of either orientation or education. For example, the main effect of education in this study is confounded by the fact that most students were behavioral whereas the field instructors were predominantly existential or humanist. The responses of the psychoanalytically oriented subjects seemed markedly different from those of the behavioral or existential/humanist subjects, but almost all of these subjects fell into the field instructors group.

In an effort to study further the separate effects of education and orientation two additional post hoc analyses were performed. First, because the student group included only one subject of psychoanalytic orientation, a test of the effect of orientation was made for field instructors only. The effect of practice orientation became even stronger than in the initial analysis. Field instructors of the psychoanalytic orientation were much more negative in their labeling (mean = −15.75) than were field instructors of existential or humanist (mean = −8.93) or behavioral orientation (mean = −5.25). Again, these differences were statistically significant (F = 5.89; df = 2,20, P = .001).

Second, because the lone student of psychoanalytic orientation was so different in labeling score from the four field instructors of this orientation it was suspected that the inclusion of psychoanalytically oriented subjects in the analysis of the effect of educational level might be skewing the results. Accordingly, a comparison of student subjects with field instructors was performed including only those of existential or humanist and behavioral orientation. In the original analysis students were less negative in labeling and the difference approached statistical significance. In the reduced analysis, however, the differences due to educational level largely disappeared. Students of behavioral and existential or humanist orientation had a mean labeling score of −7.29, only slightly different than the mean of −8.16 for field instructors. Further, this difference no longer approached statistical significance.

The post hoc analyses suggest two revisions, then, in the earlier statement of main effects. First, it now appears, at least in this study, that practice orientation has a substantial effect. Field instructors with a psychoanalytic orientation have a much more negative labeling score than those of behavioral or existential/humanist orientation. Second, once the effect of practice orientation is accounted for, educational level seems to have little or no effect on total labeling score.

Discussion

A word of caution is necessary when considering the results of this study. The study sample was small, and the distribution of subjects

among cells of the design was uneven. It is difficult to discern specifically what the individual and combined effects of educational level and practice orientation were. Consequently, generalization from these data to social work practitioners generally should be made with extreme caution. Nevertheless, some of the relationships observed were sufficiently strong, even considering the small sample size, to reach statistical significance. Hence, they may be considered reliable.

The most important finding of the study is that subjects, whether students or experienced professionals, and regardless of practice orientation, had a consistent tendency to label the client negatively. If it is true, as some theorists suggest, that the effect of negative labeling is to stabilize rule-breaking behavior, then social workers may be contributing to the maintenance of deviant or problem behavior in their clients. This is a most troubling possibility and warrants much additional investigation.

Although the present data suggest a slight tendency for negative labeling to increase with level of education, this tendency seems to be negligible. Although the Case and Lingerfelt study showed a significant tendency for professional workers to use negative labels more often than graduate students, the effect was relatively slight. Averaged across clients of high and low socioeconomic status, the average difference in labeling score was only 1.52, a difference considerably less than that found in our initial analysis of the effect of educational level on labeling scores but slightly larger than that found in our post hoc analysis. Thus, although our data are consistent with those provided by Case and Lingerfelt, they suggest that level of education may be less important than other factors in predicting labeling.

The largest and most consistent effects in the present study were due to subjects' practice orientations. Behaviorally oriented workers were found to be least negative in their labeling, existential or humanist workers were somewhat more negative, but psychoanalytically oriented workers were much more negative (three times more negative than behaviorally oriented workers). The tendency for psychoanalytically oriented workers to use more negative labels appears to be due largely to their greater use of traditional psychiatric diagnostic terminology such as that found in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual*.[8] These findings are consistent with earlier studies by Gingerich and others, and Duehn and Mayadas.[9] Taken together, these three studies provide evidence that the theoretical orientation of the worker significantly affects the tendency to use negative labels to describe the client. Our data also suggest, unexpectedly, that practice orientation has no effect on the use of objective descriptors in planned assessments.

Although the findings with respect to practice orientation are disturbing, there is room for optimism. Practice orientation is largely a consequence of professional training in graduate schools of social work. As such, practice orientation might easily be modified, particu-

larly for workers currently in training and those yet to come. It may also be possible for experienced workers to begin using more behaviorally based descriptions of client problems rather than using stigmatizing and negatively valued subjective terms.

Notes

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Social Development and Mass Society: Iowa

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When social citizenship rights like public assistance are extended by elected officials to society members who were previously excluded, the society has adopted a mass-society approach. Between 1960 and 1970 Kirsten Grønbjerg confirmed circumstantially that the mass-society approach supplanted the stratification approach regarding welfare benefits and eligibility. This study finds that for Iowa's counties in the late 1970s the mass-society thesis also has explanatory value for policies for differentiated target groups along the continuum of deservedness. The role of local communities in the extension of social citizenship in advanced, industrialized representative democracies is discussed.

In T. H. Marshall's view, citizenship is the "basic human quality of membership" bestowed on full members of a community. Endowed with the status of citizen, community members are equal with respect to the rights and duties of citizenship.[1] Over time, changes in the content and distribution of citizenship rights and duties represent the progress of a society's movement toward equality. Marshall offers the configuration of citizenship rights and duties of a society as a benchmark: ". . . societies in which citizenship is a developing institution create an image of an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be measured and towards which aspiration can be directed."[2] The most advanced element in Marshall's notion of citizenship rights is the social, that is, "the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share fully in the social heritage and

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to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society."[3]

Present-day economic and social trends place the welfare state and its progress toward equality in a rather problematic light.[4] Empirically based analyses of citizenship and social welfare policy may contribute to our understanding of the present and to the shaping of our future.

The Grønbjerg Thesis: Joining Marshall's "Citizenship" with Shils's "Mass Society"

In what some regard as the work that "transforms sociological analysis of welfare,"[5] Kirsten A. Grønbjerg examines the extent to which the concept of citizenship accounts for changes in U.S. social welfare policies in the 1960s. Using census data and data for states from the *Social Security Bulletin*, Grønbjerg assembles social, economic, and political participation profiles of twenty-four variables for each of the states at two points in time, 1960 and 1970. By a priori conceptualization and factor analysis, Grønbjerg designates variables as indicators of two competing explanations for burgeoning Aid to Families with Dependent Children roles and changes in welfare eligibility policy: the mass-society model and the stratification or economic dependency model.

A mass society is one in which central belief systems and common associational forms are shared by a large proportion of the population.[6] The governing elites exercise authority and manipulate cultural symbols to bring more remote, more peripheral population segments in touch with the "center." Expansion of the center occurs through expansion of education and mass communication making possible more "interaction between members of a society" and the promotion of "a sense of common identity and mutual responsibility."[7] Grønbjerg joins Marshall's social citizenship with Shils's mass-society construct:

> In the mass society, where the center, or the elite, includes a wide selection of the population . . . and where the distance between the center and the periphery is diminished, the well-being and disposition of the periphery becomes a criterion for policy. This perception of equal "civil quality" of the elite and the masses . . . is one of the most important foundations of the modern welfare state. And it is when the civil quality of the masses comes to be fully recognized as comparable or equal to that of the elite that Marshall's three types of citizenship rights are likely to be equally and fully extended.[8]

The stratification approach to social welfare is employed by societies when the need for social welfare benefits is widespread and when policies restrict aid to those who are "deserving" or "full members" of the

community. In Shils's terms, those who will not receive aid or whose level of benefit may be very low are on the periphery. A stratification approach leads to more restrictive responses to conditions of need so that only those desperately in need receive public assistance and grant aid. At the other end of the continuum, a mass-society view treats public assistance as an "equitable response" to needs broader than "absolute destitution," such as temporary unemployment and the need to finish higher education.[9]

A Missing Link

Grønbjerg's findings suggest that the United States moved toward a mass-society perspective in the 1960s as it granted social citizenship rights to increasingly larger segments of the population who joined AFDC rolls. However, there is a conceptual link that is missing. Both Marshall and Shils placed emphasis on actors who bestowed citizenship rights or on elites who expanded the center through the exercise of authority based on values and beliefs of the center elites. Yet Grønbjerg's data contain no measure of attitudes of the center's elite toward extending rights and duties of social citizenship. Also, her data do not include the creation of institutional structures that facilitate more complete participation by the periphery in the institutions, like the social services, that reflect social citizenship.

Consequently, Grønbjerg's richly detailed analysis of AFDC rolls and eligibility policies falls short of the mark.[10] Citizenship and mass society are provocative concepts that have the potential to advance our understanding of social development. By incorporating measures of elite attitudes toward the role of government in meeting welfare needs, as well as a measure of an institutional structure designed to facilitate more complete participation in social service decisions, this study attempts to provide the conceptual link that is missing in Grønbjerg's impressive, but nevertheless circumstantial, analysis.[11] Before attempting a more complete analysis of citizenship and the extension of welfare, Grønbjerg's operationalization and findings need to be reviewed.

Grønbjerg's Operationalization and Findings

Grønbjerg's unit of analysis is a state. Given the leeway granted to states to operate their public assistance programs, ideologies of the culture of poverty sort leading to a stratification approach to welfare or of the structural sort implicit in a mass-society perspective may prevail in a particular state. Just as states may be closer or more distant from Shils's national center, they may have peripheries that are larger and more remote.

Grønbjerg's case for the mass-society explanation for the extension of welfare between 1960 and 1970 rests on stepwise regressions of AFDC rolls and on measures of eligibility restrictiveness in state-level social

statistics in 1960 and 1970. Five variables account for 73 percent of the total variation in 1960 AFDC rolls; "the greater the underemployment rate for males (stratification variable, β = .25);[12] the larger the non worker–worker ratio (stratification variable, β = .66); the larger the proportion of broken families (stratification variable, β = .61); the larger the voter participation (mass society variable, β = .11), and the larger the in-migration (threat variable, β = .31),[13] the higher are AFDC rolls."[14] Since stratification variables prevail, Grønbjerg concludes that AFDC rolls are determined more by economic needs than by broader more relative standards of how to meet citizen need.

In 1970, however, the broader, more relative view of citizen need of the mass-society perspective supplanted the stratification approach to economic dependency. Again accounting for 72 percent of the total variation in AFDC rolls are five variables, "the larger the proportion of broken families (stratification variable, β = 1.02), the greater the per capita revenue (mass society variable, β = .33), the greater the proportion of *females underemployed* (stratification variable, β = .51), the higher the proportion of the adult population with at least a high school education (mass society variable, β = .51), and the smaller the total in migration between 1965–1970 ('threat' variable, β = −.22),[15] the higher are AFDC rolls."[16] The prominence of two mass-society variables implies that states whose population is better educated and more inclined to assume collective responsibility are more likely to extend AFDC to a greater proportion of families than in 1960, and to extend it beyond proportions indicated by the basis of economic need.

This shift in composition of the five most determining factors of variation in AFDC rolls from stratification variables to mass-society variables between 1960 and 1970 is the primary basis on which Grønbjerg rests her case that there has been a shift to a mass-society orientation.

AFDC rolls allow the two models to be more easily distinguished than welfare-eligibility policies. States adopting a mass-society perspective are more likely to undertake broad social responsibilities and to have more families on the AFDC rolls. States with more people in desperate economic need would also tend to have higher AFDC rolls. Regarding welfare policies, however, states not adhering to a mass-society perspective would place more restrictions on eligibility. High rates of economic dependency would also lead to more restrictive eligibility regulations. Rather than measures of either mass society or stratification, the percent black (β = .33 in 1960, β = .46 in 1970) and per capita taxes (β = −.37 in 1960; β = −.29 in 1970) were found to have the strongest impact on the eligibility restrictions of the states in both years. While not among the original set of mass-society variables, the percent of the population that is black undoubtedly represents the size of the periphery against which eligibility barriers are erected to prevent access to public assistance. The role of per capita taxes is interpreted as

a willingness of states to tax themselves and assume more responsibility for their citizens.[17] Due to the less robust relationships between the two models and eligibility policies, Grønbjerg looked more closely at the rather complex association between AFDC rolls and her score on state eligibility restrictiveness (r = .15 in 1960, in 1970, r = −.08).

Several additional sources of support for the shift to the mass-society approach are uncovered as Grønbjerg unravels the apparent paradox of weak relationships between the models and welfare-eligibility policy. First, eligibility policies became more lenient in almost all states by 1970, although the rank order of states on restrictiveness remained stable. Second, states with higher application and approval rates had higher mass-society status, implying that even where economic conditions were less pressing, people perceived AFDC more as a right with little or no stigma.[18]

The Piven-Cloward Thesis in Light of Grønbjerg

Grønbjerg's findings also require a reconsideration of the familiar Piven-Cloward thesis that welfare rolls expand and contract as the government attempts to control domestic turmoil initiated by the poor and to reaffirm the work ethic. Regardless of the apparent fit of the Piven-Cloward thesis to more historically remote periods, the fit with 1960s data is problematic.[19] Grønbjerg and others have marshaled more complete data for more cautious inferences. The shift in AFDC rolls between 1960 and 1970 to a mass-society pattern, in light of the simultaneous trend toward more lenient eligibility restrictions across the board, lends credence to a trend toward governmental responsiveness, given necessary economic conditions.

Ultimately, both Grønbjerg's mass-society thesis and the Piven-Cloward thesis depend implicitly on the imputed motives of elected officials. This study incorporates measures of officials' attitudes. To the extent that these findings are consistent with the mass-society thesis, then the Piven-Cloward thesis may have to be set aside until more complete, recent evidence allow inferences in its favor.

Measuring Elite Attitudes and Institutional Structures of Participation

The effects of the elite center's attitudes toward incorporating the periphery by extending social citizenship rights may be moderated by political variables. Positions taken by government leaders may not be reflected in policy output because political process or structure variables such as interparty competition, partisan elections, and interest-group strength may determine their behavior and shape the outcome

more than their own beliefs or value commitments. Measuring elite attitudes requires that political variables be taken into account.

A second consideration in measuring elite attitudes is the validity of aggregating elites' scores for an overall average of a political jurisdiction. For Congress or statehouses, a single numerical average for 100 or more persons with respect to attitudes of a "center" seems to be, prima facie, partially invalid. Finally, final votes or policy outputs also represent executive branch and legislative branch activity. It is conceivable that collapsing two aspects of the central elite into one measure may mask the central tendency of the elite.

For these reasons the ninety-nine counties of Iowa may be particularly satisfactory units of analysis. County boards consist of three to five supervisory members who are elected in biennial nonpartisan elections and who carry out executive and legislative responsibilities. While counties are a lower level of political jurisdiction than states, they are pragmatically and theoretically more viable units of analysis.

Institutional structures of citizen participation are also in existence on a county basis. In Iowa each county represents a subdistrict planning jurisdiction for Title XX of the Social Security Act. Consistent with the emphasis of Title XX, county directors of departments of social service are responsible for assembling a citizen's planning unit which participates in decision making for the purchase of services allocation. Ranging from very informal to very formal in constitution, these groups make recommendations about the procedures, accountability mechanisms, and dollar amounts for the particular service categories and target groups that will receive "county match" dollars. Therefore, these citizens' groups are participants in the apportioning of the state Title XX allocation.

Consequently, recalling that Marshall specifies social services as one of two institutional sectors associated with the extension of social citizenship rights, Iowa's counties serve as very appropriate units of analysis in examining Grønbjerg's thesis.[20] Each county can be scored according to the extent to which citizens participate in substantive decisions for Title XX planning. In addition, because county boards of supervisors make executive and legislative decisions, it is plausible to aggregate responses on attitudinal items to represent the prevailing attitude taken by the board toward levels of citizenship and other possibly relevant attitudes.

The Data

Elite Attitudes

A mail questionnaire was sent to each of Iowa's 365 supervisors. Using Don A. Dillman's total design method, three follow-up communica-

tions and a replacement questionnaire were used to obtain the highest response possible.[21] Two hundred forty-five supervisors returned their questionnaires for a 67.1 percent response rate.

Four items dealing with elite attitudes toward social citizenship were used. For each item a score was assigned to each supervisor and an average score for the county's supervisor was given to each county to represent the prevailing attitude of that county's board. First, to measure the importance supervisors attached to the recommendations of representatives of client groups relative to the importance of recommendations from community leaders and legislators and people in public welfare and social service agencies, this question was asked:[22] "Many individuals and groups have a legitimate interest in social services policy. Do you think policymakers should be most concerned with the recommendations of (1) people actively working in public welfare and social service agencies, or (2) representatives of client groups, or (3) community leaders and legislators?" For each respondent a score was given by subtracting the average score for importance given to people in public welfare and social service agencies and to community leaders and legislators from the importance attached to recommendations from representatives of client groups.

A second item based on Titmuss's model of social development[23] was purposively designed to elicit a respondent's conception of the purpose of social provisions and social services.[24] "People have different reasons about the provision of financial and social services. Some say financial and social services are a privilege enjoyed by people of a free society who need temporary, emergency services. Others say these services are necessary because an industrial society has to meet the economic needs of people when the market system doesn't work for everyone. Still others say society provides these because society has an obligation to give its citizens access to economic and social resources and opportunities so each citizen can work towards his/her goals." By indicating with which reason they most agree, the respondents place themselves in a residual, an industrial-achievement, or an institutional-redistributive frame of reference.

The remaining two attitudinal items also capture facets of social citizenship and the extent to which the center regards the periphery as full-fledged citizens. Supervisors were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with the statement, "People are now working constructively together to get things done for this county." Agreement indicates an inclusiveness, that is, the cohesive element of a community actively trying to get things done.[25] The fourth item deals with the extent to which supervisors believed that "inadequate income for citizens" was a serious problem, a problem, or a nonexistent problem. A high score would indicate that the respondent believes that the financial needs of citizens is a serious problem. Each attitudinal dimension is treated in the analysis as a separate independent variable.

Citizen Participation

Each of Iowa's sixteen district offices of the Iowa Department of Social Services is responsible for obtaining citizen participation for allocating the annual Title XX appropriations. Despite the Title XX mandate that there be public hearings, there are no prescriptions on how to do this. Districts usually create advisory boards with some form of representation from each county, often including county supervisors, providers, and citizens as consumers. Similarly, each county has the opportunity to arrange for citizen participation in assessing need in devising a plan for funding Title XX purchase of service contracts. To measure citizen participation in counties, a form was sent to all Department of Social Service district administrators asking them to indicate the way citizens participated in the counties of their district. Types of citizen participation ranged from public hearings and informal consultation between the county director and staff to formally constituted groups of citizens, providers, and local officials. There were three variations between those two poles. Any or all of the different procedures may apply for a particular county. Therefore, whenever a procedure was indicated by a district administrator, a score between one and five was entered for the county. For example, if a county had only a public hearing and/or the county director consulted with her/his staff, then that county would receive a "1," meaning that it did what was minimally required to obtain citizen participation. On the other hand, if the county had a formally constituted group of citizens, providers, and local officials (worth a score of five), and it also conducted a public hearing (worth a score of one), then the county received a total score of six. Counties' citizen-participation total scores ranged from one to sixteen (see table 1).

Other Mass-Society Variables

Included in this analysis are variables very similar to Grønbjerg's indicators of mass society. For each county there is a measure of voter participation,[26] percent of college educated,[27] education expenditures,[28] county-government revenue,[29] population size,[30] and percent of profes-

Table 1

The Distribution of Counties' Citizen-Participation Scores

	Total Citizen-Participation Score										
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	16	Total
No. of counties	11	12	16	24	7	6	6	1	9	5	97*

* Scores were not received for two counties.

sional workers.[31] Each of these represents factors other than income and economic need. The extent of voter participation reflects the extent to which citizens exercise their political citizenship rights in choosing the governing elite. In Grønbjerg's terms, the proportion of the population that is college educated and professionally employed indicates the relative size of the "center." The well educated comprise the occupational elites, and as their numbers increase so does the center. Education was the other institutional sector identified by Marshall as a concomitant with the extension of social citizenship rights. By spending more on public education a county invests in one of the primary mechanisms that sustains the center and enhances the population's well-being. County-government revenue is one aspect of the county's fiscal capacity and represents the extent of resources available for providing services. Population size is very close to Grønbjerg's index of urbanization, which is seen as a context within which people have broadened their horizons and have attained a modicum of citizenship beyond that available in the particularistic social orders of small towns and rural society.

Stratification Variables

To the extent possible, given statistics available at the county level, variables approximating those of Grønbjerg for the stratification approach have been incorporated for each county. Assuming that these variables manifest the degree of economic dependency and absolute financial need, they are per capita income,[32] the unemployment rate,[33] the divorce rate,[34] the percent of the population with income less than the official poverty level,[35] and the infant mortality rate.[36] Except for per capita income, which would be expected to vary inversely with economic dependency and absolute need, each of these can be expected to vary with the levels of economic dependency and need.

Dependent Variables

One objective of this study is to examine the Grønbjerg thesis with a more differentiated set of dependent variables such as AFDC rolls (February 1980),[37] the poor tax,[38] the tax levy for the mental health and institutions fund,[39] and the amount of county match for services to the aged.[40] Counties are obliged to support the poor, and general relief is usually regarded as the most residual of all income-assistance programs as its recipients are treated as among the more "undeserving." Persons benefiting from the mental health and institutions fund include a variety of clients, but a group which can be described as "deserving." The aged who receive services through the Older Americans Act would most likely be regarded as among the "more deserving" and least stigmatized segments of the social provisions and social services population.

The Method

With the above selection of variables we are able to scrutinize more rigorously the mass-society perspective. Measures of elite attitudes and citizen participation as a structure of the social services institution are necessary before we can fit Shils's notion of the center and the periphery to social citizenship rights and the extension of welfare. With these data two research issues are pursued. The first requires an examination of the relationship between measures of the center's elite and the surrogate measures of the mass-society approach and a look at the relative strength of the mass-society approach and the social stratification approach. The second requires the use of a more differentiated set of dependent variables to obtain a better conceptual fit of the competing approaches to elite decisions as well as the extension of welfare.

Data collection efforts follow the natural sequence of events of the county-budgeting cycle. Consequently, independent variables are measured before the variables they are presumed to influence. Table 2 presents the variables and the period in which they are measured. County

Table 2

Variables and the Data-Collection Sequence

1970–78	Winter 1978–79	Late Spring 1979	July 1979	February 1980
Stratification Per capita income Unemployment rate Divorce rate Poor (%) Infant mortality rate Women employed as % of women in labor force Mass society Voter participation College educated (%) Educational expenditures County government revenue Professional workers (%)	Institutional structure Citizen participation	Elite attitudes Recommendations of client representatives Inadequate income for citizens Work constructively together Social citizenship support	Allocation decisions Poor tax Mental health and institutional levy Agency on Aging services	Welfare AFDC rolls

supervisors and county and district citizen advisory boards begin the needs-assessment process[11] and service-planning cycle in November, and the process continues through February. As data from counties are incorporated into the planning process, supervisors meet with citizens, citizens-at-large, local government officials, consumer-client representatives, and service providers fairly often, sometimes twice a month or more. Counties rank service needs, and these are conveyed to district citizen advisory boards for Title XX. Each district is required to offer services throughout the counties in its area so all who are entitled have access.

After supervisors directly or indirectly experienced this planning process, they received the mail questionnaire eliciting responses that would reflect the effects of the experiences. The poor tax, the mental health and institutions fund levy, and the county match for aging services are contained in county budget reports to the state comptroller. Finally, six months later the level of AFDC rolls is recorded. While supervisors do not have direct authority over income-maintenance workers, they may set the tone or climate in the county courthouses.

Although 67 percent of the supervisors returned the questionnaires, not all 245 completed the attitude items, particularly those eliciting the relative importance given to recommendations of client representatives and support for social citizenship rights.[12] In only fifty-seven of the ninety-nine counties did the majority of the county supervisors complete the full set of attitude items. The *T*-test results comparing means of variables in the analysis between the fifty-seven counties with a complete set of attitude items and those forty-two without a complete set indicate that there are no significant differences between counties in which data are complete and those with missing data.[13]

Following Grønbjerg's lead, the dependent variables are regressed stepwise until the *F*-level is trivial or the tolerance level for multicollinearity is insufficient.[14] For parsimony, the zero-order correlations, the standardized regression coefficients (β), the *F*-statistic, and the level of significance are reported for those variables that demonstrate relationships beyond the realm of sampling error or measurement error.

The Findings

The question of relative utility of the mass-society approach and the stratification approach against a differentiated set of dependent variables shall be dealt with first. Table 3 presents the determinants of AFDC, the one dependent variable shared in common by this study and Grønbjerg's. Divorce rate and the percent poor reflect the stratification

Table 3

Determinants of AFDC

Independent Variables	Zero-Order Correlations	Standardized Regression Coefficient (β)	F-Level for β	Level of Significance
Divorce rate, 1974	.61	.63	37.19	$p \leq .01$
College educated, 1970 (%)	.08	.55	36.93	$p \leq .01$
Poor, 1970 (%)	.15	.29	8.61	$p \leq .01$
Inadequate income for citizens	.20	.21	6.79	$p \leq .025$
Citizen participation	.33	.19	5.07	$p \leq .05$

Note.—R^2 = .67, df = 51.

model of economic dependency and financial need. The other three, which outnumber and outweigh the stratification variables, are the mass-society variables of percent college educated, the elite attitude that citizens do not have adequate income, and the institutional structure of citizen participation. Collectively these five account for nearly the same amount of explained variance, 67 percent, as did Grønbjerg's final models, which obtained 72 percent in 1960 and 73 percent in 1970. Given the lower level of abstraction and more cases, this relative comparability is unexpected. By looking at the extension of welfare alone, the mass-society approach prevails over the stratification model. The educational center, a consideration of supervisors for the income level of their citizens, and the presence of substantive, viable institutional structures for citizen participation are associated rather strongly with the size of the AFDC rolls.

When the poor tax and the mental health and institutions tax levy are examined, these data do not yield quite as clear a picture. As tables 4 and 5 reveal, for either client group—the "undeserving" general relief recipients or the "deserving" mentally retarded, developmentally disabled, and juvenile delinquent—few variables demonstrate significant associations. The final determinants of the poor tax account for only 22

Table 4

Determinants of Millage Rates for the Poor Fund (General Relief)

Independent Variables	Zero-Order Correlations	Standardized Regression Coefficient (β)	F-Level for β	Level of Significance
Recommendations by client rep's.	.251	.36	7.78	$p \leq .01$
Divorce rate, 1975	.19	.27	3.49	NS
Work constructively together	.21	.26	4.35	$p \leq .05$

Note.—R^2 = .22, df = 53.

Table 5

DETERMINANTS OF MILLAGE RATES FOR THE MENTAL HEALTH AND INSTITUTIONAL FUND

Independent Variables	Zero-Order Correlations	Standardized Regression Coefficient (β)	F-Level for β	Level of Significance
Poor 1970 (%)	.55	.57	28.82	$p < .01$
Unemployment rate, 1977	.36	.32	9.63	$p < .01$
Educational expenditures	.01	.22	1.26	$p < .05$

NOTE.—R^2 = .13, df = 53

percent of the variance; for the mental health and institutions fund 13 percent of the variance can be allocated to three variables.

One would expect that stratification variables would overshadow mass-society variables in accounting for variations in the poor tax. However, two mass-society variables—the elite attitude of viewing as relatively important the recommendation of client-group representatives and the view that we "work constructively together" to get "things"[15] done—are the only significant independent variables of the sixteen that bear on this issue. This indicates that in Iowa's counties the "undeserving" very poor are embraced as citizens with rights to general relief, contrary to expectations. While the very poor appear to receive an embrace as citizens, the "deserving" beneficiaries of the mental health and institutions funds appear to receive a cold shoulder. Since the percent poor and the unemployment rate are stratification variables indicating economic dependency and absolute need, a stratification approach prevails.

This less than clear set of findings is due in part to present real-world conditions. In 1979 county supervisors were limited by the state legislature from increasing the poor tax levy more than 9 percent of the annual growth in property tax. The only levies of the 125 that a county is authorized to levy in Iowa involve the court-expense tax and the mental health and institutions fund tax. Therefore, counties may have shifted some of the financial burden from the poor tax to the mental health and institutions fund levy. Indeed, the Iowa State Association of Counties gave legal advice on how to shift "certain costs from the limited poor fund to the unlimited mental health fund."[16] Therefore, it is more realistic to treat these two taxes as a group. The standardized regression coefficients of the significant independent variables for the stratification model (.57 and .32 in table 5 vs. .36, .26 in table 4, and .22 in table 5) are balanced roughly by those of the mass-society approach.

The lack of clarity with more ambiguous measures of concern for the "undeserving poor," the "more deserving" mentally ill, and mentally retarded/developmentally disabled is eclipsed by the clear findings for the "most deserving," the aged. Table 6 reveals that only mass-society

Table 6

DETERMINANTS OF TARGETED RESOURCES FOR THE AGED

Independent Variables	Zero-Order Correlations	Standardized Regression Coefficient (β)	F Level for β	Level of Significance
Population size, 1976 estimate	.65	.66	12.66	$p < .01$
Citizen participation	.18	.11	18.89	$p < .01$
Voter participation, 1978	.29	.23	1.38	$p <$ [illegible]

NOTE.—R^2 = .58, df = 53.

variables obtain significant, strong association with the extent to which counties mobilize local resources for matching Title III and Title VII funds of the Older Americans Act. These findings are exactly what one would expect if mass-society variables were to behave differently than stratification variables. The contrasting approaches of mass society and stratification do stand up to tests involving different dependent variables involving presumed gradations which are not present when one deals only with extension of welfare, that is, social citizen rights to public assistance recipients.

The second research question was whether or not it would be beneficial to include more direct measures of the center elites and institutional structures. The evidence is rather convincing that measuring attitudes of the central elite and taking into account the institutional structure of citizen participation do yield empirical and explanatory benefits. Of the eight mass-society variables that yield significant relationships with the allocation decisions, five are used for the first time in this study and only three are similar to Grønbjerg's previously used measures.

More important than the robust nature of these more direct measures of the mass-society thesis is the fact that the attitudes of county supervisors and the institutional structure of citizen participation are suitable targets for planned change. The social statistics in Grønbjerg's analysis are not readily influenced by planned change agents.

Implications

The mass-society approach to the extension of welfare and to policies for differentiated targets from the very poor on general relief to the deserving aged can direct our attention toward social development. In the counties of Iowa the attitudes of the elite and citizen participation

is an institutional structure play an important role in supporting social citizenship rights.

Indeed, these findings underscore a contention by Janowitz and Suttles[17] that the central place occupied by the idea of citizenship in advanced, industrialized representative democracies is incomplete unless local communities are taken fully into account. "The extension of rights . . . presupposes an effective extension of obligations or voluntary stewardship. . . . Bureaucratic norms, universalistic standards, and the civic ideals of democracy seem uncompelling unless they are endorsed and given exemplary weight in the smaller confines in which individuals can feel the consequences of their actions by 'taking the role of the other.'"[18] As the buffer between diverse interests, the local community serves as an arena "for articulating grass roots sentiments with policies of national leadership."[19] Perhaps counties in Iowa are fulfilling this purpose.

But Iowa has a very homogeneous population and a rather stable economy. However, as economic conditions deteriorate and public monies shrink, structures of citizen participation for social service planning and allocations have become strained. More and more target groups or their advocates are making strident demands on county revenue. In the face of block grants of the Reagan administration that may pit the "truly needy" even more directly against the "undeserving poor," structures of mass society and social citizenship are quite significant. The potential of counties to act as mediators between diverse interests will be sorely tested. Citizen participation structures may mitigate against debilitating competition for scarce resources. On the other hand, their efforts may not be enough. Nonetheless, using social citizenship as a concept to buttress social development may prove to enrich our understanding of the welfare state.

Notes

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1. T. H. Marshall, *Class, Citizenship, and Social Development* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1964), pp. 65–122.

2. Ibid., p. 81.

3. Ibid., p. 72. Marshall identifies institutions that correspond to the three elements of citizenship. For civil citizenship judicial courts are the relevant institution; for political citizenship the institutions are national government and local government; for social citizenship the educational system and social services are the corresponding institution.

4 See Jack Rothman, "Macro Social Work in a Tightening Economy," *Social Work* 24 (July 1979): 274–83; Mayer N. Zald, "Demographics, Politics, and the Future of the Welfare State," *Social Service Review* 50 (March 1977): 120–22; and Morris Janowitz, *Social Control of the Welfare State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).

5 See Morris Janowitz, "Foreword," in Kirsten Grønbjerg's *Mass Society and the Extension of Welfare, 1960–1970* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), p. x; and Judith Mayo's review of Grønbjerg's book, *Social Service Review* 22 (March 1978): 150.

6 Edward Shils, *Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975). A collection of articles and papers written over a twenty-year span, Shils's work is somewhat problematic. Some chapters (e.g., 1, 2, and 10) seem at odds with other chapters (chaps. 5 and 17) on which Grønbjerg depends primarily. See Stephen M. Aigner ("Indicators of Political Alienation" [Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1977], pp. 282–302) for a critique of Shils's definition of citizens and "political need."

7 Grønbjerg, pp. 10–11.

8 Ibid., p. 11.

9 Ibid., pp. 11–16.

10 Grønbjerg's work cannot be summarized justly in this short space. Readers desiring more complete familiarity with Grønbjerg's excellent work are directed to the book itself.

11 Grønbjerg herself recognizes (pp. 117–18) that the changing attitude of public officials toward the mass-society perspective is one of four factors that could explain the 1960s shift toward the "mass-society" approach. While the other factors, like higher rates of application and higher rates of approval of applications in high-mass-society states, received empirical attention by Grønbjerg, the attitudes of public officials did not.

12 The β denotes the standard regression coefficient controlling for all other variables in the equation. All are statistically significant at the .05 level or better, on a single-tailed test.

13 Initially she uses the term "threat" variables, which represent an influx of potential welfare cheaters whose economic opportunities may threaten "the central value system." The presumption is that state legislators would respond with more restrictive welfare policies. After her analysis of 1960 results, however, Grønbjerg qualifies the use of "threat," saying that a correlation of immigration with AFDC rolls more likely indicates that people have moved to states with more economic opportunities.

14 Grønbjerg, p. 92.

15 The reversal in direction of the correlation between AFDC rolls and total in-migration is explained by an examination of successive partial correlation coefficients between the two variables as each of the independent variables preceding in-migration. In 1960 stratification variables were entered first, and in-migration reflects the state attractiveness or pull more than bleak economic conditions or push. In 1970 mass-society variables were entered first, and in-migration behaves more in line with other stratification variables, indicating more push than pull.

16 Grønbjerg, p. 101.

17 Apparently, no other mass-society or stratification variables had significant effects on the variation of eligibility restrictiveness. In both years mass-society variables had the strongest significant association at the zero-order, voter participation ($r = -.18$) in 1960 and percent with 12 years or more of education ($r = -.19$) in 1970.

18 Grønbjerg provides data and a rather rich discussion of the connection between rolls and policy (see pp. 135–51).

19 The discussion between Eugene Durman ("Have the Poor Been Regulated? Toward a Multivariate Understanding of Welfare Growth," *Social Service Review* 47 [September 1973]: 339–59) and Frances Piven and Richard Cloward ("Reaffirming the Regulation of the Poor," ibid. 48 [June 1974]: 147–69) is instructive. Durman employs many variables, principally the role of an expanded pool of families, to account for the increase in welfare rolls during the 1960s. In so doing he uncovers certain difficulties Piven and Cloward have in making the conclusions they do. In my view, Piven and Cloward respond by "shouting louder" and by arguing that "rising application rates . . . are themselves an important form of disorder," thereby showing that the poor have become "deregulated" (p. 167). It's permissible, perhaps, to redefine the variables and their epistemic link. Indeed, the mass-society thesis and the Piven-Cloward thesis could be said to converge: citizens who press for social citizenship rights during the same period that

center elites are extending those rights could be said to be less regulated or deregulated. Nevertheless, the burden rests on supporters of the Piven-Cloward thesis to refine the empirical tests of their position. While I am personally quite comfortable with the historical application and utility of the Piven-Cloward thesis, I cannot disregard its rather inadequate fit with more recent data.

20. There are also disadvantages in using Iowa counties. Iowa's population is rather homogeneous, with less than 2 percent of the population being nonwhite. Additionally, it may be problematic to apply a theory of societal trends to a state. While Iowa's geographical size compares to some Third and Fourth World nations, its population of 2.8 million does not.

21. Don A. Dillman, *Mail and Telephone Surveys: The Total Design Method* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978). The questionnaire is a modified version of a needs-assessment questionnaire sent to 8,000 Iowans in the fall of 1978 by the Iowa Department of Social Services and the United Way of Greater Des Moines. I used the original form designed by a colleague and Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Sociology at Iowa State University, Charles Palmer, and added two items specifically constructed for this study.

22. Janet Rosenberg ("Discovering Natural Types of Role Orientation: An Application of Cluster Analysis," *Social Service Review* 52 [March 1978]: 85–106) first used this item. Respondents were instructed to: "Please put a '1' after your first choice as the most important, a '2' after your choice as the second most important, and a '3' after your third choice: People in public welfare and social services, Representatives of client groups, Community leaders and legislators." Responses were recorded so that "3" was assigned to the most important.

23. Richard M. Titmuss, *Social Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1974).

24. Respondents were instructed to: "Please circle the reason with which you most agree: 1. Temporary emergency services are a privilege; 2. Industrial society meets the economic needs of citizens; 3. Society has an obligation to meet social and economic needs of its citizens."

25. This question and the next were part of the original needs assessment questionnaire. This question follows three sections in which respondents were asked to indicate for their county: (1) the seriousness of thirty-two problems on a three-point scale, (2) the adequacy of services for the thirty-two problems on a five-point scale, and (3) the extent to which financing for each of the thirty-two problems' services ought to be increased/decreased on a five-point scale. Consequently, because of the question's location, the implication is that "things" refers to social services for social and economic problems.

26. Voter participation is measured by dividing the number of actual voters in the governor's 1978 race by the number of registered voters. These data were obtained from the Iowa Republican Party.

27. The percent of college educated results from the division of those twenty-five years and older who have sixteen years of education by the estimated 1976 population (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *County and City Data Book, 1977* [Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978] [hereafter cited as *CCDB, 1977*]). See also n. 30 below.

28. Educational expenditures are the expenditures per public school pupils in 1978 (*Iowa Public School Data, 1977–1978* [Des Moines: Iowa Department of Public Instruction, 1978]).

29. County government revenue is the general revenue of counties in 1972 (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *County and City Data Book, 1972* [Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973]).

30. Estimates of population size are obtained using a formula designed by Marvin Julius, Department of Economics, Iowa State University, to more accurately reflect within a decade changes in the age structure. An industrialization index has not been attempted due to insufficient data and the expectation that a heavily skewed bimodal distribution would present more problems than benefits. Grønbjerg's more adequate measure of industrialization did not figure into her final results.

31. The percent professional workers is obtained by dividing the number of professional workers by the estimated population in 1976 (*CCDB, 1977*).

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Iowa Department of Health, 1978.

37. Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report, February 1980 (Bureau of Management Information, Division of Administrative Services, Iowa Department of Social Services).

38. The tax rate for general relief and the Mental Health and Institutions Fund available from budget forms submitted to the Iowa Comptroller's Office, see chap. [illegible] of the Iowa Code.

39. See chap. 444 of the Iowa Code. The Mental Health and Institutions Fund is used for the care and treatment of county residents at state mental health institutions, state hospital schools, the state psychopathic hospital, the state alcoholic treatment center, the juvenile home, and at the state schools for the deaf and blind. Also, diagnostic evaluations of mental retardation, developmental disabilities and autistic children, care and treatment for persons at the county home, the community mental health center, and the more recent provision of mental health services to community-based halfway or three-quarter houses.

40. Amounts allocated as county match for services such as Meals on Wheels, congregate meals, seniors' centers, and coordinating councils for the aged are obtained from county budget forms submitted to the comptroller's office and verified through the Area Offices on Aging.

41. Needs-assessment tools vary from utilization rates as a surrogate measure of consumer demand to mail surveys and interviews with local officials and citizen elites and to "expert" opinions from social service agency employees and service providers.

42. The two items that were most often skipped by respondents dealt with somewhat complex material and were longer and not as easily answered within the context of a mail questionnaire. These items have been field tested with about eighty elected officials at different levels of governmental decision making in the winters of 1978 and 1979. The interview context did elicit valid responses. Fortunately, the respondents who answered these came from counties that did not differ significantly from counties where supervisors skipped them.

43. The critical factor in response rates and missing data is the extent to which nonrandom factors account for the failure to respond, thereby resulting in biased, invalid distributions. *T*-test results and knowledge that county clerks idiosyncratically filter mail to supervisors, creating further time pressures, incline me to assume that on these particular items the nonresponse rate very likely is random.

44. Multicollinearity is the situation when some independent variables are highly intercorrelated. Conceptual problems result because the indicators cannot be said to measure separate entities when they cannot be sufficiently disentangled.

45. See n. 23 above.

46. Arnold Garson, "Two Funds Outstrip Rest in Tax Rise," *Des Moines Register* (December 10, 1978), p. 6A.

47. Morris Janowitz and Gerald D. Suttles, "The Social Ecology of Citizenship," in *The Management of Human Services*, ed. R. Sarri and Y. Hasenfeld (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), pp. 80–104.

48. Ibid., p. 84.

49. Ibid., p. 85.

Research on Issues in Collaboration between Social Workers and Lawyers

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Positive collaboration between social workers and lawyers is an increasingly important issue in social work practice as the arena of professional interaction enlarges in court-related work with families. This paper presents the results of two recent studies of interprofessional collaboration. One study found that attitudes toward collaboration between social workers and lawyers are more positive than earlier studies indicate, when the social workers have received intensive training in court-related work. The other study tested an educational model to prepare social work students for interprofessional collaboration.

Family Problems: Social Work and Legal Roles

The interdependency of the social welfare and legal systems in relation to child dependency, divorce, child custody, adoptions, juvenile status offenses, and delinquency focuses attention on the need for effective communication and collaboration among the social, legal, and judicial professions. Skills in interprofessional collaboration become increasingly important as the arena of practice enlarges in court-related work with families and children. Collaboration and client-advocacy

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skills constitute a critical part of the practice repertoire. The positive and negative interaction between social workers and lawyers frequently affects the quality of legal and social service which families receive. These interactions have been altered by role changes affecting both social workers and lawyers.

The juvenile courts have moved rapidly to adopt an adversary model of practice since the Gault decision in 1969 required that a lawyer be an integral participant in juvenile-court proceedings.[1] Today, social workers involved with delinquency and status offenses must be prepared to function in an adversary system. Similarly, lawyers need to understand some of the remaining differences between adult criminal and juvenile proceedings. Court proceedings in dependency issues and in abuse or neglect of children are also moving toward an increasingly adversarial model with the intent to protect the legal and civil rights of parents and children. In such cases, lawyers represent only one client's interests, while social workers may be involved with conflicting or potentially conflicting interests of several family members. For example, social workers function in a variety of roles as family advocate, child protective investigator, parent worker, and foster-placement worker. Sometimes these roles are separate, but often a social worker is expected to work to support families as units and at the same time carry child protective investigation responsibilities. The best interests of parents may not be congruent with the best interests of children, yet the social worker has a professional and ethical responsibility to parents as well as children. In court-related work social workers may serve as either petitioner or defendant representative or may work in court liaison functions as a colleague to court staff in fact finding and treatment.[2] In addition, social workers may function in the very different roles of percipient or expert witness. However, the place of the court in family matters raises difficult questions, and judges, social workers, and lawyers are engaged in searching for appropriate models for service, protection, treatment, and above all, justice. While juvenile and dependency courts move toward the adversary stance, a countertrend is present in the area of divorce and child custody. Increasing attention is given to "no-fault" divorce, and after pendulum swings from fathers' primary right to custody to the doctrine of "tender years" favoring maternal custody, courts now look with increasing favor on joint custody. California's Civil Code articulates a preference for joint custody: ". . . it is the public policy of the state to assure minor children of frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage, and to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child rearing in order to effect this policy."[3] The development of conciliation courts staffed by mental health professionals and the decline of the adversary model in custody and divorce proceedings have radically changed the traditional roles of

social workers and lawyers in these cases. The development of conciliation and mediation models reflects this shift.

Role alterations in each of these areas affects legal and social work practice. Increasing interdependence has contributed to enlarged areas of shared responsibility leading to changes in roles and tasks for both professions. They and the court system must adapt to the changes in ways that clarify professional roles and functions and that assure more effective and accountable services to clients. This paper will present collaboration issues and highlight the results of two studies of collaboration: one investigated attitudes and role perceptions of social workers and lawyers, and the other evaluated an educational approach to interprofessional collaboration.

Interprofessional collaboration involves two or more persons working together from different professions. In a collaborative process, the workers have joint responsibility for carrying out agreed-upon action.[4] Collaboration may involve parallel communication, joint planning, or may entail difficult negotiation to determine clients' interests. Collaboration between social workers and lawyers is possible when there is a shared goal, that is, a hoped for outcome for a client. A major factor in tasks which involve both social workers and lawyers is the determination of common or conflicting interests. Where a different outcome is desired, the relationship is adversarial, and social workers must be prepared to effectively support their clients' positions.

Social workers trained in problem solving through a mediating model may be professionally responsible for a family which exhibits conflicting interests. Lawyers, however, are committed to problem resolution through adversary procedures and are enjoined from ever even appearing to represent conflicting interests. The knowledge and practice bases of these two professions have some major differences. Collaboration, negotiation, and confrontation for the benefit of clients, where these differences are apparent, present a most exacting professional responsibility. The two studies reported here were undertaken to explore different aspects of interprofessional interaction, including an investigation of attitudes and perceptions and the testing of an educational model.

Issues of Collaboration between Social Workers and Lawyers

An exploratory and descriptive investigation of attitudes and perceptions about communication and collaboration between social workers and lawyers was undertaken in 19[illegible]–78.[5] The researchers all had expe-

rience in dependency or adoptions practice and came to the project with concern for interprofessional problems which hampered service delivery and decision making. Through an intensive literature review the present study was based on earlier research findings. Research reported by Brennan and Khinduka in 1971 revealed a considerable degree of actual and perceived role disagreement between social workers and lawyers in juvenile-court settings.[6] Lawyers surveyed in that study believed social workers had usurped some legal tasks. Both groups wished to attain or retain primary responsibility for many court-related and client-processing tasks and were unwilling to see certain tasks allocated to the other profession. For example, both social workers and lawyers considered that informing juveniles of rights of custody, conducting investigations of facts, and explaining reasons for adjudication fell within their own domain.[7]

A study reported by Smith in 1970 utilizing open-ended interview schedules and attitude measures investigated job responsibilities, role perceptions, and the nature of interdisciplinary collaboration between social workers and lawyers in a legal aid setting.[8] She concluded that "while professional conflict is inevitable, the degree and expression of this conflict is greatly influenced by factors over which the organizations have control."[9] The attitude measure was a semantic differential with thirty-seven bipolar adjective attribution scales which social workers and lawyers used to rate themselves and each other. Interviews indicated two levels of problems in the interprofessional relationships of the thirty-nine lawyers and ten social workers studied: (1) problems in defining social work service in legal aid settings, and (2) lawyers' utilization of the social work service.[10] In numerous instances, the lawyers were unaware of the professional nature of social work services. About one-quarter of them felt that they could perform the social work functions equally as well as the social workers. "These attorneys stated that social workers in the downtown office did nothing for clients but listen to their problems which anyone who had the time could do."[11] Other lawyers indicated concern about overlapping of functions in marital counseling, interagency contacts, planning for the aged, handling parent-child conflicts, and counseling delinquent boys.

Social workers in Smith's study illustrated role confusion or overlap by stating that they could conduct initial interviews, secure information for legal cases, complete the forms for divorce filing, interpret laws regarding social functioning, and arrange debt-payment plans. Control of cases was also an issue.

These role perceptions clearly affected the content and quality of interprofessional work. On the attitude scales, lawyers were more conservative in their ratings of social workers. From information in the interviews, Smith concluded that the organizational setting affected the climate of interprofessional relationships.[12]

The findings of Brennan and Khinduka, and of Smith, and the literature review indicated that there are major role-definition and collaboration problems between social workers and lawyers operating in the sociolegal arena related to family problems.[13]

Role Perceptions and Attitudes Toward Interpersonal Collaboration

The University of Southern California study focused on issues of col- laboration related to role perceptions, task allocation, and attitudes of social workers and lawyers about their own and the other profession. A purposive sample was drawn from four subgroups: (1) social workers practicing in child dependency, (2) lawyers practicing in dependency court, (3) social workers in adoptions, and (4) lawyers practicing in adoptions court. The total sample of county counsels and panel attorneys consisted of four of twelve dependency county counsels, five of twenty dependency panel attorneys, the only adoptions county counsel, and ten of thirty-three adoptions panel attorneys responding to the survey. Lawyers in two subsamples thus had a one-third response rate, one subsample a one-quarter response rate, and one subsample consisted of only one possible respondent. A one-third response rate is typical for mailed questionnaires, but self-selection factors which influence the choice to respond or not are not known. A sample of ninety-two of 659 dependency social workers was drawn with a response of thirty-seven, a better than one-third response rate. All adoptions workers with court experience within the last year were sampled with twenty-four of thirty-eight responding, which provided close to three-quarters of the subsample as respondents. The participation of dependency social workers was determined by selecting two court dates and sampling all workers who were scheduled to appear on those days.[14] The higher response rate among social workers may reflect greater interest or be related to the social work auspices of the study.

The study used modified versions of the instruments developed by Brennan and Khinduka and the instrument measuring attitudes developed by Smith. In addition, two attitude measures were developed by the research team to assess perceptions of positions and attitudes about each profession. The four subgroups were compared with each other to determine similarities and differences in perceptions.

Perceptions of role function in court.—Using the Brennan-Khinduka model, role functions were divided into the three major court phases: preadjudication, adjudication, and disposition. Respondents were asked to identify the person or persons who ideally should be and who actual-

ly are responsible for each of the identified functions. Responses from the Los Angeles sample indicated far more agreement regarding ideal assignment of functions than was the case in the Brennan-Khinduka study. All respondents strongly associated the responsibilities of the disposition phase to social workers. Both social workers and lawyers, again in contrast to the earlier study, indicated a desire to collaborate in court functions with the other profession. Each profession recommended transferring from social workers to lawyers some specific legal functions currently carried by social workers in the preadjudication phase. The congruence of assignment of roles and greater similarity between actual and ideal role assignments may reflect differences in organizational climate, as Smith cited, and was markedly different from the Brennan-Khinduka study.[15]

Perceptions of own and other profession.—Dependency social workers perceived their position more positively than did adoptions workers. Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) social workers perceived lawyers positively, while adoptions workers perceived lawyers negatively. Lawyers in both subgroups viewed their own position positively. Adoptions attorneys viewed their position as more "satisfying" than did dependency court attorneys. Substantial differences were noted in the attorneys' perceptions of their social work counterparts. Generally, dependency court lawyers viewed social workers more positively than did adoptions attorneys. Two-thirds of dependency lawyers viewed the social work position in their service areas as "stimulating," compared with one-third of adoptions lawyers. Less than one-third of adoptions lawyers and more than one-half of dependency lawyers viewed their social work counterparts' positions as "satisfying." Fifty percent of dependency lawyers perceived the social work position to be "creative," compared with 10 percent of adoptions lawyers.[16] The more positive self-view held by the dependency social workers may be related to greater clarity about role in court procedures than adoptions workers. The more positive view of dependency workers by dependency court lawyers may also reflect role clarity and the organizational climate in dependency court which has supported collaborative work. The less positive view of their own role held by adoptions workers was an unexpected finding and may well relate to organizational climate and less preparation for court-related functions. In addition, the positive views dependency social workers and lawyers have of each other may be mutually reinforcing in interaction, as may be the negative views of those in adoptions. If perception of professional role affects performance these findings merit further consideration.

Attribute ratings.—Using a modified form of Smith's attitude measurement scale of paired adjectives, social workers and lawyers rated their own and the other profession on thirty-seven items grouped for analysis into clusters related to "intelligence," "effectiveness," "asser-

tiveness," "concern for the others," and "practicality."[17] As with Smith's results, ratings tended toward the positive end of the attitude scale. Social workers in adoption rated themselves lower than the three other groups rated themselves except in the "concern for others" cluster. Social workers in DPSS rated lawyers higher on "effectiveness" than lawyers rated themselves, while lawyers in dependency rated social workers considerably higher than the social workers rated themselves on "effectiveness." Overall, the law groups gave social workers highest ratings on "effectiveness" and lowest ratings on "concern for others." This seems to go against negative stereotypes which attest that lawyers think social workers are "all heart and no brain." Lawyers gave the highest possible rating to themselves on assertiveness, a judgment which was not repudiated by the social workers. Social workers gave lowest ratings to lawyers on concern for others and highest ratings on effectiveness and assertiveness. Social workers gave a positive, but lower, range rating to themselves on effectiveness and the highest possible rating to themselves on concern for others. Obviously, some differences of opinion prevailed here.[18]

The relatively low assessment on the concern for others cluster that social workers and lawyers assigned to each other may be related to each profession's parochial view that their own service exhibits more concern for client welfare. Stereotypical views that social workers do not concern themselves sufficiently with clients' rights may color lawyers' views, whereas a typical criticism of lawyers is that they evidence more concern with winning than for their clients' needs. Indeed, positive professional identification may have a countereffect of lowering the appraisal of other fields. It is interesting that both social workers and lawyers questioned their own effectiveness. Inability to achieve desired goals within the complex adversary process and bureaucratic structure of the court may account for this assessment. Seeing the other's profession as more effective may reflect greater retention of feelings about cases which were not settled in accordance with the lawyer's or social worker's judgment. Despite the variation in assessment, the prevailing views of their own and the other profession were positive for the sample.

Information on collaboration experience and training.—One possible reason for the more positive views of the counterpart profession's practicing in the dependency area was the finding that 66 percent of the DPSS social workers reported that they had participated in a two-week special agency training program related to social work in the courts, court processes, and legal issues. Other groups reported minimal to no training, and the majority of all three of the other groups reported that their experience in collaboration came solely from experience on the job. It seems likely that the intensive training provided for the DPSS social workers aided them in clarifying roles, functions, and areas of

collaboration. This may account for their more positive view of lawyers as well as the lawyers' more positive view of them, which may have resulted from the social workers' solid grounding in court processes. This finding was unexpected because such training had not been offered in the past few years. But, nonetheless, the DPSS sample drew 60 percent who had had that intensive training experience. In general, the total Los Angeles sample was more positive than earlier respondents about the other profession. Yet they also expressed some problems related to lack of communication, lack of training in collaboration, and lack of clarity regarding professional identity.

Dependency court lawyers and social work counterparts demonstrated a better understanding and greater respect for each other's positions than did the adoptions group. The special training program for DPSS social workers was considered by respondents to have been very helpful in court-related work. No other group had received any specified interprofessional work role training. The need for role clarity and for collaborative planning relationships regarding shared court duties was clearly identified.

In comparison with the earlier studies cited, the Los Angeles sample showed more favorable attitudes toward collaboration. Lawyers indicated a willingness to share court functions with social workers and, in general, showed a high regard for social workers. With regard to organizational climate, it should be noted that the chief county counsel in Los Angeles dependency court has been very positively disposed to social workers and has been supportively involved with the DPSS court liaison unit which assists with cases.[19] This relationship was not studied, but the positive results seem to indicate that some factors in the organizational climate of the Los Angeles court have eased relationships reported to be strained elsewhere. Although social workers in both adoptions and dependency had longer work experience related to the court, they felt that they were less effective in court than the less experienced lawyers. While DPSS workers saw their professional role in court as generally very positive, they also perceived it as "frustrating." Role function in dependency court appeared to be more clearly defined than had been expected. Blurring of roles and possible role confusion appeared to be more obvious in the area of adoption.

After examining the research data and noting the importance which dependency social workers assigned to the training they received in court functions, the research team concluded that intensive training in court functions, roles, and interprofessional collaboration should be provided to all social workers involved with the courts. Further, the research team thought that both social work and law schools should develop curriculum content related to interprofessional collaboration, with the goal of increasing knowledge and understanding of the counterpart profession's involvement in legal processes related to family problems.[20]

Educational Program in Interprofessional Collaboration

An earlier study of the development, implementation, and evaluation of a practicum in interprofessional collaboration was conducted by the author with students in a law and social work class at the Hunter College School of Social Work, City University of New York.[21] The purpose of the project was to increase social work students' understanding of problems of interprofessional collaboration with lawyers and to increase their knowledge and understanding of the family court and sociolegal aspects of the social welfare system. The project was a limited practicum designed as an experiential form of role learning. It provided students with firsthand experience with lawyers and social workers where collaboration is needed for responsible delivery of services to clients. The project sought to test the effects of interprofessional role learning at the graduate school level. To integrate the practicum with the course, entitled, "Law and Social Work," the author collaborated with the instructor, a lawyer specializing in child welfare and family law who also holds an M.S.W. degree.[22] The practicum stressed experiential learning and included field visits, observations, interviews, selected speakers, field logs, and assignments.[23]

The program evaluation used four instruments: (1) a knowledge test, (2) an attitude test, (3) an interprofessional collaboration questionnaire, and (4) a self-anchoring scale to assess the students' familiarity with legal and collaboration issues. In addition to these measures, content analysis of field logs and the term papers examining practicum-related issues was conducted so that qualitative, as well as quantitative, data were used in evaluation of the program. Students also completed an evaluation of the course at the final class, and the instructor was asked to provide a general evaluation of class performance and practicum effects. The target group completed pre-, mid-, and posttests on all four measures. A comparison group, the "Law and Social Work" class from the previous semester (group A), took the posttest to provide a comparison of attitudes and knowledge. Two other comparison groups were tested concurrently with the practicum class: students enrolled in a course entitled "Social Work in the Authoritative Setting" (group B), matched with the practicum group for demographic similarity, and the third (group C) was selected as an "average" or representative general social work class. This last group was composed of first-year students who would have some exposure to legal settings in the course of their fieldwork. Only highlights of the findings are reported here.[24]

Highlights of the program evaluation.—Consideration of each aspect of program evaluation and composite results indicated a high level of success in increasing and *intensifying* learning related to law

and social work, and interprofessional collaboration. Scores on the knowledge test by the target group were more than double those of both the previous year's law and social work class (A) and the authoritative setting class (B). This finding indicated that the combined effects of the practicum with class instruction increased and intensified the learning experience. Positive attitudes toward, and understanding of interprofessional collaboration were stronger. Students involved in the practicum demonstrated greater understanding of both benefits, complexities, and difficulties of interprofessional collaboration. They exhibited a more positive attitude toward lawyers and a more analytic attitude regarding the roles and role conflicts of social workers involved in court proceedings. One comparison group maintained about the same opinion of lawyers at the posttest, while the first-year student group shifted markedly toward a more negative attitude toward lawyers. This finding indicates the risk of heightening negative attitudes toward other professions while becoming socialized to one's own chosen field. It also illustrates the negative views which may result when social workers are involved in court and legal processes without adequate cognitive and experiential preparation.[25]

The practicum group indicated a more positive belief that people trained in different professions can communicate effectively with each other. Their experience in interprofessional communication in a role-learning situation with field visits, interviews, class speakers, and discussion may well have contributed to this positive attitude. They viewed social workers' experiences with the legal system as less frustrating than did comparison groups, and their attitudes toward lawyers and interprofessional interaction became increasingly more positive. The field logs indicated good abilities to analyze interprofessional and law and social work problems related to roles and responsibilities. From the practicum experience, students seemed to gain a more realistic perspective on the problems and possibilities of work in sociolegal arenas and developed an increased understanding of the interrelation of the social welfare and legal systems.

At the completion of the planned learning experiences, the practicum group differed markedly in a number of respects from the comparison groups. They demonstrated a more heightened understanding of the complexities of interprofessional work than did the two comparison groups. They showed greatly increased knowledge of law content and processes in comparison with the other groups, where the knowledge gains were considerably less. They demonstrated greater ability than the other groups to define, describe, and differentiate the roles and responsibilities of social workers and lawyers operating in social welfare and the family-court system. In addition, they demonstrated increased sophistication in ability to identify interprofessional work problems such as status differentiation, issues of confidentiality,

conflicts in allegiance, protection of clients' rights, and value conflicts. They evaluated the learning experiences as very useful in aiding them in understanding the legal-social system and professional roles.[16]

Taken together, these findings indicated that the field experience, in combination with active classroom learning and intentional motivation, provided a more effective means to develop understanding of the interrelations of social work and law, and the different functions, roles, and responsibilities of lawyers and social workers. The program was apparently highly successful in helping students to understand law–social work issues and issues in interprofessional collaboration. It offered a strong model for professional education in interprofessional collaboration.

Conclusions and Recommendations: Education and Training for Effective Interprofessional Collaboration

The demand of interprofessional collaboration in family problems is that social workers and lawyers be able to understand each other and negotiate successfully for the benefit of clients. Learning in such a complex area of practice should not be left to chance or limited to cognitive learning experience. Several published studies indicate the value of education and specialized agency training as a means to assist social workers in understanding and dealing with roles in interprofessional collaboration, the courts, legal process, and legal and court personnel. For graduate students, the practicum provided a sound and productive experience in role learning. For practitioners, the specialized training provided assistance in role clarification and a means of learning court process and procedures. The results of the studies bear out the importance of the investment of resources in specialized education and training for social workers, if they are to be effective in serving clients in court-related matters. The active learning experiences of the practicum intensified and increased learning and aided in the integration of knowledge.

Notes

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Policy Sources of Worker Dissatisfactions: The Case of Human Services in Aging

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This article explores job dissatisfaction experienced by service providers in the field of aging and the policy sources of such dissatisfactions. Workers interviewed identified four major areas of complaint about their jobs: lack of resources, agency problems, mandates and regulations, and client characteristics. Such problems, it is argued, are associated with specific characteristics of policies under which the respondents work. These characteristics include the symbolic nature of legislation, policy ambiguity, universal entitlement, and calculated fragmentation. Whether or not policy changes should be made to alleviate worker dissatisfactions is discussed in the concluding section of the article.

Studies of a variety of human services have documented the worker frustrations and professional burnout of direct service providers.[1] Given the current political climate of fiscal retrenchment, it is likely that service worker dissatisfactions will be heightened.[2]

Many studies which document professional burnout have provided suggestions for the alleviation of worker discontent through the implementation of personal and managerial strategies. However, no attention has been given to ways in which policies under which service providers operate may contribute to their dissatisfaction with their work. This article uses the case of workers in the field of aging to explore dissatisfactions experienced by service workers and to suggest some possible policy-related sources of such dissatisfactions. It is not

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our intention to argue that the adequacy of social policy should be measured primarily, or perhaps even secondarily, by the satisfaction of those who implement it. Rather, we wish to link the everyday discontents of service providers to larger systems than have heretofore been explored.

Worker discontents focus on four major areas of complaint: lack of resources, problems with the service agency, mandates, rules, and regulations, and certain client characteristics. The policy sources of worker dissatisfaction explored here are the symbolic nature of legislation, policy ambiguities, universal entitlement, and calculated fragmentation. This article concludes with a discussion of whether or not policy alternatives for the alleviation of job dissatisfactions expressed by service workers should be pursued.

Dissatisfactions of Service Workers

The data which form the basis for an understanding of provider dissatisfaction derive from in-depth, semistructured interviews with thirty-five workers in the field of aging, most of whom are associated with services funded through the Older Americans Act (OAA). Both direct service providers and supervisory and administrative personnel were interviewed. Interviews lasted one to two hours and were conducted in private in the respondent's work setting. This article is based largely on the responses of those workers, both providers and supervisors, who have ongoing contact with the older people served by their agencies.

Respondents were asked to describe work situations or characteristics of their jobs which generate frustration, stress, or dissatisfaction. A content analysis of their answers revealed four major areas of dissatisfaction.

Lack of resources.—The lack of resources which fostered worker dissatisfaction included the interdependent issues of time, staff, and money. A large number of respondents pointed to the seemingly overwhelming responsibilities they were expected to fulfill in one workday. For example, one worker related " to meet all the clients on the program, that's a big task for one person. We have about 200 clients (for) which I'm the primary provider. I think that that's an unrealistic goal because they need so much, and stretching one person too thin really doesn't get that much done." Indeed, to relate to clients in a sympathetic and personalized way becomes dysfunctional with regard to time and work demands on the service provider.[3] As if it were not enough that one's time is inadequate to meet the many client needs and demands, the intrusion of paperwork serves further to diminish time for service provision. This frustration is described later under mandates

and regulations. For the present, it is sufficient to note that most service workers believe that paperwork demands contribute significantly to lack of time for clients.

With demands from one's clients for services and from one's agency for paperwork, service workers in aging feel that more staff would relieve the stresses of their heavy workloads. However, they recognize that the employment of additional staff requires additional funding, another limited resource. If additional funds were available, they might also be employed to bolster the limited programming currently in operation.

That programming is limited is another source of discontent for those who serve the aging. As one worker noted, "[T]o me [it] is very disheartening because I have to tell the person, you know, I'm sorry there is nothing that we can do." Another provider described the juggling act that occurs with the limited funds available for programs: "[The 126 meals served are] not even a drop in the bucket. And so sometimes you're even forced, if a person is even a little bit better, sometimes you are forced to take them off the program . . . and, you know, they really could stay on the program, but you've got somebody else out there who's in worse shape than they are. It's just sad. We're fighting over crumbs."

It is not surprising that providers interviewed tend to see their particular program or activity as being the most underfunded. For example, transportation coordinators see the need for more drivers and vans as top priority, while nutritionists believe funds should be transferred from activities such as recreation to nutritional services. This appears to result from one's situational perspective in seeing unmet needs within one's jurisdiction, coupled with the likelihood that no programs have enough funds to meet the demand for their resources.[4]

In sum, the related issues of insufficient time, staff, and money are sources of ongoing personal frustration, role stress, and work dissatisfaction for providers of services to the aging. That lack of resources is a widespread problem, not confined to our interviewees, is clear from a recent report of the Subcommittee on Human Services of the U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee on Aging,[5] which cited the following statistics: "Overall, 73 percent of our elder population is currently in need of some kind of help, 12 percent are receiving all the help they need, but a whopping 61 percent are not . . . [W]e are not responding to three out of every five elders in America . . . ." In addition, Nelson[6] provides data which demonstrate that it is the rural Area Agencies on Aging (AAAs) and their service providers that experience the severest inadequacies of money and staff.

The service organization.—A second source of worker dissatisfaction is the service organization itself. These issues relate to lack of job specificity or program structure and differing perspectives of various levels of the work organization.

Lack of job specificity or program structure, sometimes referred to as "job ambiguity," is a source of frustration for many respondents. With regard to the job itself, one respondent related: "At the time I was interviewed for the job, there was a job description, or job responsibilities or duties, however you want to term it, that was ... in fine detail, ... and after joining the organization, I found the impression, the way it was described to me and so forth, was about as far from the product I got into as you could possibly get."

With regard to ambiguity in programming, another worker described her situation: "... when I got here, there was not a whole lot of structure for me to follow, and ... there's still, you know, questions about what this particular service is supposed to do. ... I did expect to have more structure for the program itself, which I didn't get. We had to sort of forge that for ourselves. ..."

A further source of worker dissatisfaction related to the service agency itself derives from the differing perspectives and responsibilities at various levels of the work organization.[7] Most service providers become frustrated when supervisors or administrators fail to respond to their requests for additional resources or alterations in programming activities. One respondent described her frustrations in the following manner: "I've had people say, 'Well, why is it that we cannot get, maybe, the top to deal with certain things better?' And I think it's because they are not in direct services. They do not really know what is going on. Sometimes we may have some problems with fiscal ... things that we want to do, that we want to purchase, and you would think sometimes the money is coming out of that person's pocket rather than from the program. ..."

Constraints "from above" seem to be an ongoing source of discontent for direct service providers. What are often overlooked, however, are the constraints under which those administrators "from above" also must labor.[8] That administrators also are frustrated by constraints is evident in the following quotation from a former agency director: "Functioning in a position between policy-makers, regulation-enforcers, and funding sources and staff was a difficult position, particularly where line staff were concerned, people who daily came into contact with older people and were quite knowledgeable about the daily needs of those older people were unable many times to respond positively to those needs and not understand why they couldn't. That kind of position was tension-producing."

Thus, workers at different levels of the agency experience constraints: direct service providers must negotiate their roles out of the frequently conflicting demands of their clients and their supervisors and administrators; administrators must negotiate their roles out of the frequently opposed dictates of their own workers and advisory committees, political decision makers, and funding sources. It seems that neither fully understands the stresses of the other, and blame may be placed person-

ally rather than being located in the structural arrangements of the work setting

Mandates and regulations.—Another source of worker and administrator dissatisfaction is the myriad of rules, regulations, and mandates under which programming must operate and the level of paperwork necessary to document compliance with such procedures. Workers are especially discontented with the relative inflexibility of priority setting for local programming. One administrator described this issue as follows: "In aging there are policies that are made at the national level that I suppose are based on national data, not local data, and my opinion has been that national data can sometimes present a priority that is not at the local level. But because of priorities and policies set at the national level relating to funding, it's impossible to use that funding for anything except the priority that has been set or the particular service that's been identified."

At the level of the direct service provider, the imposition of various guidelines leads to confusion and frustration, as is evident in this scenario offered by a respondent working at a senior center: " . . . [We] were allocated 35 people, but I only have 25 coming, so I have 10 extra slots for people. Then I get a team in that builds up interest here, and they whip it up to 40, but by that time our allotment is cut back because our average is only 25, and they don't want us transporting 40 people. I guess that causes me some frustration, you know, where it just seems like things don't jell all at the same time. When the need is there, you don't always have the programs and money or the program availability to meet that need, and when you don't have the need, you have plenty [of resources]."

The implication of these comments, and similar ones made by other respondents, is that greater discretion should be allowed at the local level for setting priorities and determining criteria for the allocation of various resources. This was also a theme that was articulated by national organizations on aging during testimony on the 1978 reauthorization of the OAA.[9]

Finally, with regard to mandates and regulations, a large number of respondents complained about the accompanying paperwork. One provider summarized these general feelings: "There is a lot of paperwork involved in this job . . . . There is a lot of accountability, and I'm not sure that it is . . . worth all the effort that we put into it. It just takes away a lot of my time and energy that I need to be doing other things with the seniors. If I have to record every single thing that I do, I would not have time to do it. . . ."

Indeed, the question of how much paperwork is useful and necessary was the subject of inquiry by Estes and Noble[10] in a report for the U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging. They found that before Title VII was merged with Title III of the OAA, "the Older Americans Act

reporting system for Titles III and VII alone annually amasses more than 15,000 million items of data dealing with basic contract compliance, at an annual cost exceeding $1 million just for reproducing the forms and copying the reports for minimum mandated distribution . . . This represents up to 7 miles of paper generated annually.

Since neither the work effort required to fill out this paper nor the program costs due to staff time lost are calculated in such estimates of paperwork costs, the basic 'paper-systems-costs' represent only the tip of the iceberg relative to the actual cost of maintaining the paper flow."

Client characteristics.—A final theme emerging from our interviews is that certain client characteristics generate stress and frustration. Such characteristics include the perceived unwillingness of some clients to help themselves and, closely related, the perceived unfair demands made by some clients on workers' time and energies.

While it is in the very nature of service work to serve one's clients, workers tend to perceive service as limited to doing for people those things they are unable to do for themselves. Thus, when the service provider perceives a client as becoming unnecessarily dependent upon the worker or upon a program, this becomes a source of vexation. As one interviewee expressed it, "[O]ne of the surprises that really floored me . . . is the demanding nature of some of the senior citizens . . . , the attitude [they have] that [a service] is owed to them." Another respondent observed: "I just don't feel that the elderly [are] as involved as they ought to be, and, on the other hand, I don't feel that they, even given the opportunity to be involved, that they really advocate for themselves in terms of what they want. Many times they will say, 'Why, y'all know what we need and what we want, and you just go on and plan this program.' And that can be frustrating."

Such client demands and dependencies further tax workers who feel that their time and energy are already tested to the limit. One particular type of demand, when perceived as illegitimate, provokes anger from providers. This occurs when the clients define their situation as an emergency, which forces workers to rearrange the organization of their time and tasks.[11] A respondent described one such situation:

> Sometimes they tell you stories. Sometimes they call in and they claim that they are half-dead and they're in such bad shape. Okay, once we had a referral that someone had really convinced the person on the phone that they were really in dire need of the meal. . . . So I went out to do the referral. I rang the door bell, . . . and I was thinking, "Wow, this lady is really sick. It's taking her a long time to come to the door." I walked to the side to the driveway, you know, to see if I could see in the window or anything. So up comes this lady storming through the back of her yard. So I was thinking that she was a neighbor there to help. It couldn't be anything else. I mean, she was physically fit. This lady had been down in her garage or somewhere in her house . . . and she [was covered with] this wet paint. . . . So she comes up, and when I tell her who I am, then she gets all slumpy-shouldered and everything, and I've never been so knocked

off my feet before in my life. And then I found out that this is, she's the one, the client. . . . I guess because people are in hot water, they think they need to lie, but I would rather hear the truth.

However, in this case, if the client had told "the truth," it is unlikely that she would have received a response as quickly as she did, if at all, given the provider's already demanding schedule.

In sum, when asked to describe their dissatisfactions with their jobs, service providers in agencies for the aging delineated discontents which can be subsumed under the four general areas described above.

Despite the numerous and varied discontents the interviewees expressed regarding their jobs, it should be noted that very few of the individuals interviewed characterized themselves as "burned out." In part this is attributable to the short amount of time most respondents had been employed in their current jobs (approximately 1.5 years, on the average). Indeed, many workers had moved to their current positions because of feeling burned out in their former jobs. The relatively low rate of burnout expressed by those interviewed can also be explained by the workers' frequent use of "aligning actions" to cope with their discontents.[12]

Nevertheless, in general their dissatisfactions were strongly felt, suggesting that intervention is warranted. In addition, complaints were similar from one respondent to the next, suggesting that the problems are not a matter of individual work styles or managerial approaches. While these standard social psychological and organizational variables may explain part of workers' difficulties, there is enough consistency across personality and organizational variables to dictate further exploration of sources of discontent. Alternatively, the fact that the same kinds of problems arise across agencies of varying sizes and throughout worker levels indicates that the ways in which agency services are structured, and the policies from which such arrangements arise, may contribute to worker dissatisfactions. Let us examine this argument more closely.

Policy-related Sources of Dissatisfaction

In this section I will argue that many of the dissatisfactions felt by workers with the aging may derive from the policies under which they and their agencies operate. This is not to deny that the same dissatisfactions may be felt because of characteristics of one's work style or the organization of one's workplace. Multiple sources have documented such arguments. However, this article seeks the sources of discontent

beyond the individual or organizational domains. Utilizing implementation estimates[13] or the examination of policy implications, I believe that each of the types of dissatisfactions registered above can be traced at least in part to dysfunctional characteristics of aging-related legislation and the process by which it has been implemented.

I shall refer especially to the Older Americans Act, but some of these difficulties apply to other policies as well. The characteristics which may ultimately result in worker dissatisfactions are (1) the symbolic and ambitious nature of the legislation, (2) its universal entitlement, (3) its intentional ambiguity, and (4) its calculated fragmentation.

Symbolic and ambitious legislation — The Older Americans Act has been described in various sources as a largely symbolic piece of legislation whose stated ambitions far exceed its ability to deliver given current or anticipated funding levels.[14] That is, the legislation "project[s] images of adequate and reasonably comprehensive social welfare programming to taxpayers and consumers, while in fact it limits support and assistance."[15] Binstock characterizes this weakness as it relates to the OAA as a "funding distribution so thin as to have little impact on any given problem."[16]

As the preceding section showed, it is the service workers in their interaction with consumers or potential consumers who must mediate the consequences of high consumer expectations and inadequate resources for fulfilling those collective expectations. Service providers have to deny services to consumers, which is not only distasteful and disheartening but antithetical to their role. Nevertheless, this buffer task has been argued to be a critical function of many service workers in the public sector[17] who then become labeled "dirty workers."[18]

Not only may ambitious but underfunded legislation create frustrated workers and frustrated clients whose expectations cannot fully be met in the provider-client relationship, but such immodest policies can also generate interworker competition within agencies and between agencies over scarce resources for their particular program. Earlier it was noted that many of the respondents in our interviews expressed dissatisfaction with the level at which the activities within their own jurisdictions were funded. However, instead of directing their frustrations to the policy which structures such discontent, they tend to focus their ill feelings on the programs of fellow workers which they think less important than their own and whose funds might otherwise be utilized for their own program. Such competition can undermine the efforts of a single organization, interagency competition can significantly reduce the possibilities for service coordination in the interests of one's clients.

In addition, the lack of resources may create tensions between line staff in an agency and agency administrators. While the direct service provider tends to blame the administrator for inadequate funding (i.e.,

they do not know the needs because they are not out in the field, administrators generally believe that they are doing the best they can with the limited funds available to them. Thus, inadequate resources may generate stress both vertically and horizontally within the aging service system.

If ambitious, symbolic legislation creates such problems for the service provider and the administrator, why does it emerge and persist? Binstock and Levin[19] maintain that it is functional for the politician to espouse such legislation because it provides symbolic reassurance[20] to constituents and enhances one's chances for reelection. Insofar as such immodest policies are characterized in exaggerated terms commensurate with their ambitiousness (e.g., a "landmark"), they are likely to neutralize potential opposition or challenges to them.[21] Nevertheless, while ambitious, symbolic policies may be functional for the politician, we have seen that they can create distinct problems for service providers who, along with consumers, bear the burdens of unfulfilled promises.

Universal entitlement.—Closely related to the ambitious nature of the OAA is its intention to cover all aging Americans regardless of social or economic status. This intensifies the lack of resources because the number of potential service beneficiaries is the largest possible for aging programs. Despite amendments to the OAA calling for the targeting of funds to the aging with the greatest social and economic need, "Title III services cannot be 'means-tested' and access to these services is not uniformly restricted by specified eligibility criteria or intake procedures. . . ."[22] Thus, such targeting mandates are at least difficult to implement.

The policy characteristic of universal entitlement is also related to workers' frustrations regarding certain client characteristics. It was documented earlier that providers express dissatisfaction with clients who are perceived as unwilling to help themselves and with clients who make unfair demands on their time. Because all elders are entitled to benefits from the OAA, the expectations of the aging for services may be perceived as "rights," a social construction of reality highly consistent with the rhetoric of the OAA legislation.

However, service workers seem to operate with their own conceived hierarchy of entitlement which is based roughly on level of needs as defined by the provider. Thus, demands from those elders who utilize program resources but whom workers believe to be less needy than other potential beneficiaries may be perceived by the worker as overdemands, and therefore may be sources of stress or frustration. Indeed, it is the overdemanding or overdependent consumer to whom services are most accessible and who is most likely to be served by self-referral programs.[23]

Insofar as universal entitlement continues to be coupled with inadequate funds, workers are likely to continue to experience demands on

their time from "emergencies." Once clients or potential consumers realize how keen the competition is for the services available, it is in their own interest to employ the notion of an emergency in order to secure the scarce resource they seek. From the client's perspective, the situation may in fact be seen as an emergency. However, from the perspective of the worker, who is familiar with a broad range of levels of need, the definition of emergency may be narrower. So long as the definitions of the client and the worker differ, the worker will continue to see certain clients as sources of dissatisfaction and frustration.

If the policy attribute of universal entitlement can create such strains for those who must implement it, is it the case that it may also have positive functions? Binstock and Levin[24] note that the delineation of broad target groups as the constituents of legislation is in the interest of the politician in at least two ways. First, it assists in garnering support for legislation from other politicians. Indeed, such policy expansion or dilution, depending on one's perspective, is, according to Binstock and Levin, a classic means of overcoming power fragmentation among decision makers in order to obtain passage of legislation. Estes[25] maintains that the universal entitlement of the OAA was necessary in securing its passage by distinguishing it from other "welfare" legislation, particularly policies of the Office of Economic Opportunity. Second, politicians benefit from universal entitlement legislation in their ability to utilize such a symbolic product as evidence of their concern for a large number of constituents. Such evidence is believed to be critical, despite much documentation to the contrary regarding a solid bloc of aging voters,[26] in the reelection concerns of politicians.

Universal entitlement may serve the interests of some service providers as well. A variety of studies have documented the preference of social workers for middle-class clients over low-income consumers.[27] In addition, universal entitlement reduces the need for detailed paperwork on clients' eligibility. Thus, while this policy characteristic may be a source of frustration to a number of service workers, to others it operates to promote provider satisfaction in client contact and to free providers from certain paperwork demands.

In sum, the intent of the OAA to guarantee coverage to all aging Americans has probably contributed to the frustrations of workers with the aging in at least two ways. First, the goal of universal entitlement serves to dilute already severely inadequate funds even further. Second, it generates strain between providers and consumers when their priorities differ. On the other hand, the policy characteristic serves the political interests of legislators and the client preferences of some service workers.

Intentional ambiguity.—A third policy characteristic which may be troublesome for service workers is the intentional ambiguity characterizing the Older Americans Act.[28] As noted by Street et al.,[29] "... public assistance policies and practices are in almost perpetual flux, reflecting

the complex permutations of the phasings of federal, state, county, local administrative and fiscal processes, the vagaries of political decisions, pressures, cycles of virtue and terror, and local grass-roots demands, and the organizational disarray induced by shifts in caseload size, turnover of employees, and so on . . . [P]olicies are in perpetual fluidity from office to office and from day to day."[29] The negative latent functions likely to be experienced by service providers as a result of ambiguity include their complaints of lack of job specificity and program structure and the existence of large amounts of paperwork.

The ambiguity of the OAA is evident in the following conflicting goals of the OAA, the regulations it has generated, and its implementation structure:

1. Who should be served, a dilemma emerging from universal entitlement versus establishing priorities of need for subgroups of the aging;[30]

2. What kind of effort should receive greatest emphasis, a dilemma emerging from the dual emphases of direct services and pooling and coordination;[31]

3. What specific functions each level of the implementation apparatus (Administration on Aging at the federal level, Regional Offices on Aging, State Units on Aging, Area Agencies on Aging, and local service agencies) should perform, a dilemma emerging from new amendments to the OAA and from structural constraints experienced at the various levels of organization regarding their mandates;[32]

4. How accomplishments should be measured, a dilemma emerging from the demand for national accountability versus a decentralized planning strategy.[33]

If the framers and interpreters of the OAA have not been clear with regard to these questions, it is not surprising that workers at the local level are confused about what they and their programs are supposed to accomplish, how it should be accomplished, and how they are to cooperate with other units. Such confusion eventually leads to stress, frustration, and job dissatisfaction for a number of workers.

Lack of job specificity and program structure are not the only problems resulting from the ambiguity surrounding the OAA. Demands for excessive paperwork grow out of this policy characteristic as well. When goals are ambiguous, accountability becomes problematic. According to Estes, "The necessity to devise performance standards under conditions of intentional ambiguity and decentralization has led to sharply narrowing the focus of accountability . . . ."[34] Accountability is reduced to a numbers count and the provision of assurances that the worker is abiding by certain regulations. Since goals are ambiguous, it is not clear what specific data are needed for accountability; thus, complete data must be amassed in case they are needed at some level of the overall structure.[35] This form of goal displacement[36]—that is, the emphasis

on number of clients served and amount of funds expended—when coupled with the likelihood of multiple jurisdictions for whom such reports are required,[37] creates the large amounts of paperwork about which service providers complain. Indeed, Street et al. argue that "the net impact of all these external demands . . . is the cumulative growth of worker responsibility and client hurdles. . . ."[38] Further, "the capacities of bureaucracy are overwhelmed and reduced to the caricature of filling out forms."[39]

Thus, policy ambiguity, which permeates not only the original legislation but its multiple layers of interpretation across agencies and over time, may create distinct dysfunctions for workers at the level of direct services. It must be acknowledged, however, that the very discretion which social workers expect from their jobs[40] derives from certain types of policy ambiguities, particularly that of multiple service mandates. The frustrations expressed by our respondents about mandates and regulations are calls for greater discretion in decision making. Consequently, it may be that workers will have to settle for some trade-offs of ambiguity and paperwork in order to obtain the discretion they believe will enhance their ability to set and to accomplish local goals.

As earlier sections have noted, policy characteristics which are in certain ways dysfunctional at the level of service provision are frequently functional for the politicians who devise such policies. The same argument can be made for ambiguity. Binstock and Binstock and Levin[41] note that the passage of intentionally ambiguous legislation is one way for Congress to "cope with an overload of popular demands for adopting policies of social intervention." Such "circuit-breaker legislation," as they term it, allows politicians to claim responsiveness to constituents and interest groups, while at the same time it allows them to pass on the controversial issues of substance to other levels of government where the hard decisions of implementation and regulation must be made.[42] Finally, the quantifiable "achievements" which are the outcome of paperwork generated by ambiguity are useful to politicians to symbolize the "success" of their legislative efforts.

Although ambiguity may create certain problems for agency administrators, it can also operate to their benefit. Because agency goals are ambiguous, accountability, as we have already noted, is problematic. Thus, it is possible for administrators to register organizational success by defining and operationalizing objectives and interpreting quantified information in their own interests. According to Edelman,[43] "Evaluation of the achievement of vague objectives *inevitably exaggerates* results and the utility of services." Such maneuvering room with regard to accountability is functional for organization maintenance, whatever the organization's level of performance.

In sum, ambiguity yields both functions and dysfunctions for a variety of actors in the service system. Any attempt to clarify ambiguities

is bound to have trade-offs which must be considered against the functions those ambiguities serve. Means of resolving three of the complaints registered by service providers—namely, job and program ambiguity, paperwork, and certain problematic mandates and regulations—may be inherently incompatible. The provision of greater local discretion and decision making, which would address problems associated with certain mandates and regulations, could increase ambiguity and paperwork. On the other hand, the clarification of ambiguities, which would provide greater job structure and would probably reduce paperwork, could lead to tighter mandates and regulations, which would diminish local decision making and priority setting.

Calculated fragmentation.[14]—A final characteristic of social policies which may generate worker discontents is fragmentation, which can be defined as the existence of multiple organizational units both horizontally and vertically to address the same or related issues. Fragmentation is likely to occur when new organizational structures are created to implement newly legislated policies, as illustrated by the aging network put into place by the Older Americans Act. The specific worker complaints with which fragmentation is associated are the perceived lack of resources and job ambiguity.

A fragmented services system is characterized by (*a*) the dilution of funding resources across the multiple organizational jurisdictions, resulting in minimal agency impact and expressed worker discouragement with what one is able to achieve, (*b*) confusion over which agency is to perform what functions, resulting in the lack of specificity for program structure and worker roles, and (*c*) the ongoing attempt to coordinate activities with other units in the interest of coherent client services, contributing to the worker's perceived lack of time for direct service delivery.

It is argued by some that calculated fragmentation, or the purposeful proliferation of organizational units, leads to calculated failure. For example, Estes maintains that it "results in an inability to treat any major problem coherently or holistically" and frequently does not provide organizations "jurisdiction over areas that are vital to their assigned responsibilities."[15]

There is a certain irony in the fact that, having intentionally created a parallel aging service system set apart from other service networks, the OAA legislation calls upon its organizational units to devote time and funding to the functions of pooling and coordination. It is as if the problems imposed upon older people were not enough for the OAA to address. Therefore, the OAA created an additional problem, that of fragmentation, and charged its various administrative units to give priority emphasis to it. Consequently, any inability to achieve coordination is seen as a local failure rather than as a design problem inherent in the legislation and its implementation.[16]

Yet, efforts at coordination are likely to fail, because, as Kuhn remarked, ". . . The state and area agency offices on aging have been placed without proper regard for the programs already in operation by established social agencies and denominational groups . . . ."[47] Therefore, organizational domains are likely to become even further entrenched, and competition over scarce resources is likely to be even keener. In addition, certain interest groups and middlemen benefit from the existence of a fragmented service system and will therefore support its continuation.[48] Finally, it is predictable that policies from which service systems are generated will exacerbate the fragmentation problem, given the disjointed committee structure of Congress.[49]

In fairness to those who would support a separate social service network for elders, their argument that "newly created bureaucracies will be unfettered by organizational stasis, committed to the innovations of the policy that created them, and willing to expend what power they have directly for the goals of implementation"[50] must be acknowledged. However, these advantages must be traded off against such drawbacks as the requirement of new agencies to expend significant efforts on organizational maintenance and political survival,[51] the likelihood of the availability of relatively low political resources by virtue of organizational newness, and the worker dissatisfactions that separate fragmented services may generate.

Should Policies Be Changed?

If I am correct in arguing that service worker dissatisfactions can be traced in part to dysfunctional characteristics of public policies which guide their work, then it may be useful to consider certain policy alternatives designed to provide relief to service workers. However, this suggestion must be accompanied by a certain degree of caution.

First, it must be recognized that service workers represent only one of several constituent groups, including the aging, program administrators, bureaucrats in the aging network, and politicians, whom policies affect. The impact of such policies on service workers as a group may or may not be a central concern in policy evaluation. Second, policies affect these groups differently. For example, what may seem a favorable policy characteristic for service workers may nevertheless create certain dysfunctions for service recipients or for politicians. Third, single policies may contain inherently conflicting messages based on equally valued principles.[52] While we may want to espouse both or several principles simultaneously, joint implementation of such principles may often be logically or practically impossible.

Consequently, decisions regarding the pursuit of policy alternatives should be made with the realization that constituent trade-offs are involved in the choice of maintaining or altering current policies. Such trade-offs must be explicated; then, on the basis of a more complete understanding of both manifest and latent policy outcomes, it can be decided which set of trade-offs is preferred. Decision makers may not find it in their interest to alter policies for the purpose of improving the situation of the service worker; such policy changes may generate dysfunctions for other groups about whom the decision maker has concern. Indeed, policy alternatives may not even be endorsed by the worker whose situation they are meant to improve, due to certain latent functions the alternatives might produce.

If this is the case, then one can expect worker discontents to remain a predictable part of the job and the manifestations of such discontents (e.g., absenteeism, turnover, personal and interpersonal tensions) to be characteristic of service work. Thus, it would behoove those concerned with workers' job satisfaction to explore avenues of stress reduction other than top-down policy change. Specifically, agencies could examine and alter organizational characteristics which contribute to work stress[53] and could offer workers training in personal stress reduction techniques.[54] In addition, workers themselves, given their discretionary latitude, could employ a bottom-up strategy for social change in the human services.[55] While some of the larger, policy causes of job dissatisfaction may remain built into the work itself, workers can be afforded temporary relief from stresses and renewal for the pursuit of their highly demanding work.

Conclusion

This article has employed the case of service workers in aging to illustrate the argument that worker dissatisfactions may stem from the very policies which define the performance of their work. This argument does not apply only to the field of aging, however. Insofar as legislation for social welfare in general is characterized by promises which outstrip allocations, by policy ambiguities, and by fragmentation—and there is abundant evidence for such claims[56]—the issues raised here are applicable across human services. Similarly, other human services face the same dilemmas outlined here in seeking to address the issues which trouble their workers. By utilizing the field of aging as a case in point we are able to see the contradictions that are built into service work and to go beyond issues of personality and organizational climate in under-

standing the sources of worker dissatisfactions. In doing so, we are able to transform what many view as personal troubles into public issues which are political in nature.[57]

Notes

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38. Street et al., p. 12.

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40. Lipsky.

41. Binstock and Levin, p. 519; Binstock.

42. Lipsky; Street et al.

43. Edelman, p. 80.

44. This phrase is attributed to Senator William Cohen and is quoted in U.S. House, p. 33 (see n. 5 above).

45. Estes, pp. 231-32; see also Edelman, p. 90.

46. Armour et al., p. 207.

47. Quoted in U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Aging, *Federal Responsibility to the Elderly: Executive Programs and Legislative Jurisdiction* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977).

48. Estes; Robert H. Binstock, "Interest-Group Liberalism and the Politics of Aging," *Gerontologist* 12 (1972): 265-80.

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50. Binstock and Levin, p. 521.

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Basic Problems of Applying Experiments to Social Programs

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The application of experimental designs to social programs generates nume
problems for evaluators. This paper describes some of the major problems and
they may be overcome. Suggestions include the utilization of existing social sc
research methods, institutionalization of program evaluation, and applicati
theory to social experiments.

The application of experimental designs to ongoing social prog
poses major difficulties for the evaluator. In this paper, the major
lems of application, such as problems with program goals, con
tion of adequate control groups, randomization, timing, politic
ministrators, practitioners, organization of social programs, and
will be discussed.

Problems with Program Goals and Measurem

To evaluate a social program effectively, the researcher must h
understanding of the program goals.[1] Without a comprehensive

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standing of the goals, there is little basis for knowing how successful the program actually is. If the evaluator is employing an experimental design, most likely the goals will be related to the indicators and variables used in measurement of the program. Unlike classical research, the evaluator does not formulate the hypotheses but derives them from the nature of the program and its goals.[2]

One of the difficulties confronting the evaluator is that the goals may lack clarity or be unknown.[3] Vague abstractions should be translated into concrete and measurable program goals.[4] Scriven has observed that in some instances the espoused goals are not always consistent with the program's content.[5] Goals may be not only unclear and uncertain but also difficult for program personnel to discuss.[6] Personnel may be so preoccupied with the daily operations of the program that they lose sight of the program objectives.[7]

Program goals may be implemented in numerous ways. Once they are determined, they might not be carried out in a consistent manner.[8] In laboratory experiments, what constitutes a variable is consistent, the same is not true for variables in evaluation studies. The net consequence is that the evaluator may construe variables as being manipulated and controlled when they are not.

There may be a lack of interorganizational consensus as to what the goals are or should be.[9] In organizational terms, the relative position of the person within the organization influences his or her perception of the program and its objectives. A reasonable approach to this problem would be to employ an experimental design allowing for multiple objectives. There are several ways the relative position of the program staff could serve as a basis for a clearer understanding of a program and its operations, speculations could be made as to what other personnel perceive as the goals of the program, and comparisons could be drawn.

The existence of multiple goals may pose problems for the evaluator. If multiple goals are present, a determination should be made as to the priority of each goal. If low-priority goals are utilized in an experiment at the cost of neglecting those of higher priority, such an error might prove to be a fatal flaw in the evaluation. Given the narrow scope of most experiments, it seems important that the evaluator be sure that the highest-priority goals are included in the design. Additional problems would include a temptation for the evaluator to investigate those goals that are the most accessible or convenient.[10] Furthermore, some goals may be incompatible with others.

Some experts have made useful recommendations from problems generated by the existence of multiple goals. Weiss recommends that multiple measures be employed, for she views them as superior to simple and misleading summary measures.[11] Riecken suggests that unanticipated consequences of programs be noted.[12] Specifically, he recommends exercising foresight as to what the unanticipated outcomes

might be and determining whether the consideration of such possibili-ties would enhance the program's ability to accomplish its goals

Two difficult problems that program goals pose for evaluators con-cern changes in goals over time and unrealistic goal commitment made at the program's inception.[13] Changes in program goals ca affect background and baseline data acquired in the early stages of th experimental design. In effect, they alter data to a point where it be comes uninterpretable. As goals change, so must their operational de initions since they are often the dependent variables of experimen designs Another difficulty develops if objectives are set too high, the the program, as well as any experimental manipulation within it, w be doomed to fail The experimental manipulations will always f short of the stated goals of the program

Construction of Adequate Control Groups

Another obstacle to experimental designs is difficulty in obtaini adequate control groups [14] Program personnel may resist the need control groups.[15] More important, the construction of control grou may interfere with service delivery The denial of services becaus participation in a control group runs contrary to the sympathies objectives of program personnel If the personnel are professionals, manipulation of clients may be viewed as impinging on their pro sional judgment, and cooperation may be difficult to obtain Eve personnel cooperate with the formation of control groups, probl can still occur. Personnel may not always stick to the requirement maintaining equivalent groups, and attitudes, feelings, or other s jective elements may interfere with the group's maintenance [16]

If the program depends on voluntary participation, additional c culties arise.[17] In voluntary situations it is often unclear what the c trol group is a control for because volunteers may not be represent of the larger target-group population. It is unlikely that clients wo volunteer if they knew they would be in a control group

Communication between members of the experimental group members of the control group may serve as a source of contaminati Ideally, control and experimental groups should be insulated en that they do not communicate any information about their expe ces. In field settings, the program probably takes up only a small of the client's life. When clients return to their neighborhoods, share their experiences with others who are also in the program.

If intergroup communication is likely, certain strategies may be ployed to diminish the degree of contamination. The evaluator standardize as many variables as possible in order to control them

ensures that some of the variables are equally present in all groups. The evaluator may also measure the extent to which communication among groups has occurred. The researcher may rely on multisite investigations, where time and geography serve to eliminate cross-group communication. Multiple treatments (experimental interventions) can be employed to minimize effects of intergroup communication as well as to handle difficulties stemming from the right of clients to obtain services. The intensity of the independent variable(s) can also be manipulated by attempting to educate the program personnel on the value of maintaining and constructing control groups.[19]

Problems of Randomization

Attempts to employ randomization face numerous obstacles. Randomization raises many political problems. One such problem is that large-scale programs should not be held back until randomization can take place. Furthermore, political pressures may be just as great if programs are later found to be ineffective. Second, there is the belief that deprivation for purposes of experimental control is a political act. To counter this argument, the evaluator may assure that randomization affords a fair chance for all clients. This system of allocation of services seems attractive compared to the political and subjective way these decisions are made in some programs. It is important to note that program services run under demand, and thus some deprivation of services is characteristic of many programs. When some clients do not receive services for lack of resources, randomization may be easier to execute because the research design is not a denial of services.

The randomization of clients into control groups usually implies that they will be deprived of a service in the form of the experimental variable. This is not always the case. The experimental variable could be only a small part of the services they receive. The control subjects may still be receiving supplementary or alternative services from their program. It is also possible to hold back temporarily the treatment until measurements can be made.[20]

Problems with the Timing of Experiments

The timing of the experiment raises some important methodological problems.[21] The nature of the program being evaluated should dictate the best time to measure. Evaluators are sometimes commissioned to set

up experimental designs after programs are well under way. This creates some major obstacles because variables cannot be freely manipulated and baseline conditions are more difficult to establish. Some experts believe good evaluation cannot be undertaken after program are under way or completed.[22] A preferred experimental design is one in which the assumption is built into the program from its inception that manipulation and measurement are facilitated by familiarity with the program along with participation in the decision-making process. Rivlin cautions that such involvement may lead to greater problem with subjectivity.[24] However, the consensus is that the benefits of earl design and application of experiments to programs outweigh possib disadvantages.

Evaluation research is often an important tool in the decision making process for improving social programs. This presents a timin problem for the experiment because the results must be available whe decisions are being made.[25] The evaluator may be caught in a situatio where quick results are demanded. Ideally, the experiment should allowed to proceed for the time period designated in the design, b this is often not the case. The pressure to produce quick results impl that timing may be a critical concern.[26]

Political Problems

The notion that evaluation research is both a political act and an influenced by political factors has been discussed by various autho One problem is that large-scale social programs should not be h back until a design can be implemented.[28] The assumption that exp mental design has a major effect of slowing down program implem tation may not always be the case. Unquestionably, there are so situations where systematic implementation of experimental de has little or no bearing on how fast a program is implemented.

Thompson calls our attention to the serious problem created wh tested program is thought to produce great benefit, but also incre political pressure as communities strive for selection.[29] By the s token, finding willing communities can be difficult if program thought to be inferior. Randomization is one way to help negate t political implications by making the decision one of chance, not o political influence.

It is clear that the evaluator must be aware of the political aspe evaluation research. Riecken and Boruch suggest a consideratio relative informational needs, the chance of influencing program importance of investing in experiments, resource limitations, co delaying the program intervention, and other political cons

tions.[30] If possible, the researcher and sponsors of an experiment should define evaluation as an apolitical process and persuade others that it is such.

Problems with Administrators and Practitioners

The ability to work with program personnel is crucial for a successful evaluation. The problems confronted by the evaluator vary little from those encountered by any organizational researcher. The ability to relate to program personnel may be as important as proper design. Failure to successfully relate to personnel can create tremendous pressure for the evaluator. If that pressure is great enough, the evaluation should not be undertaken.

The relationship between the practitioner and evaluator can be a source of difficulty.[31] The researcher must establish a role within the program that allows him not only to remain in the program but also to motivate practitioners and clients in a cooperative spirit.[32]

Evaluators and program personnel share certain characteristics, but they also have differences that influence the execution of the experimental design. One major difference is orientation.[33] Program personnel are action oriented in their perspective in that they develop methods and a philosophic base for problem solution. The evaluator has an orientation toward the development and testing of theory. Frequently, the charge has been made that evaluations done by program personnel lack any substance or theoretical base, while evaluations done by academics lack relevance to social problems. The long-range solution to this problem of differing orientations is to change the way we train academic evaluators and program personnel. Academics should learn more about application of social action programs, and program personnel should learn about the scientific mode of thought.

The values of researchers and program personnel can also prove to be a source of difficulty. There are several dimensions where values come into play. Program personnel are usually highly committed to their program goals and activities long before the evaluation is introduced or the results are tabulated or compiled.[34] Research neutrality is problematic for program personnel because they believe that a strong commitment to their program is important.[35] Commitment to their program is not by accident, personnel not only have a vested interest in the program and its operation but also utilize such feelings to deliver services.[36]

The style of work between evaluators and practitioners differs. Researchers usually come from academic settings, whereas practitioners come from an on-the-job setting. The level of training varies between

*the two: evaluators have a greater understanding of research methods and practitioners are better educated in program implementation. Finally, the contractual commitments of both groups may differ. Evalua*tors are contracted to perform systematic evaluations, whereas practitioners provide services and demonstrate program effectiveness.

The performance of the practitioner is evaluated in part by how well the program's objectives are being met. The performance of the evaluator is determined by the measure of effectiveness and impact of a social program. Caro distinguishes the roles by stating "Implicit in the evaluator role are attempts to discover inefficiency and to encourage change. Administrators, however, usually prefer to conceal inefficiencies for which they may be held responsible and resist disruptive change." Thus the performance of these two differing roles may lead to conflict of interest.

The career patterns of evaluators and program personnel diverge. Some program managers have career trajectories that depend on the success and size of their programs. If they suspect their programs are unsuccessful, it is unlikely they will want to have their programs evaluated.[38] Present-day bureaucratic structures tend to reward "successful" programs and program personnel rather than "realistic" ones. The social program for the practitioner may be an end in itself, whereas the evaluator may perceive the program as a career stepping stone. The practitioner must live with the results of the evaluation, but the evaluator in most instances moves on to another program.

The role of the evaluator may be ambiguous to program personnel. Thompson links imperfect role definitions of evaluators to much of the conflict between evaluators and program personnel.[40] Many practitioners have only vague notions as to the role of the evaluator, let alone what experimental design involves.[41] The implication is that there are considerable misconceptions operating when the evaluator attempts to perform his role.

The role of the evaluator may be threatening to the social structure of the program for any number of reasons. In some instances effectiveness of the practitioners is involved. In situations where the program treatment is inseparable from the person administering it, the execution of the design becomes more difficult.[42] Furthermore, cooperation may be difficult to obtain.[43] The fact that evaluation always involves a judgment of worth implies that it will always be threatening.[44]

Some experts contend that, when practitioners know their program is weak, they tend to be threatened by evaluation, particularly when much has been promised or claimed. An additional threatening element is that evaluation is usually linked to top administrators or programmers; thus the practitioner perceives himself as being under scrutiny of the evaluator.[45]

A recommendation for diminishing the degree of threat present is to change career trajectories of program personnel. Personnel shoul

be promoted or demoted on the basis of the success of their programs. Specifically, Campbell suggests that program managers should be rewarded less for the size and effectiveness of their programs and more for the quality of the procedures they employ for evaluation.[46] It should also be stressed that evaluation is often not concerned with the role performance of practitioners but rather with the impact of the total program. There are additional ways to diminish the degree of threat.[47] Participant observers have been confronted with this and other relevant problems for years and have developed several interesting approaches. For example, Scott recommends that researchers temper their roles with friendliness and tact.[48]

Problems Stemming from the Social Organization of Social Programs

Problems of applying experiments to programs may stem from the organizational structure of the program. Where there is little staff continuity, the evaluator finds it more difficult to execute the design.[49] Staff turnover means the design must be explained to incoming personnel, and cooperation must be secured again. These discontinuities increase the chance that confounding variables may take effect. For example, program implementation varies with the perspective of each new staff member.

The competence of the program to collect and record data may serve as a problem area.[50] Organizational structure and mechanisms for record collection may be problematic. The information gathered by practitioners tends to be for program control rather than research purposes.[51] If records are not adequately kept, the evaluator may be forced to rely on faulty and incomplete data. This is a source of concern for experimental designs when establishing baselines and taking measurements during the execution of the experiment. Inadequate record keeping over time yields a ledger that can produce severe methodological consequences.[52]

The application of experimental procedures may be perceived as interfering with the routine operations of the program and serve as a source of friction between the evaluator and the staff. The selection and formation of experimental and control groups is seen as an imposition because it interferes with the routine delivery of services. The practitioners cannot directly respond to client needs as they arise, but must adhere to an imposed experimental design. Collection of data may also be perceived as an imposition.[53] Weiss observes that, where there are conflicts between the demands of experiments and the needs of programs or clients, the priority usually goes to the program.[54] She sug-

subjects.[63] Experimental designs are often add-ons to ongoing programs, and manipulation would have occurred with or without the experiment. Change is somewhat arbitrary in social action programs. This change is characterized by some as haphazard experimentation with people.[64] Frequent and arbitrary changes in programs are meant to be beneficial, yet we change programs with little or no evidence as to their possible outcomes.[65] Gilbert et al. make a comparison between "fooling around with people," which is the way we run social programs, and "experimenting with people," which is when our changes have scientific design and value.[66] Compared to arbitrary, meaningless change, controlled experimental change appears to be more ethically attractive.

Some Closing Suggestions

It seems clear that sound application of experiments to social programs is a difficult, but not impossible, undertaking. The position of this paper has been that experiments may become more difficult to execute using these new standards, but their net benefits outweigh most costs. Advances in experimental technology will result in decreasing the difficulties faced by the evaluator. On this note, three general recommendations may be added to those mentioned earlier.

One way to facilitate experimentation is to develop research techniques that are applicable to evaluational research. The utilization of existing social science research methods is critical. Many of the problems confronted by evaluation researchers are no different from those of nonevaluative researchers. Specifically, the problems of field experimentation are similar to those of program experimentation. Nonevaluative researchers have overcome some of these difficulties; there is no reason the evaluative researcher cannot do the same.

A long-range strategy is the institutionalization of evaluation and experimental procedures in social programs.[67] The institutionalization of these procedures would diminish some of the difficulties. Design and application of experiments would be facilitated because both would be built into programs. More specifically, social programs should be conceptualized with experimental design in mind. From a program's inception, decisions facilitating the application of the experimental design could be made.[68] Other facets of institutionalization would include the establishment of the evaluator role within social programs.

As was pointed out earlier, there is a tremendous need to develop and utilize theory in evaluation research. Theory is central to the proper execution of experimental design. Thus, as a long-range recommenda-

tion, increased reliance on and development of theory are essential if our experiments are to generate meaningful results. Eventually, the theoretical efforts of evaluators will facilitate construction and application of experimental designs to social programs.

Notes

I want to thank Cassandra Geneson and Professors Russell Endo and Robert M. Hunter for their contributions to this article.

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Social Change in Perception of Work Relations

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The effects of year, age, and education on perceptions of vertical and horizon
relationships are explored through a sample of 1,128 respondents randomly select
from two larger representative national samples. Data are based on a thematic app
ceptive procedure in which projective stories are coded for perceptions of stat
differences. A significant increase in perception of status differences in work settin
from 1957 to 1976, and a corresponding decrease in perception of horizontal relatio
ships are revealed. Implications for social change in co-worker relations, and the ne
for professional practitioners in industry are recognized.

Affiliation with peers in the work setting is an important factor in j
satisfaction; most people prefer to work at jobs which offer opportu
ties for informal socializing, and are more likely to quit jobs t
prevent the development of congenial peer relations. In addition, wh
employers organize workers into supportive work groups and mi
mize status differences, attitudes toward the job and overall mor
improve.[1] Alienation is rare in nonhierarchical work groups. O
study of factory workers revealed that 65 percent of those integra
into work groups were pleased with their working conditions in c
trast to 28 percent of those who were isolated.[2] Several studies h
reported that burnout declined when individuals participated in so
support systems at work.[3]

Over the past twenty years, a number of historical changes, incl
ing transformations in sex roles and increases in geographic mobili
achievement, and technology, have altered people's perceptions of w

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and their associations with co-workers. Some assert that these changes have led to a decline in sociability and an increase in feelings of alienation at work.[4] According to these theorists, the need for peership varies with the social emphasis or de-emphasis on values of achievement, individualism, and universalism, with peer group formation least likely where these values are strongest.[5] This view is consistent with recent findings that people have become more individualistic and concerned about power, that women and college-educated men have higher needs for achievement, while men's motives for affiliation have declined, and that working Americans have lost their "team spirit" and commitment to the group.[6] In two national surveys of worker attitudes in 1969 and 1973, 80–90 percent of the workers reported that they were satisfied with their jobs, but the percentage who reported feeling "very satisfied" declined in 1973. In addition, although subjects in 1973 expressed some degree of satisfaction with their relations with co-workers, the percentage that was satisfied was lower than that in 1969.[7] Concomitantly, alienation and feelings of powerlessness prevail as workers feel isolated and incapable of influencing general policy collectively.

In contrast, others assert that these historical changes, specifically trends toward occupational specialization, technological advancement, and sophisticated work settings, decrease alienation and feelings of powerlessness and enhance peer interaction on the job.[8] There are many opportunities for contacts and affiliation with other workers in these situations. These investigators believe that the new technology provides a synthesis which mitigates differences and strengthens overlaps and integrative functions among workers, so that peerships are strengthened rather than weakened.

These contradictory conclusions may be explained, in part, by researchers' failure to employ representative national samples and by their lack of adequate controls for historical effects.

The present study seeks to determine whether Americans' perceptions of same-status or horizontal peerships and hierarchical different-status associations have changed from 1957 to 1976 and to assess whether any such changes have strengthened or weakened peer relations in the work setting. Such information is essential to practitioners interested in understanding and improving social and psychological aspects of the workplace. Unlike most surveys of attitudes and personality, the focus of this investigation is on respondents' subjective perceptions, rather than on self-report data. A thematic apperceptive procedure, modeled after the Thematic Apperceptive Test—which is a particularly useful tool to measure feelings, motives, and conflicts underlying human behavior—is employed.[9]

Since verbal fluency is often a confounding factor in research using thematic apperception procedures, education is included as a control (education and the number of words used in a thematic apperception

story are significantly correlated) Age is also used as a control variable because social change rarely affects all age groups equally [10]

Method

Subjects.—This investigation is based on a sample of 1,128 respondents randomly selected from two larger representative national samples of American men and women. These larger samples are from a 1957 study and from a replication of that study in 1976 [11] Approximately two-thirds of the respondents in these investigations were given a thematic apperceptive procedure in addition to a questionnaire; the present sample is drawn from that group. The sample accurately represents a cross section of persons twenty-one years of age or older living in private households in the United States. Reflecting demographic changes during the period, the sample set of 1976 contains a larger proportion of young, elderly, working women, retired, and college-educated respondents than the 1957 sample.

Procedure.—Trained interviewers from the University of Michigan Survey Research Center conducted ninety-minute structured interviews based on questionnaires, which ranged in content from demographic data to marital and work problems, and a thematic apperceptive procedure. Interviewers in both 1957 and 1976 showed the same thematic apperceptive pictures to respondents, one at a time, and asked four basic questions: (1) Who are these people and what are they doing? (2) What has led up to this, what went on before? (3) What do they want and how do they feel? and (4) What will happen, and how will it end?

A total of eleven thematic apperceptive pictures were shown—five to women only, five to men only, and one to respondents of both sexes. Five of these pictures, selected for their ability to elicit status-perception responses, are used for analyses in this investigation. The two pictures shown to women are quite different: picture F.1 depicts two women working in a laboratory, while picture F.3 consists of four modestly dressed women, with one standing and three facing each other. The three pictures shown to men, which are analyzed, are picture M.1, showing two men working; picture M.2, showing four men seated at a table with coffee cups; and picture M.5, depicting seven men gathered around a table. There are, thus, three group pictures (F.3, M.2, and M.5), and two nongroup pictures (F.1 and M.1) analyzed in this investigation.

The total coding system, or dictionary, comprised of over 1,500 variables, is based on the collaboration of professors and graduate students of psychology, and of social work and psychology. Coders who were

blind to the research questions of this investigation were hired by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center and trained by expert coders. Each coder was assigned to one picture and was supervised by one expert coder, who coded ten randomly selected responses of every 100 responses coded by the novice. Coding reliabilities are computed by estimating the percentage of agreement between novice and expert across all variables for each card and picture; these coding reliabilities average in the 90 percent range. Since coders were aware of the year of interview for the stories being coded, 100 randomly selected stories were recoded by coders who were blind to this variable; analysis of these stories reveals no biasing effect.

Response Variable—Status Perception

The status norm is a differential attribute which generally accrues to a person on the basis of characteristics the person possesses which are valued in society. All social settings present a wide range of potential status criteria, such as sex, age, or income. In this investigation, "status" is operationally defined somewhat more specifically as the relative role position or power rank existing formally between two or more mentioned characters. A relationship between two characters is considered vertical or a different status relationship if at least one of the characters has an occupational or formal authority standing such as "boss," which gives that character power over the other; the result is an asymmetrical and unequal relationship with respect to power.

A horizontal relationship, or peership, is coded according to these basic status definitions, where there is an explicit reference to characters occupying similar roles, such as co-workers. The same-status or peer category is broader than the different-status category in that it includes references to informal roles, such as buddies or companions that are not necessarily connected to occupational positions; such responses are primarily confined to the group pictures.

Where respondents make no references to status differences or peership, the response is coded no mention.

Analysis is limited to the first two levels of this variable; approximately one-third of the total sample who did not mention status differences or peership are excluded from consideration.

Construct Validation of Status Perception

A primary criticism leveled at thematic apperceptive research is its frequent failure to acquire evidence validating proposed measures. A construct validation analysis is employed here to assess the adequacy of the status-perception measure. Its purpose is to examine whether the apperceptive responses tend to measure what they are designed to measure, the salience of the expressed themes, or the respondents' concern with them. This procedure c[illegible] assume that the apperceptive data reflect

Table 1

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTION OF STATUS DIFFERENCES (AS PEERS) AND YEAR AND EDUCATION BY PICTURE AND SEX

	PICTURE											
	Female				Male							
	F 1	(N)	F 3	(N)	M 1	(N)	M 5	(N)	M 2	(N)
Variable year										
1957 (%)	46	(294)	11	(250)	20	(196)	15	(172)	12	(198)
1976 (%)	57	(353)	15	(225)	30	(177)	18	(170)	12	(165)
χ^2	8.71				8.66					
P	< .0032		N.S.		< .0032		N.S.		N.S.	
Education										
Grade school (%)	58	(134)	17	(93)	21	(81)	14	(78)	15	(85)
High school (%)	47	(350)	10	(260)	25	(166)	13	(156)	13	(164)
College (%)	58	(157)	15	(116)	30	(121)	22	(108)	7	(113)
χ^2	7.61									
P	< .02		N.S.		N.S.		N.S.		N.S.	

NOTE.—Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of respondents who perceived status differences.

ic power and status, rather than affiliation and peership as in 1957. The pattern of these changes during the period is not known; on the basis of this data, the transition may have been gradual, cyclical, or irregular. *The change is statistically significant only in* responses to depictions of work settings, but consistent trends are found in all but one of the other pictures. It appears that the greatest change has occurred in the work arena and that the particularistic and expressive elements of group-affiliation settings remain more intractable to historical influences. These findings corroborate assertions made by researchers who argue that social changes over the past two decades have led to a decline in peer sociability and in collective orientations at work. The social changes cited earlier include increasing societal emphasis on values associated with achievement and universalistic criteria, an increase in technological complexity and occupational specialization, and growing concern with status inequities.

The greater importance of achievement in 1976 contributes to this decline in the salience of horizontal relations according to Hess. When needs for achievement and status are high, people become increasingly concerned with their standing relative to others, and attention becomes focused on the ways in which they are different; social comparison prevails. As a result, competitiveness and narcissistic pursuits emerge at the expense of cooperation and collective endeavors. Emphasis on achievement and universalistic standards also implies the existence of performance criteria against which comparisons are made, and the existence of experts and authorities who perform evaluative functions. While there may be less status inequality with respect to age or other ascriptive factors, status differences arise from both differentials in individuals' achievements and the social mechanisms designed to evaluate performance.

The trend toward occupational specialization in the society is concurrent with and related to this emphasis on values of achievement and individualism. A group of workers under the supervision of an authority are rarely all involved in the same activity; rather, co-workers of roughly the same status are more often engaged in highly specialized and different activities. This greater differentiation of tasks is tied to an increasingly complex organizational hierarchy and the development of increasingly detailed shades or levels of status within which values of achievement are acted out. In the work arena, this has resulted in a decline in the number of accessible, same-status co-workers, and in greater confusion as to who is, or is not, a peer.

A third, related historical development is based on the *decline in* importance of ascriptive criteria as achievement and performance criteria increase in significance. Movements dedicated to racial and sexual equality of opportunity over the past two decades have focused attention on issues of power, influence, and the appropriateness of status

distinctions, and the emphasis on equality with respect to ascripti factors has led to increased sensitivity toward, and awareness of, stat inequalities.

In light of the results of the validity analysis, the increase in perce tions of vertical relationships also indicates that people feel more pow erless than in the past, particularly in the work arena. The relationsh between status references and direct expressions of powerlessness highly significant. In addition, perceptions of different status are sign icantly related to reports of social isolation among women and frien ship deprivation among men. A dialectic or tension arising from tl incompatibility between concerns about status, power, and achiev ment and sociability is apparent; the historical trends have entaile social costs for both men and women. It is not clear, however, wheth failure in interactions which are affiliative leads to an orientatio toward status differences and concomitant concerns about work or vi versa.

Implications

The results reported in this study have important implications fo social workers and other professionals committed to improving cond tions in the work place.

First, given the association between participation in supportive wo groups and job morale, we can expect to find an increase in work alienation and a decline in job satisfaction as workers spend less tim informally socializing both inside and outside of the work setting. T recent attention to burnout and tedium may reflect these historic changes at work. Specifically, in settings where workers must focus o feelings of power and powerlessness, status, and achievement, repor from workers that they wish they had more friends and that they rar visit with friends and family will be greater. On the other hand, whe the formation and maintenance of co-worker bonds are inhibited, fee ings of alienation and powerlessness, and concerns about status an achievement will prevail. To deter a decline in job morale and produ tivity, employers should remain sensitive to this incongruency or te sion between influencing and affiliating with others.

Second, a potentially vulnerable group has been indentified. Unt recently, focus has centered on the nonworking—the roleless. The da from this study serve as a reminder that those who occupy roles are al susceptible to deprivations and, accordingly, deserve attention. T growing recognition of occupational stress may reflect a step in th direction.

Third, the results from this research confirm the need for soci workers in industry: practitioners who are knowledgeable about wo and about the needs and problems of workers; who consult and provi assistance to employers by identifying potential stressors; and who c

intervene skillfully and organize informal supportive work groups when necessary.

Finally, these findings are highly speculative and causal relationships cannot be determined from this data. It is hoped that this research will stimulate further national studies of relationships among co-workers, as well as investigations of how these associations and their concomitant concerns change over time.

Notes

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Youth Policy and Young Women, 1870–1972

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The forces shaping the evolution of social services for delinquent and pregnant young women have affected institutions serving a variety of urban residents. This article chronicles the history of responses to wayward youth, focusing on fundamental changes in the structure of funding for social welfare (particularly the impact of the federated charities movement), the division of labor between the public and private sectors, the role that professionalization has played in the definition of deviance, identification of appropriate client populations, strategies for rehabilitation, and assumptions about the future opportunities of youth upon release from institutions.

Johnny Carson recently commented that he could tell that the new academic year was about to commence because the maternity boutiques in Beverly Hills were having their "Back to School Sales." This remark nicely captured a profound, if still theoretical, transformation in the way Americans have responded to pregnant adolescents, for it was not until the late 1960s that they were permitted to attend school. Those young women who were exposed to any instruction at all ordinarily received it at home or in maternity home classes. Even as late as the 1960s, the only significant alternatives were the isolated, segregated "schools for girls with special needs," which many communities established after 1964 to contain the young women's contaminating effect on other adolescents. A history of the training and education of this population, therefore, must consider private-sector policies and institutions.

The forces which shaped such programs, at least since the mid-nineteenth century, also substantially affected the development of

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agencies that cared for the indigent, unemployed, sick, emotionally disturbed, and troubled youth in general. Despite the focus of this article on the history of private-sector institutions, it is also crucial to understand the relationship between public policies at all levels and the development of private agencies. An examination, therefore, of the division of labor between private and public programs and an assessment of the impact that private decisions has had on the evolution of public educational and social services are also important.

Unlike the history of interest in young men, policies directed specifically toward young women have focused principally on the issue of sexual misconduct. Male deviance has been viewed as significantly more acceptable than female deviance. Misbehavior on the part of boys has ordinarily been seen as nonsexual and even normative. Virtually all males go through and eventually grow out of such a phase, with few permanent serious consequences, either to the child or to society. In contrast, female delinquency, because of its sexual nature, has been seen as behavior that is dangerous and potentially contaminating, with enormous long-term consequences.[1] One analyst of the nature of female delinquency perceptively observed that "a boy may be grossly immoral and his immorality does not always find him out and follow him; it is not so easy for the girl who has been immoral to be helped back to a normal place in society."[2] Within the deviant female population itself, a further historical distinction has been made between "redeemable" young women—courageous but unlucky girls guilty of perhaps a single mistake, or possibly the victims of predatory men (the "fallen woman" concept), and "unredeemable" women—hardened recidivists, older adolescents, or even prostitutes. This distinction, which has been expressed in different ways at different times, has had a significant impact on the organization of social and educational services for the group as a whole.

It is obvious that pregnant and delinquent adolescents comprise two distinct populations, each with its own character and needs. This study will suppress the distinctions between them because until recently most individuals and institutions serving the two groups treated them similarly. Agencies established to care for wayward girls, for example, often accepted pregnant women as well, and institutions founded to provide maternity services often evolved programs for delinquent, nonpregnant youth. This lack of discrimination resulted from the commonly shared assumption that female delinquency was sexual delinquency.

Leaders in the movement to organize programs for wayward and pregnant young women also failed further to distinguish between delinquent and dependent adolescents. This omission is far more disturbing because it caused them to treat children guilty of crimes and children who were abused, neglected, and victimized in the same manner

Juvenile and family courts routinely placed both groups in the same institutions, and on those occasions when they suggested that delinquents and dependents be treated differently, they were commonly unable to persuade the receiving institutions to carry out their requests. Courts depended on the willingness of private agencies to accept and subsidize public wards. Few judges or other civic authorities attempted to intervene in the treatment provided in such institutions. They realized that whatever services were offered, they were uniformly superior to those provided by the state reformatories and industrial schools. They did not wish, therefore, to jeopardize the care that private institutions were willing to offer court-placed youth.

The following remarks on the history of the education and training of pregnant and wayward young women are based on an examination of the evolution of a broad range of social and educational services established to serve adolescents since the late nineteenth century. It is crucial to emphasize that the social, organizational, and economic forces that shaped the institutions for young women affected the development of perhaps three out of four youth-serving agencies. And because public schools were unwilling to admit pregnant and delinquent girls until very recently, it is vital to examine the efforts of educational authorities to provide training programs in the private agencies for client groups considered too degraded or demoralized to participate in regular classrooms. The history of social service and educational programs for pregnant and wayward young women can be conveniently divided into three principal periods, each with its own distinctive mode of funding, conceptualization of the problems of unwed parenthood and delinquency, definition of prospective clientele, and strategies for prevention and remediation.

Evangelism and the Maternal Bond, 1870–1930

The first period extends in the Midwest from the early 1870s through the 1920s and was characterized by the establishment of evangelical residential homes and intermediate care facilities. In contrast to the rural location of public reformatories, state industrial schools, and asylums for adolescents during the nineteenth century, private-sector agencies were ordinarily established in large urban centers as refuges and shelters for fallen women and prostitutes. Purity crusaders, city mission reformers, and organized women's groups initially founded these institutions to serve women who were voluntarily attempting to reform themselves, or who were disowned by their families or abused by their husbands for alleged misconduct, as well as those who were committed by local police courts.[3]

Reformers during the nineteenth century felt that the problems of unmarried motherhood and sexual delinquency were increasing rapidly because traditional social controls governing the behavior of adolescents were visibly deteriorating, particularly in the urban environment. This process left young women vulnerable to unscrupulous men who took advantage of them and then abandoned them, thereby diminishing their marketability as prospective wives. The city attracted thousands of young women with employment opportunities in factories, restaurants, and private homes, but provided relatively few wholesome and adequately supervised housing facilities. It also provided access to "vicious" amusements—public theaters, parks, saloons, and dance halls, where many girls, observed more than one commentator, went "whirling down the road to ruin in two-step time."[4] The superintendent of Chicago's Erring Woman's Refuge captured the variety and condition of the home's clientele in 1880 when she observed that "the accustomed procession of fallen ones, with its familiar types, has halted at our doors. The waif, the drunkard's daughter, the pretty weak one, the child with inherited taint, the lover of fine dress and of ease,—all these, helpless and ignorant, worsted in the conflict with sin, trampled and crushed in its mire, often only the faint hope of a something better with us, they hardly know what, holding them back from suicide,—all these have come, and to these we have ministered as best we could, in body and soul."[5] The reformers established residential institutions in the cities to provide each fallen woman with a refuge—the opportunity to regain her composure, to reflect on her situation, to repent, and hopefully to reestablish her dignity, self-worth, and self-esteem by demonstrating her commitment to decency, morality, and Christianity.

The residents, at least through the end of the nineteenth century, were ordinarily young white women in their twenties. Approximately one-half of them were pregnant, except in the purest maternity homes which served almost exclusively prospective unmarried mothers. Although it is extremely difficult to determine the residents' social class because of the secretive nature of the institutions, intake records suggest that, over the nineteenth century, an increasing proportion were either immigrants or the children of foreigners. Institutions rarely accepted black women, and those that did usually limited their number to fewer than 10 percent. Of the two-thirds of the residents who indicated that they were employed, 80 percent worked in some form of domestic service, and the remainder held positions in factories or as waitresses. Most of those not employed were students.[6]

Placements in the homes were lengthy, because the process of reclamation was slow. Prior to the 1920s, the average commitment approached two years, and disposition records indicate that four- and five-year terms were not uncommon. Superintendents and trustees developed comprehensive programs of rehabilitation that were based on the expectation that, upon release from the homes, the young women

would either return to their families or be placed in honest, respectable positions, ordinarily in domestic service, especially if the residents were unmarried mothers. The institutional authorities, consequently, developed programs that would best fit the young women for domestic service, either in their own homes or in the homes of middle-class families.[7]

Specifically, the comprehensive rehabilitation programs consisted of sustained exposure to intense, evangelical religious services combined with training for motherhood, and, significantly, even motherhood itself. To continual, fiery exhortations, matrons added extensive industrial training sessions during which inmates assumed full responsibility for performing the basic maintenance operations of the institutions. Residents customarily spent seven to ten hours daily in the kitchen, laundry, nursery, or cleaning the home. Matrons maintained that it was vital to build rigorous industrial habits in the young women. They complained that many residents were unfamiliar even with the common sewing needle; the mechanical sewing machine was "as great a marvel to them as the locomotive to the Indian, their first attempt with it about as successful as his endeavor to lasso the iron monster" as it swiftly rushed by.[8] To their modest academic programs, consisting of only a few hours weekly in elementary subjects and several sessions in music, the arts, and culture, the homes added relatively complete programs in the domestic sciences, including formal instruction in sewing, laundry, cooking, child care, and household management.[9]

In addition to these industrial work and education programs, virtually all institutions strictly enforced policies against permitting their residents to put their children up for adoption. Motherhood itself, therefore, played a potent role in the women's rehabilitation. Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, reformers concerned with unmarried motherhood were convinced that nurturing the maternal bond was the most effective way of reforming the young women. One superintendent commented astutely that "the appeal to which a girl is most ready to respond is the appeal of her coming motherhood. The slogan 'You want to be your best for the sake of your baby' seldom fell 'on deaf ears.'"[10] The trustees of Chicago's Erring Woman's Refuge, for example, initially encouraged their residents to turn their babies over to the local orphan asylums and foundling homes. By the late 1870s, however, they maintained that the experience had taught them that "the practice of separating mother and child . . . is most pernicious to both. The unnatural perversion of maternal feelings caused by such separation, hardens and makes desperate an otherwise reclaimable woman."[11] Claiming striking success rates in excess of 90 percent, of which we should be highly suspicious, the staffs attributed the stability that their women had achieved in their lives to "the sacredness of maternity . . . the sense of obligation to helpless infan

ey . . . the clinging arms around the mother's neck, the lisping of the sweetest name to childhood—mama," all of which developed the best qualities in the woman's nature.[12]

Residential staff members stridently argued that this program was effective. The responsibilities and obligations associated with rearing a child, particularly for unwed mothers, customarily demanded such dedication that few women had the energy, opportunity, or inclination to repeat their earlier transgressions. Few leaders in the movement, however, acknowledged the detrimental effect that such a program—particularly the commitment to baby retention—might have had on the opportunities of the young women, especially those who were placed in domestic service, whose access to respectable contacts and useful training was completely circumscribed by the organization of work in that field.[13]

As the average age of the residents declined dramatically after the turn of the century, from twenty-two to fifteen—primarily as a result of *an increasing number of juvenile-court placements*—the homes' educational activities were expanded. For the youngest girls, formal instruction was provided for approximately four hours daily. Matrons were determined to keep older adolescents occupied after dinner with engaging instruction because "those who know what feverish pleasures once came to our inmates with the evening hours appreciate the necessity of filling them with an occupation that will erase the memory of the theater and the dance hall."[14] Boards of education often assumed responsibility for the academic and industrial programs at some of the private institutions for wayward and pregnant adolescents. Recognizing that the labor market for young women was changing, after the turn of the century public educational authorities also instituted relatively comprehensive commercial education programs offering instruction in stenography, typing, and office management. Despite the declining age of the residents and the gradual expansion of the educational programs to conform to changes in the occupational structure, nevertheless, the homes had changed very little since they had been established.[15]

Transforming the Urban Missions, 1930–65

The second phase in the history of the education and training of pregnant and wayward young women began during the 1930s with the professionalization of social welfare and educational services and extended into the 1960s with the initial intervention of the federal government. The transfer of power from the evangelical, voluntaristic

trustees and staffs to the professional welfare administrators, largely completed by the late 1940s in most cities, resulted in the complete reorientation of many youth-serving institutions, including the agencies that admitted young women.

This transfer of power occurred in part because of a major shift in the way private, urban welfare services were funded. Professionally trained social welfare leaders appropriated power over the direction of the social service industry, a process facilitated by the emergence of the large, centralized, consolidated financial campaigns directed by the imposing federated charities organizations, the predecessors of the United Way. Without going deeply into the evolution and structure of the federated charities movement, it is important to understand that the consolidated financial campaigns provided the professional, federated leaders with critical leverage over individual local agencies, especially during the Depression of the 1930s when thousands of programs were threatened with financial collapse. The federated professionals used this leverage to shape their communities' social service industry: to assess needs, reduce duplication, assign priorities for service, evaluate programs, and ultimately to intevene in virtually every phase of the operation of those agencies seeking to participate in the centralized solicitation campaigns. Within a short period of time, perhaps fifteen years, the federated leaders were able to redirect the missions, reform the organizational structures, modify the staffing policies and programmatic strategies, and change the client populations in many urban social service institutions.[16]

The federated leaders' first objective was to replace the traditional matrons and superintendents with professionally trained social workers, for they recognized that after instituting senior staff members sympathetic to modern social work concepts and practices it would be easier to shape the institutions' actual rehabilitation programs. This substitution was accomplished quickly, and the federated leaders moved on to renovate most of the other practices characteristic of the religious evangelical homes.[17]

They successfully redefined the problems associated with adolescent pregnancy and sexual precocity. They dramatically modified the rehabilitation programs by substituting modern casework, psychological counseling, extended academic instruction, and relinquishment (all of which were based on professional expectations for the young women after their release) for the traditional strategy of evangelism, industrial work, home economics, and baby retention (approaches which were based on limited expectations for the residents' futures).

Historically, residential administrators and trustees had acted on the assumption that every girl in their institutions suffered from essentially the same problem and discouraged the young women from dwelling on their individual, personal experiences. In their effort to protect the residents from heartache and melancholia stirred unnecessarily by fore-

ing them to reconstruct the events leading to their downfall, the matrons avoided inquiring into the specific circumstances surrounding each inmate's inability to deal with family stress and social disorganization in a conventional manner. Few distinctions among the residents were made, and matrons ordinarily avoided pressing for personal details beyond the point when confessions were made. They encouraged the women to forget their pasts and to face the future with the confidence that both faith and motherhood would bring.

In marked contrast, the professional approach stressed a case-by-case examination of each woman's particular experiences, the structure and character of her family, her economic circumstances, her psychological profile and intelligence level, and the specific problems that had led to her placement in the institution. Armed with these data, the staff in consultation with experts in psychiatry and mental health attempted to devise a unique therapy for each client. They substituted a medical model for the traditional moral approach. The homes were "not prisons for culprits," argued one social worker, but were "shelters and schools for the crippled." Girls were to be admitted not "because of their *sin*, but because of their *need*."[18] Rehabilitation was to be a lifelong process, undertaken with the expectation that each resident would require casework and psychological counseling on a regular basis long after her release.[19]

The social workers' efforts, which were no less evangelical than were those of their religious predecessors, were based on the assumption that motherhood and domestic service were not particularly beneficial to the residents. They were skeptical of the wisdom of placing former inmates in the service of private families. They recognized that pregnancy was perhaps the principal occupational hazard of domestic service, a belief that was eloquently reflected in the intake records of most maternity homes. They claimed that domestic service also circumscribed the opportunities of the young women and probably precluded their eventual reintegration into mainstream society, a process which depended on the women being as independent and mobile as possible, able to take advantage of employment training and extended educational opportunities. By the 1920s, they observed, employment opportunities in domestic service had declined sharply. To enhance the young women's opportunities, the social workers adamantly opposed the traditional policy of forcing mothers to keep their babies. One of the few options available to unmarried mothers with children was domestic service, and the professionals understood that it would be necessary to convince the residents to give up their babies for adoption if they were to avoid the problems inevitably associated with "the service."

The federated charity leaders consequently reversed the longstanding antiadoption policies and domestic service placements. The director of Chicago's Florence Crittenton Anchorage, who had been recently in-

staffed by the local Welfare Council, articulated the caseworkers' new conceptualization of the issue of baby retention in a policy statement released in 1951 which argued that "the baby must be given up for adoption for [the] protection of himself and [the] mother."[20] Disposition records reflect the dramatic change: whereas perhaps two babies in ten were adopted between 1890 and 1930, at least eight out of ten were being adopted by the early 1950s.[21]

Social workers believed that occupational placements should be made in businesses rather than in domestic service. Consequently, they encouraged the expansion of office training programs, provided either by local public school systems or by correspondence schools offering courses in the city.

They also believed that the young women who were not pregnant, an increasing proportion of the residential population, required access to more formal academic programs. In one fascinating case, they reversed the Chicago Home for Girls' traditional "closed" policy of refusing to allow the residents out of the institution unchaperoned and permitted a carefully selected group of mature, responsible inmates to attend several local high schools on an experimental basis. The experiment failed. Several of the girls, not surprisingly, ran away as soon as they were allowed out of the home. Far more disturbing, however, was the behavior of the local schoolteachers and administrators. First of all the residents were not permitted to participate in extracurricular activities, to be walked home from school, or to develop social contact with boys. Interestingly, these three proscriptions did not trouble the residents seriously because they were never enthusiastic about revealing their address to their classmates, for fear of losing their respectability by broadcasting their status in the community. More serious than these circumscriptions was the attitude of the Chicago teachers and principals who did not handle the experiment gracefully or sensitively. Several of the young women were harassed by administrators and subsequently ran away. The home's director was also convinced that several teachers threatened the girls with exposure in the presence of their classmates. Because of this treatment, the young women were withdrawn from the public schools and returned to the special educational program operated within the Chicago Home for Girls.[22]

In addition to modifying the educational and social service program in the institutions, the federated leaders also attempted to reshape the homes' intake policies, which in their opinion grossly underserved young minority women and adolescents with severe emotional disorders. The professional social workers pressed a variety of agencies to accept delinquent and pregnant black girls. In 1929 they cooperated with the Chicago Urban League and the Board of Education in organizing a special public school, located in the league's quarters, for unmarried, black adolescent mothers in which home economics and

child-care practices were taught. They were also committed to expanding private-sector programs for black adolescents, recognizing that pregnant and delinquent minority females were ordinarily incarcerated in the State Industrial School for Girls in Geneva, Illinois, in disproportionate numbers because there existed virtually no private-care placement alternatives for them. The Welfare Council and Community Fund forced Chicago's Florence Crittenton Anchorage, which had never accepted pregnant black adolescents, to integrate its program during the 1940s in order to continue to receive financial assistance. They later forced the merger of the Chicago Home for Girls and the Mary Bartelme organization and reoriented the consolidated institution's attention toward more seriously disturbed young women.[23] By the late 1950s, therefore, after several decades of effort on the part of social work professionals and the federated charities leaders to shape the opportunities for pregnant and wayward young women, the entire industry had been radically transformed.

Aunt Martha's Decline and the Impact of Federal Policy, 1965–72

As a result of the transformation, the residential institutions were immensely popular during the 1950s and early 1960s. Many facilities increased their capacity and intensified their health and counseling programs. While the homes were riding on the crest of this popularity, however, changes in the pattern and character of unmarried motherhood, coupled with the first significant expressions of federal interest in the problem, quickly shifted the focus of discussion away from the private residential institutions toward alternatives which policy analysts thought could better serve the needs of young women. During the third phase in the movement to care for pregnant and disturbed young women, concern over the issues of equity, opportunity, and economy directed attention toward alternatives to the cloistered, costly, and customarily segregated residential homes.

After World War II, urban black illegitimacy and unwed parenthood emerged as major social and economic problems. At the same time, young white women had less need of residential care because they were either having fewer children out of wedlock or were less willing to enter maternity homes because of increased public toleration of their condition. The residential population began to decline drastically. The press regularly commented on "Aunt Martha's Decline," the reporters' way of referring to the diminishing number of young women who were sent off to maternity homes under the guise of visiting relatives in some

distant metropolis.[24] Since the institutions had become heavily committed to adoption, white women who preferred to keep their infants spurned the homes. There did remain a need, however, for programs for minority youth. Many institutions were not particularly interested in serving blacks or seriously disturbed young women and simply closed their doors rather than integrate or attempt to adapt their programs to distressingly different emotional problems. The executive director of a desegregated Crittenton home commented candidly that many of her counterparts in the maternity industry were willing to close their facilities because they were "confronted with serving a different population and they don't want to."[25] Those homes that did admit blacks were confronted by the absence of a viable adoption market for minority babies. Adoption was a "white, middle class commodity," observed one Crittenton counselor.[26] As their predecessors had done for generations, black adolescents relied on the support of relatives and friends.

In addition, pregnancy among young women had become less of a problem, or at least one that no longer required intensive isolated rehabilitative treatment out of the public's view. Adolescent emotional maladjustment became identified as a more pressing social and health problem. Although it was often difficult, a number of residential facilities reoriented their services toward other troubled populations, especially emotionally disturbed adolescents, who brought with them public mental health and antipoverty funding. Furthermore, professional social workers and psychologists began to stress the possible damage that isolation in residential homes due simply to pregnancy could inflict on young women. Finally, the cost of total residential care had become staggering, a trend which, when coupled with declining admissions, threatened the financial viability of many institutions.

When the federal government began to explore various options for the care and education of delinquent and pregnant adolescents during the 1960s, consequently, policy analysts recommended alternatives to the costly, cloistered, segregated residential institutions. Federal support instead encouraged the effort to establish community-based, nonresidential, comprehensive-care centers which provided a broad range of health, social work, counseling, nutrition, child care, employment and educational services in a facility—particularly a public school—that could be conveniently located in inner-city neighborhoods where demand was increasing.[27] Promoters emphasized that this model of service enabled a growing number of young black women to remain in school and even graduate. A number of cities followed the lead of Washington, D.C., which established the first comprehensive care center in 1963. Access to external sources of both public and private funding enabled many school administrators to experiment with the center concept. The external funding, however, virtually guaranteed that the

young women would remain isolated in their separate programs. As is the case with many "special" students, the young women often became in effect more "valuable" to their local districts upon their separation from "normal" children. With various groups of deviant children separated in their own externally funded programs, locally derived educational tax revenues could be used to support the basic education of relatively fewer regular students.[28]

Many young women and their parents recognized with social policy and juvenile justice analysts that their separation and isolation from regular classrooms would diminish their opportunities for full social and economic integration, despite the promise and appeal of the comprehensive center model. They became enraged especially after extended schooling began to be marketed to the public not just on the basis of the opportunity costs associated primarily with dropping out (pregnancy remains the principal reason for early withdrawal from school by females), but also with separation from the fundamental classroom experience. School authorities, nevertheless, continued to enforce exclusionary policies, or at best counseled the young women to enter the separate facilities. Such practices were ordinarily defended on the basis of the demoralizing effect that the "maturity" of pregnant adolescents would inevitably have on other students who might be led to emulate the young women who exasperatingly brought snapshots of their babies to school and talked of nothing but the advantages of unmarried motherhood.[29] During the late 1960s and early 1970s a series of lawsuits successfully removed legal barriers to regular classroom attendance, gains which were theoretically codified in Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments.[30]

Despite the legislative and judicial victories, few young women have been systematically integrated into regular classrooms. Many administrators continue to maintain that by organizing elaborate social, medical, and educational services in distinct centers—programs which were relatively painless to establish with outside assistance—their communities actually provided the young women with superior opportunities. The health and social welfare professionals who initiated campaigns to persuade local school authorities to "coax" the young women into the special programs that had been established "just for them," obviously misread the mood of most communities. Virtually all educational officials preferred to transfer the young women into the schools for girls with special needs, or "family living centers," depending on the preferred local euphemism, upon the first sign of their condition. Ironically, public financial support has made it easier for local school boards and administrators to circumvent the public mandate to integrate these young women.[31]

This brief review of the establishment and evolution of institutions organized to serve pregnant and wayward adolescents illustrates a

larger effort under way to clarify several significant historical and policy-related issues. First, we can glimpse the fascinating struggle to gain control of the right to define deviance and normality, especially the distinction between acceptable and unacceptable deviance, in American society, and can explore the efforts of several different groups to shape private and public institutions on the basis of their assumptions about these matters. Second, we can examine in detail the machinery through which these groups attempted to affect the process of setting priorities for service and enforcing specific definitions of problems and deficient groups. It is crucial that we begin to understand the transfer of power from the nineteenth-century voluntaristic charity movement to the highly professionalized twentieth-century welfare industry, particularly the impact that various funding structures have had on the organization and content of social welfare and educational services. And it is also imperative that we begin to explore the aspirations of the professionalized welfare industry during the mid-twentieth century, because it was this group that confronted federal authorities when they attempted to shape local social service delivery systems during the 1960s. Third, we can begin to examine the relationship between the public and private sectors, the division of labor that has developed, the impact that private-sector decisions and priorities have had on the options of public officials, and the reciprocal influence of federal aid and mandates on the ability or inclination of private agencies to chart their own courses. We must probe the interests and efforts of professionals at various levels in government and the private institutions (social service agencies, federated organizations, and foundations) to identify and exploit new service markets, and the ways in which these efforts have affected the concepts and assumptions on which our social welfare policies have been based. Finally, we can attempt to expose contradictions within public efforts to serve specific client groups, such as the way in which various agencies funded separate comprehensive centers which have been used by local communities to resist court-ordered integration.

Notes

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ence participants and colleagues. I accept complete responsibility for the interpretation offered in this essay.

1. Although virtually all of the literature on the history of programs for wayward adolescents focuses on public-sector institutions, I have learned a great deal about the particular nature of female delinquency from the following: Steven L. Schlossman and Stephanie Wallach, "The Crime of Precocious Sexuality: Female Delinquency in the Progressive Era," *Harvard Educational Review* 48 (February 1978): 65–94; Barbara Brenzel, "Lancaster Industrial School for Girls: A Social Portrait of a Nineteenth-Century Reform School for Girls," *Feminist Studies* 3 (Fall 1975): 40–53; "Domestication as Reform: A Study of the Socialization of Wayward Girls, 1856–1905," *Harvard Educational Review* 50 (May 1980): 196–213; David J. Rothman, *Conscience and Convenience: The Asylum and Its Alternatives in Progressive America* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1980), pp. 261–89; Margaret Reeves, *Training School for Delinquent Girls* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1929); Marie Skodak, "Girls on Parole—and After," *Journal of Juvenile Research* 22 (1938): 145–61; Patrick T. Murphy, *Our Kindly Parent—the State* (New York: Viking Press, 1974); Liz Harris, "Persons in Need of Supervision," *New Yorker* 54 (August 14, 1978): 55–89; James C. Beane, "A Survey of Three Hundred Delinquent Girls," *Journal of Juvenile Research* 15 (July 1931): 198–208; Estelle B. Freedman, *Their Sisters' Keepers* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1981).

2. Martha P. Falconer, "Causes of Delinquency among Girls," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 36 (July 1910): 77–79.

3. See Carroll Smith Rosenberg, *Religion and the Rise of the City: The New York City Mission Movement* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1971), pp. 97–124; Carl Degler, *At Odds: Women and the Family in America from the Revolution to the Present* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 279–97; David J. Pivar, *Purity Crusade: Sexual Morality and Social Control, 1868–1900* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973); Mark T. Connelly, *The Response to Prostitution in the Progressive Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), pp. 3–47, 91–135; Eric Anderson, "Prostitution and Social Justice: Chicago, 1910–15," *Social Service Review* 48 (June 1974): 203–28; Frances Willard, "The White-Cross Movement in Education," *Addresses and Proceedings* (National Education Association) 29 (1890): 159–78; Paul Boyer, *Urban Masses and Moral Order in America, 1820–1920* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 191–219; Vice Commission of Chicago, *The Social Evil in Chicago* (Chicago, 1911); Clifford W. Barnes, "The Story of the Committee of Fifteen of Chicago," *Social Hygiene* 4 (1918): 145–56; "Boston Conference on Illegitimacy," *Survey* 30 (September 13, 1913): 707–08; Dorothy F. Puttee and Mary R. Colby, *The Illegitimate Child in Illinois* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937), p. 86.

4. "Chicago as Seen by Herself," *McClure's Magazine* 29 (May 1907): 67–73; see also Falconer (n. 2 above), pp. 77–79; Connelly (n. 3 above), pp. 28–67; Edith Livingston Smith, "Unmarried Mothers," *Harper's Weekly* 58 (September 6, 1913): 22–23; Elias Tobenkin, "The Immigrant Girl in Chicago," *Survey* 23 (November 6, 1909): 189–95; George Kibbe Turner, "The City of Chicago: A Study of the Great Inequalities," *McClure's Magazine* 28 (April 1907): 575–92; J. W. Dinsmore, "Vices of Childhood and Youth," *Addresses and Proceedings* (National Education Association) 38 (1899): 591–600; Edward C. Lindeman, "Youth and Leisure," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 194 (November 1937): 66; Katherine P. Hewins, "A Study of Illegitimacy," *Survey* 46 (April 23, 1921): 115–16; *Newsletter* (Church Mission of Help, Chicago) 1 (January 1936): 3, in Church Mission of Help Files, Welfare Council Records, Chicago Historical Society (hereafter cited as Welfare Council Records); Mrs. Joseph T. Bowen, "The Policeman with a Wink: His Menace to Youth as Shown in the Present Chicago Administration," *Survey* 43 (January 24, 1920): 458–59; "Florence Crittenton Anchorage," undated brochure, ca. 1890, p. 1, Florence Crittenton Anchorage Records, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, Department of Special Collections (hereafter cited as Florence Crittenton Anchorage Records).

5. Erring Woman's Refuge, *Annual Report* (1880), p. 7 (hereafter cited as EWR).

6. My understanding of the composition of the private-sector institutions is based on a comprehensive review and analysis of the intake and disposition records of a number of delinquent and maternity care facilities, including the revealing annual reports of Chicago's Erring Woman's Refuge, Florence Crittenton Anchorage, Mary Bartelme Clubs, Chicago Home for Girls, Church Mission of Help, and the Park Ridge School for Girls.

Complementing these reports, the statistics collected by the Council of Social Agencies on the area's programs for unmarried mothers were useful; see the "Minutes of the Committee on Illegitimacy," Welfare Council Records, box 207. In addition, I have attempted to locate corroborating evidence from the records of residential institutions in other cities, including Minneapolis and Boston. My data suggest that the patterns characteristic of the institutions located in Chicago are reasonably representative of the composition of homes elsewhere, at least through the World War I era. It should also be noted that this article's interpretation has been shaped by my reconstruction of trends characteristic principally of midwestern urban communities; as my research incorporates developments in the East, the periodization presented here may have to be adjusted slightly. Based on a thorough review of published national data, I am confident that any adjustment either in timing or interpretation will be inconsequential.

7. On the character of the evangelical homes, see generally Smith (n. 1 above), p. 2; Robert S. Barrett, *The Care of the Unmarried Mother* (Alexandria, Va., 1929), p. 19; Kate Waller Barrett, "The Unmarried Mother and Her Child," *National Conference of Charities and Corrections* 37 (1910): 98; Frances V. Emerson, "The Place of the Maternity Home," *Survey* 42 (August 30, 1919): 773; Otto Wilson, *Life of Dr. Kate Waller Barrett* and Kate Waller Barrett, *Some Practical Suggestions on the Conduct of a Rescue Home*, bound together and reprinted (New York: Arno Press, 1974); "Florence Crittenton Anchorage," brochure released in approximately 1951 reviewing the early Crittenton homes, Welfare Council Records, box 318; Joan Younger, "The Unwed Mother," *Ladies' Home Journal* 64 (June 1947): 102.

8. EWR, *Annual Report* (1876), p. 7.

9. Ibid. (1879), p. 9, (1880), p. 9, (1881), p. 8, (1897), p. 15; Margaret Hickey, "Unmarried Mothers ... Salvation Army Care," *Ladies' Home Journal* 66 (June 1949): 23; Brenzel (n. 1 above).

10. Emerson (n. 7 above), p. 773.

11. EWR, *Annual Report* (1877), p. 9.

12. Ibid. (1881), p. 7, (1871), p. 12, (1874), p. 9, (1876), pp. 8–9; Church Mission of Help, "Church Mission of Help" (n.d.), p. 1, in Welfare Council Records; Crittenton Anchorage, *Annual Report* (1925), pp. 6–9 (hereafter FCA, *Annual Report*); see generally the discussion in Katherine G. Aiken, "The National Florence Crittenton Mission, 1883–1925: A Case Study in Progressive Reform" (Ph.D. diss., Washington State University, 1980).

13. See, e.g., EWR, *Annual Report* (1876), p. 6, (1879), p. 7, (1881), p. 7.

14. EWR, *Annual Report* (1891), p. 8, (1883), p. 7, (1880), p. 10, (1887), p. 9.

15. For a discussion of "educational programs," see EWR, *Annual Report* (1910), pp. 8, 18, (1917), pp. 11, 14, 20, (1920), pp. 17–21; Chicago Board of Education, "Minutes" (March 26, 1926), p. 1267, (January 11, 1928), p. 702; Chicago Superintendent of Public Instruction, *Annual Report* (1916), p. 83.

16. My understanding of the federated charities movement is based on both secondary sources, including Roy Lubove's *The Professional Altruist: The Emergence of Social Work as a Career, 1880–1930* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 157–219; Judith Ann Trolander, *Settlement Houses and the Great Depression* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1975); Martha Heineman Field, "Social Casework Practice during the 'Psychiatric Deluge,'" *Social Service Review* 54 (December 1980): 482–507; and a comprehensive examination of the rich federated organization collections in Chicago, the Welfare Council Records, and the Community Fund Records (located at the Special Collections Department of the University of Illinois at Chicago Circle).

17. Family Service Section Committee, Council of Social Agencies, "Minutes" (June 9, 1940), Welfare Council Records, box 318; on the Crittenton review process, see more generally the "Subscriptions Investigating Committee Report on the Crittenton Anchorage" (1936), Family Service Section Committee, "Minutes" (November 8, 1936); the "Memos to File" prepared by Edwina Lewis of the Council, dated (November 1, 1940), (March 12, 1941), (March 18, 1941), (June 29, 1942), (July 1, 1942), and (July 17, 1942), all located in Welfare Council Records, box 318. Evidence suggests that the substitution process was completed by the early 1950s in most targeted agencies. In contrast with the significant role played by the local federated organizations in modifying the character and staffing of Chicago's Crittenton home, in other communities the chain's national

organization exerted leverage over the local operations. The vast majority of maternity homes, particularly those located in large urban areas, were not components of the chain structure and as independent agencies were more susceptible to the efforts of the federated organizations to shape the delivery system.

18. Emerson (n. 7 above), p. 772.

19. On the modernization of the institutions in general, consult Smith (n. 1 above), pp. 22–23; Committee on Problems Related to Unmarried Parenthood, Council of Social Agencies, *Handbook Describing Maternity Home Care in Chicago* (June 1940); Florence Crittenton Association, "Historical Development of Florence Crittenton Service," a brochure prepared and distributed in February 1951, several copies of which are located in the Florence Crittenton Anchorage Records; Mary Louise Allen, "What Can We Do about America's Unwed Teen-Age Mothers?" *McCall's Magazine* 91 (November 1963): 40 ff.; "Background of the Mary Bartelme Club" (1960), a pamphlet in the Community Fund Records, accession no. 72-17, box 126; Hickey (n. 9 above); Margaret Hickey, "The Crittenton Program," *Ladies' Home Journal* 75 (August 1958): 23; George E. Jones, "How Does Our Treatment of the Unmarried Mother with the Second or Third Child Differ from Our Treatment of the Unmarried Mother with Her First Child?" *Proceedings of the National Conference of Social Work* (1919), pp. 81–86.

20. Florence Crittenton Association, "Florence Crittenton Anchorage," mimeographed (February 1951); Mary Young, "Florence Crittenton Anchorage Running Record," Welfare Council (March 3, 1952); "Evaluation of Program, Florence Crittenton Anchorage" (1951), (1952), and (1953), all located in Welfare Council Records, box 318.

21. In addition to the disposition records of the agencies under review, consult Mary Young, "Florence Crittenton Anchorage Running Record" (March 3, 1952), and her "Evaluation of Program, Florence Crittenton Anchorage" (1951), (1952), and (1953), all in the Welfare Council Records, box 318.

22. Chicago Home for Girls, *Annual Report* (1938), p. 12; (1939), p. 12; (1941), p. 11; "Report to the Board of Managers" (January 18, 1915), by the executive director, included in the Mary Bartelme Records, still held by the Mary Bartelme organization. I would like to thank Executive Director Mr. Alton Broten for allowing me to review his organization's historical records. See also, Chicago Home for Girls, *Annual Report* (1911), p. 15; "Minutes of the Annual Open Meeting" (January 15, 1912) and "Minutes of the Board of Managers" (January 31, 1911), both held in the Mary Bartelme Records; Marion K. Craine, "Special Report on the Chicago Home for Girls" (June 16, 1946), Welfare Council Records, box 280.

23. Committee on Illegitimacy, Welfare Council of Chicago, "Minutes" (May 8, 1929), Welfare Council Records, box 207; Chicago Superintendent of Public Instruction, *Annual Report* (1936), p. 236; (1938), pp. 101–02; (1939), p. 304; (1940), p. 273; on the integration of the Crittenton Anchorage, see the correspondence in the Welfare Council Records, box 318, and the correspondence in the Florence Crittenton Anchorage Records, accession no. 73-35, box 6; on the Bartelme–Chicago Home for Girls merger, see the correspondence and internal reports on the matter in the Bartelme Records.

24. I am currently preparing an analysis of the evolution of services for wayward and pregnant adolescents after the entry of the federal government into the market during the 1960s. I would like to thank Suzanne Hinds, formerly of the United Way of Metropolitan Chicago, for discussing trends in programs for unmarried mothers. The following are particularly useful: "Aunt Martha's Decline," *Newsweek* 79 (March 27, 1972): 100; Martha Liebrum, "On the Decline: Homes for Unwed Mothers," *Houston Post* (August 13, 1972); *Chicago Tribune* (July 22, 1973), and dozens of similar clippings located in the Florence Crittenton Anchorage Records.

25. *Chicago Sun-Times* (November 21, 1972), sec. 2.

26. FCA *Annual Report* (1962) and (1963), passim; Linda Rockey, "Mothers without Husbands," *Chicago Tribune Midwest Magazine* (March 23, 1969).

27. On the origins and evolution of the community-based comprehensive care center movement, see Mary Holmes, Lorraine V. Klerman, and Ira W. Gabrielson, "A New Approach to Educational Services for the Pregnant Student," *Journal of School Health* 40 (April 1970): 168–72; Susan [illegible], "The Schools and the Pregnant Teenager," *Saturday Review* 50 (September 16, 1967): 80 ff.; Marion Howard, "Teen Age Parents," *Today's Education* 62 (February 197[illegible]): 39 ff.; "Pregnant School-Age Girls," *Journal of*

School Health 41 (September 1971): 361–64; "School Continues for Pregnant Teenagers," *American Education* 5 (December 1968): 5–7; Jane F. Bedger, *Teenage Pregnancy: Research Related to Clients and Services* (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1980). On developments in Chicago, see the Chicago Board of Education, "Minutes" (Chicago: Chicago Board of Education Library, July 16, 1966, November 9, 1966, October 11, 1972, August 27, 1975).

28. The following policy discussions are useful: Glenn C. Atkyns, "Trends in the Retention of Married and Pregnant Students in American Public Schools," *Sociology of Education* 41 (Winter 1968): 57–65; "The Administrator and His Problems Related to Sex," *Clearing House* 42 (February 1968): 372–75; "School Policies Waver on Teen-Age Pregnancy: School Administrator's Opinion Poll," *Nation's Schools* 83 (February 1969): 99; "Pregnant Schoolgirls and Pregnant Teachers," *American School Board Journal* 160 (March 1973): 23–31; Donald R. Warren, "Pregnant Students: Public Schools," *Phi Delta Kappan* 52 (October 1972): 111–14; Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., Richard Lincoln, and Jane Menken, eds., *Teenage Sexuality, Pregnancy, and Childbearing* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981); Theodora Ooms, ed., *Teenage Pregnancy in a Family Context: Implications for Policy* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981); Gail L. Zellman, *The Response of the Schools to Teenage Pregnancy and Parenthood* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corp., 1981); Michael W. Sedlak, "Schooling as a Response to Crime: Educational Policy and Juvenile Delinquency in Historical Perspective," in *Reactions to Crime*, ed. Dan A. Lewis (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1981), pp. 205–26; Kenneth Polk and Walter E. Schafer, *Schools and Delinquency* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972); Richard E. Johnson, *Juvenile Delinquency and Its Origins: An Integrated Theoretical Approach* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), chaps. 1–3.

29. This refusal to serve pregnant adolescents and unmarried mothers because of their "maturity" or "experience" reflects a profoundly important underlying conception—a roadblock to expanding educational opportunities for these girls—expressed with exceptional clarity by a New Jersey schoolteacher during the early 1960s: "a mother can no longer be considered a schoolchild." By the very nature of their behavior, most wayward girls and pregnant teenagers were commonly thought to have relinquished their rights to an "adolescence." Parents and civic authorities responded to these young women by attempting to pass them through to adult status as quickly as possible. Communities feared that they would contaminate their peers, much like the few bad apples that would spoil the whole bushel. Most districts that even agreed to readmit unwed mothers usually refused to allow them to participate in extracurricular activities, hold student offices, or receive awards at graduation ceremonies, lest it appear that the schools were acknowledging that these girls were just like the regular students. See Jonathan Rinehart, "Mothers without Joy," *Saturday Evening Post* 236 (March 23, 1963): 29–30 ff.

30. Zellman (n. 28 above).

31. "Pregnant Schoolgirls and Pregnant Teachers" (n. 28 above), p. 25.

Book Reviews

The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal: Penal Policy and Social Purpose. By Francis A. Allen. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981. Pp. xii+132. $15.00.

This small book, a series of essays, makes an important statement. The author, a professor of law at the University of Michigan, concentrates on the philosophy and social context of corrections policies and practices. The analysis, however, has implications for the whole of direct-service practice within social welfare. Ideas about rehabilitation as a primary goal for direct services cut across social welfare in general, as well as corrections in particular. Allen makes frequent connections between these two fields. Other connections are strikingly obvious as the analysis of the rehabilitative ideal is developed in these essays.

Allen's book is the latest in a series of analyses published since the early 1970s that have sought to isolate and identify streams of thought about the social role of psychological interventions loosely called "therapy." Some of the previous analyses are: Barbara Wooten, *Social Science and Social Pathology* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1959); Nicholas Kittrie, *The Right to Be Different* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971); W. Gaylin et al., *Doing Good: The Limits of Benevolence* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978); Peter L. Berger, "Toward a Sociological Understanding of Psychoanalysis," in *Facing Up to Modernity* (New York: Basic Books, 1977). From a number of viewpoints, these and other writers have been examining an issue which is summarized in a succinct form in Allen's work. That issue can be stated as follows: What accounts for the earlier flourishing development of ideas and practices focused on the rehabilitation of deviant sectors of the population? What accounts for the rapidly increasing disillusionment with the philosophy of rehabilitationism and the therapy practices which seem to have saturated treatment and correctional programs?

This question has immense importance for social welfare, which has been turning away from the rehabilitative philosophy and practices of an earlier period. These former approaches and programs have been replaced with a divisive revisionism. There has been extreme difficulty in achieving a new consensus within and among the helping professions as to the proper goals and procedures to be followed. A rethinking of the philosophical and social bases of these formerly respected ideas and practices is developing. This is leading to a peculiar situation in which socially minded and well-intended

professionals find themselves in the company of simpleminded, retrogressive neoconservative politicians.

Allen suggests that the rehabilitative ideal flourished in the post–Civil War reform era, continued to develop in the twentieth century, and began to fade with the dawning of the seventies. This thesis suggests that underlying the expansion of rehabilitationism is "a vibrant faith in the malleability of human beings and a workable consensus on the goals of treatment" (p. 12). Allen's development of this thesis is novel and fascinating and succeeds in throwing new light on an old issue.

Space permits only a few of his major points to be touched on in this review. He suggests that "a durable commitment to the ends and aspirations symbolized by the institutions overcame disappointments with institutional failure" (p. 19). This tolerance dwindled with the changed historical conditions of the 1970s. Allen develops the point that the institutions traditionally relied on for socialization and for directing human behavior toward social purposes "sustained massive losses of confidence and corresponding erosions of morale" (p. 19). There emerged the condition which we now find familiar, namely, "deep-seated skepticism about the capacity of traditional institutions to achieve beneficial direction to human behaviour and aspirations" (p. 20). This skepticism, disillusionment, and the ensuing attacks on the institutions can be traced to corrections, to the various therapeutic programs, and to public education. While faith in the rehabilitative ideal declined rapidly, a "new psychologism" arose and became widely disseminated, pervading education, television, drama, commercial advertising, popular music, and other popular arts. Allen suggests that this new psychologism is a different entity and is not a continuation of the tradition of rehabilitation as it was conceived in the earlier parts of the century.

This point enlightens an issue which has been troublesome in the development of the casework or social treatment sector of the rehabilitation field, namely, how to account for the overwhelming interest of students and young practitioners in the several hundred varieties of psychotherapy and social treatment while repudiating the traditional modalities of the recent past. Allen suggests that the "new psychologism" is a different entity from the ideals and expectations of the earlier forms of social therapy, that the new psychologism is characterized by "an extreme anti-intellectual orientation" (p. 26). The new psychologism reveals an American population that suffers deeply from a sense of loss of autonomy in contemporary society and from extreme dependence on the prescriptions of variously credentialed professionals; "the sense of dependency manipulated by the new psychologism reflects the reality of dependency in social, economic, and political realms" (p. 27).

In other words, the sense that modern Americans have of being overwhelmed and helpless in the face of random attack, pervasive insecurity, and bewildering complexities tends to push them to helping institutions to tide them over, give them expedient explanations, and preserve them temporarily from chaos and violence. These are different objectives than those contained in the human services of an earlier time. Such an idea opens up new areas of thought to explain, at least partially, the schisms that afflict the various schools of thought or divisions of practice in social welfare. It makes one think that the effort to salvage the best from the old and attach it to the best from the new, the self-imposed chore of the revisionists in social treatment, may be irrelevant. We may be trying to articulate two streams of thought that are not related.

Another puzzle: How does it come about that some professionals and academics unhappily find themselves in a similar boat with neoconservative politicians, criticizing the same program in the same way? Allen does not think that the motives of the revisionist in the social welfare field are the same as those of

the neoconservative politicians. He suggests that helping professionals and the academic disciplines connected to them have failed to pay attention to the political basis for and consequences of rehabilitation programs. Rehabilitative theory has tended to be "formalistic in its statements and only partially aware of the principle currents of thought and events outside of the area of its immediate concern" (p. 31). Rehabilitative theory has performed as if it were a "pure" product of social science. It has not attended to the fact that its social science face is a product of and a rationale for the beliefs and power distributions that it both serves and attempts to manipulate. This is a complex idea, basically foreign to most scholars and practitioners in the interventionist fields. There may be a greater consciousness of these matters in the field of penal rehabilitation, undergoing a thorough modern critique at the present time, producing sophisticated ideas which could be of considerable value in the present struggle of the social welfare intervention establishment. In his discussion of the classification of ideas that comprise the critique of the rehabilitative ideal, Allen indicates three general areas into which the critique falls: (1) that rehabilitationism is a threat to the political values of free societies; (2) that the rehabilitative ideal is "peculiarly vulnerable to debasement and the serving of unintended and unexpressed social ends" (p. 34); and (3) that a rehabilitative technique is lacking.

The threat to political values is thought to be produced by "incursions by the state into areas of human freedom and autonomy believed to lie outside the proper province of state action" (p. 15). In penal institutions it is reasonably clear that lines between therapy and repression tend to fade. Criticisms of this sort have also been at least implied regarding sectors of intervention in social welfare. Issues involved in "protection" of children and of aged persons come readily to mind. Here problems of the appropriate degree of state intervention in the thoughts, beliefs, feelings, attitudes, life-styles, and behaviors of citizens are usually a dilemma for programs and practitioners. The proper degree and kind of intervention, for example, in controlling the behaviors of impoverished families with multiple misfortunes and of impoverished families headed by women have also been the source of dilemmas for social programs and a source also of ethical questions about degree and kind of intervention, particularly with involuntary clients.

The tendency for innovative rehabilitative programs to rapidly lose their steam, to become ineffective, sometimes turning into programs that are rehabilitative only in rhetoric and not in fact, is the development which Allen refers to as debasement. Furthermore, Allen notes the phenomenon of program functionaries deceiving themselves into beliefs in practices which have lost the reality of their mission. He asserts that "central among the causes of debasement is the conceptual weakness of the rehabilitative ideal. Vagueness and ambiguity shroud its most basic suppositions" (p. 51).

In the institutional settings, such as prisons and large welfare organizations, the pursuit of the rehabilitative ideal competes with other interests, such as system maintenance, staff careers, and other social purposes of the programs. For example, in prisons the rehabilitative ideal competes with the punitive and deterrent purposes of corrections. It often stands a poor chance to compete against the pressures of bureaucracy and the political, social, and cultural purposes to which rehabilitative programs may be put.

Adding to the debasement of rehabilitationism is the competition among social and correctional programs for scarce resources, and the practice of seeking public support by promising savings to taxpayers—savings which rarely, if ever, appear. Yet in the course of juggling the sources of funds for programs and parts of programs, the rehabilitative practices become distorted.

Allen's review of "the proposition . . . that there is no evidence that an effective rehabilitative technique exists, that we do not know how to prevent criminal recidivism through rehabilitative effort" (p. 57) is remarkably identical to the considerations about poor outcomes within the social welfare system in direct services. Allen characterizes as "new orthodoxy" (p. 57) the "assertion that rehabilitation objectives are largely unattainable and that rehabilitative programs and research are dubious or misdirected" (p. 57). Thus for the closing decades of the twentieth century, Allen comes up against the question in corrections which is also the question in social welfare programs, namely, What happens when the traditional rehabilitative aspirations have been eliminated or weakened? To what extent are criticisms of rehabilitation also applicable to alternative policies, to revisionist policies and practices, and what additional problems may be anticipated from new policies?

In this relatively short book Allen has gone to the heart of the issues that beset social welfare in terms of what its programs ought to be doing and why they are doing what it is they do. These are questions that worry the soul of the helping professions but that ordinarily, in the press of business, remain as eternal dilemmas. Allen's analysis is of help in directing attention to the right or the most productive questions that ought to be addressed.

What is interesting about Allen's book for the general reader in social welfare is that the concentration on the correctional field makes the issues dramatic and highly pointed. The relationship between the issues exemplified in corrections and the issues in social welfare in general are unavoidable. The drama of the penal example forces the analogies with the welfare system. It is for this reason that it is hoped that this book will not be passed over by people in other fields than corrections. It could elevate and clarify the often fragmented and sometimes irrelevant discussion that goes forward around issues of what welfare programs should be, what practice should be, and what social work education curriculum should be. Allen's phrase, "the rehabilitative ideal," captures aptly the sense of the philosophy and the ideology of modern social welfare—"the welfare state." Considering the context of the vast changes in social structure occurring at present, the problem for social work and the helping disciplines, as well as the academic disciplines which are related, concerns what kinds of policies to pursue in the emerging period of time. It is realized that expectations for any kind of a "quick fix" are irrelevant. We have to assume no restoration of things as we know them. The disturbances of the present era will leave permanent traces no matter what the future brings.

In his last essay of this book Allen turns to considerations of the future of the rehabilitative ideal. He examines alternative theories of penal justice: retribution, deterrence, social defense. These theories, as well as rehabilitationism, contain potentialities for debasement and abuse. He anticipates that many theories of criminal justice will exist in tandem and in dissonance, including rehabilitationism. Allen asserts that the central justification of rehabilitationism "rests on a proposition of public morality. In dealing even with those who have seriously breached community forms of conduct, it is wrong for the state to strip all hope and opportunity for self-development from the human beings within its custody and care; it is accordingly part of the state's obligation to facilitate, where feasible, prisoners' aspirations for knowledge and growth" (p. 84).

Consideration of the possible future of rehabilitationism in criminal justice raises an issue yet to be fully explored in social welfare. "Wariness of the state and suspicion of authority in all of its various forms may be said to be the wisdom of many persons inhabiting the late twentieth century world" (p. 87). Many look for minimalist interventions of least intrusiveness. It might not be possible universally to adjust person and society. Nevertheless, social purposes

exist that could contribute to the achievement of more desirable qualities of life. The burden of Allen's conclusion is that ambiguity, changing responsiveness to complex political, economic, and cultural events, debate, and dissonance will be characteristics of the coming period, during which our society struggles toward a consensus that may be continuously out of reach. What Allen's analysis suggests is that we must proceed with complex social policy analysis. Furthermore, the rehabilitative activities of direct service are moral and are a reflection of contradictory impulses within whatever social policy is ascendant for the time.

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Child Abuse: An Interactional Event. By Alfred Kadushin and Judith A. Martin. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981. Pp. x+304. $25.00.

This book, and the research on which it is based, is intended by the authors not simply to fill a gap in the child-abuse literature, but, more important, to contribute to a reconceptualization of the entire problem itself. The missing links concern the antecedent behaviors of children and their parents' perceptions and responses to that behavior as integral components of abusive incidents. Hence, as the subtitle implies, the authors set out to establish that child abuse occurs in the context of an interaction between two parties, and that each makes a contribution to that interaction and its eventual outcome, the abusive event. The authors contend that the child's contribution to this interaction has been virtually ignored, and that this omission has distorted our understanding of the problem. Such distortions are evident in the theories, research, and practice concerned with child abuse.

The book begins with an overview of the child-abuse literature, which is followed by an exploration of their basic conceptualization of child abuse as an interactive event and an accompanying review of research relevant to the bidirectionality of parent-child relationships. The research methods employed are laid out in chapter 3. Essentially this was a two-stage study. Stage one consisted of a survey of 803 nonsexual physical abuse reports, out of a total of 1,284 reports, submitted by social workers during 1974–75 in Wisconsin. The second stage consisted of indepth interviews with sixty-six abuser respondents known to protective services in six Wisconsin counties.

Results of the record survey are presented in chapter 4. Analyses of various demographic and other data on the form are included. Two pieces of information on the standard form serve as the basis for the analysis of the children's behavior in these reported incidents. One is a checklist item inquiring about the parent "overreacting to" the child's "incessant crying," "disobedience," "hostility or provocation," and "other." The second source was obtained from workers' narrative responses to questions concerning the precipitants of the alleged abuse and the abuse incident. From the checklist item the authors report that some child behavior was mentioned in 91 percent of the cases, but was rated as "victim precipitated" by the research teams' coders in 77 percent of the cases. From the narrative material the authors constructed eleven categories of child behaviors that were immediate precursors of abuse. Verbatim reports of the descriptions of these behaviors are reported. The authors present several cross-tabulations of the types of behaviors with other variables such as age, severity of injury, and court involvement. Age is associated both with the type of behavior, the method by which an injury was inflicted, and the severity of injury. For preschool children, behavior involving food, elimination, sleep-

ing," and "crying, whining" accounts for a little over half of the most prevalent behaviors reported, for latency age, "aggressive behavior" and "lying and stealing" for two-thirds, and for the adolescents, almost half the most prevalent behaviors were rated as "aggressive behavior." Preschoolers were the most severely injured children, and consequently those behaviors most typical of them also accounted for the largest group hospitalized.

The interview data are presented in chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 focuses on details of the abuse event itself, that is, the interaction between the parent and the child, and chapter 5 examines other factors surrounding the incident that transcend the child's behavior. There were sixty-six respondents to the interviews, which were conducted by trained social workers. Eligibility criteria included the following: (1) known to protective services, (2) a recent physical nonsexual abuse of a child was indicated, (3) the identified abuser was a parent, stepparent, or adoptive parent, and (4) the identified abuser acknowledged having injured the child. These criteria alone, especially the last one, set some limitations on the representativeness of the already relatively small sample. Further, although the authors go to great pains to demonstrate the representativeness of the respondents by comparing them with the nonrespondents and with national statistics, they tend to dismiss some differences—differences even from their own record survey sample. Of particular note is the high proportion of women respondents, 68 percent as compared with the national figure they present of 45 percent and their Wisconsin sample figure of 49 percent.

Only a sketch of the actual interview schedule is given in the methodology chapter. The letters to the respondents inviting them to participate are appended. "Abuse" is not mentioned in the letters, rather, the terms used are "parent-child conflict," "a disciplinary problem with their child," and "studying what happens when parents discipline their child." The extent to which this introduction might have influenced parents to report about the abuse incidents as a part of disciplinary action is not dealt with by the authors. However, they do present some information regarding the verification of the respondents' replies through a review of sample records. In responding to the interview questions, some respondents did not always refer to the abuse incident that brought them under surveillance, but rather to some other incident in which they had physically harmed the child.

The interview data are presented under six categories, and for each there is a summary statement of interpretation given by the authors. Most of the eighty-two pages in this chapter consist of the parents' verbatim accounts. It is probably the richest source of data available on the perceptions of abusive parents from my standpoint, and therein lies the greatest contribution of the book. The six categories include the parents' perceptions of the interaction preceding the event, that which followed, the parents' interpretation, their intentions, the termination of the event, and the eventual outcome. The chapter ends with some total case reports. Major conclusions drawn by the authors are that in all cases the children engaged in some behavior aversive to the parents, that the parents employed some disciplinary measure other than physical assault before the abusive event finally occurred, and that their intention throughout was to discipline the child, to stop the aversive behavior. The parents' accounts themselves are most revealing, and in many the hurt, confusion, frustration, rage and fear fairly steam from the pages. Although the categories under which the reporting of the accounts is structured are defensible, there are two unfortunate omissions. No attempt is made to deal with the data by the age of the child. It is somehow jarring to have juxtaposed an account of a severe injury to a month-old infant for incessant crying and the punching of a twelve-year-old who had gotten drunk and was using drugs and refused to bathe, all included together as

if they illustrated the same qualitative event. Sometimes the age of the child is not even recorded. The other omission is that the ultimate consequence for the child is not always given. A beating with a belt is recorded, but not any subsequent injuries, leaving the reader to wonder if the only "abuse" was the beating.

Although the authors report the variations in parental responses both in the narratives and in their summaries, their conclusions often fail to take into account the variations among them. In many of the parents' accounts, for example, they report recalling a point at which they were out of control and simply could not stop the spanking or beating in which they had engaged themselves. However, the fact that the material is so fully presented at least leaves the readers with the option of considering whether they wish to accept the authors' conclusions or interpret the data for themselves. The data are there, and for this the authors are to be commended. Additionally, since a large proportion of the cases concern adolescents, this book should be considered a rich resource in understanding the relatively neglected area of adolescent abuse in the existing literature and research.

In chapter 6 a similar format is used in examining the parents' accounts of other experiences that might have had a bearing on the occurrence of the abuse. Again, the verbatim accounts are most revealing. Unfortunately, the authors, out of their intent to establish the importance of the child's precipitating behavior, tend to minimize these other factors, such as situational stress, citing the infrequency of such reports relative to the reporting of the child's behaviors. Here, perhaps, the conceptualization of the child abuse "event," or "interaction," can be brought into question. If all human behavior is the result of interconnected interactions, emphasizing a piece of the total interaction is at best arbitrary. Certainly, it is analytically defensible and in fact a precondition of any research in human behavior. But, the arbitrariness of the designated slice of interaction should not be forgotten, and that which has not been studied, for example, the precipitant of the children's behaviors and their perceptions of the event, should temper conclusions. Such temperance is not a hallmark of this book.

In their concluding chapter the authors offer several specific suggestions for the altering of practice in dealing with parents and with children. The most important of these seems to be an understanding of the parents' perceptions of what has gone on with them and with their children and with the agencies that have interfered in their lives. Cogently the authors argue that the dissonance between the parents' perceptions and those of the agencies and workers can lead to futility in the assumed helping process. The rich material that they present in the book can certainly serve to enhance training in improving the capacity of agencies and workers to take the role of the other or, as the authors state, "starting where the client is."

This book is likely to stir controversy. "Blaming the victim" is not only unpopular, it is forbidden. Although the authors go to great pains, over and over again, to counteract the impression that they are "blaming children," some of the limitations already cited in the presentation of material are likely to incur wrath, not understanding. Further, some of their own language at times is likely to have the same effect. For example: "Neither is totally responsible, neither is totally innocent" (p. 252). If blame is not at issue, why discuss innocence? Similarly, in discussing a recommendation that children learn to avoid abuse by "psyching out their parents," they note that "with increasing rights accorded to children, it is reasonable to expect greater responsibility of the child for the interaction in disciplinary events" (p. 276).

I hope that neither the limitations nor the language will deter readers from

pursuing the major message of the book so that it will not go unheeded. It is important, it has been neglected, and the authors have given us a rich source of data on which to build our further understanding.

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Administration in the Human Services: A Normative Systems Approach. By Paul Abels and Michael J. Murphy. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1981. Pp. xi+221. $17.95.

Administration in the Human Services is one of a growing number of basic texts that have appeared in recent years aimed at students and neophyte managers in social work and related fields. Like other books of this genre, this one attempts a broad coverage of human-services administration in which the reader is introduced in a concise but cursory fashion to a wide range of topics ranging from decision making and planning to leadership and interpersonal processes. Unlike some other introductory texts, however, this one sets forth philosophic and theoretical frameworks in an effort to differentiate human-services administration from administration in other fields, and to provide a rationale for this practice. Unfortunately, the book's distinguishing feature is also its major failing.

As the subtitle suggests, *Administration in the Human Services* rests on two major ideas. The first is that both the goals sought and the means used by managers should be in the service of values such as social justice, equality, and democracy. The purpose of administration is to realize "just outcomes" and "good consequences" for those who provide services and, above all, for those who receive them. The second idea is that organizations are best understood and managed as open social systems interacting with the environment, composed of interdependent parts and processes, and coordinated to achieve some rationally derived, explicit, widely agreed-upon goal.

As the book proceeds, these two ideas become intertwined into one belief system which may best be described as a human-relations approach to management. The author's argument, perhaps too simply put, is that good administrative practice builds effective organizations characterized by synergistic problem solving, agreed-upon goals, coherent action, and quality service. On the whole, this model of administration is consistent with the historic view of management in social work. It projects standards of administrative behavior and organizational performance that are consonant with professional values and sentiments. Unfortunately, though the book has much to tell us about what administrators should aspire to, its usefulness as a text is diminished by several failings.

The authors present the human-relations model of administration as an unvarying prescription for effective management applicable in all situations. Increasingly, however, this "one best way" approach has given way in management theory and practice to the view that, within certain ethical parameters, leadership style and organizational structure should vary in relation to the nature of the decisions to be made, the tasks to be performed, the experience and skill of employees, and the degree of environmental stability confronting the agency. This approach, broadly referred to as contingency management, requires a clear sense of values and goal priorities but stresses the selective use of a broad array of administrative strategies in order to achieve desired outcomes. Given the enormous diversity of human-service organizations in size

labor force characteristics, and technology, it seems only reasonable to assume that managers must have a wide repertoire of interventions to draw upon as they confront different situations. In their eagerness to argue a point of view, the authors neglected this recent development in the management field and thus understated the complex behaviors required of social agency administrators.

Administration in the Human Services depicts the effective organization as one in which there is agreement about goals, rational decision making, coordinated action, and mutual trust and respect. Unfortunately, in depicting organizations as they would like them to be, the authors give little systematic attention to organizations as they are. Pervasive conditions, such as goal ambiguity and goal conflict, the underutilization of available information for decision making, the pursuit of selfish interests, and the use of power to gain control over resources, are implicitly treated as pathological processes which can be rectified with human-relations management. For example, the authors bemoan the adversary quality of relations between supervisors and workers and attribute this largely to psychological and interpersonal difficulties which can be "... minimized if people treat one another with respect" (p. 193). Mutual respect is important, but it is a serious omission not to acknowledge that conflict may also be rooted in substantive disagreements over means and goals, divergent self-interests, and different priorities. Indeed, there is a growing body of literature that argues that human-service organizations are intrinsically political entities, not the organic, internally coherent systems that Abels and Murphy describe. If this is so, then negotiation and compromise may be just as central to management as building trust. The point is that the authors would have done well to address those organizational processes that are commonly found in social agencies so as to provide would-be managers with a more realistic picture of the constraints and dilemmas with which they will contend.

One final observation. At several points throughout the book, arguments or assertions critical to the authors' thesis are inadequately supported. For example, a central tenet of the normative structure is that minimizing authority differences creates a humane and healthy agency environment (p. 11). One study from 1958 is used to buttress this point, even though there is extensive literature on this subject. A textbook should provide more updated references.

Despite my sympathy with the thrust of the book, it is more relevant to the 1960s than the 1980s. There is much about the sense of purpose and hopefulness of that earlier decade that social work needs to recapture. However, an equally urgent need at this juncture is a practice technology equal to the complexity and diversity of human-service organizations.

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The Many Dimensions of Family Practice: Proceedings of the North American Symposium on Family Practice. New York: Family Service Association of America, 1980. Pp. ix+310. $11.95.

The Many Dimensions of Family Practice represents a collection of papers presented at the First North American Symposium on Family Practice in November of 1978. The Family Service Association of America sponsored the symposium in a move to draw attention to the need for conceptualizing and integrating family-practice theories. The intent of the symposium and the book is to promote and stimulate sound theory building among family practitioners

The book provides an empirical overview of the state of the family and the state of the art of family practice. The Family Service Association of America (FSAA) has the advantage of being able to draw on family practice from wide geographical and cultural bases, comprising nearly 300 family-service agencies in the United States and Canada. *The Many Dimensions of Family Practice* is a valuable source book, a barometer of the family's condition, and a guide to workable methodologies in treating the family. I hope it also marks the first step in the process of family-practice theory building by the FSAA.

As the family continues to undergo profound changes, the family practitioner is constantly challenged to rethink and evaluate the effectiveness of his theoretical framework and practice methodologies. This book provides the substance to begin this theory-building process.

Because of its diversity, it presents a challenge to the reader to gather in, organize, and cull out the salient themes in family practice. The way in which papers are interspersed among the five appropriate chapter headings is at times disruptive to continuity. I often found myself questioning how a particular paper earned its place in one chapter and not another, and some papers overlap. One should not approach a book of this type expecting tight chapter continuity. The fact that some papers seem shoehorned into chapters does not seriously detract from the impressive scope of the book.

The strength of the book for family practitioners and theorists is considerable. Chapter 2, "The Non-Nuclear Family," is exceptionally well ordered and provides one of the most thorough treatments of practice methodology to the "kaleidoscopic explosion of new family forms" (p. 31). The treatment issues faced by these families on the "social frontier" are presented clearly, pragmatically, and sensitively. Esther Wald's caveat to practitioners not to apply "irrelevant therapeutic interventions" (p. 40) to these families reflects a respect for the unique fragility of these evolving family forms. The entire chapter is deserving of study by the practitioner, especially for its thorough delineation of the forms, functions, difficulties, and phases these families experience. Ann Barry's "Research Project on Successful Single Parent Families" (p. 59) is the kind of paper from which much valuable theory building can be done. With its strong research component, this paper should serve as a model for future practice symposium papers.

The status awarded to family life education here as a viable full-fledged treatment modality (see "Family Life Education Service Delivery for Separated Family," Huffman, p. 50, "An Educational Treatment Approach: The Battered Parent-Child Relationship," Calladine, p. 138, "Involving the Parents of Children at Risk," Kochman and Games, p. 292) is a progressive step toward acknowledging the value of learning theories. Family life education has been considered until now a sort of stepchild to counseling. This attitude seems to ignore the increasingly effective outcomes and self-report of client populations hitherto considered "unreachable."

The book's focus on specific problem areas, especially in chapter 5, "The Myth of the Unreachable," increases its value as a reference for working with special populations. The papers dealing with child abuse, the deaf, the severely handicapped, the aged, homosexual parents, and holocaust survivors are foundational works that I hope will be substantiated with longitudinal research to assess the effectiveness of these approaches.

While there is no central or unifying theoretical framework of family treatment presented in the book, the study plan for a family-treatment model that emerges from the papers is a sound one that attempts to incorporate the developmental ideas of Mahler, Winnicott, and Erikson with the systems theory, and the work of Murray Bowen and Boszormeny-Nagy on intergenerational behav-

for patterns. However, as Elizabeth Jacob points out in the first paragraph of her fine paper, "*Family Treatment: A Developmental Point of View*," "The dilemma is that detailed knowledge about individual development cannot be translated directly into family terms" (p. 171). This family-treatment model is an example of the theoretical breadth demanded of practitioners if they are to acknowledge and address the complexities of family behavior and development. That we have not yet developed a common language descriptive of family functioning seems in part responsible for the theoretical Tower of Babel among practitioners.

While this work is strong in its presentation of diverse methodologies, its treatment of non-nuclear family dynamics and tasks specific at-risk populations, and its acknowledgment of family life education's effectiveness, it does, however, leave some noticeable gaps for theory builders. Two areas that were especially disappointing were the brevity of treatment of the marital relationship and its surface treatment of children. Leville's paper "*To Be or Not to Be Divorced*" (p. 12), and Weingarten's "*The Process of Remarriage*" (p. 90) constitute the book's direct discussion of the marital relationship. Leville's paper is nonetheless a refreshing stepping out from a safe, nonjudgmental therapeutic stance with couples into a direct confrontation of difficult therapeutic and ethical issues underlying marital dissolution and/or disillusion. Because the marriage is the primary relationship of the family, its care and treatment deserve considerably more attention and study from family practitioners than is offered.

In the same vein, I would have appreciated more attention given to the treatment of the child, especially when approximately one-third of all referrals to family agencies are for parent-child problems. Chapter 1, "The Child in the Context of Family Practice," is almost skeletal in its consideration of the child. The effects of marital separation and divorce on children are only now being comprehended and reflected in the rising figures on runaways, teenage pregnancies, delinquency, teenage suicide, and childhood depression. These are grim indicators of serious family deficiency. And while we as family practitioners acknowledge that all the failures of the family cannot be blamed on the family or on those of us who profess to treat families, are we, perhaps, in our fascination with the phenomenology of new family forms and treatment techniques, being blinded to our points of entry into the family-dissolution cycle?

The book also lacks any serious reference to the eroding effect of alcoholism within the family. While there is considerable discussion of abuse and family violence, the awareness of the role of alcohol in these incidents or anything to do with its treatment is missing. John Taylor's paper "Theoretical Consideration for Male Anxiety Crisis as a Cause of Episodic Family Violence," while certainly an important contribution to our understanding of cumulative-stress disorders and reactions, lacks the paragraph on assessment for alcoholism and/or chemical dependency. As family agencies move increasingly into the field of industry and employee assistance, they will have to develop a heightened awareness of this disease and its crippling effect on the family and the emotional development of its members.

The final point I want to address is the epistemological question raised by Sanford Sherman in the book's keynote paper (p. 3). Historically, family service agencies had cut their teeth on psychodynamic theory. For many years this theoretical framework provided a consistency of treatment methodology for family caseworkers. Clinicians apprenticed long and learned their craft well. When systems theory arrived on the practice scene, it challenged the epistemology of the psychodynamic explanation of human behavior (i.e., How do we know what we know?), of individual behavior, and of family behavior. The

challenge shook loose the psychodynamic hold on the explanation of human behavior. Systems theory added context, it took empiricism as its method, that is, knowledge from experience, and pragmatism as its yardstick. Sherman's notion of a hybrid eclecticism, as "preserving the heart" of each of these models and grafting them to newer insights (p. 7), is a prosaic solution, yet it avoids the basic differences of these theories because the epistemology one uses will determine what sort of conclusions and outcomes one reaches. To emphasize eclecticism seems to me to promote and encourage the very theoretical fragmentation of which the profession is so self-conscious. Sound family practice must be anchored in rigorous research. If there is a need for emphasis in *The Many Dimensions of Family Practice*, it is for prolonged, intensified research of the many creative practice methodologies presented herein.

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Social Service Politics in the United States and Britain. By Willard C. Richan. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981. Pp. viii+276. $19.95.

This book is an analysis of the ways in which social workers attempt to influence social welfare politics in the United States and Britain. It is an ambitious work that is well written and interesting. Social welfare policy analysts in both countries will find the case histories useful. Richan synthesizes an enormous amount of documentary evidence, and he presents it in a concise and brisk manner. In the six case histories he provides an understanding of the events leading up to, and, the substance and meaning of, the Social Work Act (Scotland), 1968, the Local Authority Social Services Act, 1970, the Allied Services Act, 1970, the Social Services Amendments, 1974 (Title XX), the strike of social services workers in Britain, 1978–79, and the various efforts to achieve licensing of social work in Pennsylvania, 1974–80. Richan's descriptions of the contrasting political environments of the United States and the United Kingdom are concise so that the reader easily grasps the similarities and differences of political processes in the two countries.

The flaws in the work can primarily be attributed to the exceedingly wide range of phenomena covered by the case histories and to Richan's inclination to attack the material on too many levels. That is, his analytic framework ranges all the way from the larger social, political, and economic contexts down to the interpersonal interactions of individuals. For that reason the analysis frequently touches on everything but explains considerably less. While anecdotes about well-known persons make interesting reading, the political behaviors of social workers as a body are better understood when seen in the larger sociopolitical context in which they occur. The effects of this widespread use of theoretical perspectives is evident in the concluding chapters, in which Richan attempts to generalize about social workers in politics. He puts forward a congeries of propositions about political behaviors that have been researched and written about much more substantially in political science, sociology, and social psychology.

The most outstanding of the six case studies is "The Aborted Reform: The Allied Services Act." Here Richan is at his best, integrating a rich understanding of American social welfare policy and political history. Interestingly, the discussion of the political behaviors of social workers is introduced only at the end of the chapter, and one has a keen appreciation of the sociopolitical context in which this behavior occurs. In the chapters on the British material the

social workers are pretty much at center stage all the way through. The descriptions of the politics involved in the Social Work Act (Scotland) and the Local Authority Social Services Act are almost entirely about the work of the Kilbrandon committee and the Seebohm committee. Other political actors in Parliament and the government hardly appear on the scene at all. Like the two central characters in the play *Rosenkranz and Guildenstern Are Dead*, one feels that there must be something pretty important happening offstage. Perhaps this is the result of Richan being less familiar with politics in the United Kingdom.

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Voluntary Agencies in the Welfare State. By Ralph M. Kramer. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981. Pp. xxvii+331. $21.95.

Ralph Kramer very honestly describes himself in the preface to his book as a "supporter of voluntarism strongly committed to the importance of maintaining an effective and influential nonprofit sector" (p. xxiv). Kramer will, in fact, disappoint anyone whose instinctive belief in the merits of voluntarism is not tempered by a critical examination of the distance between the belief and the reality. For his book is a major attempt to examine those beliefs to see which should be regarded as "myth." For that reason, the book is an important contribution to the debate about public and private social welfare. If for some people the book does not go far enough, it may be because there are more myths in heaven and earth than he has ever dreamed of, and also because Kramer places himself in the role of critic from the inside, which means that some premises about voluntary agencies remain unexamined.

The fate of voluntary agencies has attracted so much attention recently because the essence of their voluntariness is being called into question by the increase in the percent of their budgets coming from government funds. Traditional agencies, founded in the late nineteenth century with income from endowments, contributions, and federated funds, worry when the amount of government grant and purchase of service money exceeds 30–40 percent of their budgets. Newer agencies, many founded in response to government initiatives in the 1960s and 1970s, worry that they started life with 100 percent government funding and congratulate themselves when they manage to obtain that income from several rather than one government source. This increasing reliance on government funds challenges the meaning of voluntarism. Since the early nineteenth century, voluntarism when applied to welfare agencies has meant the establishment of agencies free from government control—not, as some might think, agencies dependent on voluntary labor. The separation from government is not, except in the most doctrinaire circles, an end in itself, but is supposed to guarantee the existence of certain virtues which improve the services delivered by voluntary agencies. Kramer includes among these virtues the ability of the voluntary agencies to be pioneers or innovators, their ability to rouse the public to perform voluntary and collective acts of helping, their capacity for monitoring and improving government services and acting as advocates for their clients, and their potential for providing services in a way and of a kind that public agencies cannot provide. He addresses the question of whether these virtues do in fact exist by examining the merits and demerits of different relationships between the voluntary sector and the government sector in the United States, the Netherlands, Israel, and England.

Government funding is perceived to be a threat because it is accompanied by regulations and directives that limit the autonomy of voluntary agencies, thereby preventing them from doing what is needed. The assumption is always that the intent of the regulations and directives is generally in the direction of what is not needed. Reliance on government also inhibits the voluntary agencies from taking their paymasters, the public agencies, to task when the public agencies do their job inadequately. Kramer concludes, as any forthright accountant in a voluntary agency will attest, that whereas the amount of paperwork government requires is burdensome, the fuss about government control is much ado about nothing.

In the Netherlands, where private agencies organized along denominational lines have primary responsibility for the provision of services and where these same agencies receive 80–90 percent of their staff costs from government sources, the voluntary agencies retain their autonomy. They are protected by the confessional parties in the States General, by the lack of any coherent government policy to serve as a standard against which to measure their performance, by the small size of the government ministries that fund the agencies, and by the government's lack of alternatives. In the United States, Kramer points out, diversity of income sources, the countervailing power of service monopolies, voluntary agencies' political power, and low accountability due to the interdependency of voluntary and public agencies produce the same effect. In the United States the largest agencies, which are most reliant on government funds, shout the loudest or, in Kramer's words, "are among the most active advocates" (p. 229). He might have added that it is not unknown for the largest agencies to use their power in fairly unsubtle ways—an example being the action of a large publicly funded religious agency in a midwestern state that threatened to dump all the children in its child-welfare section on the front door of the state agency if the state did not accede to some of the religious agency's demands. Kramer also notes that the private sources of funding, particularly the United Way, make their own demands of voluntary agencies. In fact, they probably get more deeply involved in the workings of the voluntary agencies than public departments who purchase services, yet scarcely a word is raised in public against this particular form of control. Autonomy in a voluntary agency is a means, not an end, and Kramer wonders whether that autonomy is being used in the best way by voluntary agencies that are essentially private governments operating as oligarchies.

Autonomy is also an issue of long-term financial survival. Funds that are not under the direct control of an agency can dry up, it is argued, because of changing policies or more stringent fiscal conditions. Kramer is not convinced by this threat. "The high birth rate and low mortality rate among voluntary organizations indicate that most of them succeed in attracting enough support to maintain themselves on a minimum level" (p. 128).

One theory of the appropriate division of labor between the voluntary sector and the public sector is that the supposedly more flexible, responsive, and compact private sector can attempt innovations, refine them, and pass them on to the more bureaucratically encumbered public sector. Kramer has no doubt that this theory is a myth. "There is little evidence that voluntary agencies are the chief source of innovation for government" (p. 192). Indeed, he quotes Alvin Schorr's arguments that most of the significant attempts at pioneering in the 1960s were set in motion by the government. He goes further and suggests that the emphasis put on innovation by a variety of funding sources in the United States might detract from more important goals such as access to services, equity, and efficiency.

Not only can government be innovative but, as Kramer somewhat reluctantly admits in a footnote, it can also be imaginative. Kramer quotes from the British 1970 Chronic Sick and Disabled Persons Act a provision that requires the local public social service department to provide for disabled persons who need a number of practical services plus "radio or t.v., outings and other recreational and educational facilities in and outside the home, means of transportation to benefit from social activities . . . comfort and convenience in the home, holidays" (p. 238, n. 7). Despite this example, Kramer is in general reluctant to admit the possibility that the public sector can be imaginative. He does not object on the grounds that the provision of such services is the province of the voluntary sector. Indeed, he derides Sidney and Beatrice Webb's notion that voluntary agencies should supplement, enrich, and extend the work of the public authorities as "quaint" because he found that such supplementation generally does not happen. His reluctance is based on the fact that British practice falls short of the goals enshrined in the legislation. Some part of this criticism is valuable. Public services do fall short of their mandates, and the use of public services does not guarantee equal distribution. He might have added that the cost of such services may now be beyond the resources of any government, and that legislation about these "extras" should be permissive rather than mandatory to allow for local and client discretion in choosing which services are most appropriate. None of these criticisms should be allowed to take away from the fact that the 1970 act was an example of legislators being extremely imaginative about people whose lives were greatly constrained by handicaps. Furthermore, that legislation was aimed at enriching those peoples' lives on their own terms in their own homes, not by administering help on other people's terms.

One reason why voluntary sector innovation might preclude some other desirable goals is that voluntary agencies generally set their agendas according to their own needs as agencies, not according to any perceptions of the needs of the general population in their service areas. The result, where overall government directives are weak or are not backed by adequate financial rewards, is a jumble of services. The fund-raising capacity of a particular group of clients is not always congruent with their need relative to the rest of the population. In England, the Spastics Society raises money by promoting betting on soccer matches and has an income seven and a half times that of the Multiple Sclerosis Society, despite the fact that the total number of victims of each disease is the same. Kramer points out that the same problem occurs in the United States, where, of the twenty agencies he surveyed, "the agency serving the smallest clientele—the blind—had the largest budget, twelve times that of the Multiple Sclerosis Society" (p. 140). In the Netherlands, where social services are essentially controlled by the voluntary sector, a government inquiry published in 1974 and titled "Knelpuntennota" or "Bottleneck" reported the uncontrolled growth of voluntary organizations, the existence of fragmented overlapping service systems, and massive inequalities in the distribution of services with a considerable degree of overuse of some services and underuse of others. In short, the voluntary sector seems incapable of coordinating a coherent set of services to match the actual distribution of need in a society.

Kramer has other interesting insights into the work of voluntary agencies and their relationship with the state, many of which were prompted by his international comparisons. The Israeli experience, for example, suggests very strongly the model of the collective helping of equals rather than voluntary helping among unequals. It is interesting to note that only in the United States are detailed laws, regulations, and reporting devices used to monitor the work

of voluntary agencies. In fact, he covers so much territory that at times insigl that could be argued for pages are tossed off in several sentences. But in all il he performs the great service of being the first person to do a major study of t range of voluntary welfare organizations with an eye that looks beneath sinfi claims of virtue.

The analysis can, however, be taken further. Kramer is at his strongest wh exploding myths and weakest when supporting a particular view of the leg mate role of the voluntary sector. Among the claims that Kramer thinks can legitimately made for the voluntary sector are that its existence guarante pluralism, that it encourages individual, collective, and familial forms of hel ing, and that it advocates its clients' cause before public departments a mediates between them and the state. (It is sometimes not clear, incidenta whether these conclusions represent what Kramer thinks the voluntary sector doing, is able to do, or should be doing.)

The notion of pluralistic social services, each person served by his or her ow kind, might be an adequate goal in a society where, to use a piscine metapho the scales of each particular group overlap to cover the entire population. B there are many people in this country who either by choice do not belong to group that relies on religious or ethnic identification, or whose religious ethnic group has not or cannot organize voluntary social services on the sc that would serve all their members. Furthermore, many people who are th attached would not choose to take some of their problems to such organiz tions. Older adolescents, for example, might choose the anonymous help t that occurs outside the boundaries of their community. People whose distre might evoke the moral indignation of their communal, religious, or eth organization might well seek help elsewhere. The dimensions of own kind ness that are relevant to religious and cultural exercises may not always relevant when the need is for help to overcome distress. It is true that ma immigrant groups were able to organize helping networks because their re gious and ethnic identifications were reinforced by proximity of habitatio But Catholic parishes, which exemplified this kind of helping, have now give up many of their charitable functions to diocesan-wide organizations whic have no local identity. Other large-scale voluntary agencies were never org nized on a local level and started life as city-wide organizations. Moreover, as t Dutch have discovered, there are substantial minorities of supposedly co nected people who are either virtually unchurched or separated or who are the road to that state. The example of Jewish service agencies, which do o their own kind in a way that their own kind appreciates, should be encourag and extended but not taken as a model for the whole.

Kramer moves from special organizations that help special people to organi zations devoted to special needs. This specialization, or "particularism," as h calls it, gives the voluntary agency specialized knowledge and experience. I goes on to contrast that with the universalist services that government provid Now it is clear that many voluntary agencies are organized on a scale whic allows them to treat their clients more "particularly" than is possible in lar public departments, and this is one of their most crucial assets. But implicit Kramer's argument is both a misunderstanding and a misplaced critique universalism. He criticizes what he perceives to be the Fabian influence British politics, which resulted in the notion that the state ought to have prior tax claim on discretionary income for public purposes. The notion which originally came from the Democratic Federation, not the Fabians, wa not, however, designed for the purpose of enlarging government power, nor did it have anything to do with social services as we know them. Its purpos was to attack the massive inequalities that existed in the England of the 1880

and to temper those inequalities by leveling up through education and leveling down through taxation (see George Bernard Shaw, "The Radical Programme," in *Fabian Tract No. 6* [London: Fabian Society, 1887]). In short, what Kramer fails to see is that the chief argument for universalism in England and indeed anywhere else is that it balances the inherent inequities of a voluntary system. The fervor with which universalism is embraced by the older generation of the British Labour Party has to do with that generation's recollection of the cruelties of selective government services in the 1930s and the family-destroying means tests that accompanied those services.

Selectivity means excluding as well as including, and being excluded is devastating, whether it is based on race, religion, respectability of clients' problems, or on an income test where the inclusion point for service provision is set so low that people have to spend themselves down to penury before they are eligible. It is, of course, important when discussing the appropriate roles of the two sectors to distinguish between different kinds of services. The government role is and should be dominant in the redistribution of income, but it should perhaps have a different role when it comes to social services. The 1980s are very different from the 1880s. But to forget the real reasons behind the fight for universalism through government action will lay us open to repeat the errors of the past and move us perhaps unwittingly into a state of greater inequality.

One of the chief criticisms levied against the voluntary sector in England is the one Richard Titmuss has made: that in a service area where a voluntary service and a public service coexist, more resources will flow to the voluntary sector and the more distressed clients will be steered to the public sector (*Commitment to Welfare* [London: Allen & Unwin, 1976], pp. 138–52). The speed with which private hospitals are now unloading their Medicaid patients on public hospitals suggests that this problem of "creaming" exists on both sides of the Atlantic. Voluntary agencies in the United States are tempted to select their clients not only by the criterion of who will best fit their special expertise but also by the criteria of who will best fit their professional, economic, and bureaucratic well-being. In this they are no different from any other kind of organization, and some degree of selectivity is often needed to preserve organizations in their current form. It can, however, be a serious problem past a certain point. The fairness of this charge and the extent of the problem have not been demonstrated sufficiently in all service areas, but the charge has consequences that are too serious to justify Kramer's passing over the issue in three sentences at the end of the book.

There are plenty of examples of voluntary agencies acting as advocates, particularly over the issue of increasing government funds for the provision of services. There are some newer voluntary agencies that do not have a stake in service delivery which spend a considerable amount of time advocating the cause of individual clients. But there are problems with Kramer's view that "there is both a moral and a legal sanction for voluntary agencies to mediate between the citizen and the state" (p. 212). (Kramer, incidentally, does not spell out the grounds for either sanction.) While Kramer's argument that the receipt of government funds has left the voluntary sector free to challenge the state on a number of issues is reasonable, it is not always in the voluntary sector's institutional interest to have a strong, well-trained, imaginative, and effective public sector peering down on it. Even where voluntary agencies monitor the work of public agencies, the two types of organization often exist in contexts that are more similar than dissimilar. Middle-level and senior staff in both sectors go through the same training schools and in general pick up many of the same commitments. Two of these commitments, to professionalism and to therapeutic services, may well differentiate their joint world view from that of their

clients who might want to talk about next week's rent money, dangerous neighborhoods, unemployment, and ineffective schools. Preventive services, which often fall outside both public and voluntary agencies' array of services, are given more lip service than effort, and there remains the nagging thought that an agency's need for clients will sometimes limit its enthusiasm for prevention. Occasionally this phenomenon is uncovered, as in Robert Scott's account of the way in which organizations for the blind attempt to make their clients more, not less, dependent on their services (see Robert A. Scott, "The Selection of Clients by Social Welfare Agencies: The Case of the Blind," *Social Problems* 14 [Winter 1967]: 248–57). If, as I suggested earlier, many traditional agencies lack strong communal links to their clients, and if they are trained into different ways of looking at client problems than their clients, it is not clear how they can advocate for their clients.

There are also the practical problems of advocacy. Funds for advocacy are in short supply. Public agencies are not enthusiastic about giving voluntary agencies funds to enable the voluntary agencies to criticize them. Though it sometimes demands courtesy and always demands cunning, advocacy occasionally requires acerbity; the pragmatic partnership that Kramer concludes is the proper relationship between the two sectors will probably not allow for the sheer contrariness that is sometimes necessary to bring attention to a client's plight.

Kramer recognizes that the orbit of voluntarism is broader than the borders of voluntary agencies, and that recently that orbit has been extended by the growth of self-help groups. He notes that the voluntary agencies that coordinate the work of self-help groups for the physically and mentally handicapped are encouraging collective and communal helping. He does not ask whether the professional service-providing agencies similarly encourage that sort of helping; the answer may well be that many of them do not.

The observation that the world of voluntarism includes at least professional agencies, volunteer helpers, and self-help groups suggests a critical question of definition that goes further than the descriptive and structural definitions of voluntarism which Harold Wilensky raises in his foreword to the book and of which Kramer is conscious throughout. This critical question is prescriptive. In an age when many professional voluntary agencies move closer to government and farther from the families and communities their clients represent, it seems no longer sufficient to rest the case for voluntarism on separateness from government, mediation between government and clients, and the mobilization of unpaid helpers. The tacit assumption behind these claims of separateness and mediation is that voluntary agencies are in fact geographically, culturally, and psychologically close to the familial and the communal, that they are an expression of the wishes and aspirations of the nation's families and communities. That assumption is probably not very accurate for many volunteer agencies in the United States or, of course, for many public agencies. The agencies are very often separated from their clients not only by geography but also by class, race, and ideology. It would seem, then, that many voluntary agencies are neither particularly "voluntary" nor, to use the other expression, are they particularly "private," if we use that word to mean that they reflect and represent the privateness of the family and the local community.

The critical question is, Which groups of people are able to help those in need on at least some of the terms the needy would choose? The answer may be that the ones best able to provide help on these terms are now self-help groups and volunteers who, because they inhabit the same world as the helped, are engaged in collective helping. There is also a place in this nonprofessional world for anonymous helping, where the establishment of a relationship be-

tween the helper and the helped is not asked for and is not necessary to accomplish the task. Such groups cannot of course do the whole job: some of the people in the most desperate need could not profit from self-help groups or attract sufficient help from volunteers. But these newer groups have grasped an essential truth about the advantages of private helping which some established agencies have forgotten.

It will be objected that this proposition denigrates the professionalism that the helping professions have been striving for since the early decades of this century. It is not intended to, but it is intended to raise the question of whether professional helpers find it more difficult than others to see distress and remedies at least partly in the distressed person's terms and in the context of that person's community.

One aspect of helping in America that Kramer omits to mention is that many clients come to voluntary agencies under varying degrees of duress. Dependent and neglected children and children in need of court supervision come under the coercion of the law. The handicapped and the old who lack resources come under the duress of having no other options. Does it matter to these people that the agency they are sent to by the state under purchase-of-service agreements is separate from government? What are the characteristics of an organization that can help these people on terms they can accept, in a dialect they can understand, and with some assurance of equitable treatment. All this is to change Ralph Kramer's question. At the end of this important and insightful book there remains a suspicion that the client in the book is the voluntary agency, not the voluntary agency's client, and that, despite a few hints in the wind, the author has suppressed the recognition that the health of the former does not always ensure the well-being of the latter.

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Social Policy and the Welfare State in New Zealand. By Brian Easton. North Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1980. Pp. 182. $21.00 (cloth); $11.50 (paper).

States of Welfare: Comparative Analysis in Social Policy. By Joan Higgins. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981. Pp. vii+193. $25.00.

In the early 1960s leading American scholars were proclaiming the "end of ideology." A rough consensus among intellectuals on political issues was seen; the fundamental political problems of the industrial revolution had evidently been solved, and the welfare state was firmly established and accepted across the political spectrum. Two decades later, in the midst of global recession, chronic unemployment, apparently permanent high inflation, and uncertain energy-source futures, questions of human well-being pushed themselves to the fore, but this time with considerably less manifest consensus about political issues. A concerted attack, electorally endorsed, has put the welfare state under threat. In the industrialized nations the recent exponential growth of welfare-state activity has come to an abrupt halt. The ideological debate is being recast with both careful and crude dissections of the rights, shares, and claims of citizens—old and young, taxpayers and nontaxpayers, property owners and nonowners, ablebodied and disabled, employed and unemployed, dependent and independent. The struggle for rights and shares reflects the power structure and the rhetoric and reality about the distribution and redistribution of economic surplus. Ideologues in one camp argue that we can no *longer afford to spend*, as we have, to ensure well-being, while these in another camp argue that we

cannot afford *not* to spend as much, or even more, than we presently do if we wish to *improve, or at least maintain, living conditions*.

Social policy, the study of the theory of benefits and their distribution, is basically a sociopolitical process. Both books examined here are concerned with social policy development and outcomes—the Higgins book from a set of theoretical and ideological propositions, the Easton book from a more traditional economic position. The books are very different and provide readers with contrasting perspectives on comparative social welfare. The Higgins book, firmly within a social administration genre, is not about social policy in any specific country or set of countries (though it does illustrate richly with a wide range of international examples). It is not a comparison of specific policies such as housing, health, income maintenance, and child welfare. "What we are concerned with," says Higgins (p. 5), "is not a *field* of study but a *method* of study."

Arguing that comparative research is not simply the frosting on the social policy cake, but rather an important methodological tool for exploring key issues in social policy, Higgins searches for good questions to identify fruitful lines of enquiry that might ultimately produce plausible accounts of social policy in different societies. The book sets out to develop a scheme to analyze the perennial questions of the whys and hows of social allocation, the values and processes underpinning services, and the dimensions of need to which social policies can be applied. The result of Higgins's erudite analysis is that time-honored conceptual tools are used to shape a malleable framework which leads to the conclusion that it is highly inappropriate to examine specific programs or policies in isolation from other systems of care. Higgins does not (nor did she intend to) delve into evaluative questions of whether specific programs were any good, were better than what had previously existed, or were worth the cost.

This is the task of Easton's book, a thoughtful and competent account of social policy in New Zealand that examines poverty, economic inequality, employment, the elderly, disability, family policy, housing, medical services, and women. Easton's book is very much a chronicle of benefits and of the events that shaped and shape the benefits. Written primarily for a New Zealand audience, it contains considerable detail of local issues. However, the foreign reader will have much to consider regarding the magnificent innovations of this pioneering welfare state. New Zealand, a country with a more equal income distribution than the United States, Australia, or the United Kingdom, still has approximately one person in five below the poverty line (p. 30). This number persists despite an extremely generous universal national superannuation system, a no-fault, universal, and earnings-related accident-compensation scheme, generous family allowances with provision for capitalization for purposes of purchasing a family home, and an acceptable national health scheme. Easton finds fault with most of the provisions of the New Zealand welfare state, the state that pioneered old-age pensions in 1898 (yet excluded aliens, Asians, and those not of good moral character and sober habits [p. 63]), widows' pensions in 1911, family allowances in 1927 (but excluding, until 1939, aliens, Asiatics, and illegitimates [p. 106]), and invalid pensions in 1936.

Long-standing provision of benefits does not guarantee the elimination of poverty, and while Easton argues that the welfare state in New Zealand evolved as a consequence of the unregulated private market's failure to attain social goals, his methods of seeking out the causes of market failure set him on a very different path from that of Higgins. He proceeds by analyzing policy by policy and by supporting his arguments with copious quantities of data pointing out program anomalies, but not really integrating the material into any overview

of social policy. The one exception is the chapter on women, the only one that tries to spread itself across the policy spectrum.

Higgins, in contrast, weaves her way through a process—examining the role of the state and the role of religion as determinants of social policy—and then focuses on two central theoretical issues that cannot currently escape contemporary application. The first is the relationship between work and welfare. Most systems have punished the unemployed and, despite the realization that unemployment is not self-inflicted, have been slow to respond with broad policy. Unemployment is not a minor problem, but something afflicting 25 million people in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries, the world's wealthiest nations. The second issue is the division between public and private welfare. Like Easton, Higgins argues that the private market is not the most comprehensive, successful, or humane method of allocating social benefits. She reexamines the famous Titmuss division of welfare—social, fiscal, and occupational—and shows how backlash against public welfare seeks out reprivatization and a shift in the relationship between the state and its citizens. It is unlikely that backlash will lead to dismantling of the welfare state; far too many people are dependent on it, both those whose level of living would fall below subsistence and those well-off people in receipt of multifarious fringe benefits.

What Higgins has done is comprehensively analyze the literature in her search for a framework that covers policy areas, problem areas, groups in need, comparisons of policy areas, comparisons of welfare spending, comparisons over time, different and similar systems, and most of all, concepts and issues. Her point is that most societies are faced with a series of common problems that require solutions. The failure to engage in comparative research will lead to poor understanding of problems and solutions. There is a lot to be learned by examining the widely differing strategies that have been directed at common problems.

Social policy cannot be studied other than with theoretical and conceptual tools. Higgins shows how theory can be used to generalize, to explain, and to predict the structure and practice of social allocations. She identifies the elements of choice, the frustrations of constraints, and the political realities of compromise. She does not advocate a theory of social policy, but rather some theory for social policy (p. 161). Because of its lack of theoretical depth, the field of social policy and administration has been regarded as lightweight in the company of other social sciences. Higgins suggests it is due to come of age, and if one thinks carefully through her integrated concluding chapter, one will see how her contribution is a substantial effort to attaining this end.

While one can disagree with aspects of both books, they will be useful to theoreticians, researchers, and most of all, teachers. The Higgins book would be invaluable to any group of inquiring social policy students interested in theory, while the Easton book would suit a group concerned with developing a comparative register of social welfare benefits.

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ommunity Problems and Social Work in Southeast Asia. Edited by Peter odge. Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press, 1980. Pp. 218.

o be precise, this is a book of readings on community problems and social ork in Hong Kong and Singapore, not in Southeast Asia. It would have been ore appropriate to put the subtitle (*The Hong Kong and Singapore Expe-*

rience) on the front cover, rather than having it appear only on one of inside pages. The editor's original intent was to publish a volume of writings of Jean Robertson, the first professor of social work at the Univer of Hong Kong (1967–72). However, it was found that apart from the consi able amount of programmatic reports and materials presented to governm and outside bodies, she had not written much. This volume consists number of papers by her friends and colleagues in Hong Kong and Singap and includes five of her own writings. It is, in essence, a memorial boo Robertson, who died in a car accident while traveling in France in 1971.

Apparently, Hong Kong and Singapore were chosen mainly because of Rob son's long association with these two city-states—fifteen years in Singapore five years in Hong Kong. Another reason may be that the two societies shar much in common that comparisons on various aspects can easily be made one contributor noted, "Hong Kong and Singapore invite comparison on count of their common British colonial heritage, predominantly Chinese p ulations, geo-political isolation, industrial and commercial characteris housing problems and so on. More importantly, however, it was the natu the assumed 'closed' political systems pertaining both to Hong Kong Singapore which was of interest" (p. 221). This book adopts a retrospe approach in the selection of writings. Of the twenty-three articles, four w written or published in or before the 1950s, six in the 1960s, eight in the e 1970s, three in 1977, and two are without dates (probably written specific for this volume). In view of the fact that community problems change rapidly in nature and intensity, and that social work encounters more and n new challenges, "the difficulty is to choose reports that will focus attention matters of continuing relevance today" (p. 11). The editor did an excellent of supplementing the selected papers with an introduction to each part with editor's notes and footnotes in some of the readings. As a matter of f the introduction to each part and the editor's notes are the most readable p in that the information is very updated, the comments stimulating, and summaries precise.

Taking a glance at the table of contents, one discovers that the papers carefully selected for particular purposes. There is no redundance or overl ping in the materials, and the papers are relevant to the subjects of commun problems and social work. On the other hand, because the title of the boo so broad and general, it would be too demanding to ask for inclusivenes depth in the subject matters. But the book does pinpoint some important c munity problems and describes certain features of social work that are significant in the contemporary societies of Hong Kong and Singapore.

The book is divided into five parts. Three articles/reports written in 1 1882, and 1956, respectively, are selected for part 1 to give the historical b ground of social work service development in Hong Kong and Singap While the information is still relevant in discussing today's community pr lems, it is not sufficient in understanding the present industrialized and urb ized societies. For instance, the population composition in Hong Kong in 1950s was entirely different from what it was in the 1970s. Some twenty y ago, Hong Kong had mainly an immigrant population, most people ca from China for temporary shelter here. They intended to return home wh circumstances allowed. Consequently, the kind of assistance needed was te porary, minimal, and mostly provided for by friends, relatives, or local orga zations. In the mid 1970s, however, more than half of the population w locally born, and most of the people considered Hong Kong their perman home. With their rising educational level and expectations, the people increasingly becoming more conscious of their rights and the governme

responsibilities to provide social services regularly and at a higher standard. To include one or two papers on the more recent social situation might have helped readers in reviewing the articles written in the 1970s.

Part 2 consists of two short papers: one identifies some traditional Chinese values on mental health, and the other discusses the custom of the adoption of babies in Singapore. These two papers cannot help readers understand satisfactorily the traditional values and changing cultural patterns in the two city-states. Instead, references mentioned in the introduction to this part provide a comprehensive picture for this purpose.

Part 3 includes three papers on social work education, all by Robertson. In her long career as a social work educator, Robertson demonstrated her firm belief in the need for truly indigenous social work courses to meet local needs, developing field instruction in unstructured settings, and encouraging projects that have not been previously undertaken. Although there are many problems in social work education, her views and perspectives were always positive. For example, in discussing the absence of good field placements with adequate supervision, Robertson stated that "the very lack of perfect supervision in the perfect agency may have advantages in the learning process," because the student "will be exposed to real life experiences while he still has the guidance and support of the school to help him" (p. 81). Robertson also believed that community work was an integral part of social work. Such a position, however, is no longer accepted by all. While it is true that social work has much to offer to community development, it is debatable whether community work should continue to remain as a method of social work in light of the increasing social control function of the profession. In Hong Kong, the situation is even more complicated. Now that more and more government departments other than social work agencies are involved in community work activities and employ a large number of community workers not trained in social work, the following questions are being raised: Should their activities be called community work? Who are the "real" community workers? What is the relationship between community work and social work? These questions need to be clarified to avoid confusion. The troublesome issue in reviewing this part of the book is that the social work education scene in Hong Kong has not been adequately presented. It gives readers the impression that only the University of Hong Kong shoulders the responsibility of training social work practitioners. Nothing is mentioned about the other social work training institutions that are making valuable contributions to social work education as well.

In part 4, the nine papers cover nine different topics ranging from social work practice to social work as a profession. The papers are informative and interesting and touch several important issues, such as the partnership between government and the voluntary sector, the social work manpower shortage, fostering mentally retarded children, the development of school social service in relation to compulsory and free education, the need for senior social work practice in front-line work, and the registration of social workers in order to enhance the professional status of practitioners. All these issues have contemporary significance and deserve attention from both social workers and policy-makers.

Four papers in the last part discuss the problems of transvestism, prostitution, drug abuse, and needs in housing estates. Two papers examine two approaches in community work—social action and community development. The social problems and community needs as pointed out by the contributors do indeed exist, but the reader may easily overlook the more pressing problems in the present society. In Hong Kong, for instance, the rise of juvenile crime, the widening gap between the rich and the poor, the skyrocketing land value

resulting in part from housing and squatters problems, corruption, maladjustment of new immigrants from China, etc., have seriously affected the normal life of the local people. Social workers and community workers in one way or another have a role to play in problem solving and need meeting. The community-work approaches presented in this part, however, do not seem to be ideal ways to organize people to solve their problems. The government-sponsored community development can hardly invite genuine citizen participation, whereas the social action approach can achieve certain instant results but only occasionally has far-reaching effects on government policies. In January the Hong Kong government decided to introduce a new scheme to decentralize administrative decisions at the district level. This is the government's first effort in encouraging people's involvement in community affairs. How successful the scheme is remains to be seen.

In brief, the book is a festschrift in memory of Joan Robertson. For those who want to get a glimpse of social problems and social work in Hong Kong and Singapore in the recent past, this collection of papers should not be missed.

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Ends and Means in Social Work: The Development and Outcome of a Case Review System for Social Work. By Matilda E. Goldberg and R. William Warburton. Winchester, Mass.: Allen & Unwin, 1980. Pp. 155. $24.50 (cloth); $11.50 (paper).

Advocates of general, neighborhood-based social services in the United States had reason to be greatly encouraged by British developments in the late 1960s and 1970s. The Seebohm report of 1968 led to the formation of personal social service departments that integrated previously scattered social work efforts. A result of the new units was a substantial expansion of public expenditures for social services and a modest increase in the number of jobs for social workers. In addition, social workers found themselves with a significant publicly funded service domain for which they had an opportunity to provide professional leadership.

Sensitive both to pressures for increased accountability in public services and research evidence that questioned the efficacy of traditional casework practice, Goldberg and Warburton initiated a preliminary inquiry into the contributions of the new social service departments. An area office serving a population of 73,000 in a city in the south of England was selected for intensive case study. The investigators emphasized such basic questions as: Who are the clients served? What do staff attempt to accomplish on behalf of clients? What activities do staff undertake on behalf of clients? As a basis for addressing these questions, Goldberg and Warburton worked intensively with staff in the development of a reporting system they call the "Case Review System." The monograph is largely a report of their experience in developing the system and on the data generated by the system in 1975. Among the variables covered are presenting problem, service provided, other agencies involved, types of workers involved, social worker role, changes (if any) sought over time, expected date of case closing, and reasons for case closing. The form, which is largely precoded, is designed for use both in service planning and in service

assessment. Accordingly, it calls for workers to record what happened since the last review and what is planned before the next review.

Although the findings are not readily summarized, a few major themes emerged. The elderly and male teenagers were overrepresented in the case load. While presenting problems were diverse, they were more heavily concentrated in the categories concerned with survival problems than those involving emotional and relationship problems. The vast majority of cases were disposed of quickly. A quarter were dealt with in a day, nearly half were closed within a week, and only 11 percent were open after six months. Staff activities were heavily weighted toward assessing client problems, giving information, and seeking resources for clients. Only 20 percent of the cases involved counseling.

Included in the text is a summary discussion of satisfaction surveys conducted with both clients and staff. Characteristically, clients reported relatively high levels of satisfaction with services. Workers, on the other hand, tended to be less pleased with what they could accomplish on behalf of clients.

The authors report on their experiences in working with staff on the development of the system and on the results of a survey of worker reactions to it. Those involved in development of the system were particularly positive. The process evidently was a useful device in encouraging social workers to think explicitly about their objectives and the rationale for various tasks.

The reporting system itself will be of interest to those who design similar systems elsewhere. The form is commendable for the breadth of information encompassed, the flow of the items, and the extensive use of precoded categories. Some limitations are also evident. Because there is no direct measure of extent of staff effort involved in various tasks, the system does not provide a strong basis for cost analysis. Since the system is also limited to information readily provided by workers, it does not indicate what happens to clients after they are referred to other service systems.

Service-reporting systems can be evaluated, in part, on the degree to which they generate complete and valid data. Unfortunately, the authors do not include any discussion of the quality of their data or any analytic procedures they may have used to test for validity and reliability. Also pertinent in assessing a reporting system is the viability question. To what extent does the system survive a developmental period? To what extent is the system adopted in other similar settings? On the basis of its strong content and seeming ease of administration, the Case Review System appears to be a candidate for general use in the British personal social service departments. No indication is given that the system continued to be used in the test district once the researchers left, nor do the authors report replication elsewhere. If this is indeed an isolated data-collection experience, it is unfortunate since reporting systems are particularly valuable when they provide a basis for longitudinal and comparative analysis. Perhaps publication of the monograph will stimulate use of the system.

For advocates of publicly funded neighborhood services, the findings are a source of some encouragement. Clearly, the district office studied was extensively engaged with diverse elements in its catchment area. It addressed demonstrable problems with plausible intervention strategies. Further, it tended to dispose of its cases quickly and managed to satisfy most of its clients. At the same time, the project invites more accountability questions than it answers. Issues of actual impact of service strategies and cost effectiveness are among those that remain to be addressed.

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Confidentiality in Social Work: Issues and Principles By Suanna J. Wilson. New York: Free Press, 1980. Pp. vii+271. $9.95.

An in-depth search for understanding of "confidentiality" results in more questions than answers. The meaning and application of the many dimensions of this principle seem perpetually open to reappraisals in the light of rapid change in technology and an increasingly complex matrix of relationships in today's world.

Social work has traditionally regarded "confidentiality" with appropriate sanctity, considering it fundamental to professional ethics and to the treatment relationship. As one moves through this highly informative and eminently readable book, the message that seems to emerge is that social workers are amazingly naive and unaware of the complexities of this principle, and that a "sizable number of settings have no written policies pertaining to confidentiality, though many are hurriedly attacking this deficiency" (p. 202), primarily because of legislated mandates and an aroused consumerism.

This comprehensive, well-documented volume is oriented to practice in agencies and in private practice and to service practitioners as well as agency supervisors and administrators. It is all one ever wanted to ask about confidentiality with forthright discussions, suggestions, and sometimes solutions. In a chapter devoted to case vignettes (chap. 12), the author poses a series of familiar everyday questions drawn from various social work settings, then follows each with insightful discussions.

The scope of the content is comprehensive; it includes an analysis of the Federal Privacy Act of 1974, confidentiality of case record materials, informed consent and release of information, priviledged communication, and problems of confidentiality that administrators/supervisors face, such as use of personnel records. Each of these components is thoroughly reviewed from the perspective of current practices. For instance, there is a helpful discussion of how one adheres to confidentiality in tape and video recordings and, even more controversial, in the use of computerized data, which is gaining ascendancy in many of the larger service systems. The author of this book makes valiant attempts at offering guiding principles and practical suggestions for protecting confidentiality in these various forms of recording practices. It is regrettable that this kind of explicitness frequently leads to some unattainable goals, given the realities of organizational structures.

"Release of Information to Others" is of crucial importance for all human service agencies, but in some, such as interdisciplinary settings, it has a particular significance. This chapter discusses the intricacies of informed consent essentially from the legal perspective. It clearly indicates the necessity for defining precisely the boundaries of consent and the as yet underutilized practice of the consumer's right to withdraw consent. Perplexing questions about access of other disciplines, third-party payers, and outside agencies' record material are raised, and although the discussion is vastly enlightening, it leaves one with the disquieting feeling that violations of confidentiality are ubiquitous. As succinctly stated in one of the author's concluding vignettes: "Help! I'm afraid to breathe for fear I'll violate confidentiality. I'm scared to do anything now—my estate of blissful ignorance was highly preferable to what I'm feeling after reading this book. Now what?" (p. 200). Whereupon the author, with characteristic courageousness, offers nine key suggestions.

The controversy over consumers' access to their records is succinctly argued from ethical/philosophical premises, traced historically from the Patients Bill of Rights up to the present orientation toward greater openness of case record material. Although the finer nuances of this pro and con discussion cannot be

fully resolved, the author again presents helpful guidelines in developing a position on this set of practices.

The review of current opinions on the right of privileged communication has increasing relevance for social workers. It is helpful to gain an understanding of the differences among the various professionals in relation to this: that is, physicians, clergy, psychiatrists, psychologists, journalists, social workers, etc. Basically, it is the client who has the ultimate privilege of monitoring information on himself, but it is pointed out that this is waived in certain specific situations (i.e., child abuse, criminal activities, suicidal and homicidal threats).

This volume is clearly an impressive undertaking and a fine resource for a wealth of data that would be difficult to search out from a variety of original sources. It is assembled in a thoroughly readable book with appendixes giving some valuable NASW positions on confidentiality, the Model Licensing Act for Social Workers, NASW Code of Ethics, etc. There is also an extended bibliography, although the references are somewhat dated. The author is candid in noting the shortcomings of the social work profession and the directions needed to sharpen awareness and move the profession toward improving its practices in this highly charged area.

Leona Grossman
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Contemporary Group Work. By Charles D. Garvin. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1981. Pp. ix+306. $15.95.

This volume reflects the author's solid grasp of practice knowledge, theory, research, and skills that characterize social work with groups at this time. The author is an experienced practitioner and teacher of graduate social work students. He leads his reader through logical processes of description, analysis, and evaluation of the thinking and doing essential to preparing for, beginning, working, and ending with groups organized for a variety and range of purposes. The major theoretical underpinnings are drawn from four sources: systemic notions, group dynamics research and theory, and sociobehavioral and cognitive views of individual and social interactions and functioning. The author is able to use these to develop and present his own practice approach that features collaborative goal formulation and development by worker and group members, and explicates the collaborative monitoring and evaluation of the effects of their individual and joint efforts.

The author is committed to the idea that "effective service is closely related to measurement of the effects of worker and member actions" (p. 62). He intends each chapter to contribute to the full expression of that commitment. I find that this theme does indeed pervade the book and that the author offers practical suggestions that social work teachers, students, and practitioners may use to evaluate the effects of their work. Each chapter develops learning-teaching exercises that engage the participants in clarifying and integrating the theoretical content and that engage them in developing and using assessment and evaluation procedures and methods.

Contemporary Group Work is a valuable addition to the literature dealing with the theory, practice, and assessment of social work with groups. Its special strengths lie in two notable accomplishments: (1) the author's achievement of a useful integration of carefully selected knowledge from theoretical sources often considered so disparate as not to be within the purview of one teacher-

researcher-practitioner, and (2) his successful presentation of practical ways and means for teachers, students, and practitioners to engage with group members in measuring and assessing the effects of their individual and collaborative goals and actions.

I am, however, disappointed and annoyed with the inadequate editing that characterizes the present edition of *Contemporary Group Work*. All too often involved sentence structure, incorrect grammar and punctuation, as well as mistakes not caught in proofreading detract from the substantive quality of the presentation. At times the reader finds it necessary to reread sentences and paragraphs to search for the precise referents of ideas and to discern the meaning and logic of the content. These lacks and mistakes should be remedied in order for the reader to gain full access to the cogent and worthwhile substance of this text.

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The Mentally Ill in Contemporary Society. By Agnes Miles. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981. Pp. vi+221. $25.00.

It may be that an introductory text on mental illness written by a medical sociologist that presumes no "previous knowledge on the part of the reader either of sociology or of psychiatric disorders" (p. x) inevitably makes for tiresome reading. Agnes Miles contends that the literature in the field of mental illness is so voluminous and the research findings so contradictory that beginning students of health professions and social sciences are easily befuddled. She offers them a predictable selection of topics—definitions of mental illness, the labeling theorists, the transition to patienthood, the sick role, stigmatization, public images and attitudes, the burden imposed on families, relationships among mental disorder, gender, social class, and environmental stress, and finally, "medicalisation."

Of interest is the weight given to the critics of psychiatry and the concluding message pointing to the expansion of psychiatric forms of social control. Though these arguments are presented somewhat simplistically, a critical perspective is apparent. Notably absent are discussions of distinctions between acute and chronic states, the efficacy of psychotropic drugs, mental illness among children and the elderly, and social policies toward the mentally ill (except in passing comments on the trend away from institutional to community-based care). The absence of the development of the last topic is peculiar given the extent to which the nationwide policy of deinstitutionalization, coupled with tightened admission criteria, has determined the form and locus of care—or the lack thereof—for the mentally ill in the United States over the past two decades.

The standard textbook format does not demand that analytic connections be made between information contained within chapter subheadings or across chapters. This approach limits Miles's development of a substantive statement on mental illness. A sense of depth is lacking, as if to suggest that naive students can absorb material without a theoretical cohesiveness.

With the exception of social policy imperatives, the issues, controversies and references discussed are current and include social networks, the relationships between mental disruption and stressful life events (i.e., unemployment and housing), and the increasing reliance on drugs by the general public to quell mental symptoms. The classics in psychiatric epidemiology are reviewed as

ell Chapters 6, "Men and Women and Mental Illness," and 7, "Social Class and Mental Illness," offer a more rigorous discussion than other sections of the book.

Miles's attempt to address critiques of psychiatry is one that is familiar to my personal sympathies. Yet to imply that antipsychiatry is limited to the writings of Szasz, Laing, Goffman, and Sedgwick is simply to peddle misinformation. Although the author frequently refers to her material as relating to contemporary Western society and psychiatry, she actually offers evidence from only the United States and Britain. Thus, the theoretically richer and more actively practiced antipsychiatric movements of France and Italy are omitted altogether. Introductory-level students deserve more on this score, but then again, the mere inclusion of the notion of antipsychiatry may be a contribution in itself.

Ellen Baxter
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Passing through Transitions: A Guide for Practitioners. By Naomi Golan. New York: Free Press, 1981. Pp. xxii+330. $15.95.

Until now it has been a problem for social workers that Erikson did not do more to clarify adult developmental tasks, and that it has been left to popular writers to address transitions in adult life. Naomi Golan, in this ambitious book, has boldly taken hold of this field of inquiry and thus has done us several favors. She has specified the concept of transitions in adult life, relating them to typical developmental changes in the life span, and she has presented substantive research on transitional states. The book makes it clear that both the concept and the content of transitions are in an exploratory stage, and that descriptive and experimental research have to be undertaken in order to validate the ideas.

The working definition of transition is "a period of moving from one state of certainty to another with an interval of uncertainty and change in between" (p. 12). Fourteen transitional states are identified: three related to maturational tasks and eleven that are viewed as free floating, where the life-span timetable does not determine when they will occur. These eleven "bridging" states are work and career shifts, transitions to marriage, couplehood and parenthood, geographic moves and migrations, separation, divorce, and remarriage, health impairment, paths to institutionalization, and death of a spouse. It is in these areas of transition that the available research is presented so that we learn exactly what the phenomena, potential risks, crises, and adaptations may look like.

In addition to the presentation of these transitional states and their connections to developmental tasks, Golan identifies sources of help and guidelines for practice. Sources of help range from self-help to professional help, and practice guidelines draw upon traditional social work practice models. Use of the concept of transitional states can be integrated into any social worker's repertoire of knowledge because Golan indicates how practice with adults going through these states of crisis can be related to psychodynamic, problem-solving, task-centered, and life-model approaches. This is not so much a book about practice theory as it is about the object or content of practice. And this is one of the praiseworthy aspects of the book. Golan introduces substantive knowledge about the way adults live their normal lives and offers a focus for practice of any kind by which to address the adaptive potential in situations where people have difficulty in living through transitional states. The author

made a wise decision in not seeking a "master transitional process" but in concentrating on a few that are characteristic of the process of transition. In effect, with the use of 125 case vignettes, the book contains a kind of selected sample of transitional states that offers an illustrative way of looking at the issue of transition. Similar to the way crisis-intervention theory developed from case examples, "transitional state theory" may have that same potential.

Golan anticipated that the book would be criticized for its "breadth and superficiality," for it was intended to depict as much as is known of particular transitional states, and studies were drawn from a panoply of sources. It is not the breadth that is troubling, but the fact that there is no effort made at reconciliation of different approaches in these studies. Golan does not critically analyze or summarize them. Also, there are some problems in the book that are possibly editorial in nature. Golan chooses an individual focus, and yet she draws upon family-developmental schemes like that of Scherz or Rhodes. She notes that attention was not paid to the variables of sex, class, ethnicity, or culture, and while this is a serious set of omissions in a book about the way people adapt to transitional states, there actually are identified sex, class, ethnic, and cultural differences mentioned in the anecdotal material. Also puzzling is the author's effort to distinguish transitional states from acute situational crises, because the transitions are sometimes viewed as those kinds of crises. We are plagued by the continual question of "when is a crisis not a crisis?"

The thrust of the book is about normal developmental issues in adult life, and it is noted that ordinarily people manage these transitions through their own efforts and with the engagement of their natural family and network supports. The lack of resolution of the transitional crisis and the cases where pathogenic consequences occur become the cases known to professional practitioners.

The fact that this is not really a new idea brings us to my central concern. Through the redefinition of "problem," this time to the notion of transitional states in adulthood, have we entered into a new phase of practice-theory development, and will this become a new fad? Are we to view the maladaptations in cases through a transitional lens now? It might turn out to be a sensible idea; certainly it will keep us task oriented, less preoccupied with pathology, and more oriented to normal life-styles and reestablishing equilibrium rather than redrawing character structure. Yet, the range and diversity of changes and maladaptations that occur during life's transitions are so complex and varied that they can be classified in multiple ways. It is not yet known that a theory of transitional states will be the most effective or even most parsimonious way to capture all of the variables.

This book offers a new way of classifying life situations, and, in addition, it presents rich data about those situations. Through the use of an array of practice approaches, interventive possibilities are illuminated. This book will warm the hearts of those of us who are committed to ecological perspectives, ego adaptation, environmental supports, models of competency, and prevention. The transitional states themselves are presented with appropriate tentativeness, and one can only hope that the field will see the research potential in defining rigorously what Golan has offered as the beginning conceptualization of transitional states.

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Brief Notices

elping Networks and Human Services. By Charles Froland, Diane L. Pan-
ast, Nancy J. Chapman, and Priscilla J. Kimboko. Sage Library of Social
esearch, vol. 128. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1981. Pp. 200.
20.00 (cloth), $9.95 (paper).

report on a study of the innovations of thirty agencies working with informal
elping networks. Its findings support the view that personal relationships in
veryday life are the primary source of caring for people. The policies and
ractices involved in the relationship between formal services and informal
aregiving are presented.

Vork, Workers, and Work Organizations: A View from Social Work. Edited by
heila H. Akabas and Paul A. Kurzman. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1982. Pp. xiv+242. $18.95.

A new perspective for the provision of service and the development of social
olicy. The focus is on the influence of work on individual development and
unctioning, on social work research, policy, and practice, and on the organiz-
ng processes of a community.

Geographical Perspectives on the Elderly. Edited by A. M. Warnes. New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 1982. Pp. xviii+478. $43.95.

A collection of geographical studies on the elderly, dealing with the changing
distribution of the elderly population, housing, mobility, health care, and
public policy.

Aging and Retirement: Prospects, Planning, and Policy. Edited by Neil G.
McCluskey and Edgar F. Borgatta. Sage Focus Editions, vol. 18. Beverly Hills,
Calif.: Sage Publications, 1981. Pp. 233. $20.00 (cloth), $9.95 (paper).

This work emphasizes the interrelatedness of planning and policy in retire-
ment for the aging. Some of the major recommendations of the President's
Commission on Pension Policy are examined in detail.

Social Networks and Social Support. Edited by Benjamin H. Gottlieb. Sage Studies in Community Mental Health, vol. 4. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1981. Pp. 304. $20.00 (cloth); $9.95 (paper).

The essays in this volume explore the ways in which natural networks, such as mutual help groups and families, help the individual cope with stressful life events and aid in the prevention and care of illness, mental illness, and other personal difficulties.

Straight Talk about Mental Tests. By Arthur Jensen. New York: Free Press, 1981. Pp. xiv+269. $12.95.

This influential author clarifies existing misunderstandings about what intelligence tests actually do. He describes how the tests work and claims that they are invaluable to society for judging people on the basis of individual talent.

Work and Welfare: The Unholy Alliance. By David Macarov. Sage Library of Social Research, vol. 99. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1980. Pp. 231. $20.00 (cloth); $9.95 (paper).

The thesis of this volume is that the long-existing link between work and welfare is not necessary and should be broken. A new set of values is needed to replace today's dominant work ethic.

Population Law and Policy: Source Materials and Issues. By Stephen L. Isaacs, J.D. New York: Human Sciences Press, 1981. Pp. 431. $29.95.

An examination of the increasing interaction between population and law on the domestic and international levels. Such topics as abortion, sterilization, contraception, and the rights of minors to family planning services are investigated.

Fuller Employment with Less Inflation. By Irving Siegel. Kalamazoo, Mich.: W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1981. Pp. xi+226. $6.00.

A chronological collection of essays by Irving Siegel on the inflation-unemployment syndrome of 1965–80. The essays consider the problems of designing remedies to combat inflation.

The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America. Edited by Peter Flora and Arnold J. Heidenheimer. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1981. Pp. 417. $16.95.

A study of the historical development and the contemporary problems of welfare states. Contributions by economists, political scientists, sociologists, and historians are incorporated into this comparison of Western European and North American nations.

Do Housing Allowances Work? Edited by Katherine L. Bradbury and Anthony Downs. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981. Pp. xiv+419. $26.95 (cloth), $10.95 (paper).

This volume presents the findings of experiments with housing allowances, started in 1973 by the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Self-destructive Behavior in Children and Adolescents. Edited by Carl F. Wells and Irving R. Stuart. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1981. Pp. xi+348. $19.95.

A practical volume for dealing with self-destructive behavior in youths. It incorporates clinical observation, theories, and diagnostic and treatment techniques.

Group Skills in Social Work: A Four-dimensional Approach. By Sue Henry. Itasca, Ill.: F. E. Peacock Publishers, 1981. Pp. x+385. $13.50.

Through the interaction and intersection of four dimensions of social work practice with people in groups, the author contends that the skills to be employed by the group worker will emerge.

Economic Efficiency and Social Welfare: Selected Essays on Fundamental Aspects of the Economic Theory of Social Welfare. By E. J. Mishan. Winchester, Mass.: Allen & Unwin, 1981. Pp. 280. $12.00 (cloth), $17.00 (paper).

Contains a number of important essays by D. E. Mishan concerned with the theoretical basis of policy economics. Of special interest to readers of this notice, particularly in today's political milieu, is "The Folklore of the Market: An Inquiry into the Economic Doctrines of the Chicago School."

Social Security: A Reciprocity System under Pressure. By Edward A. Wynne. Westview Special Studies in Contemporary Social Issues. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980. Pp. vii+220. $18.50.

Reportedly written in response to the controversies surrounding the Social Security system, this book examines Social Security as an "intercohort exchange" of implicit reciprocal contracts between young and old. The function of reciprocity in society is examined as is the increasing role of government as the main mediating structure in modern reciprocal arrangements.

Contributors

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Professions as "Callings"

James M. Gustafson
University of Chicago

The idea of an occupation as a "calling" refers to some moral and perhaps religious motives and to a vision of the larger ends and purposes that work serves. Professions are characterized by mastery of technical information, concepts and theories that guide choices, institutionalization that exercises social controls, and, at least traditionally, a service orientation. "Calling" without professionalization is inept, and a profession without a calling lacks moral and humane roots, loses human sensitivity, and restricts the vision of the purposes of human good that are served.

We use several different words in our society to designate how a person makes his or her living: job, occupation, trade, vocation, profession, calling, and perhaps others. I want to "play" with some of these words to see what distinctions we make among their usages.

One of the distinctions we make is between the professional and the amateur. There seem to be two criteria used in this distinction. The professional person gets paid for what the amateur does without remuneration; but we also assume that the quality of skill and ability of the professional is greater than that of the amateur. This is adequate when we think about musicians, hockey players, and persons involved in a number of activities. But it is jolting to think about designating someone as an amateur lawyer or social worker or physician.

We hear professionals make reference to "real pros," those who have extraordinary skill or talent surpassing other professionals. And we have the "semipros" in athletics who earn part of their living by playing, and who presumably are not quite up to the capacities of those who can earn their full living that way. What makes a "professional" politician?

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The use of the word "vocation" is just as confusing. I often wonder what students understand when they see the titles of the two famous essays by Max Weber, "Science as Vocation" and "Politics as Vocation." Weber used the word *Beruf* in each, a word that can be better translated as "calling." Of course, vocation, *Beruf*, and calling share a common meaning: to have a vocation is to be "called." It still means that in Roman Catholic religious contexts. A candidate for the priesthood has to discern, or have discerned for him, whether he has a genuine vocation. In its religious dimensions, this is to say whether he has truly been called by God to be a priest. Of course, this judgment comes as a result of assessing other things—his various abilities, both learned and natural. It is not simply the result of adding various information from transcripts, course performance, and psychological tests.

The use of the term "vocational schools" is one reason why the word "vocational" is confusing. In comparison with a professional school or a liberal arts college, a vocational school is one where a "trade" is learned. This opens the issue of what distinguishes a trade from a profession, to which I shall return. Whether one is "called" to a trade is a separate issue from what skills one learns, if viewed from another perspective. In principle one can have a "vocation" for a trade, like becoming an auto mechanic, as readily as one can have a vocation for ministry or medicine or social work.

"Calling" is a word that, in my judgment, is rapidly moving toward obsolescence. One still hears it used in ecclesiastical institutions and life, but even there less and less. Ministers are, to the best of my knowledge, the only persons who are offered a "call" when they are offered employment. Even in ecclesiastical life the usage is not uniform: in some church polities a clergyman is appointed by a bishop; he or she has an appointment rather than a call. In our time when a minister is called by a congregation, he or she generally signs a contract which states the expectations of the congregation, compensation, fringe benefits such as continuing education time, and other things that other employment contracts stipulate.

Calling

I want to dwell on the notion of calling to draw from it some religious elements that I shall later discuss in more secular terms. In the context of the ministry, John Calvin distinguished several aspects of a call. The first is what he called the "secret call" "of which each minister is conscious before God, and which does not have the church as a witness." This, for Calvin, is the witness of the heart that one is without selfish

ambition or avarice or any other selfish desire in receiving a "proffered office" Modern church bodies are given to requiring vocational aptitude tests, personality inventories, and other devices apparently to test even Calvin's "secret call." But there are some outer signs of that inward call that can be judged by others: whether a person is sound in doctrine and lives a holy life, and is in no way at fault so as to disgrace the ministry. This is part of what Calvin designates the "churchly call," by which a person is set apart by the rite of ordination for the ministry And then there is the call from a particular congregation for which the consent and approval of the people are necessary

In the history of Christianity, the sixteenth-century reformers fostered the extension of the notion of a vocation or calling from those who were to become priests and ministers to all persons. To be sure, the "tests" of a call were not the same, but since any person could have a "calling," in some circles a calling became a synonym for an occupation But that process, in a sense, cheapened the notion. To say that a shoemaker had a calling was not merely a statement of his role in the differentiation of labor in a community, or of how he earned his living It meant that no matter how menial one's task, it was viewed both by the shoemaker and presumably by others as a service to persons and the community, and ultimately a service to God Indeed, Martin Luther could speak of one's occupation as a "mask of God "[2] It was not only that one's service functioned for the common good and met individual human needs, and thus served God, but also that this was part of one's self-perception or self-understanding. It added dignity to quite ordinary work One's work had almost cosmic significance, no matter how menial. Social status lines were not erased by this; in one respect they were intensified. A person was to stay within his or her calling In another respect, however, the dignity of work was democratized

There have been traces of this dignity, in some countries at least, until very recent times. I want to illustrate this by the very secular society of Sweden, a society whose secularism is as Lutheran as France's is Roman Catholic. First, one's listing in the telephone directory always included one's occupation. For example, my uncle's listing was "Gustavsson, Magni T., Railroad section hand " This uncle was no Christian, in fact, he was a communist until the Soviet invasion of Finland in 1940 and then he became a social democrat. He was also a union member all his life. From one perspective the occupational listing was judged to be part of what critical Swedes called the "title sickness" of Swedish society. It was undemocratic. From another perspective, his dignity was not demeaned but certified by the designation of his occupation. He had a sense of "calling."

My second illustration is from the social democratic and trade union daily paper published in Malmo. Frequently in Sweden persons have their photographs printed in papers on their fiftieth and some sub-

sequent birthdays. In *Arbetet* there was a picture of a very proud wom
The caption was, "Toilet attendant Anna Andersson celebrates
sixtieth birthday." Even when there was no longer a consciousn
that God might be served by attending toilets, there was pride
dignity in the occupation. And Anna Andersson probably kept
toilets very clean.

The point of this is to indicate that any occupation can be a call
in the particular sense I have been suggesting. There is both an outw
and an inward significance to the idea. The outward is the lar
context within which any person's contributions can be seen to h
significance It contributes to the meeting of human needs, it is
element, no matter how small, in the "common good" of the hum
community It serves a purpose that is not simply self-referentia
the object of its interests The inward significance is twofold. ther
a dignity to one's work that can be affirmed, and thus a dignity to
worker; and there is a sense of fulfillment and meaning that can c
from being of service to others and to the common good. I never
Anna Andersson in Malmo, but I would infer that she was not asha
to have her "title" in the caption under her photograph. Her title
as worthy as the title "professor." One can say these things abou
calling without adding what Calvin believed was necessary for
"secret call" to the ministry, namely, that there are no element
selfish ambition or avarice. Such purity of motives one does not n
to have, or to claim. Put differently, there is a perception and in
pretation of the significance of one's activities as contributing to hu
well-being and to a larger whole, and there is a self-perception
self-understanding that adds dignity and meaning to one's own l

Such a view of calling is not without its weaknesses and pe
however. It is hard to find meaning in drudgery, and that was prob
as true for slaves and serfs as it is for someone on an assembly lin
a Ford plant. Kermit Eby, who was once the educational director
the United Auto Workers, used to say, "No one wants to put on
number 999 until he becomes nut number 999." The view that hu
labor becomes an extension of machines and other technologies ra
than machines becoming an extension of human activity, while it
be overdrawn, certainly contains a good bit of validity. The developn
of technology intensifies the difficulties of interpreting many occupati
as callings. I am sure, however, that there are many things in comn
among a woodcutter in the sixteenth century, a sweeper in Bangal
a factory line employee, or the operator of a word processor in Chic
today.

It is also the case that to view one's work as a calling can mal
worker vulnerable to exploitation. I want to quote from an art
about my maternal grandfather published in the *John Deere Maga*
in 1920. He was an immigrant blacksmith who began to work for J

Deere in 1879. The reporter was looking for a "model employee" about whom to write "During a protracted hot spell along about 1906, there were few men on the job in the blacksmith shop any day. On the hottest day of the period the men began dropping out at nine in the morning. At three in the afternoon the shop was practically deserted. At three-thirty the foreman walked through the shop to see that everything was all right before he shut down the plant for the day. He heard a noise emanating from the vicinity of Nels Moody's forge. He strolled over there and found Nels, unmindful of the heat, turning out work in the accustomed manner." The foreman was perplexed, for it was not cost effective to keep the shop running with only one man on the job. He inquired from the superintendent what he should do. "Keep the plant running as long as Moody wants to work," were the instructions from the superintendent. "Nels finished out the day and then walked home."

It is not hard to see why Nels Moody was a "model employee"! He had a profound sense of calling, which in his case included a deep sense of duty or obligation to his employer. It also included a sense of self-reliance that would make Ronald Reagan happy. Regarding the employee's pension plan, the report states, "Inasmuch as the pension is a gift of the company, [Moody] feels that he is not entitled to it." "He deems it a privilege to work."

With a sense of calling like that, Deere and Company did not have to worry about my grandfather agitating for a union! He was as vulnerable to exploitation as a blacksmith as many a social worker has been simply because of a profound sense of calling.

No doubt other weaknesses and perils are inherent in viewing work as a calling. I note only these because they are sufficient to suggest that one can become romantic about work from such a perspective, and one can permit oneself to have justifiable self-interests denied, even justice denied, because of a deep sense of vocation. But other notions are equally subject to perversions. Thus, I still want to make a case for continuing to interpret the professions as callings.

Profession

What do I have in mind by a "profession"? I have in mind what still are named from time to time the "learned professions", the three that developed quite early in our culture—clergy, law, and medicine, as well as social service and other areas that have become differentiated in the course of more modern social developments. The literature of the professions suggests various marks that distinguish them from

other occupations; I have found examples of a list of about fifteen items at one extreme and efforts to define the "essence" of a profession on the other. I shall delineate three characteristics that I judge to be important.

First, the professions are characterized by mastery of an extensive body of technical knowledge and concepts or theories that explain that knowledge and that guide its application to different circumstances. This characteristic has a graded relevance to a range of human activity and I am not interested in drawing a precise line between the activity I would name professional and its next of kin that would be named something different. But certainly these features distinguish the professions from other occupations and from trades.

The professions do not simply apply rules and examples given in handbooks or manuals. To be a professional person is to learn to think in particular ways, and particularly to exercise practical reason in making judgments about specific courses of action. I am sure many of us have participated in formal or informal conferences about particular cases or policies. For example, in a medical setting in which a critical choice is to be made, the physician uses knowledge and concepts to explain the problem in its medical features; the social worker often sees features of the wider circumstances that the physician does not and interprets his or her vision of the case in the light of concepts distinctive to social work. Nurses, chaplains, and others might also be involved. Each has a way of thinking based not only on the mastery of relevant information but concepts, theories, and experiences distinctive to each profession. The purpose of such a conference is to come to a sound judgment about the best possible course of action and to do that is to exercise practical reason.

Not only is mastery of information, concepts, and theories required; intelligence and reflectiveness are also essential. Exercising discretion, making judgments, and moving from the established and familiar to what is different in particular features distinguishes professions from most other occupations. Reliance on intelligence and learning within a sphere of discretionary judgment is important both to the practice of a profession and to the self-esteem of the professional person. This is why detailed regulations, detailed procedures, and extensive surveillance are often seen as impediments to good professional practice and insults to the practitioner. This is why confident professional persons prefer guidelines to rules; rules often seek to cover too many different cases and require strict compliance; guidelines give direction but permit the exercise of discretion in making judgments about future courses of action. The professional person who masters technical information and knows concepts and theories but cannot make sound applications or good judgments is not effective.

Second, the professions are institutionalized, and thus there are many social controls over professional activity. One is a "member" of a profession; one "belongs" to his or her profession. It is an important mark of one's personal and social identity. There are certification procedures, academic degrees from professional schools, certification by boards of one's peers, and often licensing by the state. Business school graduates are among the few whose university degrees alone are sufficient certification. Many others have to pass "state boards," get speciality certification on the basis of examinations set by experts, and so forth. Theological schools do not ordain clergy—churches do—and this normally requires examination and certification of fitness.

There are other forms of social control in the professions. In some instances, under both criminal and civil statutes, legal liability is present. In a litiguous society this provides good business for lawyers and insurance companies; even the clergy have been sued for giving bad pastoral counsel. Codes of conduct have been written for most professions, they are quasi-legal devices which, in principle, subject practitioners to a judicial review process within a profession. Peer pressure functions informally; commendation for good performance and shame for poor clearly affect motivation and practice. Peer-review procedures, whether in universities, law firms, or hospitals, institutionalize peer pressure, and individuals have heavy stakes in their outcomes. In many professions the market system functions to some extent, though it does not drive out all incompetent persons, and tends to make the best services available to those who can afford to pay the highest fees and salaries. In one profession to which I belong, namely, the Protestant ministry, being "called to a wider field of service" usually means being called to a more prestigious congregation for a higher salary; it certainly never means being called to Musselshell, Montana, a parish whose geographic area is half the size of the state of Connecticut! Continuing education, increasingly required by statute, is intended to maintain standards of competence in view of new developments in knowledge, theory, technology, and practice.

Increasingly professional persons are members of bureaucracies: a hospital staff or medical team, a social service agency, a law or architectural firm, a government research or service division, a public school or university system, or a staff of clergy. Rules and regulations, refined job descriptions within a pattern of division of responsibilities, effort reports, and hierarchies of authority and power must be taken into account. And finally, both specialization within professions and limited contact with the persons served lead to increasingly contracted, partial, and therefore often depersonalized relationships with clients and patients. Contracts for particular and precisely defined services take the place of relationships of mutual understanding and confidence between

persons and often of a broader understanding of the circumstances and needs of those served. Anyone who has been shunted from clinic to clinic in a university hospital knows this to be the case. Seldom does one have just one lawyer any more; one has one lawyer for tax matters, others for real estate transactions, estate planning, divorce, courtroom litigation, and so forth. Contracts for highly specialized services are forms of social control.

Here I want to note something that is terribly obvious. The first characteristic of a profession that I described stresses intelligent exercise of individual agency and capacities, and a range of permitted discretionary judgment. The second characteristic of a profession militates against that. Certification and licensing procedures presumably guarantee that the person has the capacities to exercise independent judgment within a particular frame of activity, but the bureaucratization and specialization of professions sharply inhibit that. The result is something also very obvious: a deep frustration or demoralization. With special reference to the ministry, a university colleague, Joseph Sittler, calls this a maceration of the professional person.

The third characteristic of the professions that I wish to note is that at least traditionally, they are service oriented. Professions exist to meet particular human needs of individuals and communities. Certainly this was the case with the first learned professions in our culture: medicine, law, and clergy. I want to stress here that service to persons and communities is intrinsic to the professions as professions, and not a matter of adding a "calling" or a "vocation" to them. The professional institutions and those who participate in them have the end of benefiting patients, clients, and parishioners; they exist, trite as it is to say, to do good. And it is not only individuals whose needs are to be served, but human groups and even the larger common good of a society. The needs of individuals and communities are not in the service of the interests of a profession or a professional person. The profession and its members exist to meet the needs of others.

It might even be accurate to say that professions emerge in the course of the development of human communities in response to actual or felt needs of persons or groups. No one thought to establish a profession called "architecture" or "engineering" first, in the hope that if a profession developed a need would be generated to serve the profession. Illness preceded the development of physicians, settling disputes between parties existed before the development of lawyers, and perceived needs of the human spirit existed before the emergence of a priesthood that ministered to them. Certainly it was never necessary to establish social service agencies to create or even to discover individual, familial, and community needs out there. Social service agencies are instrumental to human needs.

I believe it was further understood in many times and places that the services of the professions would be available to all members of the communities they served. Even the needs of those who could not afford the services were to be met. Thus, those unable to pay for services were included in work done *pro bono publico*. Of course, probably at no time was *pro bono publico* time and effort available to large numbers of the sick, the unemployed, those needing legal services, and so forth. To a great extent the development of state-funded professional services has occurred to rectify the injustices of the voluntary and market systems. Few physicians do *pro bono publico* work, given Medicaid, Medicare, and private health insurance, though more may be called on to do it under the policies of the current regime and some was done in the sixties in free clinics.

An interesting question came to my mind in a conversation with a university colleague, physician Richard Landau. Has the development of institutionalized ways of meeting the needs of those who cannot afford services (done very properly, I want to stress, for the sake of distributive justice) altered the outlook and motivation of members of the professions? Does a profession which exists to meet human needs lose something of the sense of its intrinsic character as a profession when there are few occasions in which the exercise of the profession requires some self-denial on the part of the practitioner? This is not an implied moralistic criticism of the professions, but a possible line of inquiry. Certainly in terms of my interest in "callings," I can ask, While a profession fulfills its end of providing certain human services, is the motivation and the larger vision of purpose affected when every effort has guaranteed remuneration? Of course one can serve the needs of others and the common good without a deep motivation to fulfill those ends and without having those ends consciously in view. In Luther's terms, one can be a mask of God—that is, one can be in the service of others and the common good without being consciously motivated toward that end. Services to one another are simply a requirement of the human community.

Professions as "Callings"

It now behooves me to discuss more directly the title of this article, "Professions as 'Callings,'" since I have attended to its principal terms. The strongest link between the two is in the third aspect of the professions, namely, the provision of services for the benefit to persons and communities. My grandfather pounding out plows on that John Deere

forge for fifty years made a small contribution to farmers and to food production. But he did not interact with persons in the same way that a number of professions do. If one restricts one's interests to such professions as social service, law, medicine, and the clergy, a feature of personal relationships with patients and clients comes to the fore. At least in many professional activities of these sorts the effectiveness of one's work depends in a considerable measure on the qualities of interpersonal relationships that are developed: mutual confidence, recognition of aspects of the patient or client that are not fully articulated by him or her; metaphorically speaking, good peripheral vision so that the professional person can set the particular need or interest in the context of a larger and more complex whole. Such capacities are developed in professional schools through the kinds of technical information, concepts, and ways of thinking that I indicated earlier. But they also involve a capacity for empathy—a putting of oneself in the place of the other so that one can both imagine and feel what the client's views of the circumstances are. Indeed, refined exercise of practical reasoning is developed in part through natural and cultivated human sensibilities and sensitivities and not simply through quantified computerized problem-solving methods and techniques, as important as these are. In critical situations I believe this might even involve a sense of suffering with the client or patient, virtually adopting the client's anguish, while at the same time maintaining the perspective of the disinterested observer and external agent who takes into account the client's perspective while interpreting the circumstances from his or her professional one.

Viewing a profession as a calling involves two distinguishable features: certain qualities of motivation, and a broader and deeper vision of the ends to be served. Commonly heard complaints about professions point to the absence of a sense of calling. It is sometimes said that a physician is more interested in the patient's disease than in the patient. The physician obviously had better be interested in the disease and be competent to make an accurate diagnosis and prescription for a course of action, but the particular disease is embodied in a person, and lack of concern for the person often evokes resentment. It is not uncommon to hear that many secondary school teachers view their jobs as a form of civil service; by that is meant that they put in their hours, meet the expectations of a contract, and receive their salaries just as trash collectors do. The element of complaint is that they are not deeply interested in their students as individuals, do not see them in relation to larger possibilities of intellectual and personal development, and often do not see their own subject matter in relation to a larger process of educational development. I was once genuinely shocked to see a course title in a theological school catalogue listed as "The Management of Grief Work." I inferred from it that persons do not grieve,

but are objects who do grief work. The role of the minister is the external manipulator of some psychological processes, something like an engineer who knows the stress factors in bridge construction and gets the I-beams placed in such a way that possible dangers are avoided There is merit in clergy learning about the psychology of grieving, but in a crisis I would want a pastor and not a manager I think I could quickly tell the difference.

I suppose that studies have been made of the motives of persons going into the learned service professions; I have not attempted to search for such. My impression is that for many persons, especially those going into relatively low-salaried service professions, the incentive is a deeply moral one. The presence of poverty, social disorganization, disease, personal anguish, injustice in the distribution of human services, ignorance, and similar factors move persons to seek the education and training to relieve these impediments to human fulfillment Incentive might well go beyond relief from suffering and avoidance of evil; persons see unfulfilled possibilities in the lives of individuals, groups, and communities which might be better realized by conscientious and competent professional activity. Such motives and incentives are not primarily self-interested; persons of great ability could certainly receive greater financial remuneration and status in other occupations These moral motives are part of a "calling." Professional education and activity enable persons to competently exercise their callings, their moral motives.

The calling is not utterly dissimilar from what John Calvin saw as the "secret call." There is a sense that one's life experiences, one's capacities for sympathy and empathy, and one's moral beliefs and moral sensitivities make it reasonable to choose a certain profession Professional training, certification, and employment are in the service of this moral calling. There are competence tests to prove one's fitness to pursue one's motives. A moral calling without professionalization can certainly be harmful. Some things not utterly dissimilar from Calvin's "churchly call" are necessary: assurance of adequate intelligence, knowledge, and experience to bear the responsibilities entailed in being agents whose activities have an important effect on the lives of persons and communities. But again, these exist to insure the effective fulfillment of a "calling." They not only provide a social license to practice but are specifications of the activities that give precision and direction to one's deepest motivation.

Not only subjective motives are involved, some vision of better lives for individuals, for groups, and even for the commonweal of the human community are part of a "calling" To be sure, such a vision might be idealistic to the point of utopianism, it might well need tempering by the recalcitrant [illegible]alities of individual persons, institutions, politics, economics, and oth[illegible] factors that limit its realization But such a vision draws persons forward in the hope that the lives of

persons and groups can, with effective action by the professions, become better than they now are. Such a vision requires professional education. If a vision of a higher quality of life or of a better society is to be more than rhetoric, the requirements of technical knowledge, concepts, and training in thought processes must be met. If such a vision is not simply a call for revolution, but a guide to ends that can be approximated in quite specific conditions—in this body, this neighborhood, this psyche, this city—technical competence must be achieved. But apart from a "calling," professional competence becomes technique and manipulation and the significance of one's partial contribution to a larger whole and larger good atrophies. Also, to have a larger vision sets one's own competence and effectiveness in a proper context; one sees what more must be done by others, and one sees how the larger context of the human need is related to the point of access that a particular profession has. Both "tunnel vision" and short-range thinking are altered by one's "calling."

A sense of calling is thus important for one's clients and for one's self. It can affect one's perspective on the particular needs that one seeks to meet; it can enable one to envision a contribution to a larger whole, a larger good, not only of individual clients but also of the community. It can affect one's sense of worth and well-being as a professional person not only by assuring some dignity but by nourishing and confirming the deep moral motives that lead persons to professions and that keep them alive in conditions of adversity and frustration.

I am not romantic about professions as callings. There are severe impediments to the realization of my concern, and the impediments are in a sense "structural"; they exist externally and not simply in the difficulties of keeping a sense of calling alive. They are objective to professional persons. Two impediments that I view as important are the following.

One is specialization within the profession. Recall my quotation from Kermit Eby, "No one wants to put on nut number 999 until he becomes nut number 999." I am not concerned here about the possible psychopathological consequences of specialization; Eby's words also suggest that it is difficult to find meaning and purpose in activity when the larger "product" is simply not in view. Even in industrial work experiments are undertaken to overcome the ill effects on workers of specialization, such as team production of automobiles and other goods. In large law firms, as in medical clinics, referral to other experts is frequent; the requirements of technical specialization increase as both knowledge and institutional developments progress. No patient or client can complain in toto about this, for technical competence is the conditio sine qua non for a professional person. But "tunnel vision" and short-range thinking all too often accompany highly specialized competence; indeed, they seem to be demanded to achieve some kinds

of competence. It is not easy to have a vision of a larger good, a common good, when one is a specialist in putting on nut number 999.

The second impediment is bureaucratization. I alluded to this earlier when I indicated that the first feature of a profession, that which requires initiative and capacities to make judgments, is in tension with the second, the institutionalization of the professions. The development of professional bureaucracies has been unavoidable and presents both possibilities and problems to any profession involved. It is not necessary to analyze the causes of the development of professional bureaucracies or their values in providing for division of labor, efficient use of resources, and so forth. Nor is it necessary to recite the charges made against them: inefficiency, depersonalization, and the like. These are often impediments of a sense of calling because of the demands they place *on persons that are not immediately functional to the motives and* intentions for professional activity. Specialization and bureaucracy go together to a considerable extent. Specialization narrows the range of professional competence of the individual; bureaucracies, even at their best, narrow the range of discretionary judgment of persons who rightly prize their intelligence, competence, and capacities to take initiative—all marks of a professional person.

In our culture and society there is no going back to a time when specialization and bureaucratization did not exist. If the professions are to be "callings," for many persons that sense of calling has to be sustained and nourished within the structures of these social developments. Nor is there any turning back en masse to a religious view of the significance of work, if such a view was ever widely effective. Members of any professional group are not likely to find it very meaningful to hear that each is a "mask of God," that is, that each professional person is doing the work of the Deity in the world for the sake of the good of others, or of the common good of the human community. If professions are to be callings, for many persons the sense of calling has to be nourished outside of religious communities.

We ought not to succumb, however, to the notion that all of the impediments to sustaining a sense of calling are external, as if we as professional persons were simply passive flotsam and jetsam subject to institutional forces beyond our control. Certainly there are procedures and processes of participation in policy formation and decision making that can be developed within the contexts of specialization and bureaucracies which can sustain both motives and vision. One need not go to extreme "participatory democracy" to find ways in which contributions of individual professional persons can be made to the establishment of goals that are consonant with a vision of service and to a climate of mutual confidence that encourages the exercise of initiative and discretionary judgment. There are also, I believe, individual disciplines that professional persons can practice to sustain their own

motives and outlooks. One can make the effort and take the time to read beyond the professional literature, to think and reflect about aims and purposes in the light of considerations that are marginal to one's specialization, to participate in extraprofessional activities that broaden one's perspective and nourish one's motives, and to converse with intelligent and learned persons from different fields of work. Indeed, one is likely to be a more effective professional person if one is not totally consumed by one's work and exercises self-disciplines that broaden one's horizons. No doubt many of us have experienced an alteration in our professional outlooks from the insights derived from a drama, a novel, a movie, a biography, a history, or the serious study of a text in social philosophy or some other field beyond our own. It would be a surrender of our integrity and human agency if we acted as if all the impediments to a sense of calling were external to our own characters and patterns of life.

I cannot prescribe for all persons in a given profession a way to keep the moral and humane wellsprings of motivation thriving for our work and a way to vitalize a vision of a larger whole to which we each contribute. A stubborn conviction remains, however, even if it is more asserted than substantially justified by evidences and argument. A "calling" without professionalization is bumbling, ineffective, and even dangerous. A profession without a calling, however, has no taproot of moral and humane rootage to keep motivation alive, to keep human sensitivities and sensibilities alert, and to nourish a proper sense of self-fulfillment. Nor does a profession without a calling easily envision the larger ends and purposes of human good that our individual efforts can serve. The wider context of significance and meaning, both for ourselves and for others, easily withers away.

From a religious perspective there is meaning in the notion of professions as "masks of God," but I am not interested in promoting that idea. I do want to encourage the view, however, that professions are callings in the service of human needs—individual, social, and even for the sake of the common good of the human family. Professions ought to be "callings"; they exist to serve human needs. Needs do not exist to serve the interests of a profession.

Notes

This is the sixth *Social Service Review* Lecture, delivered at the School of Social Service Administration on April 6, 1982. James M. Gustafson is University Professor of the Divinity School and the Committee on Social Thought of the University of Chicago.

1. John Calvin, *Institutes for the Christian Religion*, IV, 3, 11, 2 vols., trans. Ford Lewis Battles, ed. John T. McNeill (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1955), 2:1063. This paragraph also draws from 2:1064–66.

2 For example, "Thus the magistrate, the emperor, the king, the prince, the teacher, the preacher, the pupil, the father, the mother, the children, the master, the servant — all these are social positions or external masks. God wants us to respect and acknowledge them as His creatures, which are the necessity for this life." They are, however, only masks, and not to be confused with God. See Martin Luther, "Lectures of Galatians 1535," trans. Jaroslav Pelikan, in *Luther's Works*, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan, 56 vols. (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1963), 26:95.

Moral Philosophy in Social Work Today

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In response to major social changes, the social work profession's moral philosoph
and mission have become fragmented and weakened. Some social workers are bein
charged as "immoral." Official positions taken by professional organizations on certai
moral issues are controversial and express a libertarian morality that is open t
question and criticism. It is suggested that this whole subject merits open dialogu
that the profession's moral philosophy be reformulated and tested in practice, an
that the study of social work philosophy and ethics be reestablished in the basi
social work educational curriculum.

Until recent years, social work was characterized as a philosophy
helping people and as "humanitarianism in search of a method
These characteristics represented a moral philosophy and a set
ethical precepts that social workers professed and sought to realize
the methods and processes of their practice for the welfare of t
individual and the collective community. They were moral, sometim
even moralistic, professional agents of society. The general publ
came to accept them as people of high personal integrity, morally a
ethically principled, honest, and trustworthy.

In recent years, however, social workers have been criticized as bei
amoral or immoral and as encouraging "immoral" behavior in the
clients and people in general. The social work profession has public
stated its support for certain forms of behavior that are the subject

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ncreasing public controversy, such as homosexuality and out-of-wedlock, ingle parenthood. The "official" professional positions on these issues xpress the convictions and desires of many social workers. But they lso have created acute, painful dilemmas for many other social workers ho have questions about, or disagree with, such positions. These ifferences of belief and consequent dilemmas have not had the open iscussion they merit. I propose to discuss them here.

It should be stated clearly that only some social workers are immoral. lowever, it is the profession as a whole that somehow is being so categorized in the minds of some people, particularly during this period of political and moral conservatism. We can affirm that most social workers are very moral and virtuous people. There are plenty of testimonial data to support this view. I have no empirical data to the contrary. There are some rare social workers, nonetheless, who do act unethically or immorally and who violate the social work Code of Ethics by exploiting clients or stealing from agencies. But we can reject the suggestion that many social workers are immoral because, in providing helpful services to clients, they often break bureaucratic rules and therefore are "social bandits" and "professional sabateurs."[2]

We do have a task, though, to address as a profession. This is to respond to the charge that social workers are immoral by demonstrating our moral and ethical integrity, and at the same time to continue our tolerant, accepting assistance to people who behave immorally and deviantly. This task will also be considered here.

I will identify the moral philosophy and value system that social workers formerly stood for and currently profess, as well as certain important changes that have taken place in them. I will then examine the nature of the present controversy about moral issues and how the differences and personal conflicts about them may be better reconciled. To do this, it will be helpful to consider the meaning of morality, ethics, and professional ethics, as well as some aspects of sin and virtue in our time. I will finally explore some implications of opposing moral views among social workers for helping practice, and the emerging, responsive shifts in practice that are now taking place.

It is my intention to discuss this subject in a constructive and helpful way and to avoid being either moralistic or "liberated." I shall try to tread carefully in what is clearly a hazardous minefield. The effort here is directed to identifying and affirming some common grounds for common commitments to our professional purposes so that we can better put our internal household in order. Thus, we may be able to strengthen our professional and personal abilities to respond to our clients' spiritual and moral needs, as well as to their economic and psychosocial needs, which are intensified in the current cultural, economic, and political crises of our society.

Social Workers as Moral Agents of Society

In the history of social work as a profession, social workers clearly and consistently had a public image and public position as moral agents of society.[3] They were seen as such because of their role in helping people to find and choose ways of individual and social functioning that they themselves and the general society could consider "right" and "good." Social workers stood and fought for certain values, some of which were not generally accepted or implemented by the larger society. They took the traditional values of charity and justice, inspirited them, and gave them secular and expanded definitions. These were then used to establish a new set of moral and ethical principles as well as social institutional provisions for the "social welfare." Welfare, as Frankel said, is a "moral ideal."[4] The welfare to be protected and enhanced was that of all the people in society—the poor, minorities, and the disadvantaged, as well as the rich and privileged.

Social workers served and were characterized as "the social conscience" of the community in their concern and advocacy for people in need, particularly for the poor.[5] Levy has clarified that what social workers do and how they do it is strongly value based.[6] I have suggested that social work is in part a philosophical and normative discipline, that a basic aspect of social work practice is helping people with their prevalent moral concerns and conflicts, and with making responsible moral choices.[7] In supporting such a view, Ragg maintains that "social work is doing philosophy," with a respect for persons as a central aspect of practice.[8]

The values prized by social workers were, and still are, altruism; social interdependence and responsibility; caring for the poor and disadvantaged, the deviant and dependent; justice and equality in ethical relationships as citizens and fellow members of a community; and socialized individualism in the sense of a respect for inherent worth and individualized needs, for rights to socially reponsible self-direction and self-realization. It was a moral philosophy that expressed a moral idealism and utopian vision of "good people" in a "good society." Such a society would be characterized by "charity and justice" in democratic, mutually responsible and respectful social relations. The society also would be one in which people of different cultural, racial, socioeconomic, and religious backgrounds could live together harmoniously.

These beliefs need to be understood as expressions of ethical values dealing with interpersonal relationships of clients and with relationships among social workers, clients, colleagues, agencies, and community groups. Jane Addams thus discussed "democracy and social ethics" as objectives for social work effort.[9] Even the political issues of her time—

women's suffrage or governmental widow's pensions—were presented and discussed in traditional ethical terms. It is important to note that moral standards with regard to sexual conduct were almost entirely avoided. The emphasis on ethical values was presented as an extension of basic, religiously sanctioned, and established precepts. Also, this emphasis was consistent with social work's societal functions of building social consensus and integration, of mediating between social control and social change/deviance forces in society, and of strengthening the family and community. As a profession, charged by society to work with and for the dependent, disabled, and deviant, social workers became and continue to be the most tolerant, accepting, and caring people in our society.

This value system gave to social workers, personally and publicly, a certain moral integrity and moral authority. It was a major asset in the contributions that social workers were able to make in developing our welfare system and in changing public attitudes toward the poor and disadvantaged. It also was a major asset in gaining and maintaining the substantial public and governmental support that social work had for many years.[10] It is true that social workers are susceptible to developing a moralistic paternalism, which the profession has dealt with by setting up self-regulatory, supervisory, and disciplinary safeguards and a Code of Ethics that gives primary allegiance to service obligations. The profession's value system was and continues to be a major attraction of social work for altruistic people who came and continue to come into the profession so as to be of service to people in need.

The Current Controversy about Morality

In recent years, however, this social work value system and its moral vision have been fragmented and weakened. Many social workers now believe that people should be free to choose their own life-styles, values, and moral norms. Thus a social work consultant advises, concerning a fifteen-year-old girl who declares herself to be a lesbian, that "the right to lead one's life according to personal choice rather than by the expectations of others, is the underlying goal of all client counseling."[11]

Such a libertarian position about life-styles, including *nonnormative* sexual conduct, is expressed frequently today by many social workers. There certainly are variations in the degree of acceptance, tolerance, or nonacceptance for specific behavior patterns, such as nonmarital cohabitation, "out-of-wedlock" or single parenthood, adultery, homosexuality, bisexuality, and even incest. However, support, encour-

agement, and even advocacy of a libertarian moral position are expressed in official policy statements made by the National Association of Social Workers, by many authors in social work journal articles, by many educators in the professional schools, and in direct work with clients. The new Code of Ethics, recently revised and adopted by the National Association of Social Workers, expresses the new individualistic values by giving primacy to the interests of the individual client.[13]

From the libertarian orientation, it is argued that the above kinds of personal conduct, including sexual behavior, should not be considered or labeled "deviant," but that they are and should be defined as "variant" or "normal." It is contended that people who enact these behaviors in responsible ways should be considered "moral" people. It is further argued that the social work profession should advocate and support the social redefinition of such conduct as "normal," and should actively support or approve these behavior patterns as rightful, viable options for people in our society.[14]

From another point of view, social workers as a profession are now said to lack a set of values. They are therefore considered amoral. This argument is based on the perception that the cultural pluralism and individualism dominant in American society and among social workers today "preclude the existence of a commonly held system of values by the profession.[15] Social workers are also criticized for espousing social welfare policies that favor a normlessness and "amoral hedonism that have contributed to family and marital instability.[16]

From still another point of view, it is charged that the libertarian social workers, again as a professional group, encourage and support nonnormative and therefore "immoral" conduct, such as those mentioned above. For some people, the immoral conduct includes premarital sex and abortion. Hardman points out that instead of the proclaimed interdiction about imposing our values on clients, we give "tacit acquiescence to illegal, immoral, violent acts."[17] The social work proponents of these deviant life-styles are therefore regarded by the moralists as "immoral social workers," who sanction and advocate life-styles and behavior that are antifamily and antireligion, hedonistic, norm violating, self-oriented, and socially irresponsible. This ascription of immorality also is based on the perception that these "immoral" social workers overemphasize rights and entitlements for people and neglect or omit the social, family, and community responsibilities and obligations that people need to meet in order to function well in our society.

These charges of immorality are being made by people who believe in traditional or normative moral values or who have strong religious orientations. These critics speak both from within and from outside the social work profession. From within the profession, there are increasing questions and protests by social workers with secular orientations, as well as from those of Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, and other religious persuasions.[18] The members of the National Association of

Christians in Social Work, which publishes a journal called *Social Work and Christianity*, have been particularly active in raising questions and providing a forum for dissenters from currently "official" positions on these matters. They are concerned about safeguarding and reaffirming their own moral and ethical commitments. They also are intent on disassociating themselves and the social work profession from what they consider to be "immoral" and destructive public policies.

We thus have a situation in which social workers are considered moral, amoral, or immoral. Essentially, there are two very opposing points of view, which we may think of as "libertarian" (and "liberationist") and as "normative" moral positions. It is around these two positions that the social work profession is currently being polarized. Each camp manifests a tendency to declare that "if you are not with us, then you are against us." Many apparently cannot accept the fact that very moral social workers believe in and may support other kinds of life-styles than their own for other people, or that one can be a liberal without being libertarian or liberationist. Nor can they accept that one can be in favor of access to abortion by the poor as well as by the rich, or be in favor of responsible, private, adult sexual behavior and interaction, without advocating special "rights" for people who want a particular sociosexual identity and status.

These camps are not monolithic but rather consist of very heterogeneous groups of people. They vary from orthodox and fundamentalist to liberal or radical types. They include dogmatic, imperialistic people bent on having a world fashioned in their image, and very permissive, tolerant people who believe that their principles and identity are being compromised or threatened by their opponents, or by extremists from either camp. The extremists march to very different drums of moral beliefs, standards, and rules.

In the main, though, many social workers are conflicted and are struggling with troubling dilemmas about these moral and ethical problems. These conflicts are especially painful for those social workers who have strong personal commitments that are in opposition to the official statements about these matters and who feel that there is too great a discrepancy between their personal and the seemingly predominant professional values. It is on these dilemmas and this polarization concerning moral issues that we focus our discussion here.

Public and Professional Reactions to Changing Moral Positions

During the 1970s, social workers were criticized as being ineffective and as using inadequate methods to help their clients resolve their

problems. There also was a negative reaction on the part of an influential segment of the public to the radical social reform stance advocated by the profession. In response and out of its experience, social work improved its theoretical orientation to a more realistic social base and also improved its technical methodology. It is an open question, however, whether social work came out of the intraprofessional conflicts and the attacks made by social critics during the 1970s more weakened than strengthened as a profession. Today, there is a perceptibly more negative public image of the social work profession, and there has been a loss of public funds and other supports. The widespread declassification of social work positions in many fields of practice is but one sign of this negative societal reaction.

During the 1980s social workers are increasingly being criticized as being immoral and as encouraging immoral behavior. The current attacks and conflicts about moral issues present even greater dangers for the profession in regard to internal cohesion and also in regard to further decline in the esteem and support of the general public.

Thus far, I have identified a major change that has taken place recently in social work moral philosophy. There has been a shift from a concern with ethical matters in traditional, normative terms to nonnormative, libertarian moral and ethical positions. The nature of these changes will be discussed later on, but they are substantial and consequential.

There has been an unwillingness, however, within the profession and within the professional organizations and schools to face this subject and to publicly debate these issues. In his valuable discussion of social work ethics, Levy deals only partly with this dilemma of opposing professional and personal values. He emphasizes that the social worker needs to be "impartial"; he must not impose his own values, and yet he must give primacy to client self-determination. In situations of conflict, "professional ethics must transcend . . . personal ethics."[19]

This approach urges those who are conflicted about these moral questions to separate their professional from their personal values and to support the official professional positions.[20] But such a strategy is neither practical nor acceptable to many people who are deeply committed to their own beliefs. It also implies a morally hypocritical position that provides no solution but compounds the moral conflicts involved.

On Morality and Ethics, Virtue and Sin

Since we are attempting to tackle some difficulties that we call moral and ethical, it would be helpful at this point to clarify these concepts

and how we are using these terms here. These concepts apply to people and society in general as well as to social workers and to social work practice. Social work seems to give little attention to these important ideas. They merit much greater attention and understanding.

What is meant by moral philosophy is a set of value beliefs and principles about morality that suggest preferable behaviors and objectives of action which contribute to the well-being or welfare of people.[21] This moral philosophy includes an acceptance of moral responsibility and the use of moral principles in making judgments and in guiding one's conduct. For example, one should be honest, respectful of others, altruistic, loyal, trustworthy, dependable, responsible, truthful, fair, law abiding, and rational.

Virtue is understood to mean having a morally consistent character and conducting oneself in accordance with accepted ethical values and principles to some excellent degree. The traditional virtues of faith, hope, and charity have been redefined for our time by Erik Erikson as those of hope, will, purpose, competence, fidelity, love, care, and wisdom.[22] Many current authorities, including Erikson and McIntyre, have emphasized the reciprocal interdependence of the individual and the community in regard to the practice of virtue, and the idea that virtue is based on a clear sense of personal identity.[23]

Ethics is here understood to be that part of a moral philosophy that concerns relationships between people, and a set of values, assumptive beliefs, and normative rules that identify, support, and explain the duties and obligations for good, right conduct. Professional ethics therefore refers to the moral philosophy—the set of values, beliefs, and normative rules—that prescribes and explains the obligations for good, right conduct on the part of a profession's members. Professional virtue refers to a professional person's practice of virtuous behavior, to professional conduct in strong accord with ethical principles. It also refers to the character of a person that is strongly marked by a commitment to these principles in competent performance of his or her duties and by a high moral and ethical integrity.

A value system and a personal moral-ethical philosophy are basic necessities for optimal individual and group functioning. A set of viable and consistent values gives integrity and unity to the human personality. This enables the personal and social organization of beliefs and conduct, cooperative social living, and maintenance of the social order. From a value system, a society derives and develops moral and ethical standards, principles, and rules.[24] These prescribe preferred behaviors that have the best possible beneficial consequences and that are viewed as being both in the individual's self-interest and for the common good. They also proscribe behaviors that have harmful and evil consequences for the individual actor and for the actor's community. Such proscribed behaviors used to be called "bad," "evil," or "sinful" and now often are called "deviant" or "variant."

Moral rules and imperatives constitute basic elements of social norms, roles, and identities. They are expressed in the conceptions and expectations of rights, obligations, and performances of social roles. They tell us what is good or bad, right or wrong, what we ought to do or not do, and they give us reasons for such beliefs and conduct. They help constrain and contain greed and irrationalities, they make possible mutual aid and the fellowships of family and community. As Dewey and Tufts pointed out, "the object of moral principles is to supply standards and methods which will enable the individual to make for himself an analysis of the elements of good and evil in the particular situation in which he finds himself."[25]

All societies set up moral standards and rules to signify behavior that is preferred, expected, considered virtuous, evaluated positively, and rewarded. They also signify behavior that is disapproved, labeled sinful and deviant, proscribed, and denied social rewards. People conform to and follow these moral and ethical rules because of innate habits of conformity to rules; the fear of religious, legal, or social sanctions for violating them; the pain of punishment, guilt, and shame. But they also conform out of a recognition that such behavior best meets their own needs and helps them avoid harm.[26]

When internalized, moral rules become core aspects of the personality and of the character of the person. As Tillich pointed out, moral "norms and principles are an expression of our essential being."[27] He also said that "the moral act establishes man as a person, and as a bearer of the spirit."[28]

There are gray areas, particularly during periods of social change when moral standards and rules become outdated, ambiguous, or contradictory. They create difficulties in terms of predicaments and of intrapsychic and interpersonal conflicts. Many people adapt by accepting the inconsistencies in their moral beliefs or ethical conduct. They evade, deny, compartmentalize, lie about, and rationalize their moral conflicts and inconsistencies. Yet because everyone desires a moral integrity, many suffer the stress of cognitive dissonance and psychic conflict.

A helpful aspect is that standards and rules refer to ranges of behavior rather than to some specific behavior performance. A range of normative behavior shades from conduct that is approved or accepted to conduct that is tolerated without negative sanctions. These flexible attributes of norms and rules facilitate the processes of changing them as life conditions change.

The practice of what was successively known as charity and scientific philanthropy, and now is known as social work, calls for social workers to do good for and to people and therefore to be altruistic, caring, respectful, fair, and trustworthy. For helping purposes, social workers have tried to operationalize their value system in a twofold way

There is a set of moral behavior principles—such as that people should be honest, fair, and rational—that guides human behavior in general and provides guidelines for moral choices to be made by clients. The second set of operationalized values consists of ethical practice principles for social worker action, such as respect for persons, acceptance, client participation, and individualization. Most of these are enshrined in the profession's Code of Ethics. These practice principles are used by social workers to help people make moral choices, and in the helping process they are norm senders or norm changers, depending on the policy or case situations and problems involved. This value system, with its behavior and practice principles, and the wider moral philosophy become a part of the professional ideology, a set of ideas and ideals that helps motivate and rationalize one's professional practice.

In being of service to others, or "do-gooders," social workers used to be expected to practice virtue and to be virtuous in character. Thus early social workers were exhorted to consider "the value and success of their work to be dependent on their personal piety," first in religious, and then increasingly in secular terms.[30] It is symptomatic of the vast changes that have taken place in our cultural views and our philosophy that today such high standards for social workers are considered unrealistic. Social workers now seem to be considered as human, moral and immoral, as anyone else. Their altruistic motives are impugned as self-serving and as a benevolent and coercive despotism that results in disservices to clients.[31] Even the terms "virtue" and "sin" seem old-fashioned in our new cultural ethos and consciousness, now also called our "construct system," as well as in the moral philosophy of social work.

Social Change and Morality

The changes in the social work value system and moral philosophy, which we will now examine, are responsive to the transformations that have taken place in society and in our general culture. They need to be understood within this context.

Momentous socioeconomic and cultural changes have taken place in recent years and have revolutionized our present society. There are the technological, political, ecological, and sexual "revolutions"; the development of mass, urban cities; the mental health and the civil rights movements; and the influx of women into the labor force with consequent changes in family, gender role, household, work, and com-

munity relationships. The resulting permutations in values and life-styles have been termed a "moral revolution" and have also made for extensive changes in basic personality and behavior patterns.

A number of studies and surveys have demonstrated that many people today give greater value to individualism, autonomy, equality, personal well-being, and self-realization than to reciprocity, loyalty, self-sacrifice, devotion to duty, consensus, competent performance, or work achievement.[32] Along with these value and attitudinal changes there has been some decline in membership in formal religious organizations, a major decline in participation in civic life, a weakened commitment to the work ethic, and a loss of public and family authority. There are great increases in crime rates, chronic unemployment, public welfare dependency, divorce, feelings of alienation and social isolation, and in other indices of family and community disorganization.

It is indicative of the general decline in social morality that not only have a greater number of politicians been found guilty of a wide range of criminal behavior, but also an increasing number of public authority figures such as judges, policemen, physicians, and scientists. Even social workers, who until recently have been regarded as fools, or quasi-hero social types, now are also being placed in villain roles in real life as well as in the public media and literature.[33]

One explanation of this cultural trend is that people now live in a dangerous, frightening world, prone to nuclear accidents or warfare and dominated by conglomerate, corporate, and governmental bureaucracies. The above attitudes and behaviors and the new morality are therefore to be understood as defensive and self-protective devices appropriate to such a view of the modern world.

MacIntyre explains the current moral confusions and difficulties of our time as related to historical trends in the development of the modern dominant culture of "liberal or bureaucratic individualism." In this culture, he finds, people and their moral selves have been detached from their communal memberships and their central social roles, statuses, and identities; people are viewed as having an individuality and identity outside their social roles. The attributes of virtue also have been detached from social roles and from membership in a consensual moral community.

It is asserted that rather than indicating social breakdown or disorganization, many of these changes express the emergence of new family forms and life-styles and of a new moral consciousness appropriate to current socioeconomic conditions. Although recent surveys have found that the hedonistic, egoistic excesses of the 1960s and 1970s have declined, many of the characteristic attitudes and behavior patterns then established are still in place.[35] These studies show that a libertarian moral orientation is predominant in our current culture and generally in our society. This libertarian morality is predominant as well in social work.

The New Social Work Morality

We recognize that social work now has an assortment of moral subcultures, ranging from the traditional to the libertarian. Because the libertarian social work morality is more prevalent and controversial, we will examine several of its distinguishing characteristics and some of their consequences. These primary features are individualism, a mental health ethic, and a moral relativism.

First of all, there is a prevailing cult of individualism that gives primacy to self-determination and autonomy, to self-development, self-enhancement, and self-gratification; and to a materialist competitiveness in relation to others. In moral theory this represents an "egoistic" point of view, which asserts that "actions are right or wrong, or are obligatory, insofar as they are in the agent's own long-term interests."[36] Also operating is an "emotivist" (or "subjectivist") moral theoretical position, which asserts that what is good is an expression of preference or a statement of what feels right or results in the happiness of the actor.[37] The egoistic/emotivist positions support a moral relativism and tend to deny the validity of ultimate/basic values, moral principles, or a common good. These theoretical orientations are in contrast to the position of "moral instrumentalism," which asserts, according to Downie, that "actions are right or wrong insofar as they tend to produce the best possible consequences for the majority."[38]

Moral egoism and emotivism, and the individualistic ethic they support, are at the heart of what Lasch calls our "narcissistic culture" and the development of the narcissistic personality as a modal personality type of our society.[39] Today, many people have withdrawn into self-preoccupation and self-absorption. This redounds to the detriment of altruistic, mutual aid and of the communal activities that formerly characterized our civic life and our private, interpersonal relationships.[40]

In such an egoistic cultural climate, morality becomes a relative matter and basic social norms become irrelevant. "Situation ethics" presents an attractive rationale for doing whatever is desired. Fraternity, love, and reciprocity turn into matters of calculated cost-benefit; parenthood now is often calculated as too costly for the direct benefits derived. To be self-sacrificing means an acceptance of "exploitation." Loyalty to family and others and the essential interdependence of human beings all appear as forms of "bondage." As Frankel observed, such an orientation is prone to confuse individuality or individuation with autonomy and individualistic self-gratification; also, equality is confused with a rejection of authority relationships or is taken to mean that family and sex roles have to be undifferentiated.[41] Equity is even subordinated to the claims of a possessive quid pro quo equality. People do not have to accept limiting structures or personal or social responsibilities since their own wants and expectations are primary con-

siderations. Wants become needs and rights as a way of pressing tl
claims of self-interest.

A second characteristic of the libertarian social work morality is
adoption of a mental health ethic, along with a psychologism, whi
gives primacy to explanations of people and events in terms of inn
psychic forces. Both are related to egoistic moral theory. The prevale
view of the human being in social work, and in our modern cultu
remains essentially a psychological one. This prevails despite the wid
spread adoption of ecological systems theory and family system thera
and despite our profession of a basic belief in a psychosocial orientatio

It is the ego of the individual person, in traditional psychoanaly
terms, that remains of central concern; its defenses, regressions, a
fixations, its unconscious motivations and psychodynamics, contin
to absorb us. Behavior and relationships among people are psychica
determined, governed primarily by personality factors, such as cogniti
and expectation. The optimally functioning person is a "mental
healthy" one, and virtue is conceived in terms of "mental health."

In addition, the mental health perspective has transformed ps
choanalytic theory to suit the perspectives and needs of the men
health industry and our capitalist economy. Moral and ethical difficult
are thus defined as matters of health or illness, requiring "therap
of the "mentally ill" person in medical patient roles, ministered l
mental health practitioners.[13] As John Leonard observed, "Therapis
forgive everything, because nothing is a crime; we do not sin, v
dysfunction. . . . Guilt and sin are out of fashion."[14]

The mental health emphasis on personal needs, self-assertion, a
self-fulfillment has meant a rejection of those factors that make fo
marital and family stability: compromise and self-denial in the comm
interest, obedience and deference to authority, and generosity a
reciprocity. It has also buried a recognition that self-realization a
social contribution are interdependent and reciprocal.

Much of psychoanalytic theory does have validity, in my view, f
practice purposes, but only as part of a social psychology of personali
that we need for a truly ecological systems approach to social wo
practice. This means, for one thing, getting back to proper distinctio
between personality and behavior in place of the present confusi
of the two. We then can properly understand and deal with behavi
as a product of person-situation interaction and truly accept and respe
people as persons, without having to accept or affirm all of the
actions.

Coles has objected strongly to the reductionistic psychology th
supports the current "obsession with the self."[15] He calls for a rea
firmation of public citizenship and membership in a national communi
and of a civility to others which "means all of us subordinating ou
feelings to certain shared imperatives, and a loyalty to constitution
principles and obligations."

A third feature of the libertarian morality is a moral relativism, oug with the belief that people have a right to choose their values id to live by their own freely chosen moral rules This belief follows om the primacy given to the individualist value of self-determination autonomy. All, or almost all, norms and life-styles are equally valid s a result, deviant behavior—what is in violation of social norms and ws—comes to be viewed as a matter of negative societal reaction and finition. There is no need for feelings of guilt or shame, or for their solution by acts of reparation, or by seeking and being granted rgiveness. The intentions, nature, and consequences of one's conduct e regarded as of much less importance.

From a moral relativistic view, helping people with their moral pre- caments, conflicts, and choices gets turned into a mechanistic problem- lving exercise, with a consideration of alternatives and "utilities," to rive at the greatest rewards. The helper is thus denied a role as a oral agent, who can provide moral guidance as well as relevant moral inciples, for this choice process.

The currently popular notions and procedures of "values clarification" press this kind of characteristic moral confusion.[16] Clients, and par- ularly children, are to be helped to choose and profess their own lues Therapists, counselors, and teachers are not supposed to inculcate eir own value system and do not need to teach or transmit the moral id ethical traditions, meanings, purposes, and principles that children id many clients lack and need to learn. It is evident that some "values irification" teachers (as well as sex education teachers) unwittingly e inculcating their own "liberated" values, with unintended negative fects. Such a misguided practice contributes to a continued self- fensive narcissism and psychic crippling that social workers see so ten in their clients. It also contradicts what we know about moral aturity and the need for each child to develop and be guided through ige-sequential processes, such as have been identified by Kohlberg, in riving at mature levels of "principled" and "transcendental" morality.[17]

Another expression of this moral confusion is the distorted over- iphasis on a sociocultural diversity that is rationalized in terms of e libertarian morality. Here is a commendable concern to respect e subcultures and ways of life of the many diverse ethnic, racial, id religious groups in American society. But again, this motive gets ixed up with the belief that the differences in moral rules and customs e so great that everything is relative and anything goes. This moral lativism again rejects the validity of basic values and moral principles addition, it encourages a tendency to accentuate social differences, en to manufacture them, and to give short shrift to the values of cial integration and cohesion The common understandings, beliefs, d interests, the shared basic values, that might help social integration d also support respect for diversity are ignored. One effect is to acerbate intergroup misunderstanding and conflict

Admittedly, the above discussion of several characteristic features of the new libertarian social work morality has emphasized its negative aspects. The positive and idealistic intentions that are involved in this point of view and in these activities merit our recognition. The value of accepting people of very great diversity in background and quality is also one we share, and this should be a common effort. We turn now to examine some trends of theory and practice that aim to realize this effort, but from a different and more constructive moral perspective.

Responsive Emergent Tasks and Trends

Our examination of the libertarian morality points to certain needs and directions for progressive effort. Several general and more specific tasks are suggested here.

Social work as a profession needs to regain its moral vision and idealism and even the moral passion that the old-time social workers had. Social work also needs to be able to present itself again as a representative moral agent of society, in roles that social workers can be proud to fulfill and in ways that the general society can more fully support.

Another task is for social work to extend itself to meet the spiritual needs of people. The term "spiritual" here refers to transcendental moral aspects of consciousness, to ultimate meanings and relationships which people need, develop, and maintain in religious and/or in secular terms. Marty points out that the great majority of people in this country continue to have religious beliefs and religious organizational affiliations.[18] Also, a great many people continue to have spiritual and religious orientations in nonestablishment, nonorganizational forms. Marty suggests that social work could be responding to these kinds of needs.

In addition to these general tasks, there are several more specific responsibilities that require our effort. First of all, we need to clarify what actually is taking place in the front lines of social work practice, that is, what most social workers believe and are doing in relating to these moral issues. Are the libertarian moral philosophy and beliefs actually held by a majority of social workers? Do even those who do accept these beliefs actually practice what they profess? We may find that in this matter, as in others, there is a real discrepancy between what is professed, particularly in the professional literature, and what is actually done in practice.

Thus a recent study of the principle of self-determination, as it is actually defined and applied by practitioners, yielded some surprising

results.[40] This ethical practice principle is almost universally touted as expressing the primary social work value, that of a person's autonomy or self-direction. The study, done in Salt Lake City, involved a respondent group that included a substantial number of religiously oriented Mormon social workers. The concept of self-determination was found to be defined and applied in greatly varied ways. In a great many instances, social workers were directive and intervened directly to influence or even "force" particular actions or decisions on the part of clients, or they intervened to prevent harm by or against clients. These interventions were explained and justified in varied ways as responsive to the needs of the particular clients and situations. But they were also explained as complying with the principle of self-determination. Many of the social workers revealed that they experienced a good deal of conflict between their personal-religious and their professional social work values, such as those about divorce or abortion. This is a rare kind of study, and much further research of this kind needs to be done.

Second, there is the task of directly facing the present fragmented state of moral philosophy and ethical practices within the social work profession. This includes being of help to the many social workers who are conflicted about the kinds of moral issues and controversial policies we have considered. It is very well to offer the principle that social workers need to give precedence to professional over personal values. But how is this to be translated in practice, aside from referring a client elsewhere because value differences would hinder the helping process? And what is to be done when the "official" professional values and policy statements are too discrepant from the personal values of the practitioner? It would be helpful for the social workers who are hurting to speak up and speak out. The nature of objections and differences should be made overt. There is a need for intraprofessional dialogue, of which there has been preciously little on this subject. Out of this dialogue we may be able to find common grounds and common purposes that will help resolve some of the present differences. We also may agree to defer taking public positions as a profession about controversial matters that do not have full consensus, particularly concerning sensitive sexual issues.

Third, we have the task of formulating and developing a social work moral philosophy that is appropriate for current social work functions and responsibilities in our present society. To implement our functions in mediating between the forces of social stability and social change, to help people balance the values and claims of self-fulfillment and social obligations, to help people have as constructive experiences as possible when they engage in deviant behavior and careers, to further social integration—these responsibilities require a philosophical rationale, a value system, and ethical practice principles that are different

from the egoistic/emotivist, individualistic psychologism that we find so deficient. There needs to be a philosophic and value base that can help resolve the conceptual and theoretical confusions identified above. Our moral philosophy also needs to be tied to a proper social psychology of personality that places and understands people, in psychosocial and ecological terms, as interrelated human beings in real-life situations.

We can profit from the extensive developmental work of this kind done in recent years in England, under the leadership of Noel Timms, involving very productive collaborative experiences between philosophers and social workers.[50] Also, some beginning efforts of this kind are under way in this country under the auspices of the Hastings Center, the proceedings of which are beginning to be published.[51] In this developmental work, it would be helpful to explore whether a utilitarian kind of moral theory, such as is espoused by Downie, though grounded more in the humanistic, pragmatic idealism of John Dewey, would be suitable for current social work practice purposes.

It is clear that the moral theory and principles that we need should reaffirm the concept and value of virtue. It should give proper emphasis to social obligations and duties as much as to rights and entitlements and confirm the intrinsic rewards of altruism and moral integrity. It should articulate an ethic of personal and social responsibility with a clear conception of commitment in marriage, within families, and between citizens. These traditional values can be reaffirmed while their meanings and applications can be reinterpreted and applied in ways that are functional and appropriate for current social conditions and societal needs.

There is a functional necessity for moral principles and ethical rules to govern our lives that ought also to be made clear and explicit. This should include a more positive understanding of the nature and constructive functions of a person's conscience. More than the Freudian superego, the conscience reinforces and sanctions normative conduct through enhanced self-esteem, as well as through guilt and shame. It enables a person to make use of the processes of confession, repentance, atonement, and reparation and helps people seek and obtain self-forgiveness as well as forgiveness from one's community.

The concepts of norms and of deviance—perhaps even of sin in secular as well as religious terms—merit reaffirmation. It is of interest to note the remarkable amount of attention given to the old-fashioned concept of sin in the past few years by Karl Menninger, a psychiatrist; Stanford Lyman, a sociologist; Mary Silver and John Sabini, psychologists; Henry Fairlie, a journalist; and Andrew Greeley, a social scientist and Catholic priest.[52] It soon may be possible to speak directly of pride, envy, greed, sloth, lust, and gluttony, instead of reducing their meanings to mere symptoms of mental disorder

Formulating a social work moral philosophy requires us to operationalize and test it out in practice. This means operationalizing its elements, stating the values in propositional form as behavior principles, and in the form of ethical practice principles that guide social worker helping actions.[53] With such specific and tested propositions, we can more directly help people deal with their moral and ethical conflicts in ways that make for a more humane and effective helping practice. Clients can better be helped to make valid moral choices by considering real-life alternatives and to integrate their personal conduct for their own and the communal "good." For example, Setleis has suggested that we ask clients "What is your obligation?" as a way of helping them make more valid life choices.[54] Leader has called for more attention in family therapy to matters of family responsibility on the part of the individual family members.[55] Rosenfeld urges that we help the collective as well as its individual members by following such principles as that actions should benefit both, and by promoting the individual's good in terms of the person's membership in the collective.[56] Strean and Hartman emphasize the social worker's responsibility to strengthen family life and unity.[57]

Finally, there are tasks to be undertaken within social work education and in staff development programs for the social services. This seems to be a good time to restore to the social work curriculum the needed content on social work philosophy. Courses on the history and philosophy of social work used to be required as part of the core social work professional curriculum. It seems necessary today to return to such an educational practice. Several efforts to renew the teaching of values and ethics are appearing in our literature.[58] It might also be helpful to require every social work graduate to know and publicly accept the obligations of the social work Code of Ethics.

Conclusions

This paper began with the hope that we could discuss this difficult subject without losing our way in being either libertarian or moralistic. We have considered that social workers used to be regarded as moral agents of the community and were noted for their idealistic moral vision, integrity, and authority. In recent years, the moral philosophy of social work has been splintered, with deep divisions within the profession about value and moral issues. Also, social workers are being attacked as amoral or immoral people. This situation requires direct consideration on our part and the formulation of a considered response.

It is helpful to recognize that there are some social workers who profess what are considered by many people in our society to be immoral views. As a profession, social workers have high ethical standards and a high degree of moral integrity. Social workers historically have fought for changes in moral and ethical beliefs and social practices. But today the issues involve marked dissent from traditional and deeply ingrained moral beliefs about family integrity and responsibility, and or they involve very sensitive and controversial sociosexual matters, such as about unwed parenthood or homosexuality. As in the general society, so also within the social work profession, there are great differences and bitter disputes about the validity of the new libertarian morality. In addition, a substantial number of social workers are having difficulty with the increased discrepancies between their personal moral beliefs and the official and public positions taken by the profession on several of these controversial issues.

We have examined certain neglected notions about morality and ethics, virtue and sin, concepts that merit concerted attention in social work thinking. We have also examined certain features of the libertarian moral philosophy that seem dominant in the social work literature and in social work education. The individualist and mental health ethics; the moral relativism and the rejection of basic values and norms; the belief that individuals, including children, should freely choose their own values; the overemphasis on sociocultural diversity along with a depreciation of social integration—these are features that express much conceptual and moral confusion. They contribute as well to ineffectiveness in practice and to the loss of public support that social work has suffered in recent years.

These negative effects make it more difficult for social workers to carry out their basic societal functions: to serve as mediators between the forces of social stability and social change and to help people with their social problems and dysfunctioning, as well as with the deviant behavior and interaction patterns associated with their dysfunctioning. These effects also make it more difficult for social workers to maintain their necessary roles as accepting, caring, tolerant, and supportive agents of society, who aid people to accomplish their developmental tasks, and to negotiate, avoid, or recover from critical life events and situations.

We then identified a number of tasks for us to undertake in order to help us regain a needed consensual moral vision and integrity, as well as a greater degree of professional unity. Open dialogue about these moral issues is a necessity. It would help for us to have a fuller understanding about what practitioners actually believe and what they are actually doing in practice with regard to morality and ethics. It also would help for us to formulate, develop a clear rationale for, and test an appropriate and valid moral philosophy for social work practice

This should be operationalized so as to be capable of directly assisting clients to deal with their moral dilemmas and conflicts and to make viable moral choices.

Such a moral philosophy, with a validated set of ethical behavior and practice principles, can better assist clients to balance the claims of personal and societal responsibilities and to act for their own and the common good. In addition, it would help for the profession to reestablish content and courses on social work philosophy and ethics in social work education and to give greater personal meaning and value to the profession's Code of Ethics.

When Henry Fairlie was asked what led him to write a book about the Seven Deadly Sins, he replied, "I think there is a desperate need for us to recover the big words, to talk about the big things. We need to be able to talk again of Glory, of High Adventure, of Virtue, of the Sublime, of Love, and so of Sin."[9] And because this also is our desperate need, we should talk about these big things as well.

Notes

A short earlier version of this paper was presented at the NASW Professional Symposium, Philadelphia, November 19, 1981.

1. Nathan E. Cohen, *Social Work in the American Tradition* (New York: Dryden Press, 1958), pp. 1–15.

2. Geoffrey Pearson ("Making Social Workers," in *Radical Social Work*, ed. Roy Bailey and Mike Brake [London: Edward Arnold, 1975], pp. 13–45) describes social workers in these terms, though he does not actually categorize this behavior as "immoral."

3. This moral task and role for social work is clearly stated in such early works as John MacCunn, *Ethics of Social Work* (London: Constable, 1911), and Bernard Bosanquet, *Social and International Ideals* (London: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1917). Also Lula Jean Elliott, *Social Work Ethics* (New York: American Association of Social Workers, 1931).

4. Charles Frankel, "The Moral Framework of Welfare," in *Welfare and Wisdom*, ed. John S. Morgan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966), pp. 147–61.

5. Nathan E. Cohen, "Social Conscience and Social Work," in National Conference of Social Work, *The Social Welfare Forum, 1963* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 128–42.

6. Charles S. Levy, *Social Work Ethics* (New York: Human Sciences Press, 1976).

7. Max Siporin, *Introduction to Social Work Practice* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1975), pp. 84–90. A classic paper on this moral activity in the social work helping process is by Dorothy Emmet, "Ethics and the Social Worker," *British Journal of Psychiatric Social Work* 6, no. 4 (1962): 165–72; there she provides some particularly helpful advice on how to help clients make moral-ethical decisions.

8. Nicholas M. Ragg, "Respect for Persons and Social Work: Social Work as Doing Philosophy," in *Social Welfare: Why and How?* ed. Noel Timms (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), pp. 211–32. See also his *People Not Cases* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977).

9. Jane Addams, *Democracy and Social Ethics* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1902).

10. On this positive public acceptance and support for social work, see James Leiby, "Social Work and Social History," *Social Service Review* 43 (1969): 310–18.

11 This statement was made by Betty Spencer, in a consultation letter, *Practice Digest* 3, no 2 (September 1980) 29

12 See, e g , the policy statements on these subjects reported in the *NASW News* vol 26 (July 1981)

13 "The NASW Code of Ethics" is presented in *Social Work* 25, no 3 (1980) 184–88 On the individualistic orientation in this new Code of Ethics, see Elizabeth Howe "Public Professions and the Private Model of Professionalism," *Social Work* 25, no (1980)· 179–91

14 For example, Raymond Mark Berger, "An Advocate Model for Intervention with Homosexuals," *Social Work* 22, no 4 (1977)· 280–83 On support of single parenthood see Alvin L Schorr and Phyllis Moen, "The Single Parent and Public Policy," *Society* 6 no 5 (1979) 15–21 On support of the new libertarian morality, see Morton S Stanz and Helen F Cohen, "The Impact of Social Change on the Practitioner," *Social Casework* 61 (1980) 400–406

15 Roland G Meinert, "Values in Social Work Called a Dysfunctional Myth," *Journal of Social Welfare* 6, no 3 (Spring 1980) 5–16 An amoralist social worker technically would be one who wants to and does help people in their need but does not act as a moral agent This amoralist type is discussed by Bernard Williams, *Morality* (New York Harper & Row, 1971), pp 1–12

16 Allan C Carlson, "Families, Sex and the Liberal Agenda," *The Public Interest* 58 (1980) 62–79 Other family-marital counselors and mental health workers, in addition to social workers, have been faulted for contributing to marital and family instability See, e g , Christopher Lasch, *Haven in a Heartless World* (New York Basic Books, 1977) Carlfred Broderick, "Fathers," *Family Coordinator* 26 (1977) 269–75, Gerald L Leslie, "Personal Values, Professional Ideologies, and Family Specialists A New Look," ibid 28 (1979) 157–62

17 Dale G Hardman, "Not with My Daughter You Don't!" *Social Work* 20, no 4 (1975) 278–85

18 Paul M Glick, "Individualism, Society, and Social Work," *Social Casework* 58 (1977) 379–84, Lois Glasser and Paul Glasser, "Hedonism and the Family Conflict in Values *Journal of Marriage and Family Counseling* 3 (1977) 11–18, Herbert S Strean, "The Contemporary Family and the Responsibilities of the Social Worker in Direct Practice *Journal of Jewish Communal Service* 41, no 1 (1979) 40–49

19 Levy, *Social Work Ethics*, p 112 He makes this same suggestion in his paper on "Personal versus Professional Values The Practitioner's Dilemma," *Clinical Social Work Journal* 4 (1976) 110–20

20 Such an approach has been explicitly urged, e g , by Nancy Humphreys, then president of the NASW, in the *NASW News* (26 [May 1981] 2), in declaring that personal values should be subordinated in the profession's fight against discrimination and oppression, this professional goal is not at issue

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(London George Allen & Unwin, 1961), pp 145–65, and *Insight and Responsibility* (New York W W Norton, Inc , 1964), pp 111–57

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25 John Dewey and James H Tufts, *Ethics* (New York Henry Holt & Co , 1926), p 38

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27 Paul Tillich, "Existentialism Psychotherapy, and the Nature of Man," in *The Nature of Man*, ed Simon Doniger (New York Harper & Bros , 1962), pp 42–52

28 Paul Tillich, *Morality and Beyond* (New York Harper & Row, 1963), p 18

29 Siporin (*Introduction to Social Work Practice*, pp 71–78 and 93–115) discusses ethical practice principles, as well as distinctions between moral behavior theory and practice theory and between ethical and technical practice principles

30 F S Simey, *The Concept of Love in Child Care* (London National Children's Home, 1960), p 26 On the shift to secular social work and its meaning, see Martin E Marty, "Social Service Godly and Godless," *Social Service Review* 54 (1980) 463–81, and Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Contribution of Religion to Social Work* (New York Columbia University Press, 1932)

31 See these critical assertions made by several authors in Willard Gaylin et al , *Doing Good* (New York Pantheon Books, 1978) For a helpful rebuttal, see Nathan Glazer, "The Attack on the Professions," *Commentary* 66, no 5 (November 1978) 34–41

32 For recent surveys and studies that identify these changes, see Alex Inkeles ("American Perceptions," *Change* 9, no 8 [1977] 25–32), who reports that while there is a greater tolerance of diversity and deviance in social life, the "consumption ethic has replaced the Protestant ethic" See also Daniel Yankelovich, *New Rules Searching for Self-Fulfillment in a World Turned Upside Down* (New York Random House, 1981) This survey is a sequel to his prior work, *The New Morality* (New York McGraw-Hill Book Co , 1974) See also Joseph Veroff, Elizabeth Douvan, and Richard A Kulka, *The Inner American* (New York Basic Books, 1981)

33. Social workers as fool, hero, and villain social types are discussed in Max Siporin, "Social Work Humor," mimeographed (Albany School of Social Welfare State University of New York at Albany, 1982)

34 The quoted phrase is given in MacIntyre (n 23 above), p 209 What follows is a summary of his argument in pp 190–237 For a helpful criticism of individualism in social work from a Marxist point of view, see Paul Corrigan and Peter Leonard, *Social Work Practice under Capitalism* (London Macmillan Publishing Co , 1978), pp 109–13

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38 Downie, p 30

39 Christopher Lasch, *The Culture of Narcissism* (New York W W Norton & Co , 1979)

40 This trend is well presented and discussed in Richard Sennett, *The Fall of Public Man* (New York Alfred A. Knopf, Inc , 1977), Theodore Roszak, *Person/Planet* (Garden City, N Y Doubleday & Co., 1978) Peter Berger, *Facing Up to Modernity* (New York Basic Books, 1977)

41 Charles Frankel, "The Impact on Changing Values on the Family," *Social Casework* 57 (1976). 355–65

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43 The writings of Thomas Szasz are particularly cogent on this subject See, e g his "The Mental Health Ethic," in *Ethics and Society*, ed Richard T DeGeorge (Garden City, N Y Doubleday & Co., 1966), pp. 85–110, and *The Myth of Psychotherapy* (Garden City, N Y Doubleday & Co , 1979).

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50 See the books edited and coedited by Timms in n 21 above

51. Frederic G Reamer and Marcia Abramson, *The Teaching of Social Work Ethics* (Hastings-on-Hudson, N Y Hastings Center, 1982)

52 Henry Fairlie, *The Seven Deadly Sins Today* (Washington, D C New Republic Books, 1978), Andrew M Greeley, *The Devil, You Say!* (Garden City, N Y Doubleday & Co , 1974), Stanford M Lyman, *The Seven Deadly Sins* (New York St Martin's Press 1978), Karl Menninger, *Whatever Became of Sin?* (New York Hawthorn Books, 1973) Maury Silver and John Sabini, *The Moralities of Everyday Life* (New York Oxford University Press, 1982). In addition, there are a flock of very popular novels that have been published with the word "sin" in the title, including Andrew M Greeley, *The Cardinal Sins* (New York. Warner Books, 1981)

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55 Arthur L Leader, "The Notion of Responsibility in Family Therapy," *Social Casework* 50 (1979) 131–37

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57 Strean (n 18 above), Ann L. Hartman, "The Family A Central Focus for Practice," *Social Work* 26 (1981)· 7–13

58 A fine example of such a teaching program is by Paul Amons, "Inservice Training in Social Work Values," *Child Welfare* 58 (1979) 659–64. Recent textbooks are by Frank Lowenberg and Ralph Dolgoff, *Ethical Decisions for Social Work Practice* (Itasca, Ill F. E. Peacock Publishers, 1982), and Frederic G Reamer, *Ethical Dilemmas in Social Service* (New York. Columbia University Press, 1982).

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Cognitive Approaches to Direct Practice

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The role of cognition in direct practice is gaining increasing interest and application. Cognitive practice is not a new fad, rather, it is the product of the development of ideas about human thought that have been in the making for over three centuries. Current models of cognitive practice represent two different orientations to the nature of human thought—one mediational, the other phenomenological. It is shown that each model has distinct implications for the methods and outcomes of practice.

The recent surge of books and articles on cognitive practice is indicative of a growing regard among the helping professions for the theories and roles of cognition in direct practice. In many quarters, cognitive approaches are hailed as a revolutionary advance in the way human problems may be understood and resolved. In psychiatry, for instance, Beck offers cognitive therapy as a radical alternative to the speculative and long-term nature of traditional psychodynamic orientations.[1] In psychology, Dember proclaims that his field has "gone cognitive" in a revolutionary way.[2] Social work as well is not without its advocates for a cognitive approach to practice. Fischer includes this approach among others that he believes will contribute to the coming "revolution in social work."[3] In accord with a competence and adaptational model of change, Fleming sees cognition as central to the various dimensions of social work practice that are aimed at achieving these goals.[4] And within a social learning model, Goldstein provides a comprehensive

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framework for the role of perception and cognition in the unitary processes of practice.[5]

The current interest in cognition is no doubt greater than the extent to which cognitive principles are being used in present-day practice. Nonetheless, the growing concern of the profession with the more conscious and volitional factors in adaptation (as evidenced in ecological, task-oriented, and problem-solving models) promises that a cognitive orientation will assume an increasingly important role in social work practice. The major purpose of this article is to provide a perspective on and clarification of the nature of cognitivism, its derivations, and its implications for practice. In addition, I want to show that a cognitive approach to practice is not just another new fad or set of appealing techniques that can be slotted among a so-called eclectic assortment of other therapeutic contrivances. Other characteristics of what cognitivism is not constitute the following outline, which serves as an introduction to the balance of this essay.

First, the recent emergence of cognitivism in the field of planned change does not constitute a revolution. As the culmination and refinement of centuries of scholarly thought and debate about the mind and its deliberative, reality-making faculties, it is evolutionary.

Similarly, cognitivism is not a unique product of a particular innovator or theorist. Rather, its advent more closely resembles what Kuhn terms a paradigmatic shift.[6] As such, it represents a growing movement of a community of practitioners and theorists away from a particular constellation of beliefs and practices toward another distinct constellation—in this case, the beliefs, theories, and procedures that comprise the cognitive model.

It is, therefore, not a school or system of change in its own right. Although Ellis's rational-emotive therapy or Beck's cognitive therapy are popularly accepted modalities and do attract a number of followers, it will be seen that these approaches are stylistic, personal, and, to some extent, theoretical variations on a broader theme. In this regard, it will be shown that cognition, while central to a specific orientation to practice, also plays a key role in most of the traditional therapies.

However cognitive practice is defined, it is not a uniform approach. This approach allows for individual differences on the part of practitioners and thus much freedom in the way it is applied. In addition to the opportunities it provides for personal expression, two contrasting sets of theories about cognition support and justify two different models of cognitive practice—each with its own implications for the roles, goals, and procedures of practice.

It is probably more precise to think of cognitive approaches as educational rather than therapeutic since their aim is not to cure or treat. Instead, the intent is to involve clients in a learning experience that, on one dimension, may be concerned with immediate matters

of self-regulation and effective problem solving and, on another, with the broader questions of the principles, ethics, values, and choices of living.

To clear up some misconceptions, the interest in cognitive faculties is not restricted to the intellectual and analytic functions of consciousness. To the contrary, cognition encompasses the enigmatic as well as the observable functions of the mind—forms of consciousness that express imagery, sentience, intuition, vicarious experiencing, and so on. Moreover, the common tendency to view cognition, affect, and behavior as separable features of personality is artificial and unrepresentative of the essential unity of the human state. Emotions are incomprehensible without some kind of cognitive designation, vague though it may be; cognitions are empty of meaning without reference to their emotional energies, and behavior would appear random if its cognitive motives and emotional force were absent.

In summary, what we refer to as cognition is basically an explanatory construct used to refer to an array of subjective functions of the mind about which we have very little demonstrative evidence. It embodies all that we know about ourselves and our world—past, present, and future. In this sense, it is our inner map of reality as we have constructed it. This knowledge is both explicit and tacit.[7] The former is what we know we know and includes the accumulation of facts, ideas, attitudes, beliefs, judgments, and premises that can be shared and articulated with others and generally understood in their conventional meanings. Tacit knowledge, on the other hand, is knowing what we cannot tell—the cues, hunches, images, or "gut feelings" that arise into consciousness when something is actually experienced. To put this another way, explicit knowledge represents our grasp of things, whereas tacit knowledge is our sense of things.

Another characteristic of cognition is its intentional function. A fundamental human need is the kind of security that comes from the ability to escape the panic of ignorance or confusion by creating or discovering meaning. Hence, our cognitive faculties purposefully strive to create sense out of non-sense, order out of confusion, clarity out of mystery, and reality out of ambiguity. These faculties include the ability to perceive, recall, and compare past events with the present, and to ascribe meanings, evaluate, and otherwise convert experiences into personally comprehensible forms and symbols. As a social mechanism, cognition also makes possible some sort of intelligent interaction and exchange with others—or just as likely, the occasion for dissension and strife.

A cognitive approach to practice is therefore concerned with the patterned ways in which clients construct and give meaning to their individual versions of reality. It is assumed that one's judgment and interpretation of reality will govern how one deals with that reality.

The intent of this approach is to enable clients to add to, revise, authenticate, or enlarge on what they know and believe; to reflect on their basic premises about themselves, their values, and their place in their world; to sharpen their perceptions; to risk emotion and action; and, in general, to clear up misconceptions that block the attainment of a more effective existence.

To begin to fill out the contours of the preceding, it is important, first, to glance backward briefly to detect where, within mankind's enduring search for the meaning of the mind, the roots of modern cognitivism first took hold. This is something more than a matter of curiosity; we will see that contradictory ideas about the nature of mind, set forth some 300 years ago, broke the ground for two divergent explanations of consciousness—explanations that are still with us and that continue to influence our approach to working with human problems.

Roots of Modern Cognitivism

Any attempt to distill even a trace of the exquisite arguments woven by earlier philosophers of the mind clearly will fall short of its goal. Yet something must be said about these ideas, if only to underscore the point that many of the beliefs we now hold about the mind (often with question or doubt), as well as the current disputes about which paradigm of cognition is most accurate, are indeed reiterations of much older beliefs.

Where to start? We could consider the ancient Chinese ideas of I'a Chi and Yin and Yang, since they have much to say about the nature of wisdom, how it is gained, and how the totality of experience is taken in by the mind. Or, it would be possible to move forward many centuries and learn from Plato's dialogues, principally the *Meno*, how he sought to discover the way the mind grasps the concepts of things (e.g., virtue) that cannot be directly known, observed, or touched. Plato asks: Do we possess within ourselves a universal knowledge which allows us to understand the world, or must knowledge be gained cumulatively through a series of experiences? As we will see, more recent theories attempt to deal with either the belief that knowing begins from inside the mind or that outside experience is the source of inner knowledge, but neither set of theories truly solves Plato's question.

It was in the Age of Enlightenment that philosophers first attacked these questions in a disciplined and scientific fashion and, as a result, provided theories of the mind that have become the enduring anchors of our ideas about perception and cognition. As Engell observes, "The

istory of creative imagination from 1660 to 1820 was a human drama nfolding by stages. Seldom in Western culture has one idea excited many leading minds for such a stretch of time. It became the npelling force in artistic and intellectual life, in literature and phisophy, and even in much political and social thought from 1750 1.[8] Two major schools of thought—first, the British empiricists, and en the German romanticists—distinguished this age and created o tracks of contradictory ideas that, over time, led to our modern theories of cognition. The empiricists, disputing the Cartesian notion that man's rationality, freed of error, will lead to perfect knowledge, argued that the mind itself could not be trusted. Only the senses are the instruments by which humans could have access to knowledge; simply put, it is through direct experience with the things around us that we can come to know. According to Locke, the mind is a receptive organ, a mirror of reality; it is thus incapable of producing any ideas other than those stimulated by the objects and events encountered in experience. Here, then, are the origins of an empirical and behavioristic psychology of the mind.

The German romanticists, including Tetens, Kant, and Fichte, after studying the British philosophers, came to a polar point of view. Contradicting the notion of the mind as a barren, reactive receptor of stimuli, they gave an account of the mind as an exquisitely resourceful realm of imaginative ideas, capable of fashioning its own idiosyncratic version of reality. The mind has many levels of thought that are able to reorder and transpose perceived images of the world into forms that bear little resemblance to the original event. Fancy, imagination, artistry, poetry, religious experience, and a visionary sense are all products of the higher levels of the human mind. Not only can we recreate reality in myriad forms, we are bound to do so. In Kant's terms, the world as we know it cannot replicate the world as it is "out there." Each of us possesses certain innate categories of the mind which, in the process of perception, are imposed on the objects of the real world, thereby converting them into uniquely personal images. It is not the mind that conforms to things, but things that conform to the mind. Here, then, are the origins of a phenomenological and personal psychology of the mind.

These two tracks of thought, the objective-reactive of the empiricists and the subjective-proactive of the romanticists, alternately dominated the subsequent development of the field concerned with the study of the mind. Buss sees these tracks constituting "psychological revolutions in terms of a transformation of the subject-object relationship."[9] Prevailing theories of human behavior in successive eras alternated between two paradigms: the person constructs reality, or reality constructs the person. Revolutions in psychological theory thus involved either a shift from the former to the latter or vice versa. In subsequent discussion,

the objective-reactive position will be called the "mediational" vie
in which cognition is defined as an intervening variable that proces
the input of outer stimuli and, in turn, affects the output of emotion
or behavioral expression. The subjective-reactive position will be call
the "phenomenological" view, in which the mind, quite apart fr
the influence of outer stimuli, is able to create its own reality or ph
nomena in accord with its own constructs and interpretations

The "psychological revolutions" to which Buss refers began at t
end of the nineteenth century with the structuralist school Accordi
to the doctrines of this school, mental associations are created by t
effects of outer stimuli—a position that is clearly reminiscent of t
empiricist view. The gestaltists that followed shifted their inquiries
human introspection and the inner forces (e.g., motivation, beli
memory) that tend to shape the person's conceptions of reality Ne
came the Watsonian behaviorists, who jettisoned the idea of co
sciousness entirely in favor of an objective, scientific study of behav

Psychoanalysis, the antithetical partner at the time of behaviorism
attempted to embrace both the subjective and objective modes in
study and treatment of mental disorders. In one respect, psychoanaly
radicalized Western thinking about the irrational and subjective si
of the human mind by creating an image of man as composed
virtually boundless subjective forces. At the same time, the psychoanaly
study of the more arcane depths of the mind was rooted in the objecti
detached, scientific method by which the physician-scientist maintain
a neutral and dispassionate distance from his patient.

The dynasties of classical behaviorism and psychoanalysis were r
less vulnerable to countervailing systems of thought. Following Wor
War II, Bruner and his associates initiated their studies of percepti
and cognition which, over the ensuing years, have deepened our u
derstanding of the role of consciousness in learning, education, a
adaptation.[10] George Kelly's theory of personal constructs explain
how the individual deals with his immediate encounters with the wor
by creating cognitive interpretations derived out of past experienc
such personal constructs enable the person to cope with what wou
otherwise be a baffling world.[11] Theories of language also flourishe
and included semantics, which show how the meanings that are ascribe
to words color thought and action, and the pragmatics of communicatio
which reveal the persuasive nature of language in the exchange betwee
people. The limits of space permit no more than brief reference to
sampling of burgeoning theories over the past few decades that un
derscored the role of consciousness: the elaboration of Mead's earlie
theory of symbolic interaction, Piaget's evolutionary rationalism, a
tribution theory, expectation theory, and further refinements in cogniti
theory. One additional theory deserves brief attention—a conceptio
of the mind that is so captivating that, judging by the recent effusio

of books and articles, it runs the risk of becoming yet another fad. I am speaking of what is variously termed the "bicameral mind," the "bimodal brain," or, simply, left and right hemispheric modes of thinking. It is now evident that thought is of two forms: left-brain thinking that is analytic, object based, and limited to the boundaries of language and rationality, and right-brain thinking that is diffuse, intuitive, symbolic, able to capture wholes and relations, and is not bound by logic or rationality. I wonder: Does this new conception of the brain and mind bring us full circle by casting the work of the Enlightenment philosophers in a new light? Unwittingly, were the disputes of the empiricists and romanticists really rudimentary attempts to say something about the faculties of either the left or right hemispheres—the former elaborating the receptive, analytic, and ideational attributes of the left brain, the latter explaining the more imaginal, creative, and intuitive capabilities of the right? Did these scholars intuitively sense what we know now with greater certainty?

The Role of Cognition in Social Work Practice

It is safe to say that these objective-subjective shifts in theories of the mind had only a peripheral effect on the development of social work practice theory. As an applied social science, social work, over a good span of its development, was focused more on the development of skill and technique rather than on a theoretical base. Moreover, the methodological roots of the profession—that is, casework and group work—tended to conserve the practical nature of existing educational and service-delivery programs. With its attractions to the closed system of Freudian psychology, social work was further inclined to resist the appeal of other theoretical positions.

Nonetheless, I believe that it can be shown that social work practice has indeed taken a more subjective and cognitive course over the past three or four decades. Apparently, this shift has occurred in a rather oblique fashion, since one will find very little reference to such concepts as perception, cognition, intention, and thought processes in most social work literature. The idea of consciousness has received considerable mention but more often than not is used in contradistinction to "unconsciousness" without much elaboration of its own qualities.

Paradoxically, it is possible to begin this argument by pointing to the profession's fascination with the sub- and unconscious mind during the reign of the Freudian diagnostic school of practice in the decades of the thirties and forties. Caseworkers at that time were admonished not to dabble in the psychoanalyst's domain of the unconscious and

to refrain from dealing directly with the forces of transference, resistan and repression. Although sensitive to the potency of these hidd motives, workers assumed guardianship of the more conscious a cognitive realms of their clients' lives, thereby entering into their clier world of daily experiences of coping, planning, and thinking

In the latter part of this same period, we do find something resembl a paradigmatic shift as a faction within the profession identified its with a Rankian-based functional school of practice. Even a casu reading of the school's axioms reveals the extent to which it was antithetical response to the diagnostic faction. The writings of Smalle Taft, Robinson, Phillips, and others contradict the determining powe of the unconscious mind and, in effect, give prominence to the creati and growth-producing potentials of the conscious mind.[12] A numb of cognitive equivalents are evident in the functionalist's doctrin the central concept of Will that refers to the person's ability to mobili one's self toward the attainment of a desired end, the deliberate u of time to arouse an awareness of motivation, the focus on the immedi present as the arena for mindful change, and the purposeful foc on the active processes occurring within the helping relationship

Alternatively, the adherents of the diagnostic school adapted t ego-psychology theories of Hartmann, Erikson, Horney, and An Freud to their work with their clients' problems of living. Hartmann concept of the "autonomous functions of the ego"[13] gave greater e phasis to the ego's conscious ability to master cognitive tasks than the force of intrapsychic drives. Thus, in the work of Hamilton a Hollis, casework is seen as a "corrective experience" that involves t client's positive identification with the worker (a cognitive form modeling and vicariation) and the modification of the client's repetiti dysfunctional themes of living.[14]

Subsequently, Perlman's problem-solving approach attempted achieve a measure of rapport between the diagnostic and function methods.[15] The accent on conscious processes is clearly evident her The focus of the approach is on the problem "consciously brough by the client and the client's ability to mobilize and reflect on the sel and the disparities between his perceptions and his reality

In 1965, Werner's book, *A Rational Approach to Social Casework* marked the first explicit step toward a cognitive orientation to soci work practice. Based on the work of Adler, Ellis, Maslow, and Ma this book rejected the concept of the unconscious and stressed th significance of conscious thought as the determinant of emotion motives, and behavior. Since the nature of one's thought is directl related to one's life-style and goals, changes in the former will evok modifications in the latter.

The decade of the seventies can be characterized by an escalatin interest in conscious processes. The profession's attraction to genera

systems theory was a consummation of its commitment to the social component of persons' existence. By implication, it underscored the conscious and cognitive elements in the relations between people and their social environment. The complementary concept of role performance, for example, points to the awareness of one's obligations in relation to others' expectations. During this period, Goldstein's social learning framework outlined the logical steps in problem solving requiring a heightened awareness of the problem itself, necessary information, possible alternative solutions, and an evaluation of outcomes.[17] The task-centered approach of Reid and Epstein, although not committed to any one theory, is clearly cognitive in orientation, based as it is on the client's ability to define his problem, set priorities, and work out solutions.[18] The life model of social work practice, designed by Germain and Gitterman, draws directly on Bruner's earlier work on the mental representations of reality and emphasizes the central role of cognition in the decision-making and problem-solving abilities of clients.[19] This brief and certainly not exhaustive inventory would be incomplete without some reference to the profession's eager adoption of family and group methods of practice. In most instances, these modes of practice are invested in the immediacy of interpersonal relationships and are directed to the cognitive meanings implicit in the rules, goals, values, and norms of the participants in interaction.

Two points are proposed by this survey of the recent developments in practice. First, cognitivism is indeed not revolutionary. What can be said about it is that, in contrast with its previous implicit role in theory and practice, it is now enjoying a more explicit role as practitioners have come to regard consciousness, thought, reflectiveness, and other cognitive functions as critical media for change. Whether these mental processes are subsumed under such concepts as autonomous ego, will, symbolic representation, or expectation, they are indicative of a growing appreciation of the ingenuity of the human mind to redefine former versions of reality, to extract new meanings out of experience, to reevaluate long-held premises, to regulate behavior, and in other ways modify old patterns dealing with problems of living.

Second, it seems more accurate to think of cognitivism as an orientation to people and their problems rather than as a distinct method or type of practice. Despite the fact that cognitive approaches have become organized into systems of therapy that are identified with one author or another (e.g., Ellis, Raimy, Beck), cognition can be seen as playing a central role in most forms of planned change, once its functions are understood. If we were to examine the generic characteristics of direct practice, suspending for the moment either its theoretical bias (e.g., psychodynamic or behaviorist), its modality (e.g., casework or group work), or its designation (reality therapy or gestalt)—we would discover a number of cognitive factors in operation. First, each system or method

has its own explanatory framework that is offered to the client in one way or another as a new means of understanding the problem, its causes, possible goals, and so on. In the process of assimilating this framework, the client will gain a new cognitive map—or another way of perceiving and comprehending experience. Second, the interactive and essentially dialectic nature of the helping relationship induces the client to reexamine, reflect on, and perhaps redefine his formerly dependable assumptions. As feelings and their meanings, imputed causes, or ethical dilemmas are reconsidered, some measure of cognitive reorientation results. And, if it is assumed that thinking, feeling, and acting make up an irreducible whole, then the active experience of risking new solutions to old problems tends to enlarge the breadth and depth of the client's cognitive talents.

Beyond these generic characteristics, a cognitive orientation differs from traditional models of practice in some important ways. For example, where a psychodynamic model relies on the inferences that need to be made about antecedent causes and the influence of deeper motives, conflicts, defenses, and the like, a cognitive view attempts to understand the client in his immediate situation by taking account of the meanings of his perceptions, motives, and intentions. Although the concern is with the present as the client defines it and the future as the client envisions it, the past is not ignored. However, rather than defining the client's prior experiences as deterministic influences on his present life, they are appreciated as constructs selectively created by the client for some purpose. In other words, anyone's reported history is a necessary fiction of sorts used to explain what the person believes needs explaining. Hence, what really happened in the past is of less consequence than why the event is being reported and how this report helps reveal something about the client's assumptions about the cause of his difficulties, his personal responsibility, and other meanings that bear on his current adaptation.

Perhaps the most important difference between a cognitive orientation (particularly in its phenomenological form) and traditional practice models has to do with the preferred outcomes of the helping experience. For the most part, the latter aims for a return to or the achievement of some measure of stability or equilibrium on the client's part; how stability is defined will vary from model to model. But as Riegel tries to show, stability and consistency are not necessarily the hallmarks of the secure and vital person.[20] Balance, consistency, or any other terms that tend to fix the person into some kind of constant or uniform state are hardly relevant to a world that shifts between ambiguity and chaos. The stable periods of living, the occasional plateaus, are usually short-lived—if not illusory. In day-to-day living, we are constantly beset by challenges to our security and beliefs—in our relationships, in the economic and political climate, in the intrusion of unforeseen events

and certainly in numerous smaller-scale occurrences. Hence, the goal of cognitive practice is to enable the client to contend with these contradictions of living. To be something more than a survivor, one needs to discover one's resiliency, inventiveness, and strength in the endeavor to exploit rather than react to the risks and vicissitudes of a genuine existence. A proactive rather than a reactive approach to living is thus the valued goal.

Two Models of Cognitive Practice

Referring to cognitivism as an orientation, I have illustrated some selected principles that, in an abstract sense, serve as common guides to practice. The emerging literature on cognitive approaches, however, reveals some critical differences in how these principles are actually translated into working systems and procedures of direct practice. Some of these differences reflect certain personal and stylistic variations or contrasts in focus. Ellis's rational emotive therapy, for example, centers on the absolute beliefs people cling to and the things they tell themselves that together impede a more rewarding life.[21] Raimy, in turn, defines the basic task as the achievement of greater accuracy where reality is concerned by a change in the client's misconceptions.[22]

Beyond these interpretive differences, however, two other divergent models of cognitive practice are clearly evident. Each corresponds to one side of the ongoing objectivity versus subjectivity polemic described earlier concerning whether the person is essentially reactive to his world of experience or whether that world is created by the mind of the person. The first position, emphasizing man's reactive nature, is consonant with a mediational cognitive approach. Here cognition is defined as the intervening variable within what can roughly be described as an information-processing system: cognitive processes are responsive to external inputs and, in modifying these inputs, generate consequent behavioral or emotional outputs. At the same time, cognition comprises the store of past experiences and their meanings which have become transposed into rules regulating how the person will interpret and respond to the particular input. Hence, within a mediational perspective, cognition is explained in linear terms: (*a*) an external condition or event excites cognitive operations that produce a particular response, and (*b*) these cognitive operations are causally linked to the interpretation of past experiences.

The second position emphasizing proactivity is consonant with a phenomenological cognitive approach. Here cognition itself is seen as the determinant—its intentional, selective, and interpretive qualities

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are not only able to ascertain what is outside but also to process wh[at]
that outside means. The implications of past experience are not di[s]-
regarded; however, the person is not bound by set definitions of pa[st]
experience since he is capable of reflecting on these experiences i[n]
any number of contradictory ways. Hence, within a phenomenologic[al]
perspective, cognitive processes can be explained in dialectical term[s]:
(*a*) transactionally, the existence of the event is deduced by cognition
which in turn endows that event with meaning, and (*b*) the person['s]
store of assumptions, derived out of his interpretations of past ex-
perience, can be used to endow meanings in antithetical ways.[23] Wit[h]
regard to this last point, one's belief, for example, that "I am boun[d]
to fail" can also be expressed as "I doubt that I will succeed." Or th[e]
idea "It is safer to be alone" can take the form of "It is fearful to b[e]
close." These are not insignificant semantics, since they allude eithe[r]
to the recessive or the assertive potentialities of the person rather tha[n]
to a persistent trait or characteristic.

Obviously, each of the two perspectives supports a distinct approac[h]
to cognitive practice that embodies its own set of prescriptions, tech-
niques, roles, and goals. The mediational view is basic to the emergin[g]
field of cognitive-behavior therapy and what may be termed cognitiv[e]
psychiatry. The phenomenological perspective gives its title to a cog-
nitive-phenomenological approach. The following identifies a few o[f]
the more apparent differences between the two approaches.

Although grounded in experimental psychology, cognitive behav-
iorism steps beyond the field of applied behavioral analysis, whic[h]
rejects consideration of the influence of mental processes on huma[n]
behavior. This approach stems from Bandura's social learning theory
which points to the regulatory functions of cognition. Cognition i[s]
defined as the major causal force that determines whether the indi-
vidual's interactions with his environment will be adaptive or mal-
adaptive.[24] When outer stimuli evoke perception and thought, it is the
accuracy and effectiveness of one's cognitive functions that govern
whether or not subsequent responses are appropriate. The relate[d]
cognitive model, cognitive psychiatry, is represented by Beck's mode[l]
of therapy.[25] Rather than focusing on the unconscious determinants
of behavior that are typically explored in the psychodynamic therapies,
Beck asserts that conscious meanings generate particular emotions
when cognitive processes are aroused by some external event. In this
linear sequence, stimulus ⟶ conscious meaning ⟶ emotion, these
meanings constitute one's "personal rules" which, as a mediating force,
become the focus of therapeutic intervention. Beck also moves beyond
the aforementioned adaptive-maladaptive definitions of behavior and
employs traditional psychiatric categories as a means of organizing
various types of cognitive aberrations. For example, he defines depres-

sion as a devaluation of domain and anxiety neurosis as danger to domain.

In contrast with the linear characteristics of these mediational systems of change, the cognitive-phenomenological approach is based on another type of social learning model, one that derives from an existential-dialectic conception of behavior. This approach is represented by Goldstein's explication of cognition.[26] In this model, the person is not portrayed as one who is prompted to act by conditions in his environment; rather, one's motives are indicative of the need to set personally valued goals and to move forward in the attempt to realize them. In his proactive endeavor, cognition serves a number of pivotal functions, including the attempt to create a semblance of meaning and order out of the confusion of living while at the same time maintaining a sense of identity and integrity. Within this scheme, concepts of pathology, sickness, or defect are put aside. Although the client may be regarded as one who is suffering from the kind of cognitive misconceptions or *distortions that deprive him of a more rewarding existence*, such cognitive frailties are appreciated as the client's exclusive expressions of his outworn and futile attempts to cope with his personal chaos of living. Moreover, the client is *not seen as alone in* his abortive efforts to create a meaningful existence; it is assumed that others in his system are also participating in the failure in some way.

Obviously, this brief description and comparison of the mediational and phenomenological practice models are greatly oversimplified; space and intent do not allow for the kind of development they deserve. However, it is hoped that the critical differences noted are sufficient to justify the following comparative outline of the implications of each of these models for the roles, methods, content, and goals of direct practice.

This discussion and table 1 show that within a shared emphasis on the role of cognition in shaping human beliefs about and consequent active attitudes toward the pragmatics of living, two distinct points of view coexist. One is based on theories about man's reactive nature and calls for interventions that will somehow alter the client's understanding of and response to his environment. The other is based on theories about man's innate ability to create constructs of a personal reality in order to facilitate his movement toward the ends that he envisions. Interventions, in this instance, deal with these mental constructions and aim to enhance the client's self-determination. Without minimizing the need for further study of these approaches, I would venture the belief that even closer examination of the pertinent theories and techniques would reveal that each model is merely a more sophisticated extension of the ongoing questions about how people come to "know" themselves and their world. Are we basically receptive creatures, subject

Table 1

Mediational and Phenomenological Types of Cognitive Practice

	Mediational	*Phenomenological*
Practitioner role	*Diagnostician-educator:* evaluates cognitive patterns and arranges learning experiences that will change these patterns and their affective and behavioral consequences	*Colleague:* partner in cooperative search for mean[illegible] of and solution to clien[illegible] problems of living. Probl[illegible] defined in accord with clie[illegible] construction of reality. E[illegible] pert in human relations le[illegible] ing, and change
Client's role	Expected to assume role of subject; expected to follow protocol and procedures	Colleague and partner; [illegible] pected to define personal c[illegible] mitments, values, intentions, goals. *Expert* in own [illegible] style, culture, belief system
Content focus	Symptoms of maladaptive patterns. In cognitive psychiatry, clusters of personal rules contributing to categorical dysfunctions (e.g., depression, neurosis)	Contingencies of living [illegible] cluding the helping rel[illegible] ship. Personal meanings, experiences, thought proc[illegible] and definition of self in [illegible] present, and future tim[illegible]
Techniques	Behavior modification and interventions designed to change personal distortions. Reality testing, authenticating conclusions. Modeling approaches	Educational approache[illegible] cluding Socratic dialogue, problem solving. Expand[illegible] perceptions of self and [illegible] ity. Developing principle[illegible] living
Goals	Removal of symptomatic patterns blocking adaptive behavior	The development of [illegible] integrity and a more au[illegible] onomous approach to the [illegible] mands of living

to the vagaries of the universe we inhabit? Or do we really possess a creative imagination that presses us to fabricate the universe?

Some Final Observations

In order to show that modern cognitive practice is neither a new fad nor another therapeutic gimmick, it has been necessary to cover much historical, philosophical, and theoretical ground. The risk in such an endeavor is the possibility of producing more surface rather than substantive material; yet the risk must be taken in order to show that both the mediational and phenomenological models are indeed worthwhile products of three centuries of thought about the human mind. These approaches hold the promise for changing the structure and function of conventional forms of practice. Cognitive approaches offer a practical, common-sense orientation to human problems. They are

applicable to a broad range of human problems, personal, interpersonal, environmental, family, and group. In the main, most clients can be expected to respond positively to a cognitive approach since it corresponds with their concerns about familiar, day-to-day predicaments of living. In this regard, this approach is not restricted to the "ideal" client—the person who actively seeks help, is verbal, and willingly allows himself to be socialized into the lexicon, protocols, and rules of the classical therapeutic systems. Perhaps the most important advantage of this orientation is its educational bent, insofar as it can equip the client with new ways of thinking and problem solving that can be transferred to many other aspects of living.

Some may question which cognitive approach is better, the mediational or phenomenological. I believe that, in the final analysis, the choice will depend on the practitioner's philosophy and style of practice, his or her intrinsic beliefs about people, how they change, and for what kinds of ends. Despite the centuries of deliberation and argument and the recent increase in knowledge and research, the objectivity versus subjectivity debate and its attendant questions about how people know and think remain unresolved. This is due in large part to the fact that we do not yet have access to a comprehensive and compelling theory of mind and brain. Although we have acquired some useful new insights into the functions of memory, the locus of basic emotions, certain cognitive processes, and left- and right-hemispheric relations, the nature of the mind remains a mystery. As Taylor observes, existing theories of mind and brain have failed.[27] The dualistic view that explains brain and mind as distinct entities or the monistic position that asserts that mind is just another term for brain do not succeed as useful explanations. Analogic theories are no more helpful. the computer or information-processing model is attractive but facile since it cannot explain such subjective phenomena as imagery, complex emotions, language acquisition, poetic abilities, or other creative powers. Even the conventional concepts used here—perception, recall, thought, and cognition itself—are very high-level abstractions for processes that we cannot directly identify or define. For that matter, our very own cognitive processes are not subject to explanation. As Nisbett and Wilson report, people have little or no direct introspective awareness when they attempt to explain how they arrived at particular conclusions or ideas.[28] Typically, they tend to resort to inventive causal explanations that have more to do with some preset notions rather than to actual thought processes themselves.

There is a certain excitement in these questions since they seem to anticipate some breakthroughs in our understanding of the mind—breakthroughs that may be as startling and revolutionary as those that have changed our understanding of the atom and the cosmos in this century. At the same time, these uncertainties do not diminish the

value and utility of what we do know about cognition. The state of the art is much like the state of the ordinary person's mind at any time: It is possible to use what one knows in creative and productive ways even though it is not possible to know all that can or needs to be known. As Bertrand Russell observed, "The mind is a strange machine which can combine the materials offered to it in the most astonishing ways."[29]

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A Follow-Up Study of Foster Children in Permanent Placements

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This study evaluates a demonstration project to find permanent homes for children in foster care. More children were placed in homes with prospects for permanence by the project than by regular agency services, and the placements tended to be stable. Children scoring highest on well-being measures were younger, were seen as permanently entrenched in their home, and got along well there initially. Parents of these children felt prepared for the child's arrival, knew enough about his past and felt the past had not caused problems. Whether a child was reunited with parents, adopted, or in foster care made little difference to his well-being.

During the past decade, child welfare professionals have paid increasing attention to the problem of children who remain for long periods in foster care. Foster care was designed to provide temporary substitute family care for a child when his own family could not care for him. Evidence began to accumulate during the 1950s that for most children foster care was not temporary and could last for a major part of their childhoods.[1]

In the late 1960s and early 1970s several special projects were undertaken to remedy the problem of children who stayed in foster care for many years.[2] For most, the goal was to work toward finding homes that had prospects of being permanent. The focus was to reunite children and parents. If this was not possible, adoption was the goal

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If neither of these was possible, contractual long-term foster care was sought.

This is a report of research to evaluate the results of one such project. It assesses how this project's record of case disposition compares with regular agency activity. It also assesses the stability and quality of the placements made. The demonstration project on which this study is based took place in Oregon, where selected caseworkers were trained to work intensively to find permanent homes for foster children. Children chosen for the special effort had spent at least a year in foster care, were considered adoptable, and had slim chances for reunification with their parents. In a two-year period 509 children in seventeen of Oregon's thirty-six counties were accepted by the project after a systematic screening of their histories, and they were assigned to one of fifteen caseworkers. Full project activity went on for two years, with a third year in which to complete those cases in court or on appeal. The project plan, methods, and initial results are more fully described in project reports.[3]

When the project was initiated, there was reason to wonder whether the effort would really result in more children being placed in homes that had prospects for permanence and whether such placements would be lasting and satisfying to those involved. It seemed possible that children who had spent considerable time in foster care and perhaps had experienced several foster-care placements might not be able to adjust satisfactorily to a permanent home. At the conclusion of the project, the study reported here was initiated to address these concerns.

This study consisted of a three-part evaluation of the results of the demonstration project. First, a comparison was made between a sample of project children and a sample of children handled in the routine agency manner with respect to the differences in the number returned to their parents, adopted, or remaining in foster care. This comparison was designed to find out whether project efforts resulted in finding permanent homes for more foster children. Second, the stability of placements, reunions with parents, and adoptions was investigated by determining whether these situations, once made, remained intact. Third, parents and children were interviewed to assess the quality of placements, and efforts were made to account for differences in quality.

Method

The study group ($N = 492$) consisted of random samples from the two populations of children in foster care. (1) those chosen as project

Table 2

PLACEMENT STABILITY FIFTEEN MONTHS AFTER CONCLUSION OF PROJECT

A PERMANENT PLACEMENTS

	PROJECT						NONPROJECT					
	Returned to Parent		Adoption by New Parents		Adoption by Foster Parents		Returned to Parent		Adoption by New Parents		Adoption by Foster Parents	
FOLLOW-UP STATUS	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Same home	43	80	39	100	25	93	45	90	19	100	18	82
Changed homes	11	20	0	0	2	7	5	10	0	0	4	18
Total	54	100	39	100	27	100	50	100	19	100	22	100

B FOSTER-CARE CHILDREN

	PROJECT		NONPROJECT	
FOLLOW-UP STATUS	N	%	N	%
Same home	55	40	96	68
Changed homes				
To permanent home	60		20	
To another foster home	24		26	
Total changed homes	84	60	46	32
Total	139	100	142	100

A comparison of stability among the separate types of permanent plans showed some differences. Placements in which project children were reunited with their parents were significantly less stable than placements in which children were adopted by new parents in both the project and the comparison group, $t(38,42) = 4.00$, $P < .005$. No difference was found between the reunified group and the foster-parent adopt group.

The most stable placements involved children adopted by parents new to them. None of these children changed homes. Though six of those adopted by foster parents changed homes, the stability of this group was not significantly different from that of the new-parent adopt group. Thus, foster-parent adoptions, which were relatively new to Oregon, appeared to offer as stable a placement as the more traditional practice of adoption by new parents.

Planned long-term foster care was not included among the permanent placements. Although thirty-seven of the original 509 project cases had been designated as planned long-term foster care when the project ended, it was not possible at the time of this follow-up study to establish for all cases that a permanent placement had been the original intent. Most of these arrangements were verbal and could not be verified through the family or agency. The investigation showed that some of these placements had represented the best judgment of the caseworker as to the likely outcome rather than a verbal or written contract between the foster parents and the agency. Since this group of children proved indistinguishable from those in regular foster care, the two groups were combined for the purpose of data analysis. Preliminary data indicated that ten of the thirty-seven children originally designated as long-term foster care cases were not in the same placement at the time of the follow-up. Thus, if this arrangement were classified as a permanent placement, as it had been at the project's conclusion, it would be the least stable.

Two kinds of movement were made by the children who were in foster care at the beginning of the tracking period: change from one foster home to another and movement into a permanent home. More project foster children changed homes (eighty-four) than did comparison-group children (forty-six). Of those project foster children who changed homes, 71 percent ($N = 60$) moved into a permanent home. The process of obtaining a permanent home for these children had started when the major project mission was completed and was concluded during the fifteen-month tracking period. Fewer comparison-group children, 44 percent ($N = 20$), moved into permanent homes.

The quality of the placements.—The third part of this study was designed to assess and account for the well-being of the child at the time of the interview as well as to compare this with the child's well-being when he first entered the home. Statistical analyses used to accomplish these

goals include factor analyses, a comparison of means, correlational analyses, and multiple discriminant function analyses. Analyses designed to account for the well-being of families are discussed first

All measures of the child's health and adjustment at home, at school, and in social situations at the time of the interview were combined to form a general measure of well-being, which was used to assign each child to a high, medium, or low well-being group. Variables measuring the family's perception of the permanence of the placement, the child's past experiences, the family's understanding of these experiences and reaction to them, the family's adjustment when the child first came, the type of placement, and the child's age were used to account for differences in the three groups. The following is a description of how this was accomplished.

The three groups were first formed by a factor analysis of twenty-seven variables measuring how things were going for the child at the time of the interview. A principal components factor analysis using an orthogonal rotation was done, and seven factors having eigenvalues greater than 1.00 emerged. These factors were concerned with (1) the parents' satisfaction with a socially accepted child, (2) the child's problems in school, (3) the child's health, (4) the child's problems and need for discipline, (5) the child's need for more parental authority, (6) the nuclear family adjustment, and (7) how well the child obeyed

Each factor was determined to have either a positive or negative relationship to the well-being of the child and family. The score given to each child was the number of factors on which that child exceeded the mean of the sample for the positive factors and fell below the mean for the negative factors. Those scoring five or more were placed in the high well-being group (N = 61); those receiving a score of four were in the medium group (N = 35); and those with three or less were in the low group (N = 64).

Accounting for the child's well-being.—The next goal was to attempt to account for group differences in well-being. Measures in each of the following areas were grouped together: the parents' perception of the permanence of the placement, the child's well-being when he entered the home, and the type of placement (reunited with parents, adopted or in foster care). Measures of the child's past experiences, the family's understanding and reaction to them, and age were also included

To assess the total influence of these sets of measures in accounting for group differences, as well as the importance of the individual variables in relation to each other, a series of discriminant-function analyses was performed.

Permanence.—When all items related to permanence were entered in a discriminant analysis in a stepwise fashion, 30 percent of the variation among the three well-being groups was accounted for. An examination of mean values (table 3) indicates that the trend was the

Table 3

MEAN SCORES OF WELL-BEING GROUPS ON SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES

DISCRIMINATORS	High	WELL-BEING GROUPS Medium	Low	F
Permanence				
Parent too busy with present to think about the future	1.39	1.71	1.85	8.25
Child plans future family activities	3.59	3.51	3.26	6.96
Likelihood of placement lasting (by interviewer)	3.79	3.44	3.25	7.13
Child will stay until 18	3.75	3.16	3.27	7.34
Child's understanding of the present arrangement	3.97	3.56	3.65	6.05
Parents' plans for child's career	3.51	3.27	3.10	5.97
Child's initial well-being				
Child's family behavior	7.91	6.60	6.17	8.13
Child didn't get along with siblings	1.60	1.99	2.22	8.86
Adjustment to the new child was easy	3.31	2.87	2.78	7.73
More discipline problems	2.10	2.51	2.53	4.51
Family's adjustment to the child	8.72	8.11	6.94	12.03
Child was sick a lot	1.64	1.77	2.10	5.34
Placement group				
Reunification with parents	.10	.11	.30	1.50
Other variables				
Age (months)	104	93	121	5.26
Past has created problems	2.05	2.36	2.49	3.12
Parent wants to know more about child's past	1.93	2.15	2.31	4.65
Caseworker prepared parent	2.94	2.79	2.44	5.67
Mother as barrier to child's return	4.50	3.73	4.06	3.75

$P < .05$ for all variables

same for five of the six significant permanence measures, children who were in the highest well-being group tended to be seen as more permanently entrenched in their family

The permanence measure entering the analysis first and accounting for the largest percentage of the group variation was, "I'm too busy trying to take care of our needs now to think about the future" Parents who had children in the low group tended to agree with this statement Also, parents who had children returned to them from foster care tended to agree with this statement. This variable was not significantly correlated with any of the other permanence measures. The analysis indicates that families with children in the low group tend to see themselves as too involved with the present to think about the future, and these tend to be the families who are reunited with their children

Not all variables that were significantly different on the tests of mean differences made a significant contribution to accounting for the group variability in the discriminate-function analysis The reason is that the stepwise discriminant analysis begins by finding the measure that ac-

counts for the largest proportion of the variation. The second variab
entering is the one accounting for the largest proportion of the variatic
remaining after the first has entered and so on until all variables hav
entered. In this way the effects of a variable in the presence of oth
measures can be known. When two variables are correlated, the o
accounting for the largest proportion enters the analysis first, accounti
for variation that the two measures hold in common. The seco
measure then may not account for a sufficient proportion of the r
maining variation to make a significant contribution.

Other permanence measures were intercorrelated, and the resul
of the analysis indicated that, if the child was seen as permanen
placed in the home, he tended to have higher scores on well-bein
measures. These children were more likely to remain in their hon
until age eighteen and to have parents who had thought of helpin
them with a career. The child was likely to see the placement as pe
manent and was involved in planning future family activities. Inte
viewers tended to agree with parents. Placements seen by the interview
as likely to remain intact tended to be seen as permanent by th
families.

Measures related to the child's past dealt with his well-being whe
he first entered the home as well as with experiences prior to th
time. A discriminant analysis was performed using just those measur
related to the time the child first entered the home to investigate th
extent to which they were associated with the child's well-being late
These measures accounted for 39 percent of the total variation in th
three well-being groups. Four variables accounted for significant pr
portions of the variation, three of which had been significant whe
the variables were tested separately. Three had to do with social ad
justment and one with health. Intercorrelations were found amon
the social measures. These results indicated that families whose chil
scored in the high group got along well, had fewer discipline problem
and an easier adjustment, and behaved well when he first entered the
home. The health measure entering the discriminant analysis secon
was "at first the child was sick a lot." This was not correlated with the
other measures of how the child fared when he first entered the home
Children who were sick a lot at first tended to be in the low well-bein
group later.

Because of the special interest that the type of placement holds for
the study reported here, a discriminant analysis was performed using
the type of placement as a discriminator. The results indicate that the
type of placement a child was in was of little importance in understanding
how he was getting along at the time of the interview. The placements—
reunification with parents, adoption by new parents, adoption by foster
parents, and foster care—accounted for only 7 percent of the variability

most of which could be attributed to the group reunified with parents. Children who were reunited with their parents were more likely to be found in the group rated low on adjustment and health at the time of the interview.

Other measures.—Table 3 shows five additional variables that were important in understanding the differences among the groups. Age made a difference; the older children were found in the low group. Another result related to age, which has implications for adoptive placements, is that children adopted by foster parents were older ($\bar{X}$ = 109 months) than those adopted by new parents ($\bar{X}$ = 85 months).

Three measures related to (1) parents' understanding of the child's experiences before coming to live in their home, (2) the extent to which the past had created problems, and (3) how prepared the parent felt for the child's arrival were significantly different among groups. Children of parents who felt they knew enough about the child's past and for whom the past had not created problems were more likely to be in the high well-being group. Children of parents who felt the caseworker had prepared them well for the child's arrival also tended to be in this group. Parents whose children were returned from foster care felt the least prepared for the child's arrival.

Another measure having to do with the child's past on which the groups differ relates to the mother appearing as a barrier to the child's return. This rating by the child's caseworker was made more than a year and a half before the family interview. Children in the high well-being group had biological mothers who, at the time a permanent home was being sought, presented greater barriers to the child's return home. Recall that children who scored in the high group tended to be those who were adopted or remained in foster care. This result then seems to reflect that finding.

Two measures that were expected to be important—the number of foster-care placements and the length of time the child had been in foster care—were not significantly different among well-being groups.

To summarize the findings from attempts to account for the well-being of the study children, the most striking is the association of well-being with perception of permanence. Children in the high group tended to be seen as permanently entrenched in their homes. Several measures dealt with the idea of the placement's being intact for some time in the future. All of these measures were correlated with one or more of the others. But the most important measure reflected the parents' absorption with the present, making them unable to think about the future. This variable was not correlated with other permanence measures. Parents who were reunited with their child after foster care tended to feel this absorption with the present, and these children tended to be found in the low well-being group. Measures addressing

Table 4

WELL-BEING RATINGS INITIALLY AND AT INTERVIEW

MEASURE	RATING MEANS: Initially	RATING MEANS: At Intervi[ew]
School work	5.03	7.96*
Behavior at school	5.53	7.56*
Behavior in the family	6.95	8.00*
Behavior outside the home	6.19	8.2[illegible]*
Health	7.15	9.16*
Family's adjustment to child	7.86	9.08*

* $P < .005$ (correlated t-test for matched samples).

the child's behavior, health, and adjustment when he first entered th[e] home made the largest contribution to understanding his well-bei[ng] later.

Comparison of initial well-being and well-being at interview.—To investiga[te] whether there was a more difficult period when the child first move[d] into the home, a number of measures were made (1) when the chi[ld] first entered the home and (2) at the time of the interview. A correlate[d] t-test (table 4) for matched samples was conducted for each of s[ix] measures assessing well-being at each of these times. Children score[d] significantly lower on all measures for the time they entered the hom[e]: schoolwork, behavior at school, health, family adjustment, family be[-] havior, and behavior outside the home. The problems with retrospecti[ve] recall and measuring change notwithstanding, it appears that ther[e] was generally a period at first when things did not go as well as late[r].

Discussion

Through the special casework effort of the demonstration projec[t] more children were placed in homes designed to be permanent tha[n] were placed by routine agency activity. This was accomplished b[y] selecting children seen as adoptable and not likely to return home and by providing intensive casework services to reach the goal o[f] finding a home for each child. Project cases were not randomly assigned; rather they were selected because project staff believed a permanen[t] home could be provided. Project caseworkers were specially trained in methods of locating absent parents, working with parents to facilitate the reunification, and, when necessary, taking legal action to free the child for adoption. This training, along with reduced caseloads, wa[s]

designed to help project workers to pursue case resolution vigorously. Project caseworkers were part of the local agency staff working alongside regular caseworkers. The extent to which the project's presence, methods, and activity affected the efforts of other caseworkers, and thus the comparison group results, is not known.

The first priority of the project was to reunite children with their parents. The first task of project caseworkers was to explore thoroughly the possibility of reunification. Caseworkers took the initiative in planning with biological parents for the return of their child and in helping them achieve this goal. The number of project children reunited with parents was not different from the comparison group, even though initially prospects of project children being reunited with their parents seemed dim. Parents were generally responsive to reunification efforts, and once reunification was accomplished they were committed to its success.

Concerning adoptions, this study indicated that more children in the project group were adopted by new parents and by foster parents than in the comparison group. Project efforts also paid off here. Though the adoption process can frequently be long and difficult, the methods developed by the project appear to have been useful in overcoming barriers to this placement option.

Stability.—The stability of the placements made by the project and by regular caseworkers did not differ. Overall, 90 percent of children were in the same placement during the fifteen-month tracking period. Adoption was the most stable; reunification with parents was the least stable. The intense effort made by project staff to reunify families, and to place the child in an adoptive home if this was not possible, did not result in more vulnerable placements than regular agency activity. Presumably the risk of a failed placement would be especially high for project children returned to their biological parents. These parents had failed once to provide care, and at the time the project started they were seen by their child's caseworker as not likely to be adequate parents. Even for this group, the rate of instability did not exceed 20 percent, and this was not significantly different from the nonproject group reunified with their parents. The finding that long-term foster care was the least stable of all permanent placements may serve as an admonition to those who are considering this as a permanent plan. These placements carried the largest risk of failure.

Well-being.—The single most important finding from the analyses of well-being was that a sense of permanency accounted for a large proportion of group differences. Where placements were seen as permanent by the parents, the child's well-being scores tended to be higher. A sense of permanence was not necessarily related to the legal permanence of the placement. Perception of permanence occurred even without legal sanction, and it was absent even when legal sanctions

were there. A foster-care placement, for example, is not legally permanent. The foster family, however, may put aside the fact that the child could be removed from their home at any time and act as if he would be with them permanently, finally coming to believe this. On the other hand, the placement is permanent for children returned to their biological parents. Nevertheless, for these families the legal guarantee has been tarnished, and they may believe the child could go back into foster care at any time. Whether the child was in legally permanent placement, in adoption, returned home, or in legally temporary foster care made little difference in his level of well-being at the time of the interview. Perception of permanence was the key.

What characterizes the understanding of permanence for each family is not clear. Adoptive parents who have gone through the application and selection process and obtained a legal adoption decree may have a different understanding of this idea than foster parents who recognize that at any time the child can be removed from their home. Biological parents who have a child returned after once experiencing his removal may also differ on how they understand this concept. Whatever the different understandings of permanence are, the importance of perception of permanence in accounting for the child's well-being is clear. It underscores the need for providing continuity in the child's life in a home that is likely to endure.

While legal permanence as measured by type of placement was of less importance to the child's well-being than the family's perception of permanence, foster children tend to change homes more frequently than those reunited with parents or adopted. This study indicates that there is an adverse effect from each move. Children did not do as well when they first entered the home as at the time of the interview. To reduce the chances that a child will have to go through repeated moves and the subsequent adjustment period, a desirable goal would be to provide foster children a home that is seen as permanent and carries with it legal sanctions for permanency.

It comes as no surprise that children who were in adoptive homes or in foster care scored higher on well-being measures than those returned home. Adoptive parents and foster parents are traditionally chosen because they are believed to be able to provide good child care. This is particularly true of parents who adopt a child new to them. These parents are carefully assessed before adoption. After the child is placed with them the adoption caseworker provides services to help assure a satisfactory adjustment. However, children returned to their biological parents go back to parents who have already demonstrated that they have problems providing for the needs of the child. In most cases some problems remain after the child returns. The fact that a parent has made sufficient adjustments to make the return of the child

ossible does not mean that the home can measure up to the carefully
elected adoptive or foster-care home.

olicy Considerations

ata from this study point to methods of resolving several child welfare
olicy issues. One concerns adoption by foster parents. Findings indicate
iat this is a desirable placement option. Half the adoptions in this
udy were by foster parents. Placement stability and well-being scores
or children adopted by their foster parents were no different from
iose of children adopted by new parents. This is a relatively new
ractice in child welfare and one that shows promise as a placement
ption, especially for the older child who perhaps would be difficult
o place otherwise. It compares favorably with the more entrenched
ractice of the adoption of children by parents new to them.

Certain study findings related to children reunited with their parents
re especially relevant for child welfare policy. First, data indicate that
substantial number of parents judged unlikely to be able to provide
home for the child were able to achieve this goal. This indicates that
ith help of the kind provided by the project these parents can succeed.
tudy results suggest that providing such services to parents of all
ildren in foster care can increase the chances of reunification.

A second issue is the apparent need for some services following
eunification to assure the stability of the placement. Though 80 percent
f the project group remained reunited with their parents, the stability
f adoptions by new parents was higher. The well-being scores of the
roup reunited with parents was lower, and these parents had felt less
ell prepared for the child's arrival. Also, the parents in reunited
amilies felt too busy with present needs to think about the future.
Nevertheless, interviewers found no cases that they thought warranted
ntervention and return of the child to foster care. All parents felt
iat it had been a good idea to bring the child home, and the majority
elt that their child was home to stay. Thus these families were generally
appy with the reunification and committed to making the placement
ucceed in the presence of a number of obstacles. Clearly, they could
se help in achieving successful reunification. Generally, fewer services
re offered to the reunified family than to adoptive families. The exact
ature of the help needed by the reunified family has not been explored
y this research. The findings do point to the need to focus on these
amilies to assure successful placements. The parents seem committed

to making reunification succeed, and this is an important first step in assuring that the home will be permanent.

These children should have been and were returned home because there was no valid legal or social reason for keeping them in foster care. Foster care is designed to be temporary until parents can take the children back. From the perspective of social policy, biological parents should have custody if adequate care can be provided. According to law, parents have a right to custody unless their extreme inadequacy can be demonstrated to the court.

The findings demonstrate that it is important to the child's well-being for parents to have sufficient knowledge of the child's past and to be prepared for his arrival. Neither ratings of the placeability of the child, the number of foster-care placements, nor the length of time in foster care (measures of the child's past experiences) accounted for well-being at the time of the interview. Thus, it appears that these past experiences are less important to the child's well-being than that the parents have sufficient knowledge of the child's past, no matter what it was like, and that they are prepared for the child's arrival in the home. In this study, children who have had experiences generally considered to be damaging were placed successfully; this should offer encouragement to parents, adoptive parents, and social workers. Children with many foster-care placements who have spent a longer time in foster care and are considered less placeable have sometimes been left out when candidates for permanent homes are sought.

Children in foster care were getting along surprisingly well. No differences were found between this group and the adopted children on measures of adjustment at the time of the interview. However, no matter how well a child is doing in foster care, there is always the real possibility that he could change homes at any time. The data show that when a child changes placements, he must go through an adjustment process during which things may not go well. In a permanent home the child does not need to make sudden transitions. Thus, the finding that children in foster care were not faring poorly does not obviate the need for permanent planning to eliminate the possibility of foster care drift.

Considered as a whole, the results of this study have important implications for child welfare policy. If families in need of help could receive services in a timely fashion, as did families who were part of the demonstration project, cases could be resolved more quickly and perhaps more satisfactorily. Caseworkers could work with fewer cases at one time, work with them more intensively, and achieve case resolution more quickly. Families should continue to receive needed services but such services should be time limited and goal directed.

Notes

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Services for Minority Children in Out-of-Home Care

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Minority children and their families have traditionally experienced a number of difficulties in the child welfare system. Using data from the National Study of Public Social Services to Children and Their Families, this paper compares black, Hispanic, Asian, and Native American children on a number of service dimensions, including case planning and efforts toward permanent placement. The discussion concludes with recommendations for changes to correct the problems faced by children and families in each of these groups.

In 1977, a national survey was made of children and families receiving public social services.[1] This survey identified a total of 1.7 million children on the case loads of public social service agencies across the country, one-third of whom (500,000) were living apart from their natural families at the time of the study. A primary goal of public social services is to address the needs of these children who are not in their own homes. In the case where a family cannot maintain a child in their own home, it is the responsibility of child welfare services to either restore that family to a level where the child can be returned or if that is not possible, to plan a permanent new home for the child.[2] There is overwhelming evidence to suggest, however, that once a child has been removed from his or her own home, many are likely to remain

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n foster care, indicating that for many children foster care is not a emporary arrangement.[3]

This paper represents an effort to document the characteristics of hese children and families, with particular focus on the differences mong children in various minority groups. Previous studies have shown that minority children tend to be overrepresented in foster care.[4] While many of these studies have identified an association between race as it is related to service status, more systematic investigation needs to be done on a national level to explore possible differential patterns in the kinds of services offered to members of various minority groups.

A concurrent concern of this paper is with the ways in which age interacts with minority group membership to affect the experiences of minority children in the child welfare system. Previous research has demonstrated that the age of the child functions as a strong predictor of the types of services children receive while in care.[5] To better understand how minority children fare in the system, we need to take into account the ways in which their age influences the delivery of service. Such an analysis will allow us to more precisely identify those groups of children who are most at risk for experiencing "drift" and lack of permanency.

Status Characteristics

These variables of race and age may be regarded as status characteristics that act to influence the type of treatment children will receive while in care. Status characteristics refer to those qualities of individuals that lead to their being placed within a particular social stratum.[6] For those whose status characteristics are less highly valued as a result of this hierarchical differentiation, life chances are restricted, for they are accorded fewer rewards and opportunities.[7] Examples of status characteristics through which such stratification occurs include race, age, sex, income, skills, personal appearance, achievement, and abilities.[8] It can be argued that these stratification processes are operating within the foster-care system to place children on a scale that influences the kind of treatment they will receive while in care.

Research has shown that social service organizations often perpetuate the societal discrimination that is shown toward those with less highly valued status characteristics.[9] For example, child welfare researchers have argued that the low status of minority group children pervades the system of child welfare services, with the result that minority children are often not treated equitably within the system.[10] One of the ways this discrimination has manifested itself has been in the way minority

children have been excluded from adoptive services, having been "defined as unplaceable or viewed as hard-to-place."[11]

Older children have also been subject to these abuses. Knitzer and Allen, for example, found that adolescents were vulnerable to inappropriate placements and indefinite lengths of time in care.[12] In a study of foster care in Ohio, Olsen found that age was a key predictor in the kind of planning done for children and in long-term impermanence.[13] Impermanence in foster care was also identified as a major problem for adolescents by Hornby and Collins in their study of the Maine foster-care systems.[14]

However, it is not enough to look solely at the effect of one set of status characteristics apart from all others. Previous research analyzing the interaction between race and age has shown that status inconsistency may also be an important factor in the types of care children out of home experience.[15] Status inconsistency occurs when an individual has several statuses which are not equivalent.[16] In the foster-care system this occurs when a child has a highly valued status characteristic, such as infancy, but also has other low-status characteristics, such as a handicap or membership in a minority group. Therefore, this paper will not only discuss the additive effects of race but will also consider the ways in which race and age interact to influence the experiences of minority group children who are living apart from their families

Methods of Analysis

This paper draws on data collected in the 1977 National Study of Social Services to Children and Their Families.[17] The national study surveyed 319 public social service agencies in thirty-eight states for the purpose of assessing what services were being offered and the characteristics of children and families being served The data were weighted to represent the national population of children under eighteen years of age. The weights used in this analysis were modified to avoid undue inflation of the inferential statistics following a procedure described in Olsen and Holmes.[18] The modified weighted sample had approximately 17,000 cases.

The analysis began with edit checks of the national survey tapes prepared for the Administration for Children, Youth, and Families, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. After the edit checks were completed and corrections made, the frequency distribution of each variable was examined to determine whether there were enough cases to justify reliable statistical analysis. These checks indicated that all variables reported in this paper had enough cases for reliable analysis

Bivariate analysis.—A set of cross-tabulations was generated for the purpose of screening for instances in which the child's racial background was significantly related to the dependent variables under consideration. Pearson's correlations were also generated in order to identify which variables would need to be controlled for in the multivariate procedures. To exclude chance relationships, an α level of .01 was applied to all inferential statistics used (this meant that the probability that the observed relationship was due to chance had to be less than one chance in 100). The .01 α level was chosen, rather than the more common .05 level, because the large sample size could produce many weak relationships that might meet the .05 criterion. The .01 α criterion helped to exclude very weak but statistically unlikely findings.

Analysis of covariance.—In order to control for the influence of other background variables, and to determine whether there was significant interaction between the race and age variables, a series of tables was produced using analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) procedures. The factors consisted of the five racial and three age groups, and the covariates included other significant background variables, namely, parents' marital status, family's primary source of income, employment status of the primary child-caring person (PCCP), and reasons for service. All covariates were treated as dichotomous variables. For these covariates to significantly mediate the effects of race, the *F*-probability on the control variables had to be less than .01 and the *F*-probability for race had to be greater than .01. Significant interaction between the child's racial background and age occurred whenever the *F*-probability for the interaction was less than .01.

Findings

The national survey identified over 500,000 children who were living apart from their own homes at the time of the study. Two-thirds (326,100) of these children were white, one-fourth (138,500) were black, one in six (30,400) was Hispanic, and the remaining were either Asian or Pacific islanders (4,400), or Native Americans (5,600).

The mean age of children in out-of-home care was eleven years. Black children tended to be younger, with a mean age of ten years, than children of Hispanic, Asian, or Native American origin, who had an average age of twelve years ($p < .0001$, $\eta = .09$). Researchers have noted that the average age of children in care has been increasing during recent years, and, as expected, the survey findings provided further evidence of this trend.[10] When placing children into one of the three age categories used in the analysis, nearly one-half (48 percent) were included in the older group, comprised of the twelve- to eighteen-

year-olds. Of the remaining children, 30 percent were six to eleve years old and 21 percent were under six years of age.

The vast majority (78 percent) of these children who were living ou of home were in foster family care. One-fifth were in other types o placement settings, including institutional care (40,000), group home (35,000), and residential treatment settings (30,000). The remainin children were in emergency care, detention centers, boarding school and independent living arrangements.

A cross-tabulation of racial background with these various livir arrangements pointed to an overrepresentation of Hispanics in grou home care and a parallel underrepresentation in foster family ca (χ^2 = 134.10, 12 df, $p < .001$). When controlling for the age of t child, these differences were even more pronounced. Among the ac olescents, 28 percent of the Hispanic youth were in group home ca as compared with 15 percent of the whites and fewer than 5 percer of those from other racial backgrounds (χ^2 = 122.41, 12 df, $p < .001$). These findings raise several questions as to why Hispanic youths ar more likely to be placed in group homes. Such questions are answere in part, when we look at the kinds of goals and services recommende for those youth.

Family background.—Many of the children (160,000) in out-of-hom care no longer had a principal child-caring person (PCCP) who woul be responsible for their care upon discharge from the system. Th was particularly true among children from minority backgrounds. I contrast with white children, one-fourth of whom had no PCCP, th percentage of minority children without a PCCP ranged from 36 percen for Hispanics to 40 percent for blacks (χ^2 = 93.80, 4 df, $p < .001$). At least two issues can be raised by these findings. One is the questio of what efforts are being made to move minority children into permanen substitute homes. Clearly, if two out of every five minority childre have no home of their own to which to return, the backlog of minorit children in long-term placement could be substantially reduced if effort were stepped up to find permanent homes for these scores of children. A second issue points to the need to provide supportive services to those families where there is a PCCP in order to restore those familie and return the child home at the earliest possible date.

Where there was a PCCP for the child, questions were asked regarding the family's source of income and the parents' marital status. Where income source was reported, black and Hispanic families were more likely to be receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), underscoring the need for supportive service to assist these economically stressed families (χ^2 = 39.70, 4 df, $p < .001$).

There was a corresponding pattern in the frequency with which black and Hispanic children tended to come from single-parent families

Overall, three-fourths of the families were headed by a single parent, but this rate increased to 85 percent among the black and Hispanic families ($\chi^2 = 37.52$, 4 df, $p < .001$). Not only do these numbers point to the vast overrepresentation of single parents among those whose children are living in out-of-home care, they also point to the greater occurrence of this phenomenon among black and Hispanic families.

Moreover, the age of the child tended to interact with racial background in such a way as to increase these differences. When controls were introduced for the child's age, the relationship between race and marital status became even more pronounced among the adolescents ($\chi^2 = 34.39$, 4 df, $p < .001$). This analysis of age-group differences also showed that among Hispanic families, the percentage of children from single-parent families increased from 65 percent for the youngest group of children (zero to five years old) to 92 percent for the adolescents. These findings underscore the need to offer services to these Hispanic families when their children are younger so as to prevent the greater likelihood of marital disruption among families with older children.

Reasons for service.—The most common reasons for service included child neglect, unwillingness to care for the child, abandonment, emotional problems of both the child and the parents, physical and mental disabilities of the child, abuse, parent-child conflict, and financial problems. Of these, neglect and unwillingness to care for the child tended to vary significantly between racial groups as the primary reason for service.

But although unwillingness to care for the child was significantly associated with the child's racial background at the bivariate level, this relationship disappeared once controls for the family's source of income were introduced. Children from families whose primary source of income was earned wages had a greater chance of entering foster care because the family was unwilling to care for the child than those whose families depended primarily on AFDC ($F = 7.4$, 1 df, $p = .007$).

Neglect as a primary reason for care continued to vary significantly among racial groups once controls for other possible influences were made ($F = 3.2$, 4 df, $p = .012$). In addition, the child's age had a strong association with neglect as the primary reason for service and interacted with racial background to strengthen the relationship between racial background and neglect among adolescents. Among these older youth, Native Americans had twice as great a chance as those from other racial backgrounds to enter care because of neglect ($\chi^2 = 55.32$, 4 df, $p < .001$). Nearly one-half of the Native American adolescents were in care because of conditions that were judged neglectful. Clearly, for Native American youth, the effects of race and age compound each other to produce an increased chance for entering care because of neglect.

The first question we must ask of these findings is how neglect defined and how the term is applied to these families. Beyond th question is the issue of what services are needed to prevent the di proportionate placement of Native American youth for reasons neglect.

Service plans.—Although a large percentage of children in care di have written service plans, a sizable minority (100,000) were in placemen without any plan specifying appropriate services for them or thei families. When the three age groups were combined to look at th overall trend, all racial groups were equally likely not to have writte service plans, with the exception of Native American children (F 4.3, 4 df, p = .002). In the case of Native Americans, one out of te had no formal service agreements. This may be compared with th rates for other groups of children, where one out of five did not hav a written plan for service. However, when we examined difference among the three age groups, this pattern shifted somewhat as childre got older, with the consequence that once they reached adolescence black children and Asian children were less likely to have written plan for service (χ^2 = 14.11, 4 df, p = .01). Among adolescents, 25 percen of the black and the Asian children had no formal service plans, in contrast with 15 percent of the white youth and fewer than 10 percen of those from Hispanic or Native American backgrounds

Certainly the absence of service plans has many implications fo service delivery and may be a large part of the reason why thes children become lost in the system. As we examine other aspects o service planning and as we look at the length of time children spen in care, the effect of the absence of service plans will be further dem onstrated.

Service goal.—The goals recommended by caseworkers tend to reflec an emphasis on the clinical aspects of service. One in three clients had goals recommending improvements in their mental health functioning and one in four had goals addressing the need to change patterns of family functioning or to modify the child's behavior. Fewer than one in ten had goals calling for improvements in financial management or household management skills or for reduced social isolation Three of these goals—improved mental health functioning, modification of family relationships, and modification of the child's behavior—were recommended differentially across racial groups.

The relationship between racial background and recommendation of mental health goals tended to vary depending on the child's age Among the six- to eleven-year-olds, Hispanic and Native American children were the most likely to have goals recommending improvements in their mental health functioning (χ^2 = 20.51, 4 df, p = .01) However once they reached adolescence, they and all other minority children were less likely than whites to have these goals recommended (χ^2 =

32.55, 4 df, $p < .001$). Thus we see an interaction between age and racial background that tends to reduce the likelihood that mental health goals will be included in the service plans of minority adolescents. Is it the case that the mental health needs of Native American and Hispanic children tend to decrease as they get older, or are they simply more likely to have other kinds of goals recommended in place of improved mental health functioning?

Indeed, when we examine the relationship between racial background and recommendations for modifications in the child's behavior, we find that Hispanic children were more likely than any other group to have these goals recommended ($\chi^2 = 86.86$, 4 df, $p < .001$). One-third of the Hispanic children had this goal in their service plan, in contrast with fewer than one in four of those from other racial backgrounds. Among the adolescents this relationship was even more pronounced, for two out of every five Hispanic youths had service goals recommending modifications in their behavior. By way of comparison with earlier findings, we may relate the frequency with which this goal was recommended for Hispanics with their greater representation in group home care.

The third goal recommended differentially for those from various racial backgrounds was that of modifying family relationships. Families of Asian origin had a greater chance and black families a less than average chance of this goal being recommended ($\chi^2 = 91.17$, 4 df, $p < .001$). This association was particularly strong among the adolescents, where over half had goals recommending changes in family relationships. We do not know from this study, however, what problems these Asian families were facing that led to the more frequent recommendation of this goal or what specific services were being offered them to address these problems.

Services recommended.—Over half of the families with children in placement had no services recommended. Moreover, the absence of service recommendations varied according to the family's racial background, with an overall tendency for Native American families to have the least chance for service recommendations and for white and Asian families to have the greatest chance ($\chi^2 = 15.28$, 4 df, $p < .001$). When controlling for the age of the child, these differences were even more pronounced. Among the six- to eleven-year-olds, only 6 percent of the Native American families had services recommended ($\chi^2 = 19.05$, 4 df, $p < .001$). There is a clear parallel here with the absence of service goals among this group. Although 80 percent or more of the children aged six to eleven from other racial backgrounds had service goals in their plans, the same was true for only 29 percent of the Native American children ($\chi^2 = 63.85$, 4 df, $p < .001$). We must question the implications of the absence of service recommendations for so many of these families, particularly the Native Americans, when

the stated goal of the child welfare system is to restore and strengthen families so that children can be returned home at the earliest possible date.

When services were recommended, they more often focused on the mental health needs of clients. Between 20 and 25 percent of the families had mental health counseling recommended, and fewer than 10 percent had health care, homemaker services, employment services, financial assistance, or legal services recommended. It may well be that the greater availability of clinical services and the corresponding lack of environmental support services are reflected in these recommendations.

Turning now to the individual service recommendations, the analysis showed that of all the services recommended for children and their families, only the recommendation of increased protective services tended to vary depending on the child's racial background. Moreover, the racial background of the child tended to interact with the child's age in such a way that the racial differences were strongest among the six- to eleven-year-olds ($\chi^2 = 17.10$, 4 df, $p < .001$). Among these children, one-half of the Asians had protective services recommended. In contrast, one in three of the Hispanics and fewer than one in five of those from other backgrounds had these services recommended. It should be emphasized that these differences held even after controlling for several reasons for service including abuse, neglect, emotional problems of the parent, and unwillingness to care for the child.

There may be a connection here with the greater tendency to recommend modifications in family relationships among Asians, but we must ask what the unique problems are of these families that they would be in so much greater need of protective services. We do not find the answer among their reasons for seeking services, for these children were not any more likely to be in care because of neglect, abuse, or family conflict.

Services delivered.—To determine whether children and their families were receiving the services that had been recommended, a comparison was made between the recommendations of each individual service and the provision of that service during the three months preceding the data collection. Because information about delivery of services was available only for the three months prior to the study, and service plans may have been developed prior to this period, it is possible that recommended services may have been coded as "not delivered" when they had been delivered prior to the three-month period. However, one-half of the children had had their service plans developed within six months prior to the study; 75 percent had had a service plan for less than one year. Because the services required were generally not for problems quickly resolved, most of those with service recommen-

ations in their plan would have been in need of that service during the three-month period studied

There were two instances in which the child's racial background was significantly related to the delivery of recommended service. The child's racial background and age interacted in such a way as to produce a significant relationship between racial background and the delivery of recommended adoptive services to preschool children. Among preschoolers, nearly all (90 percent) of the Hispanics were provided with recommended adoptive services, as compared with three-fifths of the white and black children ($\chi^2 = 27.30$, 2 df, $p < .001$) There were too few Asian and Native American children under six years to include in this analysis. Once children reached school age, however, their racial background was no longer a significant factor in whether recommended adoptive services would be offered In fact, after controlling for the reasons children were in care, their age was no longer a significant factor either. The strongest influences on the delivery of recommended adoption services were the presence of a mental or physical handicap ($F = 22.03$, 1 df, $p < .001$) and the fact of having entered care because of neglect ($F = 36.34$, 1 df, $p < .001$) Children in placement for these reasons were far less likely to have been provided recommended adoptive services during the three-month study period

Although there was a statistically significant relationship between the child's racial background and the delivery of recommended mental health care during the study period, this relationship did not remain significant once controls were introduced for having been placed because of neglect. Again, children who entered because of neglectful situations had less chance of being provided with mental health services that had been recommended ($F = 15.77$, 1 df, $p < .001$) It is disturbing that this reason for service should have such a negative effect on the delivery of recommended care.

Plan for contact with the principal child-caring person —Of the 277,800 children who had a PCCP who would be responsible for them upon discharge, one-third (84,200) had no plan for regular contact with their PCCP The development of these plans varied by the child's racial background, with the consequence that black and Hispanic children were the least likely to have plans for regular contact Two-thirds of those from black and Hispanic backgrounds had such plans, in contrast with three-fourths of the white and Asian children and nearly all (90 percent) of the Native American children ($\chi^2 = 28.51$, 4 df, $p < .001$). Clearly there is an absence of systematic service planning for black children, for they were also the least likely to have service plans that specified goals and recommendations for service

Length of time in foster care.—The consequences of the relative absence of service planning for black children are reflected in the longer periods

of time they average in care. After controlling for the date of intake and reasons for service, black youth averaged several months longer in care than children from other backgrounds. As shown in table 1, black children under six years averaged four months longer in care than the group as a whole, those between six and eleven years averaged over one year longer, and black adolescents averaged nearly three years longer in placement. On the average, black preschoolers had spent two years, those between six and eleven had spent five years, and those over eleven had spent eight years in care. It is evident from these findings that foster care is not a temporary situation for most children.

Availability for adoption.—Only a small percentage (15 percent, or 75,000) of the children in out-of-home care were free for adoption. Cross-tabulations between race and legal status pointed to significant differences in the rates with which children from various minority backgrounds were free. At the bivariate level, the analysis indicated that Native American and black children had a greater than average chance of being free and Hispanic and Asian children a less than average chance ($\chi^2 = 30.42$, 4 df, $p < .001$). However, once controls were introduced for the parents' marital status and neglect as a reason for service, these racial differences disappeared. Children from single-parent families were far more likely to be free for adoption ($F = 72.97$, 1 df, $p < .001$), while those who entered because of neglect were less likely to be free ($F = 62.50$, 1 df, $p < .001$).

Table 1

Racial Background by Length of Time in Foster-Care Placement

Racial Background	Mean Months in Care, 0–5-Year-Olds	Mean Months in Care, 6–11-Year-Olds	Mean Months in Care, 12–18-Year-Olds
White	19.2	39.3	50.6
	(57,200)	(78,300)	(117,300)
Black	25.6	59.3	91.1
	(30,500)	(39,700)	(16,000)
Hispanic	19.3	53.3	16.[illegible]
	(4,100)	(6,700)	(7,000)
Asian or Pacific Islander	18.5	37.0	33.0
	(500)	(1,100)	(2,100)
Native American	14.1	50.0	72.8
	(600)	(1,100)	(3,200)
Total	21.3	46.1	62.0
	(92,900)	(127,200)	(177,100)
F	6.83	20.31	57.12
η	.17	.25	[illegible]

Note.—Numbers in parentheses are number of children. $p < .001$ for all groups.

Reasons children were not free for adoption.—The most common reasons ıldren had not been freed for adoption included the presence of a an to return children home (149,500), a decision pending in the gency as to whether the child should be freed (43,000), and pending ourt actions (36,400). For a substantial number of children (139,300), e reasons for their not being free were not specified. Pending court tion ($F = 3.7$, 4 df, $p = .05$) and other nonspecified reasons ($F = 3.12$, 4 df, $p < .001$) affected children in certain minority groups ore often than others. Native American children were more frequently waiting the outcome of court decisions to determine whether they ould be freed for adoption, while the reasons for Hispanic and Asian hildren not being free were more likely to be unspecified. One-half f all Hispanic and Asian youth who were not available for adoption ad no reasons given for their situation. Further investigation should e carried out to determine why these two groups of children are not ree. Without answers to this question, it is impossible to determine e extent to which permanency planning is being undertaken for Iispanic and Asian children.

Conclusions

Ve began this paper with the question of how minority group children ı out-of-home care are served by the child welfare system. This question as formed within a conceptual framework that directed us to look t minority group membership as an indicator of the child's status ithin the system. Having examined the ways in which the child's inority group status is related to service delivery, we may now turn) a consideration of the significant service issues facing children in ach of these groups.

Black children and their families showed several indications of neglect v the child welfare system. There were fewer service plans for black hildren and fewer plans for regular contact between the child and eir PCCP. Black children had also spent a considerably longer time ı care than other children, with an average placement period of eight ears among black teenagers. These children are urgently in need of ermanency planning, for they truly have been lost in the system.

Hispanic children were also less likely to have plans for regular ontact with their PCCP, and there was a tendency for agencies to be nable to specify why these children were not free for adoption. Efforts t more systemmatic service planning also need to be directed toward his group of children. In addition, it appears that Hispanic youth ere treated as more behaviorally disturbed than other groups of

children. Further study should be conducted on the special needs of these Hispanic youth, with particular focus on the relationship of these needs to their status in the broader society.

There is also a critical need to improve service planning for Native American children and their families, particularly among those with children aged six to eleven. Only one-third of this group had service goals, and virtually none of their families had service recommendations. Clearly, the goal of restoring these families cannot be met in the absence of planning for those services that would help to correct the conditions leading to their children's removal from the home.

The status of Asian children was somewhat more favorable. Their families were more likely to have service plans, with particular attention given to improving family relationships. It is not clear from this study what the special stresses facing these families were, but we do know that protective services were recommended far more often for Asian children, particularly those between six and eleven years. Asian youth also averaged less time in care than other children, but the relative absence of service plans and the preponderance of unspecified reasons for their unavailability for adoption are areas where improvements in case planning are needed.

This investigation has provided us with a better understanding of the special problems facing children from various backgrounds. It has also shown how the child's age interacts with his or her racial background to compound certain problems, such as the extended length of time spent in care by black adolescents. Thus, for minority children the effects of these status characteristics are not so much inconsistent as they are a multiplier or reinforcer that results in increased difficulties in the child welfare system. Our next step must be to target services and programs to address these problems, so that minority families can be restored and children can be provided with a permanent and stable home. However, we need to remember that child welfare services are not offered in a vacuum. In these conservative times, when the rights of minority families are under attack, we must especially turn our attention to preserving and improving their status in the broader society.

Notes

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Secular and Religious Funding of Church-related Agencies

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As government is looking to the voluntary sector to fill in gaps left by social welfare cutbacks, there is limited research on how dependent church-related agencies are on government funds. Selected findings are reported from a study of three groups of Protestant social service agencies. Government fees and grants comprise approximately half of combined agency budgets for each denomination and have increased in both dollar and percentage amounts since 1950. United Way and church contributions have increased in dollar amounts, but their percentage of combined agency budgets has either remained the same or decreased.

There is no clear dividing line between public and voluntary social services. The intermingling of funds, the blurring of roles, and the resulting issues surrounding autonomy and accountability are well documented.[1] Church-related agencies, being a subcategory of the voluntary sector, are no exception. Multiple funding sources that connect them to both secular and religious sectors further complicate their struggle for identity.

Studies have consistently reported that Protestant social service agencies are diverse both within and among denominations.[2] However, few studies have examined the funding patterns of agencies related to Protestant denominations. In 1955 the National Council of Churches conducted a nationwide survey of church-related agencies and insti-

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utions. They found that churches were oftentimes eager to claim redit for these welfare efforts but reluctant to provide direct financial upport. The study concluded that tension arose when church control vas strong but financial support was weak.[3] In 1961 Morris reported hat although church funds to religious agencies had increased in lollars over the years, these monies represented a declining proportion of total operating costs.[4] Coughlin's 1965 survey of 407 sectarian agencies n twenty-one states revealed that 70 percent of the agencies were nvolved in some form of purchase of service contracting with govrnment, although public funds generally represented a small perentage of their total budgets.[5]

The Study

This article examines one specific area of change for Protestant social service agencies—the development and effect of multiple funding sources. Findings from an exploratory study are reported. The organizations studied are located in a midwestern city. They are affiliated with three denominations and include nine specialized Episcopal agencies, one large multiservice Lutheran Church Missouri Synod agency with six locations, and seven agencies of The Salvation Army.

Since surveys have been conducted to look at voluntary agencies in general (both religious and nonreligious), a case-study design was used to provide in-depth information on all agencies studied. The three groups of service providers, their parent religious bodies, and their federations comprised the sources of data. Data within groups were far from standardized and varied immensely across groups. However, the use of multiple methods of data collection, along with a systematic approach, partially controlled for this limitation.

Methods

Document analysis.—Both primary and secondary documents were used. A systematic approach to documents was essential to avoid being totally overwhelmed by the written word. Information on these church-related agencies was rich, even though unstandardized, since much is saved in the name of church history. Documents pertinent to funding sources included annual reports, audits, budgetary statements, references to funding sources in board minutes, correspondence on financial matters, and policy statements regarding such things as the receipt of public funds by church-related agencies.

Interviews.—Both semistructured formal and informal interviews were conducted. Although costly in terms of time, interviews allowed the

researcher to probe for additional information when respondents demonstrated knowledge of funding sources, patterns, and issues. Semistructured interviews were conducted with key staff of all agencies, with church officials familiar with social ministries, and with key board members. Altogether seventy semistructured and unstructured interviews were conducted with different respondents.

Observation.—The third method used was unstructured, nonparticipant observation. Field notes were typed within twenty-four hours of on-site observation.

Findings

Several similarities were identified in examining the available fiscal records for all three denominations. Every agency in this study was responsible for raising its own funds. It may have received technical assistance and some financial aid from the church coordinating body, but it was up to each separate agency's staff and/or board to raise money.

Each denomination had a coordinating body through which funds contributed by local churches could be channeled to individual agencies. All three organizations were unique in that they had developed in response to the immense task of assisting the church in coordinating fund-raising efforts in a large city. Comparable organizations did not necessarily exist in other metropolitan areas.

Each agency, regardless of denomination, drew from resources beyond the church. Often these resources were private sources such as fees for service, individual or organizational contributions, and/or United Way allocations. However, depending on the agency, sources were also governmental. No agency was solely supported by its parent religious body, and therefore all agencies maintained multiple funding sources. Within each denomination there were agencies and/or program components that received public funds. Therefore, all three denominations participated in public funding opportunities, both fees and grants.

Government funds.—Until recently, the availability of public funding has increased along with its accompanying regulations and guidelines. The acceptance of federal dollars by church-related agencies has been met with mixed reactions, even though many of these agencies have always received state monies, primarily through purchase of service contracting. Contrary to the image of voluntary agencies racing forward to embrace federal dollars, the organizations studied recounted their reluctancies. In the 1960s The Salvation Army settlement house was asked to apply for a federal grant to fund a home services program. They developed a proposal and later decided to turn the money down because they did not want to begin a program that would not be continued. Similarly, federal officials approached the Episcopal halfway house and asked them to apply for Office of Economic Opportunity

OEO) funds. Although the agency applied for and received the grant, it was after considerable debate. The Episcopal adoption service, on the other hand, made a conscious decision never to accept public funds as a resource. Other organizations, such as the Episcopal boys' home, tried to set limits on what proportion of public dollars they received. The large Lutheran agency did likewise, attempting to maintain a balance between private and public contributions. One former Episcopal agency executive explained the difficulty he felt in trying to maintain a public-private balance: "We would have never gone so quickly into public funding if they had not approached us because we had a lot of resistance on the Board. I had some misgivings even as I accepted the money. . . . There is a ratio of private to public funds which you can suddenly take . . . and we crossed the line I don't know where it was, but we ruined our reputation, our health, our agency, our program. It was a disaster!"

Even with a negative view of government funds, by 1980 five of the nine Episcopal agencies received state and/or federal funds. The Lutheran organization had received state funds through purchase of service contracting prior to 1950, and by 1980 received Title XX monies as well. The Salvation Army agencies had not received a large amount of public dollars until the early 1970s. That amount grew rapidly over the last decade.

Funding patterns varied within and between denominations. Therefore, each group was examined separately. Table 1 breaks down the amount of monies each Episcopal agency received from government at any level. The chaplaincy service and the adoption agency received no government funds. The retirement home and the counseling service received no government funds directly, but both benefited from third-

Table 1

GOVERNMENT FUNDING (Federal, State, and Local) RECEIVED BY EPISCOPAL AGENCIES, 1978

Agency	Total Agency Budget ($)	Government Funds Received in 1978 ($)	% of Total Agency Budget
Chaplaincy service	51,184	0	0
Skid row agency	398,958	82 329	21
Day care headstart agency	390,346	231 000	59
Retirement home	529,691	0	0
Boys' home	1,138 000	1 021 350	71
Halfway house for ex-offenders	238,000	70 000	29
Adoption agency	186 366	0	0
Youth counseling agency	636,351	381 118	60
Counseling service	86,014	0	0
Total	3,907 918	1 785 797	46

party payments in the form of service fees. Even though four of the nine agencies received no government monies directly, in 1978 46 percent of the combined budgets of all nine represented government funds. This was $1,785,797 of a $3,907,913 combined budget.

Episcopal agency funding patterns were diverse. Some agencies, such as the halfway house, experienced rapid budgetary peaks and falls due to changes in government grants. Agencies such as day care headstart and the boys' home experienced gradual rises in funding levels since their government-related programs had not suffered drastic cuts. Organizations like the adoption agency and the chaplaincy service stayed as private as possible, not receiving any public monies, and as a result remained relatively small.

In 1950 the Lutheran multiservice agency received 26 percent of its income from government fees. It appeared that this organization experienced a gradual rise in government fees when one looked at figures for 1950 and then 1980. By 1980 the agency was receiving 59 percent of its income from government fees and grants. This was not the case, however. The Lutheran agency's government funding pattern was curvilinear.

Table 2 presents a breakdown of contributions to the Lutheran multiservice agency from all government sources over the last thirty years. Since a large percentage of government funds were directed to a residential treatment center for children administered by the Lutheran agency, changes in such items as numbers of beds and trends in government contracting affected the flow of public dollars to the agency. One reason for the rapid increase in government dollars in 1980 was that the new executive director had successfully pulled in additional public monies from Title XX of the Social Security Act.

Prior to the availability of OEO funds The Salvation Army agencies received only limited public dollars. Some purchase of service contracting was utilized prior to the 1960s, but until the late 1960s and the

Table 2

Government Fees and Grants Received by Lutheran Multiservice Agency, 1950–80

Year	Agency Total Budget ($)	Government Grants and Fees ($)	% of Total Agency Budget
1950	267,890	101,278	38
1955	308,868	66,773	[illegible]
1960	372,872	66,178	18
1965	606,829	104,213	17
1970	1,012,611	389,359	37
1975	1,773,160	618,775	35
1980	2,689,197	1,586,792	59

Table 3

GOVERNMENT FUNDS RECEIVED BY THE SALVATION ARMY AGENCIES, 1981

Agency	Total Agency Budget ($)	Government Funds Received ($)	% of Total Agency Budget
Community center 1	100,389	25,097	25
Services for ex-offenders	1,485,405	1,203,178	81
Temporary shelter services	691,830	200,631	29
Community center 2	73,206	0	0
Counseling agency	1,403,680	308,810	22
Residence for alcoholics	1,486,455	490,530	33
Community center 3	755,174	490,868	65
Total	5,996,139	2,719,109	15

early 1970s the army was reluctant to pull in many government monies. An important issue for the army, therefore, was the rapid increase in government monies that occurred during the 1970s. In 1974–75 the army's total budget for its church and social service activities was $9,260,441. Of that amount $359,221, or 4 percent, came from government sources. By fiscal year 1979–80 the army's budget increased to $17,361,637. Of that total $2,908,669, or 17 percent, was government funded. In a six-year period public monies increased from 4 percent to 17 percent. Since these budgetary figures included religious as well as social organizations (The Salvation Army does not have a separate structure for its religious and its social service organizations), it is not possible to sort out the social agency budgets from that of the church. However, the social services 1981 financial summary breaks down agency budgets by percentage of government funds received. Table 3 presents these figures. Of a total combined Salvation Army agency budget of $5,996,139, 45 percent, representing $2,719,109, was government funded.

A number of important issues were raised in regard to government funding. These issues were relevant to all three denominations and their agencies.

1. Absorption: Although there were church affiliates that had received public funds for years, one fear that accompanied this source of income was that the organization would be absorbed by government. Respondents expressed concern over the potential loss of identity or uniqueness that could result from more and more government control. Even if government did not absorb the voluntary agencies, most recipients of public funds were fearful about their increasing responsibility to the public sector.

2. Loss of autonomy: One of the hallmarks of the voluntary agency that had been recognized for years was its flexibility. Although it was not certain that the receipt of government monies would mean a loss

of autonomy, the fear that this loss would occur dominated many agency discussions over the last thirty years. Most agency directors reported that their worst fears about loss of autonomy had not been realized. However, most admitted that dependence on government monies had caused them to lose some freedom in selecting priorities and in developing new ideas. Most, therefore, tried to reserve private sources of income for the development of pet projects, since government funds were more likely to be earmarked for specific programs and/or groups of clients. This allowed enough flexibility for innovation, while assuring that established programs were funded.

3. Secularization: One influence of government funding, regardless of denomination, was that staff and board members felt that the agency had become more secular. Secularization meant different things to different respondents. Some felt that the impact of government monies created a tension in their ability to freely and actively demonstrate religious convictions. Some agencies worried that government regulations and funding requirements could cause the agency to hire more persons not of that religious persuasion. It is not that these organizations did not have staff with various religious backgrounds, but they wanted to preserve a spiritual rather than a secular orientation.

4. Budget cuts: Even if an agency developed its program well and spent the public dollar conscientiously, a budget cut in the wrong place could suddenly kill that program. Public funds, therefore, were viewed with uncertainty. Changes in administration and alterations in program support frequently occurred. After a period of relying heavily on federal funds, an organization could suddenly find itself facing a severe deficit and the possibility of closing.

Along with cuts came anger from agency staff. Not only had an agency become more dependent on public dollars than ever before, but some staff felt indignation at an administration that had changed the nation's focus. Budget cuts often meant a time to quickly reassess the private sources of funding available to the agency. Unfortunately, in a time when rapid changes in government financing occurred, the entire voluntary welfare community began pounding on the doors of potential private-sector contributors, and competition was fierce.

Respondents had mixed reactions to the Reagan administration's proposed cuts. Even those agencies that had not dipped into public sources of income were finding that their affiliates were suddenly in greater competition with them for limited private monies. Therefore, directly or indirectly, all of the agencies studied were affected by public funding changes.

For the church affiliate that originally served only those persons related to its parent religious body, there was one type of reaction. A respondent from the Lutheran agency explained that a return to former practices of serving "one's own" could occur as funds were reduced

Resectarianizing was an option for organizations that had a tradition of serving "their own." Having such an option meant that staff and board were rather philosophical in their assessment of the new direction in which the country was going. They did not like the belt tightening that had to occur, but their sense of "Lutheranism" allowed them to see beyond the cuts and to look back to a time when the agency was smaller and very Lutheran.

A more middle-ground response to the cuts emerged from interviews with Episcopalians. Not having been as sectarian in terms of clientele, these respondents did not emphasize a return to serving their own, but focused instead on the old concept of charitable giving. The possibility of returning to a social gospel orientation was discussed by some. They observed that the new administration in Washington had issued a challenge to the church, and that the church should come through with money and volunteers to fill the gaps in funding left by government withdrawal.

For large mainline denominations, meeting the challenge may be more probable than for a small Protestant group such as The Salvation Army that has developed a large social service network. The services provided by the army have never been restricted to persons of one religious persuasion, and it has never been assumed that the army corps (local churches) would totally fund army agencies. Returning to a former time when preference was given to denominational members and to when the church contributed a larger proportion of the agency budget was not a viable option for the army. The army waited until the mid 1970s to tap a larger percentage of government funds. It held back earlier when church affiliates from other denominations were pulling in large public grants. Having waited, and having only recently depended on public dollars, some respondents were angry. Others were more resigned to their fate, yet committed to continuing needed services.

United Way monies.—One might quickly scapegoat government policy and funding as the most difficult secular influences imposed on church-related agencies. That would be a hasty response. In the last thirty years an equal, if not greater, amount of discussion has concerned the requirements of the United Way. In 1958 it was the Community Fund (the forerunner of the United Way) that refused to support what they called an "overspacious" and "inefficient structure" known as the Lutheran children's home. It was the same group that asked the Episcopal boys' home to change its referral policy to care for boys aged ten to eighteen. To make this change, programs had to be revised, staff updated, and the physical facilities rennovated. In 1966 the Community Fund strongly recommended that one Episcopal agency hire another caseworker. The agency did so, based on the assumption that the fund would help finance the position. In 1967 the fund cut the

Table 4

Community Fund/United Way Allocations to Episcopal Agencies, 1948-78

Year	Combined Agency Budgets ($)	Community Fund United Way Allocations ($)	% of Combined Agency Budgets
1948	365,673	68,391	19
1958	709,615	142,975	20
1968	1,903,642	259,900	11
1978	3,907,913	183,463	12

agency's budget allocation. The Community Fund was a major forc
in federation discussions between the Episcopal agencies in the lat
1960s. Small agencies were advised to merge. Joint applications wer
encouraged, and hours of agency time were spent in meeting on th
issue.

Priority systems, the amount of paperwork, and too much contr
for too little money were common complaints about the United Wa
While the layperson grumbled about government control and inte
ference, it was oftentimes the United Way that was exerting the mo
pressure on these church-related agencies. Given the difficulties, how
ever, the United Way had been instrumental in improving agenc
standards, in developing accurate record-keeping systems, and in pro
viding a portion of the private contribution.

The United Way was a resource for all but two of the Episcopa
agencies. In 1964 the Community Fund contributed $68,391 to agenci
of the Episcopal church. This was 19 percent of their combined budget
In 1978, thirty years later, the United Way contributed $483,463 Eve
though this was a far larger amount, it comprised only 12 percent o
the agencies' combined budgets. Table 4 shows United Way allocation
to Episcopal agencies from 1948 to 1978.

The Lutheran organization also received Community Fund/Unite
Way funds over the years. In 1950 the $54,090 allocation receive
from the Community Fund was 22 percent of the agency's operatin
budget. Although the United Way increased its allocations over th
years, its $335,501 allocation to the Lutherans comprised only 1
percent of the agency's budget in 1980. Table 5 reviews these alloca
tions from 1950 to 1980.

Since The Salvation Army does not separate its religious from it
social service administrative structure, it was difficult to locate figure
on United Way funding. The United Way contributes one allocation
to The Salvation Army, which is distributed to individual agencies in
one lump sum along with the army church's contribution. Therefore
the figures presented in table 6 are an army/United Way combined
allocation.

Table 5

COMMUNITY FUND/UNITED WAY ALLOCATIONS TO LUTHERAN AGENCY, 1950-80

Year	Total Agency Budget ($)	Community Fund/ United Way Allocation ($)	% of Total Agency Budget
1950	267,890	54,090	20
1960	372,872	93,000	25
1970	1,012,611	185,862	18
1980	2,689,197	335,501	12

Church monies.—Given the diversity among denominations and among agencies and/or programs within a denominational group, several similarities emerged. (1) First, each agency publicly acknowledged a relationship to a parent religious body.[9] This relationship was formalized in writing. (2) All church affiliates had boards of directors (governing boards) composed entirely or predominately (at least over half) of denominational clergy and/or lay persons. (3) Each agency received some financial contribution directly from its parent religious body, with as much as one-third of the agency's budget coming directly from church sources. (4) Each church affiliate was started by either clergy or lay members affiliated with the denomination to which the agency currently related. (5) Each church affiliate had a specific constituency composed of denominational members from whom the organization solicited support. In these five ways, church-related agencies were connected to their religious communities.

For over thirty years numerous mechanisms were used to encourage and to collect contributions from denominational constituents. In the 1950s Episcopal children filled mite boxes with coins for social agencies. Fund-raising events, dinners, special offerings, bulletin inserts, slide presentations, mail-outs, solicitation of funds on the streets, and

Table 6

UNITED WAY ALLOCATIONS TO SALVATION ARMY AGENCIES, 1981

Agency	Total Agency Budget ($)	Army and United Way Allocations ($)	% of Total Agency Budget
Community center 1	100,389	69,270	69
Services for ex-offenders	1,185,105	92,660	6
Temporary shelter services	691,830	353,300	51
Community center 2	78,206	67,516	92
Counseling agency	1,103,680	937,700	67
Residence for alcoholics	1,186,155	185,397	13
Community center 3	755,171	157,000	21
Total	5,996,139	2,162,843	36

other methods were used to inform people and to obtain monies. Officers[7] in the army, priests in the Episcopal church, and pastors in Lutheran congregations had spoken to groups and had made themselves available as agency representatives in local churches. Liaison persons were hired to coordinate programs between agencies and congregations. Requests for pledges and in-kind contributions were made. Representatives from individual churches were tagged as dispensers of agency news. All three denominations created coordinating bodies to provide technical assistance and to allocate church funds to agencies.

Prior to 1960 church contributions to Episcopal agencies came directly from the Diocese. In the late 1950s an annual appeal was begun since the bishop felt that the church should take a more active role with its social agencies. In 1948 the Diocese allocated a total of $7,330 to its agencies. This represented 2 percent of their combined $365,673 budget. Between 1957 and 1958, when the first annual appeal was held, contributions tripled. In 1978 the coordinating body allocated $152,997 to the agencies. This represented 4 percent of their combined $3,907,913 budget. Allocations ranged from $2,500 to $35,000 for eight agencies which represented from .4 percent to 15 percent of individual agency budgets. Table 7 shows the amounts and percentages of total contributions received by Episcopal agencies.

The 4 percent raised by the Episcopal coordinating body is misleading. Agencies receive other contributions from individuals related to the Episcopal church and from local parishes. A corporation that gives an agency a special grant may be doing so because that organization is interested in supporting the work of the church. It is difficult to draw out the motives behind individual and corporate contributions. If one separates out United Way allocations, government grants and fees, and fees paid by clients, there remains 29 percent of the combined agency budgets that come from other private sources. This 29 percent could possibly come from persons and groups motivated to give because these agencies are church related. This 29 percent, combined with 4 percent received directly from the church, indicates that 33 percent (one-third) of all contributions to all Episcopal agencies may be church-related funds. Table 8 gives a complete breakdown of funds received by Episcopal agencies in 1978.

Table 7

DIRECT CHURCH CONTRIBUTIONS TO EPISCOPAL AGENCIES, 1918–78

Year	Combined Agency Budgets ($)	Direct Church Contribution ($)	% of Agency Budgets
1918	365,673	7,330	[illegible]
1958	709,615	30,501	[illegible]
1968	1,903,642	92,500	[illegible]
1978	3,907,913	152,997	[illegible]

Table 8

SOURCES AND PERCENTAGES OF INCOME FOR EPISCOPAL AGENCIES IN 1978

Agency	Agency Budget ($)	Church Contribution		United Way		Government		Fees for Service		Other	
		$	%	$	%	$	%	$	%	$	%
Chaplaincy service	54,184	6,000	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	48,184	89
Skid row agency	398,958	20,000	5	56,832	14	82,329	21	0	0	239,797	60
Day care headstart agency	390,346	25,332	6	63,889	16	231,000	59	27,000	7	43,125	11
Retirement home	529,691	2,500	5	0	0	0	0	225,502	43	301,689	57
Boys' home	1,338,000	32,000	2	119,000	10	921,350	71	2,000	1	233,650	16
Halfway house	238,000	35,000	15	90,000	38	70,000	29	12,000	5	31,000	13
Adoption agency	186,366	1,165	2	0	0	0	0	73,317	39	108,884	58
Youth counseling	636,351	28,000	4	123,712	19	381,118	60	0	0	103,491	16
Counseling service	36,014	0	0	0	0	0	0	25,499	71	10,515	29
Total	3,907,913	152,997	4	183,463	12	1,785,797	46	365,318	9	1,120,338	29

At the July 1971 convention of the Lutheran Church Missouri Synod (LCMS) a study of LCMS agencies was reported:

> The twenty agencies included in the sample received less than $600,000 income from all Lutherans. However, the same group of agencies showed expenditures that exceeded slightly over $7,200,000. Roughly, less than 1/12 of the total operating cost of our Lutheran agencies is presently received directly from Lutherans. There may be some indirect benefits from Lutherans through contributions to United Fund, etc. The bulk of the operating money of our agencies has come from other sources including fees for service, United Fund and other. The startling situation is that more than 11/12, or slightly over 90 percent of our agency budgets is derived from sources other than those directly related either to the LCMS or any of the other synodical bodies with which we are jointly involved.[8]

This may be true for Missouri Synod Lutheran agencies in general, but the large Lutheran agency in this study always received a higher percentage of its funding from Lutheran sources than was indicated in the 1971 LCMS study. In 1950 the agency's budget was $267,890. Of that total, 14 percent, or $36,402, came from the Lutheran Church Missouri Synod's district-level coordinating body. This figure did not include $33,644, which was an additional 13 percent received directly from congregations and women's auxiliaries in the LCMS. Together these two figures totaled $70,046, or 26 percent, of the 1950 budget. In addition, it was difficult to estimate how much of the 7 percent of private contributions in 1950 were received from Lutheran constituents. It was reasonable, therefore, to estimate that one-third of the agency's 1950 budget was directly church related. By 1980, the combined Lutheran coordinating body and congregational contributions amounted to 16 percent of the agency's budget. Table 9 gives a breakdown of contributions received by the Lutheran agency from 1950 to 1980 directly from church sources.

In 1980 other private sources of income totaled $177,585, or 7 percent, of the Lutheran budget. This 7 percent combined with the 16 percent received directly from the church comprised 23 percent

Table 9

Direct Church Contribution to Lutheran Agency, 1950–80

Year	Agency Budget ($)	Direct Church Contribution ($)	% of Agency Budget
1950	267,890	70,046	26
1960	372,872	142,117	38
1970	1,042,611	238,447	23
1980	2,689,197	433,162	16

Table 10

Source and Percentage of Income for Lutheran Multiservice Agency in 1980
All Programs

Source	$	%
Total budget	2,689,197	
Church contribution	433,462	16
United Way	335,501	12
Government	1,586,792	59
Fees for service	156,157	6
Other	177,585	7

of the total income. Table 10 presents the sources and percentages of all funds received in 1980.

Since The Salvation Army agencies receive a combined Church/United Way allocation, one can only speculate how much is church donated and how much comes from the United Way. Since the total allocation for all seven agencies is 36 percent of their combined budgets, direct funds from the army church are contained within that percentage. A breakdown of the sources and percentages of income for army agencies is presented in table 11.

Regardless of denomination, being related to a parent religious body gives an agency a captive constituency composed of denominational members. In crisis, it may be helpful to have this group from which to request assistance. Endorsement by a religious group may be viewed favorably by many contributors. However, having a church affiliation has its own type of accountability. One area in which there is always potential for a constituency gap is financial support. The Salvation Army is much smaller than the other two denominations. Whereas there are twenty-four corps (army churches) in the city and its surrounding area, there are 145 Episcopal parishes and 218 Missouri Synod congregations. Therefore, in making general statements, it is important to point out that these three groups vary substantially in regard to numbers of constituents.

Respondents indicated financial support was often withheld when an agency received a high percentage of government funds. Constituents believed that the agency no longer needed private contributions. This misperception was oftentimes facilitated by an agency's neglect of its private-sector donors. One former agency executive recalls, "I became so preoccupied and hypnotized by the size of the dollars that those fools in Washington were willing to give me, that I really neglected the private sector constituency. I used to worry about that a lot, but even with worrying about it, you let it go."

Denominational constituents oftentimes do not know how costly it is to run a social agency. One board member commented that his

Table 11

SOURCES AND PERCENTAGES OF INCOME FOR SALVATION ARMY AGENCIES, 1981

Agency	Agency Budget ($)	Church Contribution and United Way Allocation		Government		Fees for Service		Other	
		$	%	$	%	$	%	$	%
Community center 1	100,389	69,270	69	25,097	25	3,012	3	3,010	3
Services for ex-offenders	1,485,405	92,660	6	1,203,178	81	89,124	6	100,443	7
Temporary shelter services	691,830	353,300	51	200,631	29	20,755	3	117,144	17
Community center 2	73,206	67,516	92	0	0	2,196	3	3,494	5
Counseling agency	1,403,680	937,700	67	308,810	22	84,221	6	72,949	5
Residence for alcoholics	1,486,455	185,397	33	490,530	33	208,104	14	302,424	20
Community center 3	755 174	157,000	21	490,863	65	37,759	5	69,552	9
Total	5,996,139	2,162 842	36	2,719,109	45	445,171	7	669,016	11

church had a $30.00 allotment set aside for each of the nine Episcopal agencies. Thirty dollars is a small percentage of a million-dollar budget.

Church members often sincerely believe that they own and financially support church-related agencies. With The Salvation Army and some of the Episcopal agencies this is indeed the case. However, no agency in this study is solely supported by the church. Between constituents assuming that they are providing all that an agency needs financially and other private donors assuming the same thing, church agencies may have problems getting the money they need. Not wanting to dismiss their church affiliation yet trying to balance that with the reality that they have to raise more money from other sources can cause tension. In addition, the organization finds itself in competition with the church itself. Parishes, corps, and congregations have to operate too. Many churches have their own deficits, and social ministries may have to take a backseat until the local church can pay its bills.

Weaknesses of Data

This study has several limitations. Given the available data, it was not possible to separate government grants from fees. The implications of purchase of service contracting as opposed to receiving grants for programs vary considerably. The available data for each group of agencies vary by denomination. For example, financial information on army agencies was not available prior to the 1970s. In addition, data available on all agencies vary. Whereas the most complete information on Episcopal agencies was for 1978, Lutheran agency audits were available from 1950 to 1980, and a 1981 financial summary for army agencies was available. These three denominations were diverse in that the three parent religious bodies were structured differently. Comparability of organizations was limited by this factor. This study was limited to church-related social service agencies with only three Protestant denominations in only one geographical location. Additional research on other denominations in different parts of the country is needed.

Conclusions

As diverse as these denominations and their agencies are, they are similar in regard to fiscal accountability. Each group has a coordinating body that works with individual churches (whether they are called parishes, congregations, or corps). All three denominations draw from multiple funding sources. This means that in addition to their accountability to the church, they are accountable to government and

United Way, as well as to private individuals and organizations. Some agencies, for example, are accountable to government for as high as 60–80 percent of their funds. What does this say in regard to their religious affiliation? Does it mean that 60–80 percent of their time is really government controlled, or does it matter as long as clients are served? What if the church tells an agency to do one thing, and its government guidelines mandate another? To whom is the agency ultimately responsible? Have some of these agencies passed an invisible line where the public overbalances the private? Does such a line exist?

The three denominations are remarkably similar in regard to percentages of government funding received. Naturally there are some agencies and programs within all three groups that do not tap government monies, but looking at their combined budgets, one can readily see that approximately half of all three combined budgets is government financed. Are constituents that channel their tithes into church-related agencies aware of this government subsidy? Does it matter as long as services are delivered? After all, constituents are paying government taxes, and these agencies are serving the "public." Is it comforting or confusing to know that some of that tax money is channeled back into religious agencies?

The United Way is a private-sector funding source that contributes to all three denominations, although not every individual agency is a recipient of United Way contributions. The amount of money received by the United Way has grown consistently over the years, but it has had difficulty keeping up with the rate of growth that these organizations have experienced. Therefore, over thirty years, although the dollar amounts have grown, the percentage of United Way monies has usually decreased.

Not only the United Way but the church has watched its dollar contributions grow, only to see the percentage of its donation to agency budgets decline. Again, this experience is remarkably similar to examining the combined agency budgets for each denomination and seeing that the direct church contribution is relatively small when compared to other sources of income. Even if one assumes that all private funds, other than United Way and private fees for service, are church motivated, the church does not match the government contribution to agencies' combined budgets. Ironically, these agencies often received as many government dollars as private contributions, yet felt more pressure coming from the United Way or from denominational constituents than from government.

A few agencies, usually smaller ones in terms of their budgets established policies that forbade the use of public monies. The largest agencies had received public funds. Individual agency reasons for deciding not to receive public monies varied. Some wanted to be as independent as possible. Others wanted to maintain a separation of

church and state. Some did not qualify. None of the parent religious bodies, however, had a policy that stated that an affiliate could not receive public funds. In fact, over the last decade all three had supported this phenomenon. The Salvation Army had been the most reluctant, but in the last five years the army had begun to draw more and more heavily from government grants and fees.

It is very important to note, however, that the agencies studied represent only a small portion of the vast network of services provided by churches. The church at the congregational level provides all types of services: food pantries, emergency funds, clothing closets, volunteer visitors, free transportation, and in-home assistance. Salvation Army corps are service-minded community centers, since the army views social ministry as inseparable from its religious life. Lutheran and Episcopal churches also provide all types of direct services. The fact is that churches do not limit themselves to the services provided by organized church-affiliated agencies, even though these agencies are often more visible.

When the government requests the assistance of the voluntary sector, it is reaching to the church on the street corner as much as it is to the agency that is church related. There is potential there that far exceeds what organized social agencies can do. But even acknowledging the many local, often unnoticed efforts within church communities, one must ask several questions. If churches are to give more in charitable contributions, will those monies go to church-related agencies who have lost funding to government cuts? Should the funds of increased church giving go only to the support of those agencies that are recognized by the church? Can the church raise enough money to fund its own agencies as funding reductions affect them? To maintain current levels of funding could mean a substantial increase in church allocations to these three groups of organizations. In a time when government is looking to the church as a major contributor, it may be that the church will do well to fund its own agencies.

Notes

This article has been adapted from a portion of my doctoral dissertation submitted in 1982 to the School of Social Service Administration of the University of Chicago. I wish to thank those organizations that participated in the study for their time, their openness, and their interest.

1. Graenum Berger, "American Jewish Communal Service 1776–1976: From Traditional Self-Help to Increasing Dependence on Government Support," *Jewish Social Studies* 38 (Summer–Fall 1976): 225–46; Eleanor L. Brilliant, "Private or Public: A Model of Ambiguities," *Social Service Review* 47 (September 1973): 384–96; Ronald P. Bird and Julius B. Richmond, "The Public and Private Sector: A Developing Partnership

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2 Horace Cayton and Setsuko Nishi, *Churches and Social Welfare*, vol 2, *The Changing Scene* (New York National Council of Churches of Christ in the U S A , 1955), Bernard J Coughlin, *Church and State in Social Welfare* (New York Columbia University Press 1965), Young and Finch

3 Cayton and Nishi, p 16

4 Robert Morris, "Current Directions of Sectarian Welfare in America," *Journal of Jewish Communal Services* 38 (Fall 1961) 57

5 Coughlin, p 63

6 The three parent religious bodies were structured differently The Episcopal Diocese and The Salvation Army had hierarchical church polities However, each Episcopal agency had its own governing board and was completely separate from the Diocese Army agencies had advisory boards but were inseparable from the church structure since they were governed by the church board The Lutheran Church Missouri Synod had a congregational polity, which meant that governance was at the local level The Lutheran agency had its own board of directors and was not owned or operated by the church

7 Officers are ministers in The Salvation Army church

8 Reported in the *Lutheran Church Missouri Synod Convention Proceedings*, Lutheran Church Missouri Synod, July 9–16, 1971, p 381 (published by the synod)

Notes on Policy and Practice

Conservatism of Social Work

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This article addresses the charge that social workers, like the charity workers before them, disseminate the conservative values of a middle-class culture. Although the underlying conservative social and political context of social work practice is not denied, the author objects to equating social work with charity work, to equating professional social work thinking with social agency thinking, and to the implication of monolithic thinking within the profession. The history of child welfare is used to demonstrate the profession's efforts to differentiate itself from its lay and organizational ties as it has attempted to develop a unifying practice methodology.

In a paper written for presentation at the 1981 program meetings of the Council on Social Work Education, Brian Gratton, a social welfare historian, explored the "conservative roots" of social reform and concluded that "social workers disseminate the values of a hegemonic middle-class culture."[1] The conclusion, really an accusation, was based on a study of child welfare developments at the turn of the century, that is, during the Progressive era of reform. Particularly telling for the author were the finding of opposition by social workers to mothers' assistance legislation and the finding that casework, the emerging technology of social workers, was used in juvenile courts as "a weapon in the social welfare assault"[2] on unacceptable personalities. The implied preference of social workers and their predecessors, charity workers, for personality reconstruction was used to infer a current professional attitude toward people in need. That attitude was seen as disdain for values other than traditional middle-class ones and, therefore, an abiding orientation against societal reform.

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The charge that social workers are conservative or, even worse, professional hustlers for a society prone to view the poor individual as the center of his own problem is not new.[3] Social workers themselves have persistently scrutinized their professional commitments and works with disdain and alarm. Most recently, during the 1960s and early 1970s, there was a veritable cacophony of denunciations and mea culpas at professional meetings, in the literature, in the classroom, and in social agencies. Indeed, the force of the eruption threatened the existence of the profession itself, as symbolized by the distaste with which the word "credentialism" was applied to having or to obtaining a professional degree.

The charge that social workers adhere to "evil" middle-class values as part of their professional endeavors seemed odd, to some at least, even during the 1960s. This was especially so insofar as the accusation implied a deliberate imposition on minorities and the poor of unwanted goods. The charge seems even more odd now that there has been time to reflect on the causes of the civil rights movement and the black revolution, and our continuing failure to meet their demands. The revolt, it seems, was not so much a rebellion against middle-class values and goods as it was a demand to be permitted to become part of the middle-class mainstream. The outpouring of guilt need not have derived from concerns about imposing middle-class values but, rather, from failure to help the underprivileged attain the equitable distribution of rights and goods deemed necessary to the fulfillment of the American middle-class dream. Calls for equality before the law, for equality of education, for equality in the job market, for equal housing, and for equal health care were calls for legal and program implementation of values held in common.

Having argued against an out-of-hand condemnation of middle-class values, one must return to a consideration of the overall historical emphasis of social work practice. Axinn and Levin have pointed out that social work and social work education have fluctuated in their views "of the relative significance of socio-environmental and intro-psychic factors in creating a need for social work services."[4] "Although both elements have indeed always been present in considerations of helping methodologies, the emphasis has changed periodically, demonstrating the field's vulnerability to the current political climate. The more conservative the period, the more likely a focus upon the pathological. . . . Conversely, periods of political reform have promoted an emphasis upon the socio-economic causes of need. . . . In the first instance, the emphasis has been upon 'professionalism,' the development of a helping methodology steeped in psychology; in the latter instance, on a helping methodology emphasizing change through social reform and legislative actions. These are, as indicated, stated too simply. For example, the politically oppressive post-World War I

period was a seedtime for the reforms of the New Deal, and the reform era of the 1960s spawned the clinical section of the National Association of Social Workers. However, the overall response to the contemporary social and political climate seems clear. Axinn and Levin do not deny an underlying context of conservatism. Social workers, like all professionals, are creatures of their own social, political, and economic milieus. Like all professionals, they are subject to the current state of scientifically informed knowledge. And, more than most professionals, they are dependent upon an employer-employee relationship and upon what the public will tolerate for the practice of their profession.

With the above in mind, we can consider more specifically the premises of Gratton's paper. In fact, doing so at what seems to be the start of another era of political and social repression may not only be clarifying but may also prevent some misunderstanding of social work's response to future events. Gratton's paper focuses on child welfare work in Boston, and, by extension, in the nation between 1820 and 1920. One can agree with the author's statement that the "underlying principle of child welfare work remained the same [during those years]: whether reaching into the family to shape its values, or taking a child out of it, social and charity workers tried to disseminate the values of a hegemonic [conservative] middle-class culture."[6] In viewing that 100-year span, however, we can nevertheless object to (1) equating charity work and charity workers with social work and social workers; (2) equating professional social work thinking with the social agency and employer's thinking; and (3) implying monolithic thinking within the profession, for the profession itself was just beginning to emerge at the turn of the twentieth century and, in 1920, was still unclear about its professional identity. These objections, generalized beyond workers in child welfare, leave room for professional diversity and self-determination in an otherwise stagnant situation.

Without denying the continuity of evolution between the charity worker of the nineteenth century and the social worker of the twentieth, one can make a distinction between the volunteer activity of the former and the professional activity of the latter. Indeed, the very failure of the nineteenth-century "friendly visiting" to produce change in the poor and/or in the conditions of the poor led to the need for paid agents and, in turn, to the need for professional knowledge. The belief "that poverty could be cured and could be prevented because it was a result of causes that could be discovered"[7] required workers who could put the "scientific" in "scientific philanthropy." A very early factor in the development of a professional stance was the realization that one might "distinguish between what is peculiar to that one family and must be individually conquered and what is borne in common . . . and must be cured by social or legislative action."[8] This realization would bring both unity and disunity to what would be called

social work, but first it led to professional self-identification. By 1898, the first school for training "professional altruists" was established, but the idea of paid charity work and of training for it was so new that Mary Richmond commented in 1897 that there was "not even a name for it."[9] Even in 1923, when the first formal report on education and training appeared, effort was still being made to delineate a "well-defined central field of social work."[10]

The situation was only somewhat better for those disciplines with which social work was allied—sociology and medicine. "Sociology in the 1890s was more a potential than an actual discipline. Lacking a distinct methodology and clearly defined field of inquiry, sociologists devoted their efforts to defining the nature of their discipline and its boundaries. Little sociological research was produced before the twentieth century."[11]

The first department of sociology was founded at the University of Chicago in 1892. Most of its faculty members had been trained in theology and were deeply engaged in social reform and philanthropic activities. *Medical Education in the United States and Canada*, the Flexner report which was to revolutionize medical education, appeared in 1910.[12] In 1915, Flexner applied his criteria for a profession to social work.[13] The point is that the state of scientific knowledge and the status of social work and of allied disciplines, despite acknowledged progress, did not yet permit sharp distinctions between knowledgeable lay helping persons and professionally prepared social workers.

A similar case can be made in distinguishing between charity organizations and social agencies. The evolution of organizations in which philanthropists made administrative and supervisory decisions into social agencies characterized by professional administration and professional supervision was very much in process during the early decades of the twentieth century. However, the relatively primitive state of social work's practice wisdom and of knowledge to be derived from the social and health care sciences was matched by the limitations on knowledge in the field of management. Taylor's *Principles of Scientific Management*[14] did not appear until 1911. In direct helping and management practice, a continuing overlap of lay and professional thinking was endemic. Nevertheless, sufficient advance had been made to encourage social workers to separate themselves from lay workers and from lay employers. The separation was formally marked with the establishment of professional associations; the American Association of Social Workers, the largest organization of social work professionals, was formed in 1921.

But even at the turn of the century, those workers who were beginning to see themselves as a professional breed apart from lay persons were not monolithic in their views of people in need or in their responses to need. Charity organization and settlement house workers distin-

guished between themselves even as they came together during the Progressive era to effect governmental legislation designed to attack environmental causes of poverty. The former sought environmental change as a base for helping families help themselves through personal and familial change; the latter sought societal restructuring as a source of justice. Social gospelism as a philosophical underpinning for social reform and the religious heritage of Progressive era leaders in social welfare speak to the Protestant, conservative influence in social work. Certainly, President Theodore Roosevelt saw no political liability in rallying the general citizenry to "reform through social work."[15] Still, cleavages among social welfare workers and between adherents to identifiable approaches to helping existed and persisted. Nowhere is this clearer than in the child welfare arena.

Charity workers of the early nineteenth century approached child welfare much as they did the welfare of adults. With practically no "scientific" base for interpreting human behavior, they nevertheless held a view of people that was not caught in the Calvinist determinism of an earlier day and was more positive in thinking of people as being able to determine their own future well-being.[16] This humanistic, even humanitarian, orientation continued a tradition of "mass care" for persons in need but, simultaneously, stressed the need for categorization. The overall purpose of institutions, of utopian communities, of the wholesale shipping of children west was to offer the needy a break with the past, a new environment in which the individual, through self-examination or nearness to God, might be largely self-reformed. The country's hope as to the potential contribution of children to the realization of a democratic society is inherent in labeling the decades immediately preceding the Civil War the child-saving era.[17] Children were no longer to be viewed as little adults but as children who, for better or worse, would grow into adults. The needs of children for education, for "moral and corporal discipline,"[18] for obedience to societal demands to help them cope with adulthood were tended with specialized, categorical care.

The number and variety of facilities for children expanded rapidly during the child-saving era. Most were privately funded and controlled, many received state subsidies, and others were publicly funded and administered. The number of houses of refuge alone grew so rapidly that by 1857 a convention of refuge superintendents was warranted. While this occurrence suggests a move toward professionalization by some persons employed in the field of charities and corrections, the reality was that voluntary agencies and volunteers dominated. The impetus for establishing institutions for delinquent and neglected children came from the New York Society for the Prevention of Pauperism, established in 1819.[19] The notion of foster home care derived from the child-saving efforts of the Children's Aid Society of New York,

established in 1853.[20] These social welfare organizations were typical. They were "not only established and sponsored by lay people but . . . [were] also manned by them. The paid worker had not yet arrived on the scene."[21]

During the last decades of the nineteenth century, child welfare was profoundly influenced by developments in the charity organization movement. That movement's insistence upon objective investigation and upon individualization in working with families gave evidence of advances in the social sciences and promise of the development of professional methodologies. The idea of a scientifically applied philanthropy was almost immediately recognized as useful for working with children. In 1888, Charles W. Birtwell, general agent of the Boston Children's Aid Society, wrote: "The aim will be in each instance to suit action to the real need—heeding the teachings of experience, still to study the conditions with a freedom from assumptions, and a directness and freshness of view, as complete as though the case in hand stood absolutely alone."[22]

Just five years later he wrote: "These children cannot be divorced from the natural relations of family life without loss, any more than those born under more favorable conditions, and therefore we must humbly set ourselves to learn the ways in which family ties may be strengthened and parental responsibilities maintained."[23] The quotations from Birtwell should not be interpreted as meaning that child welfare had generally acquired a professional knowledge base and a professional methodology. Equating the familial relationships of needy families with those of all families may in fact be interpreted as little more than a search for common, conservative middle-class roots. But there is implied a beginning separation of professional from lay, middle-class thinking.

The joining of forces by charity organization and settlement house workers during the Progressive era contributed to the successful achievement of an array of legislative goals and to the professionalization of services. Nevertheless, cleavages among those we now claim as social workers were clear. Jane Addams, addressing the National Conference on Charities and Corrections in 1897, identified their differences: "The settlement does stand for something unlike that which the charity organization visitor stands for. You are bound, when you are doing charitable work, to lay stress upon the industrial virtues. Now the settlement . . . does not lay so much stress on one set of virtues but views the man in his social aspect. . . . To get him to the pitch which shall induce him to push up that civilization he finds around him a little higher . . . is perhaps the chief function of a settlement."[24] The gulf in concept between individual and family as clientele to be acted upon, and individual and family themselves acting to change civilization

is broad. Inherent in the Addams view of settlement house goals is "radical" institutional reform.

Success and failure in connection with legislative efforts to reform child welfare are demonstrated in juvenile court and mothers' pension legislation. The readiness of society to attempt the protection of neglected and delinquent children is indicated by the rapid spread of juvenile court systems. Within ten years of the passage of the first juvenile court law by Illinois in 1899, similar laws had been passed in twenty-two states. By 1919, all but three states had enacted juvenile court laws. Grace Abbott, a settlement house worker, a social welfare educator, and toward the close of the Progressive era a chief of the Children's Bureau, conceded the discouraging results of the juvenile court movement in reducing and preventing delinquency.

In her classic work, *The Child and the State*, Abbott describes the purpose of the first juvenile court laws as being to "save a child becoming a criminal" and to identify children so they might "reach the court to be saved."[25] Looking back on the original intent of juvenile courts, she writes: "It was a constructive solution on the basis of our knowledge at the beginning of the century."[26] Despite disappointment, she saw "no mistake . . . in taking children and young people out of the jurisdiction of the criminal courts and creating specialized courts in dealing with them."[27] Moreover, she writes, "through the juvenile courts the legal questions involved in the change from punishment to treatment with a view to cure have been decided. . . . Through the specialized courts the child and his problems have emerged."[28] Apparently the socio-psychological understandings of human behavior gleaned from the works of Mary Richmond and Sigmund Freud and the helping technology they fostered had begun to make their mark.

The process of developing a helping "casework" technology paralleled the evolution of friendly visiting into paid charity work, and then into social work. The new technology provided the "scientific" base for professionalization; and the "paid agent," that is, the agent of volunteers, disappeared and was replaced by the potentially independent, professional caseworker-social worker. The demarcation between lay and professional was already so clear in 1921 that an administrative volunteer lamented, "What is there for them [board members] to do?"[29] Whatever their middle-class origins, social workers were increasingly seen to have achieved a status and stance which separated them from others.

Differences between charity organization and settlement house workers lessened as the latter developed a group-work methodology, and as the reform and legislative orientation of the Progressive era faded. In the juvenile court this was symbolized by a shift from an emphasis on helping through institutional change to helping through attempts at personality adjustment. But the joining of charity orga-

nization and settlement house work under the rubric of "social work did not herald monolithic thinking. Jane Addams continued her ac vocacy for social and pacifist causes despite disagreement with he colleagues on the platform committee of the Progressive party.[30] I view of the imminence of World War I, her stands in regard to soci welfare reforms and war could be seen as revolutionary

Developments in the juvenile court were paralleled by those of th Mothers' Pension movement. Illinois's Funds to Parents Act of 1911 the first statewide law meant to prevent the removal of children from their own homes for reasons of poverty alone, caused an outcry from social workers. Mary Richmond and Frederic Almy spoke for charit organization. The former was shocked that the Funds to Parents Ac had been "drafted and passed without consulting a single social worker."[31] The latter, the renowned Secretary of the Buffalo Charity Organization Society, feared the dispensing of relief without professional help, fo "like undoctored drugs, untrained relief is poisonous to the poor ."[32] But they did not speak for such settlement house leaders as Lillian Wald; and their outcry did not prevent social welfare workers from rallying to help establish the program.[33]

The success which charity organization workers had in capturing the general imagination and the label "social workers" tended to blur the sharp differences that existed among workers in social welfare Particularly ignored is the extent to which the outcry against Mothers Pensions was an indication of the struggle between proponents of voluntary social welfare and those of public welfare. Mothers' assistance laws proliferated, and mothers' aid developed as a publicly financed publicly administered program, not only giving beginning recognition to governmental responsibility for family and child welfare but also of changing power relationships between the voluntary and public sectors in social welfare. A portent of the future was the establishment of the Children's Bureau in 1912, with Julia Lathrop, a settlement house worker, appointed as its first chief. Under the aegis of the Children's Bureau and the leadership of Julia Lathrop, a study of mothers' assistance in "ten representative localities" was conducted during the period of October 1923 to April 1924. The study documented the success of mothers' aid programs and significantly reported that "the principle of home care for dependent children as a public function is generally accepted in this country."[34]

Thus, the mothers' aid movement was particularly symbolic of change occurring in social welfare and in social work. As early as 1912, there had been grudging recognition on the part of the voluntary sector that public welfare was, in essence, family welfare under public auspices and that alignments between voluntary and public agencies would need clarifying. This radical departure from an earlier position was announced in the resolution adopted in 1918 at the annual membership

neeting of the National Association for Organizing Charity "Resolved, that this Association believes that the division of work between public and private family work agencies . . . cannot be defined as to be uniformly applicable. . . . No permanent arrangement [for cooperation] should be on any other basis than division of cases rather than different functioning of work."[35] The admission of commonality between public and private family work agencies not only suggested the potential strength of public social welfare agencies but also of social workers practicing in those agencies.

Calls to socialize, that is, to professionalize public agency personnel so as to make them identical with workers in voluntary agencies merely served to point up the difference in their views. Mary Richmond's argument against the public administration of mothers' aid was based on the belief that social workers were necessary to assure that "the children of the widow are in school, that they are morally protected, that their health is safeguarded, that they have a good chance to grow up right."[36] The Children's Bureau's study of mothers' aid found that families had been maintained, apparently with governmental assistance and without the kind of professional supervision deemed necessary by Mary Richmond, "on a par with . . . self-supporting families."[37] Thus, the different orientations of workers in voluntary family welfare programs and of workers in these new public family welfare programs seem clear. Specifically, the difference in view of the people served was akin to differences in the orientation of the charity organization and settlement house movements—broadly speaking, it was traditionalists versus reformists.

Still the essential conservative underpinnings of social welfare and social work are not to be denied. Both charity organizations and settlements can be said to derive from the middle-class, Protestant leanings of their adherents.[38] This similarity of the two movements was enhanced by a process of professionalization in which the use of psychology to bring about change and adjustment in people became fundamental to both. This process of professionalization and abandonment of overt social reform activity was hastened, not only by calls to serve one's country during the World War I crisis, but also by the law and order oppressions of the postwar era. Nevertheless, essential differences between reform-oriented and therapy-oriented social workers remained and came to the fore again with the rediscovery of poverty during the 1930s and 1960s. The conclusion is that the development of social work as a profession demonstrates: (1) effort to differentiate between the thinking of lay persons and professionals, (2) effort to differentiate professional thinking from social agency thinking, and (3) effort to fuse the professional/clinical and professional social reform propensities of social workers through some single methodological process.

Child welfare, like other areas of social welfare for which social work

has accepted some professional responsibility, has suffered the strain of the evolutionary efforts described above. Despite change, foster care, adoptions, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and juvenile courts continue to hold elements of their conservative beginnings. Certainly, they may be judged conservative on the basis of present-day standards. But is that not to be expected? For unless the profession of social work is given to revolution, it is subject to the restraints and constrictions of all social sciences. Meenaghan and Washington state that: "How and why particular social science options are chosen depend not primarily upon the persuasiveness of schools of social science thought but more upon the compatibility of variants of social science thinking with the dominant interest-value orientations in the society." Perhaps social work's past transgression in relation to child welfare and to social welfare generally has been that it has promised too much. The prospect for the feared conservatism of the 1980s would seem to be this: whatever the general social and political climate, social workers, through diversity and difference, can be expected to sustain a professional heritage of advocacy in behalf of unpopular causes and unpopular people.

Notes

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Social Workers and Political Influence

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The research reported here suggests that although social workers may be politically active, they are not politically influential. The findings indicate that legislators do not have an accurate image of who social workers are and rate them as having little political influence compared with other groups.

Introduction

The belief that social workers are for the most part apolitical in their approach to professional practice is long-standing and pervasive. One cause for this belief may be that amorphous social work goals provide no clear direction for practitioners. Social work simultaneously embraces volunteerism and public service, casework and community organization, social change and social control.[1] The plausibility of this viewpoint is supported by the diversity and factionalism found within the profession. It is hard to imagine social work wielding strong political influence without unity of purpose and clearly enunciated positions on the important issues.[2]

Wolk cites those political activists, past and present, who have contributed significantly to social reform.[3] Such familiar names as Jane

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ldams, Harry Hopkins, and Wilbur Cohen are mentioned as ex-
nplifying that inspiring role model—the politically successful social
rker. Wolk suggests that social workers are not apolitical and his
search demonstrates persuasively that, contrary to popular opinion,
ial workers are politically active. Building upon the work of Woodward
d Roper[4] and Milbrath,[5] Wolk surveyed 470 members of NASW in
state of Michigan. Finding that 63 percent of social workers re-
onding could be classified as politically active, Wolk postulated that
cial work participation in the political arena may be as expansive
the profession has any right to expect Moreover, this political
rticipation seems to occur to the same degree as other professional
oups and business executives."[6]

How might the gap between Wolk's findings and the conventional
age of the social worker as nonpolitical be explained? One possible
swer is that while individual social workers are politically active, the
ofession as a whole does not have a record of political efficacy The
oblem then may be a lack of political influence rather than a lack
political activity. It is particularly important to discriminate between
ctive and ineffective practice in the political arena at this point in
e since the NASW is putting increasing emphasis on entities like
Political Action for Candidate Election (PACE) and the Educational
gislative Action Network (ELAN) at both the national and state
pter levels.

cus of the Study

focus of this study is to explore whether or not legislators perceive
al workers as politically active and, if they do, as politically influential
ong the questions to be addressed are (1) What image do legislators
e of professional social workers? (2) Do legislators believe that social
kers are politically active? (3) If so, does the activity result in status
influence for the profession? (4) If social workers are to develop
/or maintain influence in the eyes of legislators, what factors are
ortant to consider?

thod

mple.—To explore the opinions of legislators about social workers,
oosive sampling of politicians was conducted Politicians from

southwestern Michigan were chosen as the total population to be studied. Questions were addressed through in-person interviews with state and federal legislators. A 100 percent sample of this ten-county area yielded seventeen state representatives, seven state senators, four U.S. representatives, and two U.S. senators, for a total of twenty-nine potential respondents.

The questionnaire solicited information from the legislators regarding their knowledge of social work and social workers, their attitudes about social work influence, and their opinions of how social workers and others might effectively influence them. The instrument consisted of eighteen multiple-choice, true-false, and open-ended questions. Several questions were modified from Woodward and Roper's Political Activity Index.

Geographical boundaries were used to determine the area of representation for the purpose of our study. Lake Michigan to the west and the Indiana border to the south formed the natural southwest border for our area. Since legislative districts extended over a larger portion of the state than our geographical area, legislators were chosen when part of their district fell within the area. The southwest Michigan counties included are Allegan, Barry, Berrien, Calhoun, Cass, Kalamazoo, Kent, Muskegon, Ottawa, St. Joseph, and Van Buren. These geographic limits were selected to allow person-to-person interviews with each legislator.

All twenty-nine legislators received an introductory letter, followed by a telephone contact, and a final letter confirming time, date, and place of the in-person interview. There were four legislators who refused to participate in this study because of scheduling problems and one who refused saying, "I do not give interviews except on specific legislative issues." A total of twenty-four interviews were conducted. In the case of three of the federal legislators, legislative aides participated on behalf of the legislator.

Pretest.—An interview training experience was provided for the research team through a pretest conducted with selected county commissioners from Kent, Van Buren, Kalamazoo, and St. Joseph counties. County commissioners were chosen for the pretest because they were deemed comparable to the sample population and were easily accessible. This pretest group included commissioners from urban and rural areas characteristic of the sample population. The purpose of this pretest was to test the language, clarity, and time length of the revised instrument as well as to provide interviewing experience. After the pretest, question structure was changed for more precise wording. Minor adjustments were also made in the interview process and in information provided on the face sheet.

Instrument design.—Development of the instrument included a search of the literature for previous research into the political activity of social

ers and lobbyists. Several questions from Woodward and Roper's ical Activity Index were modified to be used to measure social ers' influence on legislators. The remaining questions were de-)ed to give data on the attitudes of politicians toward social workers the influence social workers have on legislators

ch legislator was interviewed by one member of the group. in- ews lasted thirty minutes or less. With the consent of the legislator,)e recorder was used. One legislator did not permit the use of a rder, and another six interviews were not successfully recorded use of tape or recorder malfunction

ie following operational definitions were developed to aid in the irch process. Influence is the ability to get others to act, think or as one intends.[7] Political activity is political involvement beyond ig. It includes: discussion of public issues, belonging to political nizations, written or verbal communication with public officials, paign activities, and political contributions[8] Social workers are e who are qualified to be regular or student members of the onal Association of Social Workers (NASW) and who are practicing il work. A politician is an elected official at the state or federal l who is currently serving in a legislature, representing constituents outhwest Michigan. An attitude is a predisposition of an individual valuate an aspect of his or her world in a favorable or unfavorable mer.[9] An urban area is defined as a legislative district having a n of 50,000 persons or more or a major portion thereof Rural is are those legislative districts without a town of 50,000 persons nore

ias—Several tactics were used to reduce variability of bias. First, ight members of the research team participated in the interviews egislators. Second, the observers' interviewing tasks were as closely ified as possible A detailed, typed introduction was used by each rviewer during the interview Only questions on the typed ques- naire were asked and were essentially verbatim Third, interviewers ticed interviewing by role playing, which induced feedback from research team on developing consistent phrasing of questions irth, interviewers were instructed to record answers immediately a data collection sheet during the interview. After each interview, re detailed recording took place Fifth, tape recordings were made ill but seven of the interviews to reduce the discretion of the field erver

Furthermore, in the development of the questionnaire, questions re scrutinized for bias.

oding.—Data analysis began by compiling the answer sheets from twenty-four interviews. Seventeen of the interviews were tape re- ded These recordings were replayed and answers were marked score sheets by research team members other than the original

interviewers. This was done primarily as a check on reliability. For these interviews, two answer sheets were used to clarify answers for the coding of information.

The answer sheet was used to transfer raw data into numerical form for computer use. Sixteen of the eighteen questions were coded specifically for this use. Nine of the questions were coded with a grouped score. These data were categorized and numerals assigned to each category. This process was carried out by all research team members, in four-member coding teams. There were twenty interview answer sheets available for coding. Answer sheets were arbitrarily sorted into four stacks. Each team was given a number. The teams then referred to the table of random numbers to specify which teams would record data from the interviews. If there were differences of opinion between the two coders, a third member of the research team became the arbitrator to decide on the coding.

Findings

The sample as illustrated in table 1 contained a group of legislators representing a wide spectrum of demographic, political, philosophical, and constituent characteristics.

The data showed that the majority of respondents were Republican (71 percent) representing rural areas (58 percent) at the state level (79 percent) and conservative in philosophy (79 percent).[10] Respondents were asked to provide their definition of a social worker. Replies were analyzed for inclusion of the elements of educational attainment (and consequent professional status as signified by entitlement to NASW membership) and that of occupation in the broadly defined area of human service. In recognizing the complexity of such a response, the researchers awarded high scores to responses including examples of

Table 1

Constituency, Level of Government, and Philosophy of Legislators by Party Affiliation ($N = 21$)

Party Affiliation	Constituency			Level of Government		Philosophy	
	Rural	Urban	Mixed	Federal	State	Liberal	Conservative
Democrat	0	5	2	3	4	5	2
Republican	14	3	0	2	15	0	17

Table 2

FREQUENCY AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL WORKER DEFINITIONS BY LEGISLATORS ($N = 24$)

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Incorrect	2	8
Partially adequate	16	67
Adequate	6	25
Total	24	100

ocial work, since these illustrations confirmed the respondents' level of understanding.

Table 2 shows the frequency and percentages of scores for social worker definitions provided by the Michigan legislators in our sample. The findings suggest that the vast majority of legislators interviewed could not provide an adequate description of the training and experience necessary to a professional social worker. While only two out of the twenty-four legislators interviewed supplied a completely incorrect definition, 75 percent, or eighteen out of the twenty-four respondents, failed to mention either educational attainment or employment in the human services, even in the broadest manner, as important to defining a social worker. One legislator mentioned both attributes in general terms, while four described both education and area of service generally, with a specific example of one or the other category. Some examples of responses: "D.S.S. [Department of Social Services] front line workers and volunteers"; "Government workers employed by D.S.S., who work with clients to make use of the social welfare process". "Social workers are professionals who have academic training to deal with disadvantaged groups." Of the respondents, eight identified social work with governmental services, four of these exclusively with direct service positions in the Department of Social Services. This identification was borne out in response to other questions as well, confirming a significant perception by some legislators that social work is primarily, if not exclusively, identical with governmental social services. Since some legislators perceived social workers as governmental employees, they believed them to be covered by the Hatch Act and required by law to be politically inactive.

Only seven (29 percent) of the twenty-four respondents mentioned the element of training or education in defining the social worker. Of these seven, it was indirectly implied by the use of the word "professional" in only four cases. Thus, only three legislators specifically recognized academic training as necessary to defining social work.

The next set of inquiries aimed at ascertaining the level of political activity of social workers with the legislators interviewed. Legislators

were asked how many letters, phone calls, and face-to-face meetin
from or with social workers they had during the last year. Legislato
often queried whether communications handled by staff should b
included in their responses. Interviewers were instructed to answ
that the legislator should count only those communications of whic
she or he had definite knowledge. Several legislators said that th
rarely received mail on legislative issues from anyone! One responde
stated that if he or his colleagues receive four letters on a bill, th
consider it a "hot" issue.

Table 3 depicts a frequency of personal communication from soci
workers to legislators that seems very much in keeping with Wolk
findings that social workers are politically active. Only one of th
respondents reported *not meeting* with any social workers last yea
Seven legislators reported receiving twenty or more letters from soci
workers last year. Five reported having twenty or more phone con
versations last year, and five of those responding to this question ha
twenty or more face-to-face contacts. Reasons given why social worke
contact legislators are as follows: " . . . they contact me relative to pro
grams. Also when their jobs are being threatened"; "The only tim
they make contact is when something concerns their livelihood"; " . . . c
client-related matters: casework"; " . . . to get assistance in overcomir
a problem or lobby."

Information was next gathered on the relative political influence o
a number of professional organizations. Legislators were asked to rat
these groups on a scale with one being the least and ten being th
most influential. The following organizations were rated America
Medical Association (AMA), Michigan Chamber of Commerce, Michiga
Education Association (MEA), National Association of Social Worke
(NASW), and the United Auto Workers (UAW) (see table 4).

Table 3

Frequency Distribution of Letters, Phone Calls, and Face to Face Meetings with from Social Workers Last Year

Number	Letters	Phone Calls	Face to Face Meetings
0	10	11	12*
10–19	6	4	5
20–29	3	0	2
30–39	0	0	0
40–49	1	1	0
50+	3	4	3
No response	1	4	2
Total	24	24	24

* Includes one 0 response

Table 4

MEAN AND MEDIAN RATINGS OF PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS BY LEGISLATORS

Organization	Mean	Median
United Auto Workers	4.75	4.5
Chamber of Commerce	4.70	5.0
Michigan Education Association	4.18	4.37
Michigan Bar Association	3.83	4.25
American Medical Association	3.72	3.5
NASW	2.15	2.0

This rating allowed the respondent to construct his own scale within the bounds established, as an aid to thinking about kinds of influence and the exercise of influence by the various organizations. One legislator stated that in his self-report all values would have to be between one and five because he is generally not influenced by special interest groups. Another respondent rated all groups five, reflecting his belief that all groups are equally influential on him. Still another legislator rated all groups zero. The other twenty-one respondents used the full range of the scale. Significantly, five respondents (21.8 percent of the sample) reported that the NASW had never contacted them and furthermore they had never heard of it. The NASW was the only organization of the five mentioned above that had never contacted and was totally unknown to some of the legislators.

When asked what makes an organization influential, legislators cited two factors as clearly most important. Visibility was mentioned 40 percent of the time. "Visibility" refers both to the visibility and to the activity of the group. Being well known, especially for political activity, exemplifies the positive aspect of this trait. Comments such as the following reflect an organization's positive use of visibility for influence: "They get involved in a lot of issues." Expertise was mentioned 18 percent of the time as a positive factor for influence. Expertise is shown in the ability to offer timely and pertinent information, recognized as specialized and not readily available to others; for example, "They offer me information I can use to argue with others and to support my point of view, even though it usually would be the same as theirs" and "I always listen to them because they *know* one side of an issue. I may not always vote their way, but I always listen to them." Perhaps surprisingly, money was mentioned only 7 percent of the time as an important factor, following visibility, expertise, reputation, and ideology.

Finally, Table 5 shows the answers given when legislators were asked how social workers might be more effective in influencing the political process. The development of personal relationships was mentioned most frequently, then letter writing, then providing knowledgeable input. Many of these answers are directly translatable to the terms mentioned above; namely, visibility, reputation, and expertise.

Table 5

FREQUENCY OF INFLUENTIAL ACTIVITIES MENTIONED

Recommended Action	Frequency
Develop personal relationships	10
Write letters	8
Provide knowledgeable input	6
Make financial contributions	4
Endorse and campaign	3
Meet face to face	2
Be involved in political parties	2
Make phone calls	2
Bring petitions	2
Make legislators aware of problems	4
Total	15

Discussion

Generally speaking, legislators in the sample did not have an accurate picture of who social workers are and what they do. This indicates the necessity for social workers to educate legislators as to who they are, how they are trained, and what it is that distinguishes them from other health and human service professionals. This has particular relevance to the declassification battle now raging in many state departments of public welfare.

Legislators with the highest mean scores in answer to the definition question were Democrats, urban, federal, liberal, and had graduate degrees. If we examine these data more closely, it seems a logical explanation that the Democratic liberal philosophy is more parallel with the interests and ideals of professional social work than Republican conservativism. As a result, Democratic legislators may be more attentive to and influenced by social workers and their concerns. Also, because of this mutual perspective, social workers seem more likely to contact Democrats or liberals and campaign for, contribute to, and endorse them as candidates.

Legislators reported social workers to be politically active, though they later gave partially conflicting responses when asked if they believed social workers to be active. The legislators said that social workers initiate contacts with legislators more than twice as often as legislators with social workers. This perception held true regardless of party affiliation, political philosophy, constituency, level of government, or educational background. This is significant with respect to social workers' future attempts to influence legislators, for it suggests that if social

workers expect to have input into the political process they must seize the initiative.

There was almost an even split between legislators reporting whether or not social workers had been politically active in the last election. A much higher level of activity was reported by Democrats, liberals, legislators representing urban areas, and those with a bachelor's degree or above.

Slightly more than half of the respondents reported that social workers are involved in organizations that take a stand on public issues, and many of these identified social workers in leadership roles at least some of the time. If social workers are active politically, why is social work not more influential as a profession?

As political activists, individuals need to identify themselves as social workers and professionals. They should develop personal relationships with legislators and initiate frequent contact with them. As individuals in their occupational groups and especially in their professional associations, social workers need to reconsider their tendency to align themselves exclusively with liberal, Democratic, urban politicians. Legislators of all persuasions may be most influenced by the most active section of their constituency, regardless of ideological "fit." This is borne out in comments made by more than one Republican respondent who expressed a sense of alienation, feeling that social workers avoided them because of their conservative ideology.

It is important that social workers actively support and participate in the activities of NASW, its state chapters, and local geographic units. It may not be influential but it is the only aggregate voice the profession possesses. How might social work as a profession gain more influence in the political system? The literature has much to say about effective participation in the political arena.

The power to produce desirable political outcomes requires knowledge and the ability to influence the key decision makers on a given issue. Certain prerequisites are elementary: registering to vote, voting regularly, joining a political party, and supporting candidates financially. Certainly included in politically influential activities would be campaigning for the candidates and referenda that represent the values, programs, and goals of preference. However, in the final analysis, once the ballots have been cast and the election decided political influence is measured in terms of lobbying.

In *Washington Lobbyists* Milbrath quotes Congressman Emanuel Celler: "We may define lobbying as the total of all communicated influence upon legislators with respect to legislation."[11] Such a definition would include the political activity (letters, phone calls, face-to-face meetings, and so on) of individual citizens as well as the organized efforts of special interest groups.

Henry Teune studied candidates for the Indiana state legislature to determine the influence of interest groups. The data obtained in his study reveal that "interest group activity in the constituency is crucial in affecting the attitudes of legislators."[12]

Researcher Harmon Ziegler states: "The seeking out of lobbyists by legislators is an indicator of a predisposition of policymakers to see groups as salient and valued and to accept the legitimacy of interest groups in the political arena."[13]

In her article "How Interest Groups Influence Legislators" Virginia Smith views the interest group as playing a primary role in influencing legislators. "Effectiveness in influencing legislators must be viewed in the context of their relationship with interest groups. Study of this relationship provides a more comprehensive approach to influence because it avoids the fallacious assumption that the legislator is a passive person who is acted upon by pressure groups."[14]

However, the ability of interest groups to exert influence and the extent of such influence depends on a number of variables. The literature indicates that one important factor in the ability of interest groups to make an impact is the legislator's role conception: How does he view his role in relation to interest groups?

A study conducted by Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson categorizes three general responses of legislators to interest groups (1) the facilitator, whose view of the group was friendly and who had an understanding of interest group dynamics; (2) the resistor, whose view of the group was hostile and who was also knowledgeable about groups; and (3) those who neither favored nor disfavored group activity.[15] In short, evidence indicates that legislators cannot be seen as a homogeneous body in relation to interest groups.

Evidence also seems to indicate that legislators are more responsive to interest groups that display certain characteristics. Frequency of contact between interest groups and legislators is a major factor in determining the quality of their interactions and the amount of influence the interest group exerts. In a four-state study (covering Massachusetts, North Carolina, Oregon, and Utah) Harmon Ziegler found a significant correlation between lobbyists' frequency of contact with legislators and the reduction of stereotypic behavior on the part of lobbyists. Frequent contact creates an atmosphere in which legislators and lobbyists have more meaningful interactions.[16]

In case studies by Banfield in Chicago, reputation played a significant role in the ability to influence. It was found that civic leaders or leaders with reputations were frequently utilized by organizations to influence the outcome of public issues. Reputable people played roles of (1) advisors to political heads, (2) negotiators, and (3) publicists of policy.[17] One could easily hypothesize from this study not only that reputable

individuals exert greater political influence but also that the concept of reputation generalizes to interest groups as well.

One factor that seems to dominate in an interest group's ability to influence legislators is the degree to which a group can provide legislators with technical and political information. Of the legislators studied by Wahlke et al., 47 percent gave "provision of certain resources, such as size of group," as most important.[18] Generally speaking, lawmakers in this study did not see themselves as influenced by pressure groups. However, they did admit that interest groups can create political pressure and thus affect votes. This finding appears to support the Milbrath study, which saw the power to make a legislator look "good" or "bad" in the eyes of his constituents as the strongest influence of an individual or group on a legislator.

The studies mentioned above have a number of common threads running through them that are noteworthy. Such factors as reputation, professionalism, and the ability to influence constituents play larger roles in legislators' assessments of interest groups than do such factors as political party or ideology. Congressman Celler stated ". . . we (legislators) recognize that the touchstone of good lobbying and bad lobbying is not whether the objectives of persuasion are selfish or altruistic, liberal or conservative, pro-labor or pro-business, but solely and simply whether the message conveyed is intelligible, accurate, and informative, or cryptic, deceptive and obscure."[19]

As social workers we must increase our political influence to protect political gains achieved slowly and sometimes painfully over many years of effort. The way to effective political participation is described almost identically by social work leaders, legislators, and the literature. The first step is to get involved. The second step is to get organized by joining with others in a group effort. The third step is to get acquainted with the politicians themselves. The final step is to stay involved and keep communicating to establish visibility, credibility, and identity. The social work profession has nothing to lose and much to gain through political involvement.

Notes

I would like to thank Dr. Edward Pawlak for reading over the manuscript. The present article is a recapitulation of a graduate research project I directed in 1981 at Western Michigan University, entitled "Southwest Michigan Politicians' Influence and Interactions with Social Workers." The research team included Lori Boeskool, Ann Borsclair, Kaye Bonnell, Michael Malloy, Kay Preston, Betty Schurman, June Stoke, and Richard Whittemore, all of whom were graduate students at the School of Social Work. Copies

of the full report are available from the School of Social Work, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan 49008

1. See for elaboration on this theme, Carol H. Myers, *Social Work Practice*, 2d ed (New York: Free Press, 1976), chap 1

2 Some social welfare organizations with a narrower focus and more homogeneous constituency have proven political track records Two examples are the Child Welfare League of America and National Conference on Social Welfare

3 James L Wolk, "Social Workers and Political Activity," *Social Work* 26, no 4 (July 1981): 283–96.

4 Julian Woodward and Elmo Roper, "Political Activity of American Citizens," *American Political Science Review* 44 (December 1950) 872–85.

5 Lester W Milbrath, *Political Participation* (New York Rand McNally & Co , 1965)

6. Wolk, p 14

7 Robert Morris and Robert H Binstock, *Feasible Planning for Social Change* (New York Columbia University Press, 1966), p 18

8 Wolk, p 5

9 Lewis A Froman, Jr , *People and Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, N J Prentice-Hall Inc , 1962), p 20

10 For the purposes of this study, rural areas are legislative districts without a town of 50,000 persons or more. Political philosophy of incumbent state legislators was determined by utilizing the 1979 Legislative Ratings of the Americans for Democratic Action, Michigan Chapter

11 Lester W Milbrath, *Washington Lobbyists* (Chicago Rand McNally & Co , 1963) p 185

12 Henry Teune, "Legislative Attitudes toward Interest Groups," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 11, no 4 (November 1967) 489–504

13 Harmon Ziegler, "The Effects of Lobbying A Comparative Assessment," *Western Political Quarterly* 22 (March 1969) 232–53

14 Virginia W Smith, "How Interest Groups Influence Legislators," *Social Work* (May 1979), pp 234–39

15 John Wahlke, Henry Eulau, William Buchanan, and Leroy Ferguson, "American State Legislators' Role Orientations toward Pressure Groups," *Journal of Politics* 22 (May 1960) 95–122

16 Ziegler, p 243

17 Edward C Banfield, *Political Influence* (New York Free Press, 1961), p 280

18 Eulau et al , p 203

19 Milbrath, *Washington Lobbyists*, p 185

Notes on Advanced Social Work Education

Research Teaching in Social Work Doctoral Programs

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A controversy exists among educators and practitioners over the current role of research and the scientific imperative in social work. To establish the extent to which social work doctoral program graduates are being trained as social science researchers, the required research methodology courses in thirty-three doctoral programs are evaluated. The knowledge necessary for pursuing independent social research is divided into eight essential areas which serve as a guide in determining the level of research training required of social work doctoral students. Doctoral program chairpersons are found to be grossly overestimating the knowledge of research methodology held by social work doctoral program graduates.

Few issues in social work practice and education are capable of stirring more debate than that of the role of research and the scientific imperative in the profession. The debate generally centers on one of two points: first, the extent to which social work as a profession has embraced the scientific imperative, and second, the extent to which social work should embrace the scientific imperative. The former is an issue of description and the latter, one of prescription. This paper focuses on the descriptive issue, but certain prescriptive suggestions are implied by the findings and made explicit in the conclusions. The descriptive issue is most important at this time because participants in the debate need to establish how pervasive the role of research and the scientific

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imperative is in the profession before a convincing case can be presented for the extent to which it should be adopted.

Most of the debate regarding the role of research and the scientific imperative in social work has consisted of opinion. Little evidence has been presented by either side to focus attention or to bolster opinion. This paper presents findings suggesting that current opinion regarding the role of research and the scientific imperative in social work does not concur with existing evidence. Specifically, the paper compares the research methodology content of social work doctoral programs nationwide with the ratings of the research skills of program graduates as given by doctoral program chairpersons. While empirical research methodology per se represents only a part of the broader scientific imperative, it is a crucial part and must play a significant role in the curricula of a profession embracing such an imperative.

Heineman has recently asserted that the profession of social work has adopted a scientific model of research which she describes as embracing an obsolete scientific imperative.[1] While Heineman errs in equating current social research methodology with the 1920s philosophy of logical empiricism, never adopted by practicing social scientists, her premise that social workers are trained as scientists schooled in current social research methodology is commonly held. This is in contrast to Rosen's earlier observation that only a "small cadre of trained researchers" can be found in the profession.[2] The findings presented here provide support for Rosen's observation and suggest that the research methodology skills of social work doctorates are being vastly overrated, particularly by the chairpersons of doctoral programs. Heineman, in short, has pronounced as obsolete that which never was.

Chairpersons' Ratings of Research Skills of Graduates

Chairpersons of the thirty-seven social work doctoral programs[3] were contacted by mail and asked to return outlines of research and statistics courses required of their doctoral students. The chairpersons were also asked to rank separately the research design skills and the statistical skills of recent (last five years) national social work doctoral program graduates, and to then rank the skills of their own program graduates. The response was excellent: thirty-three chairpersons, about 90 percent, responded to the request.

Table 1 summarizes the subjective ratings given by each chairperson to his or her own program and to programs nationwide. These responses

Table 1

RATINGS BY THIRTY-THREE CHAIRPERSONS OF THE DESIGN AND STATISTICAL SKILLS OF DOCTORAL PROGRAM GRADUATES

Graduates from	1 Poor	2 Less than Adequate	3 Adequate	4 More than Adequate	5 Outstanding	NR	Central Tendency*
			Design Skills				
All programs	0	5	14	4	1	9	3.01 3.00 3.00
Own program	0	2	8	15	4	4	3.72 4.00 4.00
			Statistical Skills				
All programs	0	11	10	3	0	9	2.67 2.00 3.00
Own program	0	4	9	15	1	4	3.45 4.00 4.00

* The three numbers given per row are mean, mode, and median, in that order.

give us some idea of doctoral chairpersons' views of the adequacy of the research design and statistical skills of doctoral program graduates. Chairpersons report that their own programs provide good training in both research design and statistics. Specifically, as shown in table 1, they feel that both the research design and statistical skills of their program graduates are more than adequate.

This very positive rating of the chairpersons' own programs may be due to their desire to advertise their programs as doing a good job of training researchers. The positive rating could also result from chairpersons' belief that very little skill in research is an adequate level. Alternatively, it could be that the students are indeed acquiring skills in research design and statistics that are more than adequate for social work research.

Chairpersons report, however, that the research design skills of doctoral program graduates across the nation are merely adequate, and that their statistical skills are between less than adequate and adequate. Chairpersons report, then, that their own programs do a better job than most programs in teaching both research design and statistical skills, and that programs nationally turn out students with fewer statistical than design skills.

The ratings reported by the doctoral program chairpersons contradict the evidence of social workers' research skills provided by many of the

articles in social work journals. A small minority of social work articles are based on research. Moreover, those that are provide examples of the gross misapplication of applied statistics and inappropriate research design.[4] The sophistication and appropriateness of research reported in social work journals simply does not stand up to what can be found in related fields such as psychology, sociology, or political science. It seems that social work scholars are generally less knowledgeable in research methods than those in related disciplines. Of course, there are social workers who publish in journals from other disciplines, so some of the best social work research may appear in non–social work journals.

The situation is one in which social workers are publishing very little research, while doctoral program chairpersons are claiming that their students are emerging with more than adequate research skills. The following analysis of course content supports the notion that what chairpersons rate as adequate training is simply not adequate training.

Essential Research Knowledge

Eight areas of research knowledge are identified here as essential to the implementation of independent social research. These include the knowledge required to develop problem statements and derive hypotheses and a knowledge of sampling theory, probability theory, measurement, experimental design, survey design, quantitative methods, and computer applications in data analysis.

Theory building within the context of social science and knowledge of professional values and ethics are also identified here as essential areas, but because they are frequently included in courses other than those labeled "research methods," these two areas will be discussed separately. Two other areas which are included in some course outlines, qualitative research and evaluative research methods, will be discussed separately as well.

The outlines and descriptions of the required research courses furnished by the program chairpersons were examined to determine which of the above content was present. The content was considered present if it was mentioned in the course outline or description. If the area was not mentioned, it was assumed that the knowledge related to that area was given no emphasis or an inadequate emphasis. Clearly, the quality of the teaching or the level of sophistication of the material covered is not determined here. Rather, a simple description of content is attempted. This description gives the research courses the benefit

of the doubt in that by merely mentioning an area, the course is assumed to have covered the area adequately.

An exception to this is the quantitative methods area. A detailed analysis of the content of that area was conducted to determine the sophistication of the statistical content offered in required research courses.

There are seven programs which could not be included in the analysis of content covering the eight essential areas listed above. The chairpersons of those programs did not provide adequate information describing the content of required research courses; therefore, a determination of the presence or absence of the essential content areas could not be made. Of the seven programs, four did provide adequate information to determine the statistical content of their required research courses, so only three programs were omitted from the analysis of quantitative content.

Most researchers would agree that the areas mentioned above include the necessary knowledge for conducting independent research. There would be some disagreement, however, on whether the content of these areas should be taught at the doctoral level. Some educators might argue that the ability to construct problem statements and derive hypotheses, for example, should be a prerequisite for entering a doctoral program. An effort was made, therefore, to determine if a program was considering any research knowledge as prerequisite to entering the program. On the basis of the material provided, only one program clearly requires knowledge of research methodology before entrance to the program. While most doctoral programs in social work do not have such a prerequisite, some may give preference to applicants who demonstrate such knowledge. But given the standard of most master's-level research courses, it is safe to assume that most applicants to doctoral programs enter with little or no research background.

Research Methodology Content

It can be stated with some confidence that most doctors in social work across the nation acquired what knowledge they have of the eight essential areas discussed above during or following their doctoral education rather than prior to it. For this reason, it is remarkable that only four (15 percent) of the programs examined mentioned all eight of the essential research knowledge areas in their required-course outlines and descriptions.

Excluding the quantitative area, the other seven areas were individually included in only about half of the programs' required research curricula

Specifically, of the twenty-six programs providing adequate descriptions of course content, only 42 percent cover the most basic area, the development of problem statements and the derivation of hypotheses. It is possible that many programs are covering the development of problem statements and hypotheses in dissertation seminars which would not be included among the required research courses, but it could not be argued that the content included in the seven other essential research knowledge areas is included in such seminars.

With regard to the other knowledge areas, only 50 percent of the programs explicitly include sampling theory and only 54 percent include probability theory in their required courses. But the findings on experimental and survey design are perhaps most telling of all. The knowledge included in these areas provides the core of any research effort, but only 58 percent of the programs report including experimental design and only 54 percent report including survey design in their required research courses.

Considering these findings, it is surprising that 65 percent of the programs include measurement in their required courses. In fact, this was the area most included, with the exception of statistics, in the research content of the twenty-six doctoral programs. Because measurement is generally considered a more advanced topic than problem statements, sampling, or probability, the possibility that doctoral program faculty assume that students have a knowledge of the latter areas could explain their absence in programs covering more advanced topics such as measurement. There is also the possibility that the topic of measurement is being covered at an elementary level which does not require an understanding of basic topics such as sampling or probability. Whatever the case, it seems that doctoral programs are ignoring basic research methodology content without any evidence that students have the knowledge on entering the program.

Quantitative Methodology Content

The course descriptions and outlines also provide evidence that chairpersons are overestimating their students' statistical skills. Except for the three programs which could not be evaluated with the material provided, a fairly accurate continuum of programs in terms of the required quantitative courses was developed. Based on this continuum, only three social work doctoral programs are requiring advanced quantitative courses of their students in what could be described as a more than adequate quantitative curriculum. Compare this with the chairpersons' ratings indicating that fifteen programs are producing

aduates with more than adequate or even outstanding statistical
ills. Over half the programs, in fact, are requiring only an under-
aduate level of training in quantitative methods.

The discrepancy between the level of sophistication of quantitative
urses offered by programs and the chairpersons' evaluations of the
ill of graduates is highlighted by the individual responses. Chairpersons
programs offering nothing more advanced in their required quan-
ative courses than the use of t-tests and analysis of variance have
beled that training more than adequate. These methods are commonly
ught in undergraduate courses in related disciplines. One chairperson
beled as outstanding the skills acquired by doctoral students, which
cluded factorial analysis of variance and multiple regression. These
ethods are routinely taught at the masters level in psychology and
ciology and represent nothing more than adequate training for doc-
ral students in any social or behavioral science discipline.

The complexity continuum of the quantitative methods taught to
cial work doctoral candidates may clarify the problem further. It
ould be noted that increased complexity among skills acquired by
octoral students indicates the potential for greater versatility in data
alysis and thereby produces fewer constraints on the design and
nplementation of research. Complexity for complexity's sake is not
goal to be pursued by any educational program and is not advocated
ere. Rather, programs intend to provide students with an array of
ills which will stimulate, complement, and promote their students'
search efforts. In the quantitative area, this objective goes hand in
and with increased complexity. As the methods become more complex,
ore variables, a greater diversity in types of variables, and more
esearch questions can be included in a research project, thesis, or
issertation.

Based on the content provided in the quantitative area at the doctoral
vel by social work programs nationwide, the following hierarchy of
ontent included in quantitative courses was developed.

1. Frequency distributions, z-scores, simple χ^2 analyses, t-tests, clearly in
roductory material. If these were the most advanced topics offered in required
quantitative courses, that preparation or skill level would be described as
poor" at the doctoral level. There were six (20 percent) programs which
eemed to offer no more than this level of quantitative training.

2. The material in 1 above plus simple correlation, simple regression, one-
way analysis of variance, and the construction of F-ratios. This would be
lassified as "less than adequate" at the doctoral level. There were eleven (37
percent) programs which provided this level of training in required courses.

3. The material in 1 and 2 plus factorial analysis of variance, multiple
egression, smallest-space analysis, cluster analysis, discriminant function analysis.
This represents an "adequate" level of quantitative training at the doctoral
evel. There were ten (33 percent) programs which could be included here.

4. The material in 1, 2, and 3 plus factor analysis, canonical correlation,

log-linear models, multivariate ANOVA. These topics would be included in a "more than adequate" quantitative curriculum at the doctoral level. No more than three (10 percent) of the programs could claim this level of required training for their doctoral students.

5. An "outstanding" level would include the previous material plus the matrix algebraic and geometric foundations of the models on which the analytic methods are based.

Again, three programs could not be classified based on the material received. Over half the programs, seventeen, are offering less than adequate training in quantitative methods. Of the other half, only three are offering more than adequate training. These latter programs are covering multivariate methods (multiple dependent variables), including factor analysis, multivariate analysis of variance, and canonical correlation, and one also includes log-linear models. It must be pointed out, however, that the curricula including more advanced topics seem to be negligent in providing the algebraic and geometric foundations of these advanced methods.

Programs offering outstanding quantitative training should provide, at a minimum, the matrix algebraic and geometric foundations of the general linear model. Because this algebraic/geometric model forms the basis for topics such as analysis of variance, multiple regression and correlation, canonical correlation, and factor analytic methods, it provides the foundation for the majority of the quantitative analysis reported in behavioral and social science research journals. Knowledge of this underlying model not only facilitates the understanding and interpretation of much of the quantitative work in the behavioral and social sciences, it also enhances research efforts by providing fewer constraints on the data analysis possibilities available to the researcher.

One trend in teaching quantitative methods in social work is the increased use of packaged computer programs such as the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), the Statistical Analysis System (SAS), and the Biomedical Computer Programs (BMDP). In fact, 50 percent of the doctoral programs are requiring computer application skills in their research courses via packaged programs. Such programs are mandatory, of course, unless we want to add considerable programming skills to the list of skills required of a doctoral student. However, many courses are being offered which teach only the application of these packaged programs; they offer no material which facilitates the understanding of the methodology. Such a black-box approach to learning advanced quantitative methods is far from desirable. This approach limits the understanding and interpretation of results and constrains the student to fit research thinking into categories defined by particular packaged programs.

Forty-eight percent of the programs offer electives which cover one or more of the topics mentioned in levels 3 and 4 above. However, only a small percentage of doctoral students elect to take these courses

This paper advocates more advanced topics in the required courses if social work doctorates are to be expected to engage in meaningful research activity following graduation.

Related Research Knowledge

There are two additional areas of knowledge which have also been identified as essential to the implementation of social science research: theory building and professional values and ethics. Programs include these topics in their required research courses less than they include any of the eight areas mentioned above. Only 38 percent include theory building and 23 percent include values and ethics. However, these are topics that are frequently taught in courses which are not identified as research methodology courses, so their absence in required research courses does not indicate their absence from curricula. However, it is possible that they are not found in other courses.

Two other areas of research knowledge which represent types of research were given special attention by a number of the doctoral programs. The first topic, qualitative research, also called by other names, such as "field" research, was included as required content in 15 percent of the programs. This was a surprisingly low percentage given the low level of quantitative methodology being taught. Despite claims to the contrary, doctoral students are not learning any more about qualitative methods than about quantitative methods. There is also disagreement in course outlines about exactly what should be included in qualitative research topics.

Another type of research singled out by a number of the programs as required content is evaluation research. While evaluation research depends on the same knowledge identified as essential to research generally, there are special problems encountered in the application of the methodology which are unique to the evaluation of social programs. These problems usually revolve around measurement and experimental design or the lack of it. Some 19 percent of the programs have identified evaluation research as content to be included in their required research courses.

Summary

The research methodology content of social work doctoral programs is extremely weak. This analysis of course content and the responses of chairpersons indicates that we are vastly overrating the research

skills of our graduates. The finding that only 15 percent of the programs include all eight essential research knowledge areas in their required courses is shocking. Even if one argues that some of these areas represent prerequisite knowledge, or that the more basic topics are included without being mentioned in course outlines, it is perplexing that only about half of the programs include any one of the seven topics (excluding statistics) in the outlines of their required research courses.

While all thirty programs which provided enough information to analyze their quantitative content include some statistics in their required courses, over half are teaching this content at the undergraduate level. A third of the programs are providing an adequate level of training in quantitative methods, and an additional three programs are providing a more than adequate level of training.

In summary, social work doctoral programs nationwide are not preparing students for independent research. At the very most, it seems that only about 40 percent are preparing students to conduct any research at all, and about 10 percent can claim to be producing graduates capable of social science research on a par with that published in the research journals of related disciplines. The claim that social work is pursuing a scientific imperative cannot be substantiated through an investigation of doctoral program curricula.[6]

Doctoral program faculty must closely examine and improve the research methodology content of required courses if they expect to produce competent social science researchers. They must also assume more responsibility for insuring minimum standards of research skills for graduates. While about one-fourth of the doctoral programs (27 percent) have relinquished required research courses to other departments in an attempt to provide content unavailable from social work faculty, this solution is tenuous unless social work faculty are sharing some responsibility for developing and teaching the courses. Total dependence on other departments for vital core content results in poor quality control, an unintegrated curriculum, and, more often than not, students learning research methodology in a substantive vacuum with no link to social work practice or social work faculty. Social work doctoral students need social work doctoral faculty as role models. Sending our students to research and statistics courses in other departments perpetuates the image that this content is not of central importance to social work doctoral education or practice.

Notes

This paper is based on findings presented to two annual meetings of the Group for the Advancement of Doctoral Education (GADE) in Washington, D.C., on October 28, 1980, and in Seattle, Washington, on October 19, 1981.

1 Martha Brunswick Heineman, "The Obsolete Scientific Imperative in Social Work Research," *Social Service Review* 55, no. 3 (September 1981): 371-97.

2 Aaron Rosen, "Issues in Educating for the Knowledge-building Research Doctorate," *Social Service Review* 52, no. 3 (September 1978): 437-48.

3 There have been several new doctoral programs begun since the 1980 survey, bringing the current total to over forty.

4 See Charles A. Glisson and Walter W. Hudson, "Applied Statistical Misuse in Educational Research: An Admissions Criteria Example," *Journal of Education for Social Work* 17, no. 2 (1981): 35–41, and Charles A. Glisson, "Compounding Applied Statistical Misuse," *Journal of Education for Social Work*, in press.

5 Charles A. Glisson and Joel Fischer, "Use and Nonuse of Multivariate Statistics," *Social Work Research and Abstracts*, in press.

6 For additional comments on the scientific imperative in social work, see Walter W. Hudson, "Scientific Imperatives in Social Work Research and Practice," *Social Service Review* 55, no. 2 (June 1982): 246–58.

Predictors of Success in a Social Work Doctoral Program

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A study was conducted to determine the preentry data predictive of academic success for 232 students who entered a doctoral program in social work and social science between 1957 and 1973. Predictions were better for females and students entering without an M.S.W. degree, for whom one-third of the variance in school performance was explained, than for males and those entering with an M.S.W. System variables influenced the predictions but scores on the Miller Analogies Test did not. Suggestions are offered to schools considering similar studies.

The need to identify the determinants and predictors of success in doctoral education is well recognized. As the expense of doctoral programs soars, and personal and public funds dwindle, the costs of a student-program mismatch multiply rapidly. Ultimately, doctoral programs are interested in identifying students who will be successful in their field after graduation. However, not much is currently known about preentry antecedents of recognized good work as a professional

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or a social science researcher. The classic longitudinal study by Kelly and Goldberg, published over twenty years ago, concluded that there was nothing in the extensive preadmission data available about 240 students selected for a psychology program that accounted for more than 10 percent of the variance in measures of success employed ten years later.[1] Furthermore, when a significant, albeit small, correlation was obtained between a predictor variable and an index of success in one of the two cohorts involved, it was not replicated in the second cohort. The authors attributed the low correlations, at least partially, to the absence of well-defined criteria of competence in the field. The situation has not changed dramatically since 1959. Neither the social sciences nor the helping professions have succeeded in developing agreed upon criteria of long-term success, and recent researchers examining education outcomes have reiterated the need for improvements in these measures.[2]

The difficulty in determining predictors of long-term success should not, however, discourage attempts to monitor admission procedures through the use of short-term, available success measures or intermediate criteria as they have been labeled by Willingham (e.g., attainment of a doctoral degree).[3] Although completion of a doctoral program may not be followed by effective performance in the field, it is clear that student failure to complete the program is an outcome that schools seek to avoid. Therefore, studies that utilize completion of the program as a measure of success may furnish valuable information to the faculty. However, graduation is a limited factor; it provides no information about how well a student performed. Length of time to obtain a doctoral degree is not a valid assessment of quality of performance for, as Hartnett and Willingham have pointed out, the reasons for taking longer are often ones over which the student has little or no control, for example, financial need or difficulties with dissertation committees.[4] Thus researchers most often turn to grades as the basis on which to state that students not only graduated but did exceedingly well in their course of study.[5] Both program completion and grades are, therefore, meaningful intermediate criteria of success for evaluations of admission procedures.

From a methodological point of view, a complete design to assess the validity of admission criteria requires information about all applicants, including those who were not admitted.[6] This information may be obtained by a follow-up of rejected applicants or by admitting students on the basis of random selection.[7] Unfortunately, these procedures are virtually impossible to implement, for graduate schools are unlikely to admit applicants on a chance basis and the funds required to follow applicants uninterested in the research would be enormous. Even if they were available, the fact that the rejected applicants had not experienced the same educational program would make the validity

of a comparison of long-term outcomes dubious.[8] Thus the information available to researchers is almost invariably confined to admitted students. This "incomplete" design still yields very important data, for it provides the identification of groups of students who are likely to do poorly in the program and may encourage instructors to develop support systems, in case they are needed, for high-risk students. Furthermore, if a study reveals that a certain group of students is not likely to complete the program, and they do not, admission procedures may be reevaluated to determine whether the admission of those students was justified. Similarly, a high success rate for a group of applicants with certain preentry characteristics may encourage the admission of similar individuals.

Given the analysis above, the aim of this study was to determine whether any information available to the admission committee in the Doctoral Program in Social Work and Social Science at the University of Michigan was predictive of students' subsequent work and completion of the program. As Rosen and Royce have noted, there is considerable variation in the type of training provided by different social work doctoral programs.[9] It is important, therefore, to describe the structure and goals of the program at the University of Michigan School of Social Work before discussing the study per se.

Program Description

The University of Michigan program has as its major objective the preparation of professionals who will engage in knowledge development, particularly in applying social science theory to social work practice at all system levels. As part of their training, all students take doctoral level courses in social work and in the discipline into which they were admitted, that is, psychology, sociology, economics, or political science. A research internship and a year of statistics are also required. In addition, students take a preliminary examination in social work and in their discipline. The integration of knowledge from their profession and discipline occurs, or is supposed to occur, in their dissertations.

Students can be admitted to the program with a bachelor's or master's degree in social work. An analysis of the records of all students who entered the program between the time it was initiated in 1957 and 1973 revealed that graduates who entered with an M.S.W. took an average of 5.1 years to obtain their degree. Those entering without an M.S.W. took approximately fourteen months longer to graduate—6.4 years. The greater length for the latter group is attributable to the fact that students without an M.S.W. must obtain one before they

can receive a Ph.D. Clearly the program is not an easy one to complete and takes at least as long as doctoral programs in the social science disciplines at the University of Michigan, even for students who enter with an M.S.W.

All applicants from the United States are required to submit a score on the Miller Analogies Test (MAT), but this rule was not enforced until the program was approximately ten years old. Admission decisions are made by a supervising committee composed of one faculty member from each of the five participating disciplines and two from social work. The applications are reviewed by the entire committee, and the admission decisions are the product of the group's deliberations. All applicants are asked to indicate the discipline with which they wish to affiliate and are admitted as social work/psychology students, social work/sociology students, and so on. The member of the supervising committee from the relevant discipline is often asked to comment on the comparability of the applicant interested in the area with other students in the discipline.

Procedure

The data base for this investigation was the information collected in 1979 by Joel Leon, a doctoral student at the University of Michigan, concerning all students who entered the doctoral program between 1957 and 1973. Leon organized the data into two major categories, preentry data and data about performance in the program. Among the preentry items were demographic data, educational background, choice of discipline, work experience, and interests expressed in the personal statement accompanying the application. Included with the program performance variables were length of time to reach benchmarks of progress in the program, grades obtained, and whether or not the student graduated. Also entered into the data base was information about funding received by the student in the program as well as year of entry (to monitor cohort performance). Results of Leon's study about the relationship between financial aid and attainment of a degree were reported earlier by Hasenfeld and Leon.[10] This paper will focus entirely on predictor variables ascertainable prior to admission and measures of success in the program.

Since the major goal of the program is to graduate students who will engage in knowledge development, it is reasonable to select as measures of success those criteria which appear to tap abilities, skills, and motivations related to successful performance as a researcher, namely, course grades, grades on comprehensive examinations, and

attainment of a degree. According to Willingham, who reviewed forty-three studies of predictors of success in graduate education involving over 20,000 students, these three variables are among the most commonly used success measures by graduate programs.[11] Each of the measures has flaws, but they seem to be the best intermediate criteria available at this time. In view of the joint nature of the Michigan program, it was decided to use overall grade point average (GPA) in the doctoral program as one criterion of success, and GPA in the social science as another. Similarly, grades obtained on both the social work and social science preliminary examinations were included in the list of criteria. The final measure of success utilized was the attainment of the Ph.D. degree.

The predictor variables were selected from the lengthy list of preadmission data available. After conducting some statistical tests to determine if it was fruitful to continue studying all the variables, we dropped several from the investigation. Among those deleted were the match between the undergraduate major and the social science discipline selected, grades in other graduate schools, number of publications, interest in teaching, interest in social work practice, and grades obtained in math courses as an undergraduate. Race was also deleted because of the small number of nonwhite students, only 10 percent were black and none were Asian. One variable, the MAT score, was unrelated to any of the dependent variables but was included in the analysis because of the general interest in this measure. For example, a recent study of admission criteria in thirty-two social work doctoral programs revealed that eight schools, or 25 percent, required an MAT score.[12]

After the screening process was completed, eight predictors were selected for inclusion in the extensive statistical procedures to be performed: age and sex (ascribed characteristics), undergraduate GPA, status as a pre- or post-M.S.W. on entry to the program, marital status, and parental status (that is, did the student have children) (all achieved characteristics), stated interest in research on the application (a personality or dispositional variable), and, finally, year of entry into the program (related to institutional variables). The sample consisted of the 232 students who had enrolled in the doctoral program between 1957 and 1973.

Basic descriptive data were obtained about the variables in the study and tests of significance were performed to determine significant differences between selected subgroups on the variables under study. The subgroups that we believed might show differential responses to the program were: males, females, pre-M.S.W. students on entry, post-M.S.W. students on entry, students who were affiliated with psychology and students who were affiliated with sociology. The latter two disciplines

were singled out because they were the choice of the largest number of students (over 75 percent) The subjects were analyzed by sex since numerous studies had suggested that the social work careers of males and females are quite different[13] The sample was also divided by M S W. status on entry into the program because those with and without M S W. degrees have somewhat different student careers. For example, pre-M S.W.s take some master's level social work courses, but post-M S W.s do not.

Correlation matrices were computed for all the variables for the total sample and for the subgroups, and stepwise multiple regression analyses were performed using the two GPA scores as dependent variables and all eight entry variables previously described as predictors The analyses were performed for the total sample and the subgroups In addition, a regression equation was calculated for the total group and the subgroups using completion as the dependent variable and the preentry measures as independent variables[14]

In all of the analyses above except the correlation matrices, the samples consisted of only those students for whom scores on all measures employed were available. Thus it must be noted that many students for whom the data were incomplete were omitted from those computations.

Results

Descriptive data about the dependent and the independent variables appear in table 1. Also included is information about the significant differences between pairs of subgroups For the total sample it can be seen that approximately one-half of the entering students had M S W s and slightly more than half were males. Most students were not married and did not have children About one-half of the students who had enrolled completed the program, and slightly more students failed their prelim in their discipline than in social work Similarly, grades in the social sciences were lower than the overall doctoral GPA, which included courses in social work as well as in the disciplines

Insofar as subgroup comparisons are concerned, of note is the fact that undergraduate GPA was the only variable in which the male and female students differed, with females entering the program with higher grades. There were more initial differences between the pre- and post-M.S.W. students. Those entering with just a bachelor's degree or less than a master's degree in soci work, were younger, had higher GPAs in their undergraduate work, were ss likely to be married or

Table 1

DESCRIPTION OF SAMPLE AND SUBSAMPLES STUDIED

Variable	Total Sample (N = 232)	Males (N = 141)	Females (N = 91)	Pre-M.S.W. on Entry (N = 122)	Post-M.S.W. on Entry (N = 110)	Psychology Students (N = 74)	Sociology Students (N = 104)
Age (mean)	28.0	27.9	28.0	25.7	30.5***	27.6	27.9
Undergraduate GPA (mean)	3.23	3.16	3.35**	3.33	3.12***	3.13	3.26*
Year of enrollment (mean)	1966.9	1966.8	1967.1	1967.1	1966.1	1968.3	1966.9**
MAT (mean)	65.0	64.4	65.7	66.2	63.2	64.7	65.0
Doctoral GPA (mean)	6.65	6.57	6.77	6.88	6.38***	6.99	6.19***
Sex (% male)	60.8			58.2	63.6	56.8	64.0
Pre-M.S.W. on entry (%)	52.6	50.4	56.0			56.8	52.9
Married (%)	44.8	51.8	34.1	33.6	57.3***	37.8	47.1
Has children (%)	26.3	29.0	22.0	17.2	36.1***	25.6	26.1
Social science prelim (% did not pass)	19.2	22.1	11.6	16.3	22.6	2.2	31.1***
Social work prelim (% did not pass)	14.7	15.8	13.1	14.8	14.4	18.0	14.7
Did not complete program (%)	48.8	51.2	45.1	48.0	19.5	42.4	51.2
Stated interest in research on application (%)	67.2	69.5	63.7	59.8	75.5*	63.5	72.1
GPA, social science (mean)	6.39	6.34	6.60	6.60	6.28*	6.88	6.16***

NOTE.—When there was a significant difference between pairs, i.e., males-females, pre-M.S.W.-post-M.S.W., psychology-sociology students, this is indicated with probability level. $^*P < .05$ $^{**}P < .01$ $^{***}P < .001$. For undergrad GPA, a four-point scale is used; for doctoral GPA, an eight-point scale is used. Mean year of enrollment was included as it is relevant to the grade inflation phenomenon. Some of the N's are less than the figures indicated because of missing data, e.g., not all students took the MAT. Figures for two prelim exams include only those who took the test and failed it.

› have children, and were also less likely to have expressed an interest ι research on their application Unexpected was one preadmission ifference between students who selected psychology and those who elected sociology: the sociology students were more likely to have had higher undergraduate GPA

With regard to subgroup differences in the success measures, we ›und that students entering as pre-M S W s obtained a higher overall ;PA in doctoral work, as well as higher grades in the social science isciplines, than the post-M.S.W s. In addition, psychology students btained higher grades in their discipline than sociology students, and gnificantly more sociology students failed their preliminary exami-ations.

The intercorrelations of the dependent and independent variables ›r the total sample appear in table 2 Insofar as associations among ıccess measures are concerned, it is evident that they were all inter-·lated but, unexpectedly, the range was extensive, from 18 to 84 'he lowest correlation was between the social work prelim grade and octoral GPA in social science. The empirical fact that grades predict ıades was upheld in this investigation when linkages between predictors nd success measures were examined. For example, the highest cor-·lation with undergraduate GPA was doctoral GPA It is noteworthy at the undergraduate GPA did not correlate with program completion. ıs finding cannot be attributed to the limited range of the grades ıce the undergraduate GPA ranged from 1 8 to 4 0 The only preentry ıriable to be significantly associated with degree attainment was the ›plicant's stated interest in research

As the social science prelim grade and the GPA in the social science ere the best predictors of program completion, the predictors of ıese grades are particularly important The highest correlation is year f enrollment, reflecting largely the tendency for higher grades to be warded in graduate school in more recent years grade inflation This a system variable, but individual factors were also linked with high ıcial science grades. It appears that young students, those with high ndergraduate grades, and those who entered without M S W s were ıost likely to obtain high doctoral grades Thus both ascribed and chieved characteristics were relevant Sex, marital status, and parental atus appeared to have little influence

Before the results of the regression equations are given, some com-ıents about the MAT score are in order Although the number of tudents taking the test was smaller than for other variables, it was ıll substantial, 142. Furthermore, the range of scores was also con-ıderable, extending from twenty to ninety-four with a standard deviation f sixteen for the mean of sixty-five hus, the results cannot be easily lismissed. As can be seen from table _, the MAT score did not correlate ıgnificantly with any other variable, either predictor or success measure

Table 2

INTERCORRELATIONS OF MAJOR DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES FOR THE TOTAL SAMPLE

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1 Age														
2 Sex[a]	02 (232)													
3 Undergrad GPA	−29*** (224)	21** (224)												
4 Pre-post M S W status[b]	40*** (232)	−06 (232)	−24*** (224)											
5 Stated interest in research[c]	−14* (232)	06 (232)	11 (224)	−17* (232)										
6 Year of enrollment	−24*** (232)	02 (232)	06 (224)	−17** (232)	20** (232)									
7 Married[d]	−31*** (232)	17** (232)	10 (224)	−24*** (232)	15* (232)	01 (232)								
8 MAT	04 (142)	04 (142)	12 (141)	−10 (142)	−06 (142)	−10 (142)	−02 (142)							
9 Children[e]	−38*** (232)	08 (232)	16* (224)	−22*** (232)	21** (232)	08 (232)	60*** (232)	01 (142)						
10 Doctoral GPA[f]	−32*** (225)	12 (225)	26*** (217)	−30*** (225)	05 (225)	40*** (225)	10 (225)	01 (138)	12 (225)					

11 Doctoral GPA social science[g]	− 28** (218)	13 (218)	20** (211)	− 17* (218)	54 (218)	35*** (218)	09 (218)	05 (137)	13 (218)	84*** (218)				
12 Social science prelim grade	− 22* (151)	12 (151)	16 (147)	− 12 (151)	09 (151)	18* (151)	11 (151)	− 08 (90)	08 (151)	60*** (151)	61*** (151)			
13 Social work prelim grade	− 20* (150)	10 (150)	21** (146)	− 10 (150)	− 02 (150)	13 (150)	20* (150)	01 (92)	20* (150)	26*** (150)	18* (150)	28*** (140)		
14 Completed program[h]	− 10 (205)	06 (205)	05 (198)	− 02 (205)	− 15* (205)	09 (205)	− 08 (205)	− 01 (116)	− 09 (205)	46*** (198)	18*** (191)	50*** (132)	35*** (129)	X

NOTE —N's in parentheses under the correlations N's varied from 232 to ninety

= male 2 = female

1 = entered as pre-M S W , 2 = entered as post-M S W

[c] 1 = yes, 2 = no

[d] 1 = yes, 2 = no

[e] 1 = has one or more children 2 = has no children

[f] GPA for all coursework as a doctoral student, including social science courses

[g] GPA for all social science courses taken as a doctoral student

[h] 1 = did not complete program, 2 = completed program

* $P < 05$

** $P < 01$

*** $P < 001$

Furthermore, the correlations were very low (below .10 for the most part) and not even marginally significant. To further highlight this point, an average of all thirteen correlations with the MAT was computed and found to be .06. As another follow-up study with a fairly small sample had found the MAT score to be significantly related to overall GPA in a doctoral program once the year of entry was controlled,[15] partial correlations were computed controlling for this measure. The results were again insignificant. Even with year of entry separated out, the correlations between MAT score and the four success measures involving grades were all below .07. Thus the MAT score appears to be a variable predicted by and predictive of none of the variables investigated.

Correlation matrices were also computed for the six subgroups of interest, males and females, pre- and post-M.S.W.s, and psychology and sociology students. The pattern, in general, resembled that obtained for the total sample. Only some striking differences will be mentioned. For sociology students, grade on the prelim exam was a good predictor of program completion: $r = .51$ ($P < .001$). Also significant was stated interest in research on the application, the only preentry variable to be related to program completion. For psychology students, in contrast, these correlations were not significant and were below .09. A comparison of the correlation matrices for males and females revealed that for males, stated interest in research was associated with status as a post-M.S.W. enrollee and program completion; for females, it was not. In addition, for females, status as a pre-M.S.W. enrollee was significantly associated with higher undergraduate grades and high grades in four success measures. For males, entry into the program as a pre-M.S.W. was not linked to high undergraduate grades and was associated with only one success variable.

The pre- and post-M.S.W. matrices also showed sharp differences. For post-M.S.W.s, age was significantly associated with three of the four success measures, and the correlation was negative: the younger the age, the higher the grades. In addition, interest in research predicted program completion. For pre-M.S.W.s, neither age nor research interests were related to criteria of success.

The data in table 3 emerged from the regression analyses which were performed using the overall doctoral GPA as the dependent variable and the eight predictors cited earlier as independent variables. Salient in the table is the fact that the prediction of success is much better for females than for males, and also more powerful for students entering as pre-M.S.W.s than post-M.S.W.s. For both females and pre-M.S.W.s, over one-third of the variance can be explained by three independent variables. For female students, knowing when they entered, their status on entry as a pre- or post-M.S.W., and their age enables one to explain 37 percent of the variance in their future grades. For

3

SSION EQUATIONS WITH DOCTORAL GPA AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE

mple and Independent Variable	Beta Weight	Contributions to Explained Variance	Cumulative Total Explained Variance
group (217)			
of enrollment	331	137***	137
post-M S W status on entry	- 200	059***	195
ergrad GPA	192	035**	230
(132)			
of enrollment	326	099***	099
ergrad GPA	199	040*	138
s (85)			
of enrollment	349	200***	200
post-M S W status on entry	− 276	128***	321
	− 288	041*	369
S W status on entry (117)			
of enrollment	186	244***	244
	282	082***	326
	152	023*	349
I S W status on entry (100)			
of enrollment	276	061*	061
ergrad GPA	192	024*	095
d interest in research on pplication	185	033*	128
ology students (69)			
ergrad GPA	416	195***	195
of enrollment	328	177**	302
ogy students (97)			
ergrad GPA	201	097**	097
	- 230	063**	159
of enrollment	233	038*	197
	230	044*	241

E —Entered as independent variables were year of enrollment pre post M S W on entry (1 = pre, 2 = post), undergrad GPA, age sex (1 male 2 female nterest in research on application (1 = yes, 2 = no) married (1 yes 2 no) n (1 = yes, 2 = no) N's in parentheses
< 05
< 01
p < 001

'.S.W. enrollees, knowing that they are female and young and they entered enables one to account for slightly less of the ce in overall GPA but still over one-third

next category of students for whom over 25 percent of the ce can be predicted is psychology students For psychology stu- the undergraduate GPA was most important, even more important he year of enrollment. For sociology students, slightly less than rcent of the variance is accounted for, and here again, under- ate GPA explains part of the variance Knowing the year of entry the prediction, but for these students, grade inflation plays a nportant role than for psychology students

Table 4

Regression Equations with GPA in the Social Sciences as the Dependent Variable

Sample and Independent Variable	Beta Weight	Contributions to Explained Variance	Cumulative Total Explained Variance
Total group (211)			
Year of enrollment	.282	.110***	.110
Undergrad GPA	.141	.041*	.152
Age	−.171	.019*	.171
Males (127)			
Year of enrollment	.258	.067**	.067
Females (84)			
Year of enrollment	.376	.208***	.208
Age	−.304	.085	.291
Pre-M.S.W. status on entry (111)			
Year of enrollment	.353	.128***	.128
Sex	.211	.051*	.179
Age	−.182	.032*	.212
Post-M.S.W. status on entry (100)			
Year of enrollment	.298	.075**	.075
Undergrad GPA	.207	.040*	.115
Psychology students (67)			
Undergrad GPA	.398	.169***	.169
Year of enrollment	.264	.069*	.238
Sociology students (94)			
Age	−.273	.068**	.068
Sex	.256	.045**	.113
Year of enrollment	.223	.038**	.151
Stated interest in research on application	−.209	.037**	.188

Note.—Entered as independent variables were: year of enrollment, pre-post-M.S.W. status on entry (1 = pre, 2 = post), undergrad GPA, age, sex (1 = male, 2 = female), stated interest in research on application (1 = yes, 2 = no), married (1 = yes, 2 = no), children (1 = yes, 2 = no). N's in parentheses.

* $P < .05$

** $P < .01$

*** $P < .001$

The poorest prediction was made for males and students who enter as post-M.S.W.s. For these groups, less than 15 percent of the variance is accounted for; however, it is notable that for post-M.S.W.s, stated interest in research, the dispositional variable, helps explain some of the variance, and this was the only subgroup for whom research interest contributed to the explained variance. These data suggest that there may be predictor variables for older, professional students entering the program which have not been identified, for they focus on motivational factors related to doctoral education rather than past school performance or demographic characteristics and achieved and ascribed factors. Our failure to predict the performance of males may also be related to this issue.

Putting these diverse subgroups into one category, that is, the total sample, produces the anticipated result. The amount of variance explained is slightly less than 25 percent, midway between the explained variance for the high predictive and low predictive groups, and the important variables are year of enrollment, pre-M.S.W. status, and undergraduate grades.

Table 4 shows that a similar pattern emerges when social science grades were used as the success measure, although in weaker form, as that arising when the total GPA is the variable regressed upon. Once more, the greatest amount of variance can be explained for female students and the least for males and post-M.S.W.s. And once again, less variance can be explained for enrollees who enter with an M.S.W. than without one.

Regression equations were also computed using program completion as the dependent variables for the total sample and the subgroups. It was found that there was only one significant predictor for the total group—statement of interest in research—and it accounted for only 2 percent of the variance. The same variable was the only predictor for the male and post-M.S.W. subgroups. The amounts of variance explained for these categories were 4 and 7 percent, respectively. There were no significant predictors for females, pre-M.S.W.s, or sociology majors. For psychology majors, age was the only significant independent variable, and it accounts for 8 percent of the variance in program completion.

In view of the small percentage of variance in program completion explained by preentry variables, and the considerable amount of variance in doctoral grades accounted for, it was decided to explore the role of grades as a mediator of graduation by computing regression equations with program completion as the variable regressed upon and the four other success variables as predictors. Once again it should be noted that the sample included only those students for whom complete data were available. The results appear in table 5. Several factors stand out when the table is examined. One is that fairly good predictions can now be made about males and students who entered as post-M.S.W.s. In both groups over 25 percent of the variance in program completion can be accounted for by knowledge of how the students performed on the other success criteria. Thus, despite the fact that preentry information did not help predict how these students would later perform academically, once one knew their grades or achievements in the doctoral program one could explain over 25 percent of the variance in attaining a degree. These findings support the view that males and post-M.S.W.s are not erratic in their doctoral performance but that we were not using the right preentry variables.

Once again, the most predictable group of students was females. In this case, with knowledge of the women's overall doctoral GPA and

Table 5

REGRESSION EQUATIONS WITH PROGRAM COMPLETION AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Sample and Independent Variable	Beta Weight	Contributions to Explained Variance	Cumulative Total Explained Variance
Total group (123)			
Doctoral GPA	419	267**	267
Males (69)			
Doctoral GPA	352	244**	244
Social science prelim grade	290	064*	308
Females (54)			
Doctoral GPA	478	310**	310
Social work prelim grade	259	061*	371
Pre-M S W status on entry (61)			
Doctoral GPA	432	278**	278
Post-M S W status on entry (62)			
Doctoral GPA social science	517	275**	275
Psychology students (36)			
No significant independent variables			
Sociology students (60)			
Doctoral GPA	349	226**	226
Social science prelim grade	267	056*	281

NOTE —Independent variables entered were doctoral GPA, doctoral GPA social science, social science prelim grade, social work prelim grade N's in parentheses

* $P < 05$

** $P < 001$

social work prelim grade, one could predict well over one-third of the variance in degree attainment. For the total sample, knowledge of the student's overall GPA enables one to explain over 25 percent of the variance in program completion. To express these facts in another way, grades in the doctoral program are powerful mediators of obtaining a Ph.D., although over 70 percent of the variance is still unexplained

Discussion

The basic question posed in this investigation was whether it was possible to predict school performance from information available before the student's entry into the doctoral program. The answer, simply put, is yes, but our ability to predict is much better for some groups than others. For the total sample, over 23 percent of the variance in doctoral grades was explained. However, for students who entered without a master's degree in social work and for females we were able to predict over one-third of the total variance in grades obtained, or

35 and 37 percent respectively One might question whether a prediction that leaves 67 or 78 percent of the variance unexplained has much value. In the area of predicting academic success, it appears that it does. For example, Dawes explained only 16 percent of the variance in faculty ratings of the performance of 111 graduate students in psychology from preentry data[16] Among the reasons he offers for the low prediction were the restricted range of scores, unexpected life events, and unpredictable effects of the program.[17] He concludes with the statement that he finds it remarkable that we are able to predict even 16 percent, given the fact that "life is not all that predictable"[18] Perhaps instead of considering the "prediction glass" two-thirds empty, one should more optimistically perceive it as one-third full

In contrast to the relatively accurate predictions made for females and pre-M.S.W. students were the inaccurate forecasts made for males and students entering with an M S.W degree For these groups, we were able to account for less than 15 percent of the variance in school performance. It appears that the determinants of success are different for the subgroups, and because of chance or the availability of data, we selected good predictors for females and pre-M S W. students Our data suggested that the young woman who performed well in undergraduate school and desires a doctorate apparently possesses the ability to perform well in graduate school as well; being young adds to the prediction perhaps because it reduces the time between the acquisition of the undergraduate grades and the forecast Thus the basis for the prediction is current information For males and post-M S.W.s, however, we appeared to have overlooked the important antecedents. An inspection of the findings suggests that some of the missing pieces of the puzzle lie in these applicants' motivations and commitments. For example, expressed interest in research on the application was significantly correlated with program completion only for those groups whose performance could not be predicted well, males and post-M.S.W.s. The correlations were .20 ($P < .05$) and .26 ($P < .01$). The correlation was also computed for male post-M S.W.s and it was found to be even higher, .36 ($P < .001$) The single variable of stated interest in research prior to entry may be only the tip of the iceberg. Perhaps if more accurate assessments could be made of this motivational factor, in spite of the difficulties involved,[19] the predictions for males and post-M.S.W.s would equal that of females and pre-M.S.W.s.

The focus in the discussion thus far has been on individual variables rather than system variables. However, this investigation demonstrated that it is not only the characteristics of the students but characteristics of the university as well that influence the accuracy of success predictions

It is clear that students who enter the sociology program have a

very different academic experience than those who enter psychology. Certainly the facts that grades are lower in sociology and more students fail the prelim examination indicate that the feedback sociology students receive tends to be less positive. Furthermore, in sociology, passing the prelim (an all-day, in-class examination) is critical and problematic. For psychology students, passing the prelim (a tailored exam which can be written at home over a period of months, since 1970) may be a meaningful experience, but it is neither very critical nor problematic. These facts suggest that the prelim examinations play a very different role in the two departments. For sociology they are benchmarks on the way to a Ph.D. degree and a means of screening out less capable, or more test anxious, students. For psychology, prelim exams provide an opportunity to review and integrate literature in a given domain, but the exam does not function as a screen since virtually everyone passes it, and grades on the prelim are not related to the likelihood of graduating.

The difference in the prelim examinations of the two disciplines is reflective of the difference in their norms. There is much leeway in the psychology department to pursue one's own interest in selecting courses and research internship topics. In the sociology department there is relatively little flexibility. Once students select the sub-area of sociology they wish to pursue, few choices remain. The fact that the percentages of students graduating from the two areas do not differ significantly suggests that both approaches are fruitful. In the absence of long-term success measures of the graduates, we cannot compare the wisdom of the two philosophies of education. It is an issue which warrants further investigation.

Another institutional variable that must be acknowledged is grade inflation, which influenced all of the predictions of program success. However, it is important not to dismiss all predictions for this reason because it is evident that grade inflation exerts greater influence in some areas than others. For example, it appeared to be much less important in sociology than psychology. It also influences students differentially; for example, the undergraduate GPA was unrelated to year of entry for males, but this was not true for females. Furthermore, for male post-M.S.W.s none of the four grade measures of success in the program were related to year of entry. For male pre-M.S.W.s, all four were associated with year of entry. Thus researchers must be cognizant of grade inflation but not view it as a universal influence.

As these comments indicate, some clear suggestions emerged from this study for those who wish to determine predictors of success. First, one must be certain to examine meaningful subgroups separately or important information is likely to be lost. Since the range of talent at the graduate level is rather restricted, one's ability to predict differential outcomes is limited.[20] Thus losing meaningful information is all the

more unfortunate. Second, one must attempt to develop some measures reflective of individual dispositions, that is, motivation, commitment, possibly maturity, particularly if the program considers and admits both pre- and post-M.S.W. applicants. Third, the results should be analyzed separately for different areas of the academic institution in which students take courses, because there may be gross differences across departments and schools in the same university. Fourth, if at all possible, a longitudinal study should be planned that begins long before the students to be included are accepted. In that way, sufficient preentry data that are hypothesized to be relevant can be collected, and a test of the hypotheses generated regarding predictors of success can be made. Engaging in a post hoc analysis is likely to result in the difficulties encountered in this investigation, for example, scant information about a motivational factor which proved to be the only predictor of success for some subgroups.

Finally, a measure of career success must be developed so that the preentry and in-school variables can be correlated with good performance after graduation. This is the ultimate criterion of success. Until we can articulate the dimensions of the effective social work career focused on knowledge development and create ways to measure these dimensions, we will be confined to analyzing school performance, not really the goal of doctoral education.

Finally, a word about entry requirements rather than prediction studies. We strongly recommend that doctoral social work programs evaluate the appropriateness of the MAT as an entry requirement if it is now being used and think carefully about adding it if it is not. Should dropping the test appear to be too drastic, we suggest that programs using the MAT consider suspending it until clear-cut evidence is found that it is a valid predictor of intermediate or long-term success measures of their own graduates. As Willingham has suggested, local studies should be conducted to justify selection procedures, and this would certainly apply to use of the MAT.[21]

We conclude with the observation that, as with much research involving human behavior, the issues left to be explored at the end of the study are far more numerous and complex than the questions initially posed.

Notes

This is a revised version of a paper presented at the National Conference of the Group for the Advancement of Doctoral Education in Seattle in October 1981. Funds for this study were provided by the School of Social Work, University of Michigan.

1. E. Lowell Kelley and Lewis R. Goldberg, "Correlates of Later Performance and Specialization in Psychology," *Psychological Monographs* 73 (1959): 1–32.

2. Joel Weiss, "Assessing Nonconventional Outcomes in Schooling," in *Review of Research in Education*, vol. 8, ed. David C. Berliner (Washington, D.C.: American Educational Research Association, 1980); Warren W. Willingham, "Predicting Success in Graduate Education," *Science* 183 (1974): 273–78.

3. Willingham, p. 277.

4. Rodney J. Hartnett and Warren W. Willingham, *The Criterion Problem: What Measures of Success in Graduate Education?* GRE Board Research Report GREB no. 77–4R (Princeton, N.J.: Educational Testing Service, 1979).

5. Willingham, p. 274.

6. Robyn M. Dawes, "Graduate Admission Variables and Future Success," *Science* 187 (1975): 721–23.

7. Ibid., p. 723.

8. Ibid.

9. Aaron Rosen, "Toward a Function-related Organization of Doctoral Education," *Journal of Education for Social Work* 17 (1981): 69–75; David Royce, "Social Work Doctoral Educational Programs: A Consumer's Eye-View," *Journal of Education for Social Work* 16 (1980): 43–48.

10. Yeheskel Hasenfeld and Joel Leon, "A Profile of the Doctoral Students in Social Work and Social Science at the University of Michigan 1957–1973," mimeographed (Ann Arbor: School of Social Work, University of Michigan, 1979).

11. Willingham, p. 275.

12. Royce, p. 47.

13. C. Bernard Scotch, "Sex Status in Social Work: Grist for Women's Liberation," *Social Work* 16 (1971): 5–11; Martha Williams, Liz Ho, and Lucy Fiedler, "The Differential Career Patterns of Male and Female Social Workers: More Grist for Women's Liberation," *Social Work* 19 (1974): 463–66.

14. Canonical correlations were also computed with sex, age, undergraduate GPA, stated or not stated interest in research, pre- or post-M.S.W. status on entry, year of enrollment, presence or absence of children, and married or not married as independent variables, and program completed or not completed and doctoral GPA as dependent variables. There was too much missing information to include GPA in the social sciences. The results were in general agreement with those obtained in the regression equations and no new information was provided. Details about the canonical correlation can be obtained by writing to the first author of this paper.

15. Aaron Rosen, "Admissions and Educational Process Correlates of Graduates' Research Activities," (paper presented at the National Conference of the Group for the Advancement of Doctoral Education in St. Louis, October 1978).

16. Robyn M. Dawes, "A Case Study of Graduate Admissions: Application of Three Principles of Human Decision Making," *American Psychologist* 26 (1971): 180–88.

17. Robyn M. Dawes, "The Robust Beauty of Improper Linear Models in Decision Making," *American Psychologist* 34 (1979): 571–82.

18. Ibid., p. 580.

19. Willingham, p. 276.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

Debate with Authors

Progressive and Social Control Perspectives: An Appreciative Rejoinder

John M. Romanyshyn
University of Southern Maine

I appreciate David A. Rochefort's thoughtful and provocative article (*Social Service Review* 55, no. 4 [December 1981]: 568–92) even though he misunderstands and thus misrepresents my work, *Social Welfare: Charity to Justice*.[1] Contrary to Rochefort's claim, the major ideas in that book do not fit his model of the progressive-humanitarian perspective.

My view is that social welfare is an "aim-inhibited" moral enterprise constrained by the structure and values of capitalism.[2] Thus the book represents a non-Marxist radical critique of welfare capitalism. It assumes that motives and functions associated with social welfare are ambiguous, complex, and often contradictory, so that a class analysis, though necessary, is not a sufficient basis for understanding social welfare policy.

Rochefort states that I appear to be ambivalent about whether social welfare fits the humanitarian or the social control model (p. 589, n. 11). But my position incorporates both perspectives. It is David Rochefort who reads into some of my statements his assumptions about the theoretical framework of my book. Thus he writes, "An almost evangelical spirit suffuses Romanyshyn's description of the social welfare system: 'From an ideological point of view, it is society's answer to that ancient and ever-recurring question, "Am I my brother's keeper?"' " (p. 570).

But I intended that as a statement of fact. Social welfare *is* society's response to that "ever-recurring question," but the response need not be humanitarian, as I make clear in the observations that immediately follow the above statement: "Historically our response to this question has embodied two antithetical concepts of community responsibility . . . welfare may be seen as a *residual* function,

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that of policing deviants and dependents and/or alleviating their distress in some minimal way as an act of public or private charity"[3]

The sentence immediately preceding the statement in question notes the social control function of social welfare: "From a sociological point of view, social welfare functions to maintain the social system and to adapt it to changing social reality"[4] That such functions do not necessarily reflect a humanitarian regard for the well-being of recipients is made clear throughout the book (see esp pp. 49, 111, 196–97, 379–80), but two quotations will suffice to substantiate my point.

> If we organize society as a game called "occupational achievement," somebody has to be the "loser," at least relative to the position, power, and prestige attained by others. Welfare programs have functioned in part to keep the game going by maintaining the incentive to work, to cushion failure, and to control those who have tried to beat the system, withdraw from it, or seek revenge. Such programs have focused on defects to be corrected in individuals rather than on basic changes in the social system.[5]

> We have sought to alleviate poverty without reducing the incentive to work, to socialize the poor into a work culture in a society that has never guaranteed full employment, to strengthen family life without providing parents with essential supporting resources, to assure the "rights of childhood" without disturbing the market allocation of income, housing, and medical care, to reduce social conflict without upsetting the class distribution of opportunities and privileges, to redress inequities without confronting the issue of justice.[6]

Rochefort declares that common to all authors belonging to the liberal-humanitarian perspective is the assumption that the historical development of social welfare policy is "progressive in both intentions and results" (p. 569) and that such policies are derived from a consensus rather than a conflict view of social order. That my views do not quite conform to the first assumption is clear from the above quotations from my book. My rejection of a simple consensus view of society may be found on pages 107–17, in the course of which I note, "A consensus view of society deflects attention from the reality of the continuing conflict of interests"[7] On the other hand, I do not deny that humanitarian motives have been and continue to be significant in the development of social welfare policy.

These corrections are not meant to detract from the value of Rochefort's article, which does identify some major questions that need to be addressed. The author is certainly right that we need a clearer definition of social welfare. However, no single definition will suffice since there is no single reality that such a concept can possibly identify. Social welfare is a social construct, and its definition will depend on the particular focus of any investigation. Rochefort is also correct that diverse social policies cannot be explained by any single macrolevel theory.

However, I doubt that any study of social welfare can be free of controlling assumptions about human nature or free of the investigator's own ideological persuasions, as Rochefort seems to suggest (pp. 587–88). There is no perspective apart from some vantage point, though of course the values that inform any study must be made clear.

Notes

1. John M. Romanyshyn, *Social Welfare: Charity to Justice* (New York: Random House, 1971).

2. Ibid., p. 40
3. Ibid., p. 4
4. Ibid., p. 3
5. Ibid., p. 18
6. Ibid., p. 40
7. Ibid., p. 107

Author's Reply

David A. Rochefort
Brown University

I am grateful for John Romanyshyn's appreciative comments on my article as well as for his statement of views on the nature of social welfare. Certainly my intent was not to misrepresent *Social Welfare: Charity to Justice*.[1] It may be helpful at this point if I explain further my decision to reference this book within the "progressive perspective" in my article.

First, it should be made clear that my review of literature summarized selected themes appearing among different authors in the social welfare field. Given this method of organization and obvious limitations of space, I did not attempt to explicate fully the thinking of every author cited. Thus, Romanyshyn's book was cited in connection with the progressive school of thought because, in various places, it forcefully expresses a version of what I have called "the humanitarian theme." As indicated in the above rejoinder, Professor Romanyshyn continues to affirm the significance of humanitarian motives in explaining the development of social welfare policy.

Professor Romanyshyn also believes in the importance of certain instrumental or functional processes within the social welfare system, a fact that I duly pointed out in my article (p. 589, n. 11). This dualistic description of the nature and purposes of social welfare activity, and the emphasis given the humanitarian or instrumental theme in different parts of the text, helps to explain why *Social Welfare: Charity to Justice* may give rise to varying interpretations. For example, in the above letter Romanyshyn refers to his own book as a "non-Marxist radical critique." At least one radical author, however, has criticized Romanyshyn's proposed definition of social welfare because of its "positive emphasis on manifest functions" such as protecting the vulnerable and achieving social change.[2] As explained in my article (p. 570), it is this same definition that also seems to me to suggest a harmonious, rather than conflictual, view of the social system.

I must admit, too, that Romanyshyn's use of the "residual" and "institutional" classifications of social services does not clearly identify him as a "radical" author in my mind. Romanyshyn asserts that these are "antithetical" concepts and that society, when it adopts a residual approach, is exercising a social control function within the social welfare system. But according to this typology first proposed by Harold Wilensky and Charles N. Lebeaux, residual services, strictly speaking, are not coercive and politically repressive in the way that most radical analysts intend when using the term "social control."[3] Rather,

they are chiefly *helping* measures whose individualistic and sometimes stigmatizing focus contrasts with the greater universalism of institutional services. Since both the residual and institutional approaches allow for benevolent influences, however, they are not so directly opposed as Romanyshyn implies. They simply represent two different points on a single policy continuum along which society, in the view of some progressive authors, is advancing. Romanyshyn himself expresses this idea in the following excerpts from his book:

> Social welfare in the United States reflects both the residual and the developmental (or institutional) concepts. It is a system undergoing radical transformation in response to society's transition from scarcity to relative abundance and a revolution of rising expectations.[4]

> Social welfare in the United States has fallen in a large measure within the residual concept, with its patchwork system of programs based on the assumption that social obligation extends only to meeting the emergency needs of that portion of the population that is regarded as incapable of meeting its own needs through the traditional means of the market and the family. The residual view accepts the poor as incompetent second-class members of society for whom second-class services may be provided.
>
> Increasingly, however, we are moving toward an *institutional* (or developmental) concept, by which social welfare performs the normal and necessary first-line functions of a modern industrial society in order to assure economic and political stability, provide its citizens with essential supportive resources, equalize opportunities, and redress class-related inequities in the distribution of income and power. The newer view is part of the quest for equality and accords to all a citizen's right to an equitable share in the benefits and obligations of his society. The conflict between inequalities of class and the equalities of citizenship is a major factor, accounting for the democratization of charity and leading to the more positive views of welfare that are now evolving.[5]

On balance, then, Romanyshyn believes that humanitarianism is a major force behind the development of social welfare policy but that its expression in some ways is constrained by individualistic values and certain other elements within American society. Most progressive authors would not disagree with this analysis.[6] Indeed, some amount of social criticism is implicit within the progressive perspective as part of the very process of achieving needed improvements in the existing social welfare system.

Finally, I want to comment briefly on the larger issue raised by Romanyshyn when he writes, "I doubt that any study of social welfare can be free of controlling assumptions about human nature or free of the investigator's own ideological persuasions." To elaborate a point made in "Progressive and Social Control Perspectives on Social Welfare" (pp. 585–86), my own suggestion in this regard is that analysts study how the state responds differentially to different categories of social welfare problems. This approach necessarily shifts attention away from the supposedly fixed qualities of either the state or human nature. I believe we will find, for example, that the state responds in a comparatively meliorative way to needy children, the elderly, and physically ill and handicapped and it responds in a comparatively repressive way to a second problem population of criminal citizens. Still other problem populations, such as the poor and mentally disabled, have received treatment whose character fluctuates greatly from one historical period to the next. While such an analysis tells us little about the "true" moral nature of man or the state, it does open the door to fruitful inquiry concerning the dynamics of the social welfare system and, in particular, the connection between policy and contemporary attitudes toward different social welfare groups.

Notes

1 John M Romanyshyn, *Social Welfare Charity to Justice* (New York Random House, 1971)

2 F J Peirce, "A Functional Perspective of Social Welfare, in *Perspectives on Social Welfare*, ed. Paul F Weinberger, 2d ed (New York Macmillan Co, 1974), p 42 To be precise, Peirce is reacting to a definition of social welfare that appeared in a prepublication version of Romanyshyn's book This definition does not differ significantly from the published version, however The two are reprinted below, with the first being the version that Peirce cites and the second being the one that appears in *Social Welfare Charity to Justice* (p 3) First, "A set of institutions and services to promote the well-being of the population and the better functioning of the social order It includes those provisions and processes directly concerned with the treatment and prevention of social problems, development of human resources, and improvement in the quality of life It involves social services to individuals and groups as well as efforts to strengthen or modify social institutions" And second, "In this book we will use the broader definition of social welfare as including all those forms of social intervention that have a primary and direct concern with promoting both the well being of the individual and of the society as a whole Social welfare includes those provisions and processes directly concerned with the treatment and prevention of social problems, the development of human resources, and the improvement in the quality of life It involves social services to individuals and families as well as efforts to strengthen or modify social institutions"

3 Harold Wilensky and Charles N Lebeaux, *Industrial Society and Social Welfare* (1958, paperback ed , New York Free Press, 1965), pp 138–40

4 Romanyshyn, p 5

5 Ibid , p 33.

6 See, e g , Wilensky and Lebeaux, chap 2, Harold L Wilensky, "The Problems and Prospects of the Welfare State," introduction to the paperback edition of *Industrial Society and Social Welfare*, pp xii–xxv, Kirsten A Gronbjerg, *Mass Society and the Extension of Welfare, 1960–1970* (Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp 162–68

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6. See, e g , Wilensky and Lebeaux, chap 2, Harold L Wilensky, "The Problems and Prospects of the Welfare State," introduction to the paperback edition of *Industrial Society and Social Welfare*, pp xii–xxv, Kirsten A Gronbjerg, *Mass Society and the Extension of Welfare, 1960–1970* (Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp 162–68

Book Reviews

Research in Social Work. By William J. Reid and Audrey D. Smith New York: Columbia University Press, 1981. Pp. xi+417 $20.00.

Reid and Smith characterize their book as an introductory research text with the aim of encouraging and educating social work students and practitioners to do and to use research to develop their practice The means to these objectives are explicated ably and creatively through a three-part presentation that spans (1) the interrelationship of social work and research, (2) phases and issues in research production, and (3) particular applications in data collection and measurement for social work

The content and structure of this volume as well as the relaxed writing style of the authors engage students' interests and stimulate their learning efforts The discussion of the contribution of research to the knowledge base of the profession and to the practice development of the individual social worker is portrayed in ways that address students' skepticism about the value of studying research when direct practice is the career objective. Basic research concepts, stages, and issues are rendered not only understandable but also meaningful to the student readers by the social work perspectives and illustrations that permeate the book. The research methodologies that take precedence in the presentation are those fruitful to the examination, evaluation, and development of social work intervention. The prospects of identifying which problems or targets yield to positive changes or improvements through particularized interventions challenge the social work student. Specific research applications that may be used by the practitioner to assess needs and to measure service outcomes and characteristics are offered in the third part Thus, the book closes with pragmatic tools for the study of practice and for making cumulative contributions to social work knowledge.

The platform for engaging in various forms of research is established by the authors' conception of social work, provided early in the first chapter The focus is on efforts toward change directed at individuals, families, and other small groups. Their selection of research operations and illustrations of empirical studies, consistent with this practice perspective, benefits students of social work treatment over those in planning and management. Such setting of priorities makes possible a breadth and depth in the direct intervention arena. Considering the viewpoint that macropractitioners ought to develop appreciation for and knowledge of social treatment processes and efficacy, they have much to gain from study of this text Task-centered, problem-

solving, and behavioral models of practice predominate over psychodynamic therapeutics since the former are more receptive to formalized research operations. The authors have made distinguished contributions to social work knowledge within the focused and explicated practice orientations.

One of the most intriguing chapters to students is that on contributions of research to social work. The drawing of similarities between research and practice in regard to the attitudes of inquiry and objectivity, as well the use of problem-solving processes, kindles an affinity infrequently experienced by students. Empirical practice is a sensitizing concept. The authors state that the elements include the use of empirical language to describe practice operations, the use, where possible, of explicit practice models, and the use of research-based knowledge and technology. Exposition of the developmental research strategy through which to construct practice models incrementally fosters appreciation of the function of research to the advancement of practice.

The second part of the book is thorough in its coverage of each phase of the research process—from problem formulation, research design, sampling, measurement, and data collection through data analysis. While the emphasis of the book is clearly on quantitative research strategies, the authors provide some thoughtful explanations of naturalistic and qualitative research formulations, designs, and data analysis. The likelihood of unrecognized bias in conducting qualitative studies is offset by the promise of this methodology to study the complex social systems of concern to social work.

An appealing aspect of the authors' handling of several research models is the weighing of strengths and weaknesses of each. Factors to be balanced in the choice of methods for a particular inquiry include: appropriateness to the research question, scientific rigor and pliancy to generalization, situational feasibility, ethics, and projected costs relative to anticipated benefits. The intricate judgment involved evokes interest in empirical research as a subject of scholarship.

Single-case and group experimental designs are explained purposefully in a sequence of ascending complexity. Within each approach a host of designs are set forth. The capacity of each for control of extraneous variables and generalization is discussed with candor. The principal research goal of enhancing and improving social work intervention is sustained as the referent in considering alternative research strategies.

The authors submit a multidimensional framework for classification of research designs. They indicate that they have developed this innovation over traditional typologies to extend perspectives in planning inquiries and assessing research products. The major elements include: naturalistic versus experimental knowledge-building functions, composition and size of sample, timing and repetition of measurement, and qualitative or quantitative orientations. Subcomponents of each enrich this architecture. Students experience the multidimensional framework as readily understandable and applicable to the appraisal of published research.

The authors point out that they developed a second innovation of a technical nature for their text. Several multivariate procedures are explained with regard to their application to configurations of variables with which social work generally deals. The aim is not to teach the reader how to do such analyses but rather to address consumership of research reports. Contemporary social work research often utilizes these techniques. Inappropriate applications and limitations of various types of statistical testing are identified clearly here also.

The third and concluding part of the text opens with a presentation of research approaches to the assessment of community needs. One chapter is

devoted to the study of large-scale social systems. Community need assessments often are conducted to establish a data base for planning. Recognition is given in the text to the tenuous connection between the data generated for planning and its actual use in program development and subsequent evaluation.

The discussion of measuring outcomes of clinical work encompasses initial and ongoing assessment of problems and targets. Intervention is viewed by the authors as a contributing variable to outcome, not the single causal one. Several classes of indicators of outcome are illustrated, such as change, improvement, client satisfaction, and goal achievement. A range of measurement approaches are weighed. Sample data collection instruments designed to capture outcomes are included in this section, such as the Goal Attainment Scaling Guide, the client service evaluation questionnaire used by the Family Service Association of America, and the Index of Marital Satisfaction.

A number of study methods used to describe and analyze the characteristics of direct intervention work with clients are appraised. Among the more interesting are analogs, critical incidents, and content analysis as a way of codifying practice techniques.

The text closes with a forecast of the potential of agency-based information systems to generate a data base for descriptive study of agency operations and more rigorous research aimed at knowledge building.

This text is highly readable. It takes a vigorous approach to meeting conceptual and measurement challenges in the study of social work intervention. The reader can proceed productively through the book in sequence of the chapters. However, selected topics are readily accessible through use of the thorough subject index. An ample number of quality references for further study of research methodology and products are included.

I have used the text with B.S.W. and M.S.W. students, who responded enthusiastically to it. Their sustained level of interest contributed to their solid learning. Given the way the authors present research, social workers in general are stimulated to read and maintain thoughtful attention to it. The text should be used by students in courses on research, direct practice, and integrated research and practice in the classroom and in the field. Professional practitioners would benefit from its use individually and in staff development sessions on selected interests.

Reid and Smith have made a substantial contribution to the social work profession and literature.

Claire Anderson
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City Limits. By Paul E. Peterson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981. Pp. xvi + 268. $9.95.

City Limits, by Paul Peterson, is an analysis of the constraints within which local governments operate and the implications for what cities can do, as well as how they do it. The approach, while based in the traditions of political science, is eclectic, drawing on the literature of economics and sociology. Peterson's assessment of the limits of policy options for cities and other local governments provides an articulate backdrop for debate on the structure of federalism and the extent to which social programs, which have expanded since the 1930s, can be shifted successfully to state and local governments.

Peterson argues that the policies of cities are limited by an overriding necessity to improve their "market position" while having few tools at their disposal

for the enactment of policies (p 22) Cities must attract business in order to maintain jobs, capital investment, and tax revenue To do this they seek to influence positively the classic factors of production land, labor, and capital But the means of control on the local level are closely circumscribed They can have little influence over their labor supply, at best providing an environment that is attractive to a more desirable work force Tax concessions, limits on regulatory restrictions, and low-cost utilities can be used to attract capital, but at a cost to local coffers Ultimately, a city's control of land becomes its principal vehicle for attracting industry The construction of access highways, placement of public utilities, granting of tax holidays, and favorable zoning become the means by which locales exercise their greatest controls "Urban politics is above all the politics of land use" (p 25) But while cities pursue policies that seek to influence the locational decisions of business, they are also constrained by their limited revenue-raising potential

Much of this book is organized around a categorization of types of policies by Theodore Lowi developmental, redistributive, and allocational Peterson adapts this approach to his own economic view of the city Developmental policies are ones that "enhance the economic position of the city Redistributive policies benefit low-income residents but at the same time negatively affect the local economy Allocational policies are more or less neutral in their economic effect" (p. 41). Peterson discusses the local import of these three policy areas, emphasizing differences between local and national perspectives He then develops an assessment of local political structure and process, using each of the three types as an organizational element for his analysis The politics of development provide an arena for reassessing the debate about community power structure, including a reevaluation of Hunter's reputational approach Allocational policies call forth a discussion of patronage, ethnic politics, reformers, and municipal employees Within the context of redistributional policies, Peterson examines organized interests, such as business groups, unions, and protest groups

City Limits will be of interest to those concerned with social policy, particularly for what it says about the difficulties of developing any significant redistributive policies on the local level. As in his previous books, such as *School Politics, Chicago Style* and *Race and Authority in Urban Politics* (with David Greenstone), Peterson combines extensive use of the literature with persistent attention to the reality of particular situations The result is a book that is of interest to the practitioner as well as the student of urban politics His lively style and the liberal use of examples are particularly helpful to the reader who may be less familiar with the literature cited

Peterson takes a broad view of his subject—from using multivariate statistical techniques for establishing the determinants of municipal expenditures, to examining the effects of suburbanization on the metropolitan areas, to comparing the efficiency of machine government in Chicago with the "reformed government" of New York Although I often disagreed with particulars, the overall assessment of the limits on city policies is compelling

The application of Lowi's three-part categorization raises some interesting questions. While this classification offers a useful heuristic device, its use as an analytic schema would benefit from further clarification Although some policies are clearly "developmental" (e g , tax breaks for incoming industry) and others are undeniably "redistributive" (e g , clinics for low-income residents), many important policy areas remain ambiguous Whether they are developmental or redistributive may be the subject of diverging opinions and only established ex post facto by examining the results To assess the political processes involved, the intent of political actors should be a paramount con-

sideration For example, investments in public recreational facilities may be either, depending on the overall effect—whom it serves and how it influences the attractiveness of an area for business.

Peterson acknowledges this ambiguity, but it is not systematically addressed in his subsequent analysis. One of his illustrative cases offers an example of the problematic nature of this definitional issue In discussing the politics of redistribution, Peterson draws upon a case study on air pollution control. He notes that, although this issue is not clearly "redistributive," it represents the kinds of problems that redistributive policies pose for local decision makers (p 168). It appears that the determination of whether air pollution measures are "redistributive" or "developmental" is a function of the outcome The short-term answer might be that it is "redistributive" in the sense that "less well-off segments of the community" benefit at the expense (through taxes) of those who are "better off" (p. 43). On the other hand, if the pollution controls result in a long-term economic gain because of the greater appeal of the environment, the policy could be considered "developmental" Reliance on outcomes for classification of policies tends to limit the usefulness of the taxonomy for the more ambiguous areas.

The air pollution example highlights a related point—the basic difficulty in assessing what is in the "interest" of the city Peterson offers a lucid assessment of city interests in chapter 2. In his subsequent analysis, however, there is less attention to the problems of determining the interests of the city for particular policy issues For Peterson, the "bottom line" is attracting business—a localized version of "what is good for General Motors is good for the country" While economic viability may be the sine qua non of the city, the multidimensional nature of urban settings demands a more complex examination of interests Peterson's emphasis on the market position of the city suggests that developmental policies should have widespread community support: "They are praised by many and opposed only by those few whose partial interests stand in conflict with community interests" (p 41). But many of the policies undertaken by local government to aid business ventures seem to enjoy a somewhat opposite support: they are supported by the few who will enjoy large payoffs because of their own business interests Greater attention by Peterson to the complexities of assessing short-term and long-term interests would add another component to the economic assessments of the policies discussed.

In writing *City Limits*, Peterson has made a great contribution to developing a more informed analysis of local policy enactment. He has taken a comprehensive view of the forces impinging on the city and garnered a wide range of evidence to explicate the differences between local and national policy development. His use of empirical data (e.g., assessing the interplay of local, state, and federal funds in chaps. 4 and 10) and case studies creates a rich view of municipal economic affairs For those with a commitment to more adequate provisions for the poor in society, one of Peterson's principal conclusions has particular relevance. His analysis clearly suggests that financial restrictions and the need to compete for economic development crowd redistributive policies off of the local agenda: "redistribution is not and cannot ordinarily be a constituent part of local government policy" (p. 210). As the debate about the pros and cons of President Reagan's "new federalism" continues, it would be wise to heed the realities presented by city limits.

Lawrence S. Root
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The Classroom Society. By Herbert A. Thelen. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1981. Pp. 226. $24.95.

A sense of excitement and challenge about learning and teaching infuses this small volume. The author's commitment to human potential and the human quest illuminates the content. A wise teacher, knowledgeable researcher, keen thinker, and literate writer, Thelen has brought together the essence of a lifetime of learning and teaching in this well-reasoned, well-seasoned analysis and synthesis of education as a dialectical process. Those readers devoted to, albeit often now despairing of, the public schools, will find this book a basis for optimism and hope. School social workers will feel at home in its spirit, philosophical stance, and conceptual framework. They will gain substantive knowledge, as well as creative approaches and methods to assist them in their daily work. Administrators of schools and departments of social work will glean both inspiration for and practical ways of developing their schools and departments as dialectical communities devoted to learning. Social work faculty will discover a coherent guide to educative teaching for knowledge development and practice competence and to continuing inquiry.

Central to Thelen's model is dialogue as a unifying principle, engaging school and department administrators, faculty, students, and community as interacting systems involved in the dialectical processes essential to the generation and implementation of educational policymaking and educative learning and teaching. At once idealistic and practical, the model offers an integrative framework for viewing and doing in the collaborative educational enterprise.

As a teacher in graduate education for social work, I have struggled over the years to devote conscious attention to both content and process in classroom teaching. To an unusual degree, Thelen's model assists the teacher to develop a viewpoint and approach essential for dealing with content and process in reference to individual learners, the class as a group, the classroom as a small society, and with the mutual interactions among all of these components.

Although Thelen's examples are drawn mainly from secondary schools, I think that the philosophical framework, propositions, concepts, and principles are appropriate and useful for work with graduate students in social work education. In fact, the model, its philosophical and conceptual underpinnings, and its suggestions for implementation reflect some of the major findings of recent research and writings dealing with the learning and teaching of adults.

Thelen's lively presentation invites the teacher to join the author in a careful investigation of the life of the classroom as a small society. It offers a balanced, artistic, well-researched framework and guide for teachers to use to examine and improve the educative qualities of their own teaching and their students' learning. The dialectical process, so clearly analyzed and synthesized, engages the teacher as learner and participant. It is a pleasure to accompany the author on this joint inquiry and quest.

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The Remarried Family: Challenge and Promise. By Esther Wald. New York: Family Service Association of America, 1981. Pp. xiii + 254. $19.95 (cloth), $14.95 (paper).

Recently, the growing literature on family therapy has been criticized for its silence on the dramatic changes that have been taking place in family structures,

functions, and roles over the past several decades. Family therapy has focused on specific interactional patterns within families without much regard for preexisting conditions or structures such as the remarried family. Esther Wald's *The Remarried Family* should elate those who have called attention to this gap in the literature Her book is a comprehensive treatment of this specialized area of practice. Wald's book is based on her doctoral dissertation, which apparently grew out of her many years of clinical social work experience with remarried families. A thorough reading of the book leaves no doubt about her experience, knowledge, and authority to explore the complexities of working with the remarried family

In eleven chapters, the history, theory, current trends and dynamics, legal aspects, and therapeutic implications of work with stepfamilies are covered in depth. The book is written in a clear, readable style, and the theoretical material is interspersed throughout with a series of detailed case examples that highlight and give a practical application of the conceptual points the author covers. The blending of theoretical and illustrative practical case examples is one of the unique and gratifying aspects of the text.

This book is highly recommended for the practitioner who works with stepfamilies. The material is especially helpful for practitioners with little or no experience in this area Experienced practitioners will find the material somewhat less helpful. The discussion of therapeutic intervention is limited to very general summaries of generic social work skills superimposed on the dynamics of stepfamilies Most of the case examples are descriptive and stop short of illustrating specific intervention strategies and techniques There are no glimpses into strategies and techniques, but mainly descriptions of families and their relationships The conceptualization of intervention is diffused throughout the book and generally follows the case examples There is one chapter near the end of the book that summarizes intervention, but this discussion is focused more on counseling techniques than intensive therapeutic intervention. Early in the book (p. 83) there is an excellent discussion of client and practitioner cultural orientations to the stepfamily that is helpful to workers in developing self-awareness and overcoming biases in this form of practice

The history of attitudes about the stepfamily situation is very helpful and enlightening. The historical tracing of the plight of the stereotyped stepmother is effective and fosters empathy for women who find themselves in this position This section would have been more comprehensive if the author had included more in-depth explanation of the impact of the industrial revolution on the family as well as analysis of emerging beliefs about changing sex roles in families.

At several points in the text various theories are used to explain stepfamily dynamics. systems theory, developmental theory, role theory, interactional theory, and psychoanalytic theory Most of these applications are useful but cursory and, in my opinion, constitute the weakest point of the book Ernest Burgess is misidentified as an interactionist (p 37), which epitomizes the theoretical limitations. There is a tendency to use theoretical terminology without much specificity, which is confusing to the serious reader, and the author does have a tendency to use jargon to the point of distraction Some concepts, such as "bonding," "blending," and "mix," are not adequately defined operationally. Much of the use of theoretical terms is effective only at the level of being descriptive of behavior rather than being consistently applied to a conceptual scheme in a systematic way.

The author does a good job of comparing and contrasting the nuclear and remarried family from a developmental and life stage theoretical perspective

ne mentions that remarried husbands are generally ten years older than their wives, but little attention is given to the impact of this marital life stage differential on the functioning of the total remarried family unit. It has been my experience that this factor can be a significant source of stress for the family that is worthy of more detailed exploration, and it is an area in which therapists need help and guidance.

Wald uses several diagrams and tables that distinguish nuclear and stepfamilies, which can aid the student as well as the practitioner. Also, Wald has developed a "problem process profile" that has some overlapping categories, but it is useful in focusing problems that stepfamilies have a propensity to experience.

The subtitle of the book is *Challenge and Promise* and is worthy of comment. The author deals almost exclusively with the "challenges" of the remarried family and focuses on difficulty and dysfunction that require therapeutic intervention. The "promise" is limited to case examples where therapy has helped or defused the issues. We do not learn about remarried families that have mastered relatively smooth transitions or have engaged in successful self-corrective efforts, which are only briefly mentioned in chapter 11. The majority of remarried families will never receive therapy, and some initial, meager research has shown only marginal differences in the adjustment of nuclear and remarried families. In reading the book, one needs to keep in mind this more comprehensive view of the "promise" of the remarried family.

On balance, the criticisms of this book are minor, and, when taken as a whole, this book is a substantial contribution to the literature on stepfamilies. The author has combined an easy, relaxed style of writing with a scientific approach to her topic, and all of the chapters are well documented. This book is highly recommended for practitioners and students involved in work with stepfamilies.

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The Clinical Measurement Package: A Field Manual. By Walter H. Hudson. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1982. Pp. xv + 159. $8.95.

Viewing Hudson's Clinical Measurement Package (CMP) in historical perspective easily suggests comparison with some classic manuals for clinical assessment, such as Hunt and Kogan's Movement Scale (New York: Family Service Association of America, 1950) and Geismar's Scale of Family Functioning (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1971). Hudson's work reflects the same pains-taking care in developing his scales as was reported for these other instruments. If anything, Hudson's book is more nearly complete. It identifies clearly the appropriate and the inappropriate uses of the CMP, offers detailed evidence of the current status of their reliability and validity, and provides explicit instructions on the administration, scoring, and interpretation of these instruments in varied contexts. All of the scales are presented in the book for easy reproducibility, although the Dorsey Press holds the copyright on them. And it is written with a clarity and ho nesty that sets a standard for social work research. For example, Hudson states: "In the early phases of the validation research for the CMP scales, I used the split-half method of estimating reliability of the scales because I did not know tha better method was available" (p. 85). Can you imagine R. A. Fisher writin that?

The Clinical Measurement Package refe to a set of nine paper-and-pencil self-report questionnaires designed to measure the magnitude of a given

unidimensional problem in personal and social functioning. The personal topics include depression, self-esteem, and marital and sexual discord as perceived by an individual; the social functioning scales involve parent-child, family, and peer relationship problems. A standard format is used for each scale, consisting of twenty-five items and a five-point range ("rarely or none of the time" to "most or all of the time") leading to a common scoring procedure and a clinical cutting score. This cutting score, thirty, in the range of zero to 100 points, is important in two ways: (1) as a diagnostic reference point—people who score higher than thirty generally are found to have a clinically significant problem in the area being measured; and (2) as a research criterion—movement to below the cutting score may be used as the basis for judging effectiveness of treatment. By plotting scores of repeated measures of these scales on graphs, therapists can monitor their clients' changing reports and can use the feedback from these data to redirect interventions as needed. Hudson also provides preliminary information on a screening instrument, a twenty-item scale where each item represents a problem area. The manual ends with self-training exercises.

Like its historical predecessors, however, Hudson's approach using measures of categories of clinical problems makes some fundamental assumptions that users should fully understand. Moreover, there are some features about his specific scales that might serve as limitations for some users. To begin with, some scales have both a positive and a negative pole, such as high and low levels of self-esteem, whereas others apparently have only a negative pole, such as the Generalized Contentment Scale, which measures "nonpsychotic depression" (p. 3), not, as its label would suggest, contentment. Indeed, these scales reflect a pervasive pathology orientation, since the concept of health is "difficult to define" (p. 22). However, even if practitioners in areas such as family life education, assertiveness training, and natural helping networks who appropriately assist people in achieving more nearly optimal states of mental health and social functioning are not "counted," it is still true that all helping professionals should promote effective functioning in their clients. For example, it is not sufficient to reduce the level of depression, it is equally important to replace it with some positive and constructive mental set. A therapist would need some measure of this positive dimension as much as he or she has need for a measure of pathology. It is regrettable that Hudson's important contribution to clinical measurement should be burdened with this pathological orientation.

Categorical scales present both risks and opportunities to users. The risks include a Procrustean fitting of the client to the scales. For example, an alienated teenager, a couple locked in marital tensions, and a grieving widow may all use the Generalized Contentment Scale, even though it seems likely that different factors in each case represent the core of their problems, assuming that the specific scale items in fact sample all of the factors that are disturbing a given individual. The question arises as to why the practitioner does not focus on the specific causal problems or potentials and measure changes in them. However, against these risks are the opportunities of comparing a given client with known pathologically functioning groups, using well-designed and convenient scales. Hudson also reports that his scales have been used with people from different cultures, and it appears that cultural and ethnic differences have little impact on performance as measured by these scales.

Overall, there is little doubt that this is an important contribution to clinical measurement using categorical scales. What users must recognize is that this

is only one way of doing clinical evaluation and that there are a variety of other alternatives.

Martin Bloom
Virginia Commonwealth University

Justice and the Human Good. By William A. Galston. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. Pp. xii+324. $20.00.

Unquestionably, social workers need better grounding in applying philosophical reasoning to issues and problems in social welfare. Unfortunately, Galston's book does not provide the necessary fundamentals. He assumes the average reader is at a very advanced state of knowledge and thus is able to keep pace with his own rapid train of thought. Those not intimately acquainted with the writings of Aristotle, Kant, Hume, Mill, Nozick, and Rawls, to name a few, will quickly fall by the wayside by the end of the first chapter.

I found myself quite disappointed by the author's inability to communicate complex ideas in a lucid and cogent manner. The writing is excessively abstract and arid, apparently aimed at the small in-group of theoretical ethicists who write for each other rather than a broader readership.

Having read and applied various theories of justice to social welfare problems, I was anticipating a clear, comparative analysis of the leading principles of justice. Instead, the author presents a vast array of concepts and principles, some totally unrelated to justice. Theories of justice are presented in a somewhat disjointed manner under the author's topical headings. The chapters are peppered with brief illustrations ranging from individual behavior to macroeconomic policies. There seems to be no organizing principle or unifying theme that serves to sustain the analysis from chapter to chapter. Galston claims his method of analysis is somewhat Aristotelian, and his views present a departure from the best-known European and Anglo-American theories of justice.

Somewhere toward the middle of the book, the author presents his own view of justice. Having led the reader to an impasse between utilitarianism and theories of justice as espoused by Rawls and Nozick, Galston states: "For the most part, I shall argue that the nonmoral goods for which we strive are governed by relational considerations. In circumstances in which no such considerations exist—that is, when there is no rational basis for assigning a specific good to a particular kind of individual, all dispositions of the assigned good are equally just, although some may be deemed preferable for other reasons" (p. 142). While this quote hardly does justice to the more extensive discussion that follows, it is typical of the style of prose that characterizes the book throughout.

There is no application of the leading principles of justice to the most pressing social problems confronting American society, for example, poverty, racism, and societal responsibility to the mentally ill, aged, handicapped, and homeless. While such concrete application is rare in philosophical writings, the linkage points are sometimes more evident. The reader will get no help from Galston in trying to bridge principles of justice with moral problems and dilemmas in social welfare.

In summary, it should be emphasized that here is a great need for collaborative efforts between ethicists and social welfare theoreticians. This bridging is

taking place in medicine, law, and other human-service fields. Philosophical analysis cannot only enhance the quality of analytical thinking in social welfare, it will require professionals to rely less on intuition and more on systematic ethical reasoning. While the Galston book is erudite and intellectually dazzling, it fails to provide a clear exposition of the leading principles of justice and how these principles add to our ability to analyze contemporary social problems.

Marvin Rosenberg
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The Life Cycle of Groups: Group Developmental Stage Theory. By Roy Lacoursiere. New York: Human Sciences Press, 1980. Pp. 320. $24.95

Researchers and practitioners interested in groups have long been fascinated with what happens when a collection of individuals comes together, blends into a group system, and then disbands their relationship. A wide range of group-development frameworks has been proposed to describe these events. Current conceptualizations are primarily derived from anecdotal accounts of practice experience and literature reviews with occasional references to the limited number of studies of group development. While authors agree on the nature of group development, they differ in the terminology used to describe group movement and in the number of stages they identify. Lacoursiere provides a very thorough review of the existing literature on group development. Drawing on descriptions of development in approximately 100 therapeutic and task groups, as well as his own experience as a participant and practitioner, he recasts current conceptualizations into a cycle which is purported to have universal application and which consists of five stages: orientation, dissatisfaction, resolution, production, and termination.

This comprehensive collation of frameworks should be a useful reference for those struggling to identify common elements in group development. Lacoursiere's conceptualization of a negative-orientation stage is a valuable contribution, typically ignored in other formulations. His stipulation of certain factors, such as forced attendance, that can produce a negative-orientation stage, provides a basis for predicting negative reactions and should facilitate planning and intervention to move the group beyond this point. Further, Lacoursiere considers the impact of leader, member, and task characteristics as well as group arrangements and group type on development in groups. This enumeration of the group conditions that minimize or maximize anticipated stages of development should be helpful in better understanding the course of development of a particular group.

Unfortunately, Lacoursiere's ambitious attempt to substantiate a universal framework for viewing the life cycle of groups does not fare so well. While many of the studies reviewed report group behavior that appears to correspond closely to Lacoursiere's five stages, the descriptions provided in other articles do not fit so neatly into his proposed scheme. Lacoursiere tends to deal with this lack of consistency by regrouping stages indicated by other authors; only rarely does he admit to difficulty in reorganizing group-development frameworks so that they are compatible with his format. Given the great array of groups considered and the divergent approaches to studying group development, Lacoursiere's failure to achieve a "perfect fit" in all cases is not surprising. His identification of fairly widespread similarities in the descriptions of group development is useful. It is unfortunate, however, that he has focused so much attention on trying to validate the existence of his five stages and on

promoting their application, not only to groups, but also to other life experiences. Lacoursiere's use of the group-development stages to describe "falling in love" and the Carter presidency do little to confirm the universality or the utility of his framework.

Another detractor from this promising attempt to unify group development formulations comes from Lacoursiere's overemphasis on morale as a key concept. After acknowledging that morale has not appeared as a significant variable in the study of groups since the 1950s, he devotes a chapter to describing difficulties in defining morale, its confusion with other terms, and problems with measurement. Yet, he concludes that "practical advantages can be expected from attending to morale in group experiences . . ." (p. 55). Since Lacoursiere equates morale with social-emotional tone, it would seem more useful to consider currently accepted concepts, such as group maintenance, in analyzing and discussing stages of group development.

Many practitioners today work frequently with both open ended and short term groups, yet Lacoursiere does not discuss the developmental cycle of these types of groups. He makes only brief mention of membership openness, membership stability, and length of group life cycle as conditions that affect his group-development stages. Although he indicates that openness, instability, and shorter life cycles tend to minimize the appearance of the stages he has designed, he does not elaborate on the implications for intervention. It would seem that an entire book devoted to the life cycle of groups should deal in more depth with such current variations.

Lacoursiere has provided a useful reference for readers interested in a review of the group-development literature. His development stages highlight the many common features that have been observed in the life cycle of groups and offer a framework for practice with groups and for further research. It is regrettable that Lacoursiere's overreliance on morale and his conjectures about the universal application of his life-cycle theory detract from his excellent review.

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Management Systems in the Human Services. Edited by Murray L. Gruber. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981. Pp. x + 368. $19.50 (cloth), $9.50 (paper).

Management Systems is a collection of thirty-seven articles, extensively edited, covering the broad scope of management techniques which have invaded the human-services field during the last two decades. The volume begins with an introduction by the editor that surveys the issues to be addressed. There are six sections to the book, each with a short introduction.

The first five sections present five or six articles on each of the respective management systems. The first article of each section is an overview or synopsis by a leading proponent. The remaining articles are excerpts from previously published accounts about the application and utility of the system. The last section presents a series of critiques of the management systems, arguing that the whole attempt to use rational, analytic methods in the human services is misguided and destructive. As one might expect with thirty-seven short articles the quality of the selections and the cohesiveness of the sections are sporadic. There are some pearls of wisdom embedded throughout for the human-services manager now struggling to make effective use of one or more man-

agement systems. However, the majority of the selections are mundane, detailed descriptions of the application of a system and will be of interest only to those trying to use the system in similar organizations.

Management Systems in the Human Services is a title that is bound to provoke the interest of most, if not all, human-service managers as they face the cutback and retrenchment realities of human services in the eighties. Even the most resistant managers recognize the need to converse and debate intelligently about the application of management techniques and systems to their organizations. Many will consult the book hoping to learn how to make decisions about whether or not to use one or more techniques. These readers are likely to be disappointed, since the volume raises far more questions than it answers and does not try to relate the experiences and answers it provides to the questions and problems raised. Some managers will read the book for some specific ideas on improving the functioning of a management system they are already using. These readers will also be disappointed since the selections cover such a broad scope of management systems that it is unlikely to provide much help on any day-to-day problems a manager is facing. Finally, some managers will look to the book for background on the use of these systems in human-service organizations. These managers are likely to be the most satisfied, if they have the patience to sort out and then evaluate both the claims and criticisms of each system.

The real audience for the book is the academic community. Both the selected articles and the introductions are written in the formal, turgid style of academia. Within the limitations imposed by the high levels of erudition, abstraction, and jargon, the articles communicate information on a broad scope of issues faced by human-service agencies using one or more of the management systems. The most readable and interesting selections are the overview presentations on each management system that present the general principles and the historical context of each. Charles Schultze on the Program-Planning-Budgeting System and Victor Kugajevsky on Zero-Based-Budgeting are particularly interesting. The most powerful articles—and the most disconcerting to the reader who has been persuaded by one or more of the system advocates—are the summary critiques by Aaron Wildavsky, H. G. Shaffer, Charles Perrow, Michael Lipsky, and Stafford Beer. In concise but convincing arguments, these brief articles attack the assumptions about rationality and about organizations upon which the arguments for the use of management systems are based. To present these critiques as an epilogue, without rebuttal or restatement of how to proceed toward rationality with awareness of the inherent limitations, may be disheartening to both managers and academics who want help in moving forward with better tools than human services have had in the past. The effect of the closing critiques is to cool any zeal which may have been generated in the discussions of the management systems. A more helpful ordering would have been the placement of the criticisms immediately following the overview description in each part. In this way, the reader could more easily have read articles on specific uses of the systems with the arguments pro and con firmly in mind. Also, better evaluation of the utility of the systems and their value in a specific environment would have resulted.

The express purpose of the author is to "bring into focus the best from the fields of systems analysis and management coupled with representative applications designed to identify and illuminate important implementation issues and consequences. . . . Perhaps what is needed most of all is much greater illumination between the two extremes of polemical assault, on the one hand, and bandwagon enthusiasm, on the other" (p. 13). The volume succeeds in presenting a wide range of substantive material. However, any resulting il

lumination is largely dependent on the intellectual prowess and dedication of the reader. Without a synthesis or set of recommendations on what to rely upon and how to proceed, most readers will have only an increased uneasiness when contemplating what is really worth doing

Randall R McCathren
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Strategic Styles: Coping in the Inner City. By Janet K Mancini Hanover, N H.: University Press of New England, 1980 Pp xv + 330 $15.95

This is a well-documented, carefully researched book on the myriad problems encountered by poverty-stricken black youngsters growing up under adverse conditions within the inner city of a major urban center in the East--Boston

Mancini's document may be of considerable use in understanding the complexity of life forces that bear upon the ultimate life-style adopted by young black males Whether the choice is between doctor or gangster, lawyer or pimp, minister or drug addict, high school graduate or drop out, the result is a determinant of the youth's coping style This, though, may be too simplistic and predictable an observation The book is unusual, however, in that the author has valiantly attempted to elucidate in fine detail the evolutionary and interactionary process that occurs within the family, among peers, and between the youth and relevant social institutions of the broader society There are human beings in *Strategic Styles*

In each of Mancini's five representative coping styles, the family constellation appears as the pivotal component of the interaction matrix The school is given emphasis as another social force with potential for unveiling untapped talent. In the case of Ernie, Mancini's gifted "retreator," for example, had this young male been afforded special attention, perhaps his IQ of 128 and his self-esteem might have been developed Ernie's "style" was based, regrettably, on a tough-guy posture

Lacking in *Strategic Styles* is any substantive presentation and analysis of the major problem encountered by these young males and their families — racism The book, in one sense, then, rests upon what some African-American social scientists have defined as the "deficit model" It is in such a model that the majority of American sociological, psychological, and, more recently, economic analyses of black youngsters are rooted. The young male and his family become more the source of the problem than the victims of racism and oppression Therefore, through indirection, one perceives that there is a case for neglect in personal and family relations, because these are left for the reader's point of view, which, if emanating from a majority perspective, would be viewed as deviant. Mancini acknowledges the existence of racial oppression, but not its import, in the following statement 'We detect almost immediately the impact of being Black in a racially oppressive society, and of being poor in a society that is ranked as one of the world's most affluent" (p 2) Rather, family, school, peers, and role models are viewed as the most influential social forces. Racism, which has determined the level of development in each of the weighted variables, is not part of the matrix

Despite this shortcoming, Mancini has aptly described five coping styles that are utilized by poor black youngsters And, while she fails to come face-to face with the primary determinant among social forces for African-Americans, she does provide an excellent account of the evolution of certain personality characteristics prevalent among some groups of African-American youth Jux-

taposing these social realities with science and behavioral theory, Mancini provides some insight into present conditions and suggests a scenario of future actions for the five young males considered in the book.

Strategic Styles is a book well worth reading. The questionnaire provided in the appendix might be usefully engaged as a tool for social service organizations in comprehensive planning strategies for youth living in areas of high-density population and as a means of working toward a concept of the complete human being.

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Social Welfare in Society. Edited by George T. Martin, Jr., and Mayer N. Zald. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981. Pp. viii+600. $30.00 (cloth); $15.00 (paper).

The recent upsurge of literature on social welfare suggests that there has been no abatement of interest in the subject, even though the darkening clouds of Reaganomics foreshadow the dismal prospect of a dismemberment or dismantling of the welfare state in America. Is it too much to hope that these writings may have a salutary and beneficent effect on the prevailing political wisdom and rationality in the country?

The study of social welfare as a social institution has been carried out from a variety of perspectives: its design, historical origins and evolution, impact of social reform movements on the organization and distribution of services, value dilemmas, manifest and latent functions, and cross-national comparisons. Historians, sociologists, and social workers have been prominent in launching these studies. The diversity of theoretical and methodological approaches have yielded results that largely have been promising for knowledge development in social work. The book under review, *Social Welfare in Society*, is edited by two respected scholars in the field, George Martin and Mayer Zald, and their renewed effort to spotlight attention on the subject will surely be appreciated by users in the professional and academic community.

In keeping with the vogue of the times, a good number of books these days are anthologies, popularly known as readers, which recycle articles that have already appeared in print, albeit in a form that is convenient and more readily accessible than periodical articles. Illustrative of this is *Social Welfare in Society*, which is largely a compendium of articles on social welfare excerpted from previously published sources. Out of the twenty-nine articles included in the reader, only two are what may be called new articles written specifically for the book. These two articles are written by George Martin, one of the coeditors. The rest of them have gained circulation and are presumably to be found on the reading lists and reference shelves of faculty and students.

The editors have provided a valuable introduction integrating much of the recent secondary literature and at least attempting to place the individual essays within a common framework. In consequence, the book does hang together thematically, yet it is scarcely a more coherent whole than most such collections.

There is much to commend, and there are fresh insights to be derived from a new kind of synthesis and conceptualization that is attempted by the editors. The blend of articles by sociologists and social workers provides an interesting dialectic between the theoretical and practical concerns of social welfare. For example, Morris Janowitz's analysis of the dilemmas of the welfare state and

Alfred Kahn and Sheila Kammerman's relentless push for universal social services provide a distinctive contrast in conceptual terminology and in the use of analytical tools, leaving the reader with an unresolved puzzle about the extent of congruence or divergence of their viewpoints. In a similar vein, Richard Cloward and Frances Piven's reasoned and persuasive arguments in support of radical strategies in social work may be clearly differentiated from Alfred Katz's view of the role of self-help groups and volunteer participation in reforming service delivery. The creative tensions in style and substance could be "grist for the mill" in many classroom and workshop discussions.

The book also abounds in the use of cross-national and comparative analyses of social welfare, thus enhancing its heuristic value in discussions that pertain to the significance of social, economic, and political variables. The observed variations in the types of choices that a society makes are related to the complex web of industrialization, urbanization, and modernization processes. While the causal nexus remains elusive, cross-national examples feed the appetite for increasing our knowledge about how we might meaningfully sort out available facts about programs and services in various parts of the world. Phillip Cutright's empirical investigation of income distribution, Daniel Thursz and Joseph Vigilante's inductive approach to the study of international social welfare, and Nathan Glazer's theoretical and normative constraints on social policy are illustrative ventures in mapping out the domains of social policy and social services in other parts of the world. The situation in Third World countries receives cursory attention, in contrast to fuller explorations of British and European experience.

Another result, presumably deliberate, is the mix of historical and contemporary perspectives on social welfare, which can be viewed as both a strength and shortcoming of this book. A number of articles—notably George Martin's historical overview as well as his trend analysis, John Tropman's portrait of societal values, and Mayer Zald's commentary on problems of service coordination and integration—provide information and ideas on the institutional context of social welfare and its interactions with a congeries of economic and political institutions in society. The impact of demographic changes and the resulting fiscal implications are also deftly interwoven in a number of articles. Nevertheless, these ideas have to be culled from diverse sources and pieced together in some coherent form. As the intended audience of the book is both undergraduate and graduate students, there is some question about its immediate utility as a textbook for the neophyte in sociology or social welfare. This does not negate its value as a useful supplement for the beginning student, and, more important, the book can serve as a stimulating resource for both teachers and students interested in extending their frontiers of professional knowledge and practice.

The format of the book is spelled out and is easy to follow. It is mildly inconvenient and irksome to use references that appear only at the end of the book. The price of the volume is a little steep but not unduly so by today's standards of acceptable costs of education, and the paperback permits more widespread access. Last but not least, Columbia University Press deserves just credit for a neat and elegant work of book production.

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Brief Notices

Ethical Issues in Social Work. Edited by Shankar A. Yelaja Springfield, Ill Charles C Thomas, 1982. Pp. ix + 451. $44 75 (cloth); $33.50 (paper)

Sixteen articles examining ethical issues in social work This volume emphasizes the actual problems that social workers confront in practice but does not prescribe solutions.

Mental Patients and Social Networks. By Robert Perruci and Dena B Targ Boston: Auburn House Publishing Co , 1982 Pp x + 160. $19 95

A book about how people become mental patients and what happens to them after they do, as seen in light of the social networks in which they are involved

Inequality: Essays on the Political Economy of Social Welfare. Edited by Allan Moscovitch and Glenn Drover. Toronto University of Toronto Press, 1981 Pp ix + 384 $30.00 (cloth); $12 50 (paper)

The essays in this volume on welfare in Canada argue against the general assumption that social welfare reforms surmount the inequalities and injustices of society Rather, they reveal that inequalities are inherent in our society

Rural Social Work Practice. By O William Farley. Fields of Practice Series, edited by Francis J. Turner and Herbert S. Strean. New York: Free Press, 1982. Pp. xi + 257. $17.95.

A "how-to" approach for social work practitioners in nonurban settings. Attention is given to transforming policies into services compatible with the slow pace and informality of rural environments

The American Poor. Edited by John A. Schiller. Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1982. Pp. 220. $9.95.

Eight articles on the nature of poverty and the American poor from the perspective of the tension that exists between conventional social science disciplines and less traditional disciplines such as ethics and theology.

Community Housing Choices for Older Americans. Edited by M. Powell Lawton and Sally L. Hoover. New York: Springer Publishing Co., 1982. Pp. x+326. $28.50.

Papers prepared for "Community Housing Choices for Older Americans," a conference held in Philadelphia in 1978. An overview of research findings in housing is presented, as well as the range of alternative housing now available to America's elderly.

The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, vol. 35. Edited by Albert J. Solnit et al. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980. Pp. xxii+465. $35.00.

This annual contains papers on psychoanalytic topics of interest to clinicians and developmentalists. It is especially useful to those concerned with understanding and ameliorating early problems in object relations.

Fundamentals of Social Work Practice: A Book of Readings. By Daniel S. Sanders, Oscar Kurren, and Joel Fischer. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1982. Pp. x+278. $10.95.

The purpose of this book is to aid in understanding both the conceptual and pragmatic fundamentals of social work. The authors maintain that these fundamentals are used by the social worker within whatever context he or she is working.

Lives in Stress. Edited by Deborah Belle. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1982. Pp. 246. $22.50 (cloth); $9.50 (paper).

A documentation of what has been called "the feminization of poverty." This volume not only tells but shows what depresses women.

Social Welfare in Western Society. By Gerald Handel. New York: Random House, 1982. Pp. xvi+357. $20.00.

An introduction to social welfare for those unfamiliar with the subject and for readers who want a single-volume overview. It espouses the view that the great diversity of social welfare ideas and practices in existence today stems from five fundamental ideas about help.

Social Service Organizations and Agencies Directory. Edited by Anthony T. Kruzas. Detroit: Gale Research Co., 1982. Pp. xii+525. $60.00.

A work that identifies 6,700 national and state services in forty-seven areas of social concern. It also lists centers and clearinghouses that disseminate information.

Human Services for Cultural Minorities. Edited by Richard H. Dana. Baltimore University Park Press, 1981 Pp. xii + 366. $17 95.

A collection of thirty articles dealing with four minority groups and how human intervention must be adapted to their specific cultural values.

Primary Intervention in Mental Health and Social Work: A Sourcebook of Curriculum and Teaching Materials. Edited by Milton Nobel. New York Council on Social Work Education, 1982 Pp vii + 114 $8.00

An aid to teachers, scholars, and practitioners, emphasizing social work's unique role in primary prevention

Violence and the Politics of Research. Edited by Willard Gaylin, Ruth Macklin, and Tabitha M. Powledge Hastings Center Series in Ethics New York Plenum Publishing Corp., 1981. Pp. xiv + 256. $25 00.

This book attempts to come to terms with the many complex and controversial issues surrounding research on violence. It includes the history and sociology of violence in the United States and a reevaluation of three research projects on violence.

Helping Troubled Families: A Social Work Perspective. By George Thorman Hawthorne, N.Y Aldine Publishing Co., 1982 Pp. xii + 191. $21 95 (cloth), $11.95 (paper)

An introductory text giving the basic methods and techniques used by social workers in helping troubled families with a variety of problems

Computer Use in Human Services: A Guide to Information Management. By Dick Schoech. New York: Human Sciences Press, 1982 Pp 312 $26 95

This book begins with an analysis of the information revolution and offers specific guidelines for the use of computers in the human service professions

The Psychosocial Origins of Mental Retardation. By Harold E. Simmons Sacramento, Calif : Psychogenic Disease Publishing Co., 1980. Pp x + 214 $10 00

A review of the early history of the field of mental retardation, an assessment of the present state of scientific research into the nature of mental retardation, and an account of developments in public policy and practice in California

School Social Work: Practice and Research Perspectives. Edited by Robert T. Constable and John P. Flynn. Homewood, Ill : Dorsey Press, 1982 Pp xix + 394. $12 95.

A volume that brings together theory and practice with research and policy development in school social work. It emphasizes the relation between school social work and the educational institution.

The Teaching and Practice of Child Welfare. Edited by Greta W. Stanton. The Bernice Boehm Symposium, 1979. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Graduate School of Social Work, 1980. Pp. xii + 125. $3.50.

Proceedings from a two-day symposium dedicated to exploring an innovative curriculum in child welfare. Its goal was to steer away from the traditional definition of "child welfare" and to consider issues such as the well-being of children and their families.

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